The devil is in the detail : disclosing the impact of religion on the milk system in Ethiopia by D'Haene, Eline
The role of religion – and culture at large – in affecting food
systems is still underemphasized in economic literature. Religion
and food are unmistakably intertwined and the way food systems
operate, is – among other factors – influenced by the local
religious context.
This doctoral dissertation explores how the milk system in
Ethiopia has evolved within a diverse and long-standing religious
setting. We disentangle this general objective in three different
research questions, that each address another element of the milk
system, and we study how religion influences milk consumption,
milk production, and milk transactions. On the one hand, we
investigate how Orthodox fasting rituals – that require abstinence
from animal-sourced foods – impact dairy demand and supply.
Orthodox Christians are the largest religious community in
Ethiopia who observe multiple official fasting periods covering
roughly half of the year. On the other hand, we study if the
religious identity of buyers and sellers impacts milk transactions
and trading preferences. We provide evidence that collective
fasting rituals impact consumption and purchase decisions not
only of the practicing Orthodox households, but also of other
religious groups in the country and especially in dominantly
Orthodox localities. Furthermore, sharing religious ties seems to
be important for a sub-set of producers and consumers when
selecting exchange partners. To improve the potential of the
Ethiopian dairy sector, interventions are needed to smoothen the
effect of seasonal demand swings so that returns to investments
in the sector increase.
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The devil is in the detail –  
 
 
 “Details of a matter are its most tricky or problematic aspect”, Oxford dictionary of idioms 
 
 
– An idiom conveying the idea that details are important and likely to cause problems when not 
properly accounted for. But, while it may seem simple at first sight to account for these details, the 
details are complicated and it takes time and effort to include them. 
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Persoonlijke reflectie 
Dit is het dan. Mijn doctoraatsboekje. Voorzien van een mooie kaft, geïllustreerd door een goede 
vriendin. Wat een traject. In plaats van een traditioneel bedankingswoordje, heb ik ervoor gekozen 
om in deze sectie even stil te staan bij de voorbije vijf jaar. Mijn ups and downs, mijn leercurve, mijn 
avontuur. En wat voor één. 
 
Het begon allemaal in april 2015, op het einde van mijn masteropleiding. Een opstartend VLIR 
project in Ethiopië en twee professoren die potentieel in me zagen. We schreven een 
doctoraatsproject uit en dienden dit in voor funding. In augustus kwam het verlossende telefoontje. 
Eline, proficiat, je mag aan je PhD avontuur beginnen. Euforisch was ik, roepen, springen, gillen. 
Ongeloof, mag ik werkelijk beginnen? Ik?  
 
De eerste oktober 2015 was het zover. Mijn eerste stappen in het doctoraatsleven. Ik voelde me 
groot, slim, erkend. Niet veel later kreeg ik last van de eerste PhD symptomen: onzekerheid en 
twijfel. Hoe begin je aan een vierjarig PhD traject? Wat zijn de tussenstappen in dit vierjarig proces? 
Gelukkig kon ik voldoende afleiding vinden. Ik volgde een aantal vakken, workshops en trainingen, 
en bovenal, ik kreeg steun uit onverwachte hoek: twee senior PhDs die me elk bij een stuk van mijn 
doctoraat geholpen hebben: mijn eerste vragenlijst en dataverzameling alsook mijn eerste paper. 
Plots was alle twijfel weg en voelde ik me deel van een enthousiast team. 
 
Eens gelanceerd liep alles van een leien dakje. Wat leuk dit doctoraatsleven. Tijdens een 
zomerschool in Corsica had ik het geluk een nieuwe promotor te leren kennen die met veel 
enthousiasme inpikte op mijn doctoraat. Na een tijdje miste ik toch interactie en afwisseling. Toen 
de assistent binnen onze onderzoeksgroep wegging, zag ik dus mijn kans schoon. Ik stelde me 
kandidaat en alweer was godin Fortuna me goed gezind. Zo komt het dat ik een jaar later niet alleen 
PhD onderzoeker was maar ook academisch assistent. Dit deel is me enorm bevallen. De interactie 
met studenten, deel uitmaken van hun leertraject, en hen stelselmatig zien groeien en ontplooien. In 
de tussentijd schreef ik verder aan mijn doctoraat met een gepassioneerde bureau-genoot die mijn 
ideale sparringspartner bleek te zijn. Ik lanceerde een tweede veldwerkronde, diende mijn eerste 
paper in, en schreef mijn tweede paper. Geïntrigeerd door verschillende initiatieven rondom mij, 
sloot ik me aan bij een aantal werkgroepen. Leerrijk en enthousiasmerend. Ik vond de drive die ik 
nodig had om de nodige stappen te zetten in mijn doctoraat. 
 
Het ging allemaal vliegensvlug. Plots had ik twee gepubliceerde papers en een doctoraatsboekje. 
Wel plots is relatief. Achteraf lijkt alles eenmaal ‘simpel’. De afgelopen maanden heb ik alles op alles 
gezet. En dat was best pittig, maar zeker de moeite waard.  
 iv 
Ik heb de afgelopen vijf jaar enorm veel geleerd, en dan vooral over mezelf. Je ziet jezelf evolueren 
tijdens zo’n traject en ik ben trots op mijn metamorfose. Ik heb zoveel vrijheid gekregen van mijn 
beide promotoren om mijn eigen weg te zoeken. Nieuwe dingen uitproberen en het vertrouwen van 
hen krijgen dat je dit tot een goed eind zal brengen. Dat bleek voor mij de succes-combinatie.  
 
Wel, dit is het dan. Ik ben klaar voor nieuwe avonturen om verder te ontdekken en te leren. Ik heb 
er ongelooflijk veel goesting in, so let’s do this! 
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Food systems are rapidly transforming in developing countries due to changing diets and rapid 
urbanization. Diets get more diversified with a higher inclusion of non-staples – especially processed 
and animal-sourced foods – and households become increasingly dependent on purchased produce 
rather than home-produced food [1]. Still, the contribution of animal-sourced foods to total protein 
intake remains limited in low-income countries, their contribution is only 20% [2]. Annual growth rates 
of per capita milk, meat, and egg consumption in sub-Saharan Africa have been stagnant to slightly 
negative over the past decades [3] and per capita calorie availability of animal-sourced foods is 
projected to decrease in the region by nearly 5% in the coming decade [2]. 
These trends have very often been attributed to a supply chain that could not keep pace with an 
increasing demand for animal-sourced foods. In this dissertation, we argue that factors influencing 
demand for animal-sourced foods could still suppress the intake of animal protein, even when 
animal-sourced foods are available and affordable. We specifically focus on the influence of religion 
given the explicit association between religious beliefs and practices, and animal-sourced foods. 
Food instructions laid out by various religious groups often constrain or even completely prohibit 
consumption of (specific) animal-sourced foods. Because religion changes food choices and food 
intake, it is expected to alter the food system at large [4].  
The role of religion in affecting food choices and food supply is, however, underemphasized in 
economic literature [5], while it is believed that the impact of religion on food systems will remain 
important given the growing share of religious people worldwide, and especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa. There is a need for case-by-case studies that investigate how food systems have evolved 
within particular religious settings. 
In this dissertation, we explore how the milk system in Ethiopia has evolved within a diverse and 
long-standing religious context. We study the impact of religion on the cow milk system, as milk is 
the most important animal protein source in Ethiopian diets. Despite the large stock of cattle in the 
country, milk is not regularly consumed because it is a luxury product. When it is consumed, it is 
mainly intended for children or other vulnerable population groups (such as elderly and pregnant or 
lactating women) [6, 7]. Yearly milk intake in the country reaches only 20.6 kg per adult equivalent 
[8], which is only half of the sub-Saharan African average [9] and less than one-fifth of the required 
intake for healthy diets [10]. Problems of structural supply, poorly developed local markets, low 
purchasing power, and lack of consumer awareness regarding the nutritional benefits of animal-
sourced foods have been advanced to explain low consumption levels [11-14]. Less explored is how 
religion could possibly curtail the demand and supply of milk in the country. Ethiopia hosts a large 
group of Orthodox Christians, representing 44% of the total population [15]. Ethiopian Orthodox 
Christians abstain from animal-sourced foods during multiple fasting periods that cover roughly half 
of the year [8, 16, 17]. Fasting practices cause significant milk demand seasonality in the country, 
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which in turn influences milk production, processing, and marketing practices. It seems that the 
practice of fasting affects milk consumption in two ways. First, consumption is directly affected by 
fasting as Orthodox members are not allowed to consume milk and other animal-sourced foods 
during fasting periods. Second, fasting might impact the availability and pricing of milk due to lower 
investments in the sector and broader value chain effects. The widely occurring fasting practices in 
the county thus possibly contribute to the underdevelopment of the country’s dairy sector compared 
to other countries in the region (such as for example Uganda or Kenya) [13, 18]. Few authors, 
however, have looked at these issues.  
To explore how the milk system in Ethiopia has evolved within a diverse and long-standing religious 
context, we focus on three different research questions, that each address another element of the 
milk system, and we study how religion influences milk consumption, milk production, and milk 
transactions. We provide answers to these research questions in five chapters. 
In a first chapter (which corresponds to Chapter 3), we investigate how the presence of a religious 
fasting period influences household milk intake in the country. We find that Orthodox fasting impacts 
milk intake and sourcing strategies of consumed milk, and that these effects are not limited to the 
Orthodox community. Fasting not only reduces milk intake of Orthodox consumers, it also reduces 
the availability of milk, especially in dominantly Orthodox areas, thereby also impacting milk 
consumption of non-Orthodox households adversely. 
The second and third chapter (i.e. Chapter 4 and 5) explore how milk producers have adapted to the 
demand seasonality caused by Orthodox fasting practices in two different major milk production 
areas, so called milk sheds, hosting an Orthodox majority: the Great Addis milk shed and Mekelle 
city. We find that milk producing households are affected twice by fasting practices. First, these 
households, which are predominantly or exclusively Orthodox Christian (which is the situation in 
respectively Great Addis and Mekelle), lower their own intake of milk during fasting which creates 
excess milk at the household level. And second, as market opportunities dwindle during fasting, 
there are fewer outlets available for this excess milk. To cope with this excess milk, farmers adopt 
different strategies so as to bridge fasting periods: (1) some farmers – especially those with reduced 
or limited market access – reduce the total production of milk at the farm by aligning the number of 
cows in milk with fasting periods and/or by feeding lower quality diets to the cows, (2) others 
increasingly channel produced milk to their youngest children, (3) nearly all producers expand their 
milk processing activities, and (4) those households with good market access and market 
arrangements – usually those located close to or in major cities – are able to continue milk sales to 
some extent during fasting periods. We also find that the widespread traditional home-processing 
performed within the households seems to be mainly a consumption stabilizing rather than a sales 
stabilizing strategy as sales of processed milk products barely go up after the fasting periods. 
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Having shown that religious fasting rituals undeniably impact both milk consumption and production 
in the country, we wondered if religion – which is part of one’s social identity – would influence with 
whom people preferentially trade milk. We therefore investigated if sharing religious ties facilitate 
milk transactions for both consumers, who purchase milk from the market (Chapter 6), and 
producers, who sell milk on the market (Chapter 7). Evidence of ethnic market segmentation has 
been reported in Africa [19, 20], but insufficient attention has been paid to the occurrence of religious 
market segmentation. We find that an important subset of the consumers we interviewed consider 
the religious affiliation of potential milk sellers when deciding from whom they would like to buy milk. 
These consumers show preferences for co-religious sellers and are willing to pay more and walk 
further to buy milk from these co-religious sellers. Producers on average do not deliberately 
discriminate among potential milk buyers based on their religious background, yet we observe 
significant preference heterogeneity. This implies that while some producers have less or no 
preference for the religious background of potential buyers, others display have strong preferences. 
Further research is needed to investigate the presence of religious preferences both from a buyer- 
and seller-side but are findings evidence that religious segmentation might be at stake in the 
Ethiopian milk market. 
This dissertation concludes that Orthodox fasting practices undeniably impact milk consumption and 
production in the country, thereby creating considerable market inefficiencies, since markets largely 
dissolve during long Orthodox fasting events especially in dominantly Orthodox settings. 
Furthermore, we find evidence of coordination problems along religious lines. To improve the 
potential of the Ethiopian dairy sector, interventions are needed to smoothen the effect of seasonal 
demand swings and possibly increase returns to investments in the sector. To achieve this, further 
efforts are needed towards supporting farmers, enhancing processing practices, ensuring greater 
availability of chilling centres for storage, as well as improving market access and transportation 
facilities to assure market integration and to allow marketing to areas where fasting is less prevalent. 
Furthermore, investing in school milk programmes could be an effective way to increase milk 
consumption of children, while such programmes simultaneously allow to establish a guaranteed 
milk market outlet during fasting since children are exempt from fasting participation. Finally, nutrition 
awareness creation is needed to raise the intake of milk in the country but also to alter social norms 
that force vulnerable population groups to engage in fasting practices since this has been shown to 
have negative repercussions for nutritional and health outcomes.
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Voedselsystemen veranderen in een ijltempo in ontwikkelingslanden door veranderende 
voedingspatronen, maar ook door een snel urbanisatieproces. Voedingspatronen worden steeds 
gediversifieerder en bevatten meer en meer verwerkte en dierlijke producten. Huishoudens 
produceren bovendien steeds minder van hun voedsel zelf, maar kopen in toenemende mate 
producten aan op de markt [1]. Ondanks deze trends, blijft het aandeel van dierlijke producten in de 
totale eiwitopname beperkt in lage-inkomenslanden – het aandeel bedraagt slechts 20% [2]. De 
jaarlijkse groei in per capita consumptie van melk, vlees, en eieren in sub-Sahara Afrika stagneert 
en is zelfs lichtjes negatief de laatste jaren [3]. Ook voorspelt men dat de per capita 
caloriebeschikbaarheid van dierlijke producten zal afnemen in de regio met ongeveer 5% in de 
komende tien jaar [2]. 
Deze trends worden vaak toegeschreven aan aanvoerketens die niet in staat zijn te voorzien in de 
toenemende vraag naar dierlijke producten. In dit doctoraatsonderzoek, argumententeren we dat 
zelfs wanneer dierlijke producten beschikbaar en toegankelijk zijn, hun inname kan beperkt worden 
door factoren die de vraag naar dierlijke producten beïnvloeden. We focussen in het bijzonder op de 
invloed van religie aangezien er expliciete associaties zijn tussen enerzijds religieuze overtuigingen 
en rituelen, en anderzijds dierlijke producten. Verschillende religieuze groepen leggen 
voedingsinstructies op aan hun geloofsgenoten en deze beperken of verbieden de consumptie van 
(specifieke) dierlijke producten. Omdat religie een grote invloed heeft op voedingskeuzes en 
voedselinname, wordt er verwacht dat religie ook het voedselsysteem wijzigt [4]. 
De rol die religie speelt in het vormen van voedselkeuzen en de voedselaanvoer is echter 
onderbelicht in de economische literatuur [5]. Nochtans zal de impact van religie op 
voedselsystemen groot blijven aangezien het aandeel gelovigen wereldwijd blijft stijgen, vooral in 
sub-Sahara Afrika. Er is nood aan case-by-case studies om te bestuderen hoe voedselsystemen 
zich ontwikkeld hebben binnen specifieke religieuze middens. 
In dit doctoraat onderzoeken we hoe het melksysteem in Ethiopië zich heeft ontwikkeld binnen een 
diverse en sinds oudsher bestaande religieuze context. We bestuderen de impact van religie op het 
koeienmelksysteem, gezien melk het belangrijkste en meest geconsumeerde dierlijke product is in 
Ethiopië. Ondanks de grote veestapel in het land, wordt melk niet regelmatig geconsumeerd omdat 
het een luxeproduct is. Als het geconsumeerd word, wordt het vooral gegeven aan kinderen en 
andere kwetsbare groepen (zoals ouderen, zwangere vrouwen, of vrouwen die borstvoeding geven) 
[6, 7]. Melkconsumptie in Ethiopië bedraagt slecht 20.6 kg per volwassenequivalent per jaar, daar 
waar het gemiddelde in sub-Sahara Afrika dubbel zo groot is [8]. Richtlijnen voor gezonde voeding 
bevelen innames aan die minstens 4.4 keer zo groot zijn dan de huidige inname [10]. Structurele 
problemen met aanvoer, slecht ontwikkelde lokale markten, lage aankoopkracht, en beperkte kennis 
en bewustzijn omtrent de nutritionele voordelen van dierlijke producten worden vaak naar voren 
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geschoven om de lage innames te verklaren [11-14]. Wat minder bestudeerd is, is hoe religie de 
vraag en het aanbod van melk beperkt in Ethiopië. De Ethiopische bevolking bestaat uit een grote 
groep van Orthodoxe Christenen en er wordt geschat dat deze groep 44% van de bevolking 
vertegenwoordigt. Ethiopische Orthodoxe Christenen consumeren geen dierlijke producten 
gedurende verschillende vastenperiodes doorheen het jaar. Deze vastenperiodes beslaan ongeveer 
de helft van een jaar [8, 16, 17]. De vastenpraktijken veroorzaken significante vraagschommeling, 
wat natuurlijk de melkproductie, melkverwerking alsook het vermarkten van melk beïnvloedt. Het lijkt 
erop dat vastenpraktijken de consumptie van melk op twee manieren beïnvloeden. Enerzijds wordt 
consumptie rechtstreeks beïnvloed door vastenpraktijken aangezien Orthodoxe Christenen geen 
melk of andere dierlijke producten mogen consumeren tijdens vastenperiodes. Anderzijds hebben 
de vastenpraktijken een invloed op de beschikbaarheid en prijs van melk doordat er minder 
investeringen gebeuren in de melksector. De wijdverspreide vastenpraktijken in Ethiopië lijken dus 
bij te dragen tot een onderontwikkeling van de melksector in het land in vergelijking met andere 
landen in de regio (zoals Oeganda of Kenya) [13, 18]. Weinig onderzoekers hebben zich echter 
toegelegd op het bestuderen van deze materie. 
Om te onderzoeken hoe het melksysteem in Ethiopië zich heeft ontwikkeld binnen deze religieuze 
context, focussen we op drie verschillende onderzoeksvragen. Elk van deze vragen bestudeert een 
andere element van het melksysteem. Zo onderzoeken we niet alleen hoe religie een invloed heeft 
op melkconsumptie of op melkproductie, maar ook op melktransacties. We geven antwoorden op 
deze vragen in vijf verschillende hoofdstukken. 
In een eerste hoofdstuk (Hoofdstuk 3) bestuderen we de impact van een lange vastenperiode op de 
melkinname in Ethiopië. We zien dat niet alleen de groep van Orthodoxe Christenen een impact 
ondervinden van Orthodoxe vastenrituelen. Tijdens Orthodox vastenperiodes consumeren niet 
alleen Orthodoxe Christenen minder melk, we observeren dat ook andere religieuze groepen minder 
melk consumeren, doordat er minder melk beschikbaar is, vooral in Orthodox-dominante plaatsen. 
In een tweede en derde hoofdstuk (Hoofdstuk 4 en 5) onderzoeken we hoe melk-producerende 
huishoudens zich aanpassen aan de vraagschommelingen die veroorzaakt worden de vele 
vastenperiodes. We focussen daarbij op twee verschillende melkproductiegebieden met een 
Orthodoxe meerderheid: het gebied rond de hoofdstad Addis Ababa en de stad Mekelle. We 
ontdekken dat melk-producerende huishoudens twee keer beïnvloed worden door vastenpraktijken. 
Enerzijds, aangezien deze huishoudens grotendeels of bijna uitsluitend Orthodox Christen zijn, 
beperken ze hun eigen inname van melk tijdens vastenperiodes, wat natuurlijk melkoverschotten 
creëert. Anderzijds zijn er minder mogelijkheden om de melk te vermarkten tijdens vastenperiodes 
doordat de vraag naar melk afneemt. Producerende huishoudens gaan op verschillende manier om 
met deze melkoverschotten: (1) sommige verminderen de totale productie van melk op hun boerderij 
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door hun koeien droog te zetten op het moment van vastenperiodes en/of ze minder kwaliteitsvolle 
voeders te geven; (2) andere geven meer melk aan hun jongste kinderen; (3) bijna alle huishoudens 
verwerken meer melk tot langer houdbare producten zoals kaas en boter; en (4) huishouden met 
een goede toegang tot de markt – meestal degenen die dichtbij of in grote steden opereren – kunnen 
melk blijven verkopen tijdens vastenperiodes zonder dat ze hun verkochte volumes te veel moeten 
wijzigen. We merken ook dat de wijdverspreide traditionele verwerking van melk door deze 
producerende huishoudens vooral bedoeld is om hun consumptie te stabiliseren en niet zozeer hun 
verkoop aangezien de verkoop van verwerkte melkproducten amper stijgt buiten vastenperiodes. 
Nadat we aangetoond hebben hoe religieuze vastenrituelen de consumptie en productie van melk 
beïnvloeden, vragen we ons af of religie – dat een deel is van iemands (sociale) identiteit – een 
beïnvloed heeft op de keuze met wie mensen bij voorkeur melk verhandelen. We bestuderen daarom 
hoe het delen van dezelfde religie melktransacties vergemakkelijkt zowel voor consumenten die 
melk aankopen (Hoofdstuk 6) als voor producten die melk verkopen (Hoofdstuk 7). Er is reeds 
aangetoond dat etnische marktsegmentatie voorkomt in Afrika [19, 20], maar religieuze 
marktsegmentatie werd totnogtoe onvoldoende bestudeerd. We tonen aan dat een grote groep van 
consumenten die we interviewden, rekening houdt met de religieuze overtuiging van melkverkopers 
wanneer ze beslissen van wie ze melk kopen. Deze consumenten verkiezen verkoperen met 
dezelfde geloofsovertuiging en zijn bereid om meer te betalen of verder te wandelen wanneer de 
melk verkocht wordt door een verkoper met dezelfde geloofsovertuiging. Producenten discrimineren 
gemiddeld genomen niet wanneer ze moeten kiezen tussen verschillende potentiele kopers, maar 
we observeren een significante heterogeniteit van deze groep in hun voorkeur voor de 
geloofsovertuiging van kopers. Dit betekent dat sommige producenten geen of geen sterke voorkeur 
hebben voor de geloofsovertuiging van poteniele kopers, daar waar andere producers net wel een 
sterke voorkeur vertonen. Verder onderzoek is nodig om de aanwezigheid van religieuze voorkeuren 
te bestuderen zowel langs de kant van de kopers als langs de kant van de verkopers, maar onze 
resultaten lijken erop te wijzen dat religieuze segmentatie aanwezig kan zijn in de Ethiopische 
melkmarkt. 
Dit doctoraat besluit dat Orthodoxe vastenpraktijken een onmiskenbare invloed hebben op de 
consumptie en productie van melk in Ethiopië, waardoor aanzienlijke marktinefficiënties ontstaan, 
aangezien de markten grotendeels verdwijnen en dan vooral in dominant-Orthodoxe settingen. 
Bovendien vinden we bewijs dat coördinatieproblemen bestaan tussen religieuze groepen. Om het 
potentieel van de Ethiopische melksector te verbeteren, zijn interventies nodig die het effect van 
seizoensgebonden vraagschommelingen verzachten en mogelijks het rendement op investeringen 
in de sector verhogen. Om dit te bereiken, zijn verdere inspanningen nodig om boeren te 
ondersteunen, verwerkingspraktijken te verbeteren, de beschikbaarheid van koelcentra voor opslag 
te vergroten, de markttoegang te verbeteren en ook transportfaciliteiten te verbeteren om markten 
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te integreren zodanig dat melk en melkproducten kunnen vermarkt worden naar gebieden waar 
vastenpraktijken een kleinere invloed hebben. Bovendien zou investeren in melkprogramma’s op 
scholen een effectieve manier kunnen zijn om de melkconsumptie van kinderen te verhogen, 
aangezien dergelijke programma’s het tegelijkertijd mogelijk maken een permanente afzetmarkt voor 
melk te creëren, aangezien kinderen niet moeten deelnemen aan vastenpraktijken. Tenslotte is het 
nodig om nutritionele kennis te vergroten door middel van sensibiliseringscampagnes. Dit om de 
consumptie van melk in Ethiopië te doen toenemen, maar ook om de sociale normen te kunnen 
beïnvloeden die kwetsbare bevolkingsgroepen dwingen om deel te nemen aan de vastenperiodes, 
aangezien het is aangetoond dat dit negatieve gevolgen heeft voor de gezondheid van dergelijke 
groepen. 
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1. General introduction and research scope 
Food demand is increasing worldwide due to a growing population. Simultaneously, increasing per 
capita income levels boost per capita food consumption, a trend that is especially visible in 
developing nations. Food baskets in these nations are rapidly diversifying and increasingly include 
animal-sourced foods (ASFs) such as milk, meat, and eggs. Yet, the contribution of ASFs to total 
protein intake remains limited, only 20%, in low-income countries [2]. Increased consumption of 
ASFs, however, has the potential to significantly improve nutritional outcomes in many developing 
countries, particularly among young children, pregnant and breastfeeding women, because of the 
high-quality nutrient content in ASFs [21, 22]. The low inclusion of ASFs in children’s diets is believed 
to be a main driver  – among other factors  –  of the high prevalence of malnutrition in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) [23]. Studies have shown that consumption of ASFs by undernourished children 
improves anthropometric indices and cognitive function and reduces the prevalence of biochemical 
and functional nutritional deficiencies, therefore reducing morbidity and mortality [24]. Especially milk 
has shown to be beneficial for physical growth and for brain and bone development [25-27]. 
Therefore, food-based dietary guidelines for healthy diets prescribe an average daily consumption 
of 250 mL of liquid milk for adults and 500 mL and 600 mL for children and adolescents respectively 
[10]. 
Annual growth rates of per capita milk, meat, and egg consumption in SSA have been stagnant to 
slightly negative over the past decades [3], and per capita calorie availability of ASFs is projected to 
decrease with nearly 5% in the coming decade [2]. This trend has very often been attributed to a 
supply chain that could not keep pace with an increasing demand for ASFs. This has influenced local 
policy programmes that are increasingly advocating a transformation of the livestock sector. Primary 
focus of these livestock interventions is often productivity-based, which is seen as a major bottleneck 
of the SSA livestock system. Less understood is how religion influences the livestock sector 
development, making it difficult to design effective policies to mitigate the potential effects of religion 
on ASF consumption and production. 
In this dissertation, we investigate how religion shapes ASF demand and supply patterns. We 
specifically target religion – being part of a larger socio-cultural context – because of the explicit 
association between religious beliefs and practices on the one hand, and ASFs on the other hand. 
For ages, people have practiced their religion through food and various religious groups lay out food 
instructions to their adherents. These instructions often apply to ASFs and can be temporal (e.g. 
fasting rituals that require abstinence from ASFs and/or other foods) or permanent (prohibition to 
consume pork in Jewish and Islamic faith). Studies have shown that despite food being available 
and accessible, individuals might still not consume specific food items because of their religious 
traditions [28].  
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Religion – and culture at large – thus influences consumption habits and might explain why 
consumption of ASFs per capita does not increase significantly with increased availability and/or 
income growth. As religion affects food choices and food consumption behaviour, religion is 
expected to alter the food system at large [4]. Still, the role of religion in affecting food choices, 
demand, and supply is underemphasized in economic literature [5], while it is thought that the impact 
of religion on food systems will remain important given the growing share of religious people 
worldwide, and especially in SSA. Overall levels of religious commitment in SSA are among the 
highest in the world both among the younger and older generations. Nearly 90% of the population in 
the region indicates that religion is very important in their daily lives and 80% goes to worship 
services weekly [29].  
But, religion manifests itself as a true devil in the detail. Not only is its impact not well understood, 
its impact is often not directly noticeable (it is ‘hidden’). In the case of food, the impact of religious 
dietary rules on food demand and supply is obvious. Less obvious is the role of religion in shaping 
attitudes and preferences, through norms and values [30]. Moreover, religion is also part of one’s 
social identity – next to other factors such as nationality, ethnicity, and gender – and thus impacts 
intergroup behaviour. Not properly accounting for the impact of religion is problematic both from a 
policy and scholarly perspective, leading to less or even ineffective interventions and blind spots in 
academic literature. But, singling out the impact of religion is a laborious task that takes time and 
effort. To simplify this, economic studies have often operationalized religion in terms of religious 
affiliation, i.e. what you believe, thereby dividing individuals over different religious groups (Catholic, 
Protestant, Orthodox Christian, Jew, Muslim, etc.) or by focusing on specific religious rules such as 
fasting practices. As religion cannot be seen as an isolated phenomenon but rather as a part of a 
larger socio-cultural context, research focusing on religion should be case-based and research 
findings from particular localities cannot be readily extrapolated to others. 
This dissertation aims at exploring how the milk system in Ethiopia has evolved and adapted to the 
diverse and long-standing religious context in the country. Yearly milk intake in the country reaches 
only 20.6 kg per adult equivalent [8], which is only half of the sub-Saharan African average [9]. The 
food-based dietary guidelines for healthy diets prescribe an average daily consumption of 250 mL of 
liquid milk for adults and 500 mL and 600 mL for children and adolescents respectively which equals 
a yearly consumption of minimum 90 L per capita [10]. Ethiopia’s per capita milk intake thus falls 
short of the prescribed intake by more than four-fifth. Moreover, in contrast to the rapid growth in 
crop output and productivity recorded in Ethiopia, ASF output has grown slowly and productivity has 
stagnated. This has seemingly been due to low availability and adoption of improved inputs in the 
sector leading to high and increasing prices for ASF products [31]. High prices and low incomes 
make ASFs luxury goods and thus curtail demand for ASFs in the country.  
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Yet, insufficient attention has been paid to widely occurring fasting practices by the large Orthodox 
community in the county that possibly contribute to the underdevelopment of the country’s dairy 
sector compared to other countries in the region (e.g. Uganda and Kenya) [13, 18]. Fasting rituals 
embedded within the Orthodox community, the dominant religious group in the country, create 
significant demand swings for ASFs due to the seasonal fasting rituals. This demand seasonality 
seems to offset investments in the livestock sector to a large extent, as actors along the value chain 
can insufficiently cope with the cyclical pattern of ASF demand.  
We operationalize religion’s impact on the milk system in this dissertation in two ways: (1) we detail 
the impact of a religious practice, i.e. fasting, on milk consumption, production, and output use, and 
(2) we investigate if the religious affiliation of potential trading partners affects trading preferences of 
both milk producers and milk consumers. 
We select Ethiopia as a case study because of its religious diversity and its large group of Orthodox 
Christians. The country is home to 36 million Orthodox Christians, hosting the largest group of 
Orthodox Christians outside Europe [32]. Orthodox Christians are the dominantly religious group in 
Ethiopia, but surprisingly, this religious group has been neglected within scholarly studies, while 
research has looked at religious minorities such as Mormons (16.3 million adherents worldwide [33]), 
Jews (14.6 million [34]), and the Amish (330,000 members [35]). Ethiopian Orthodox Christians 
abstain from ASFs during multiple fasting periods spread over a year. Both one-day fasts and longer 
fasting periods occur, with long fasting spells in February-March (55 days), July (10-40 days), August 
(16 days), and December-January (40 days). Long fasting periods usually proceed holy events (such 
as e.g. Christmas and Easter). Orthodox Christians fast for about half of the year (166-250 fasting 
days yearly on average) [8, 16, 17]. Fasting practices cause significant milk demand seasonality in 
the country, where periods of reduced milk demand (fasting) are followed by periods of high demand 
caused by religious festivities at the end of fasting periods. This milk demand seasonality highly 
influences milk production, processing, and marketing practices. We specifically tackle cow milk as 
it is the most important animal protein source in Ethiopian diets. While Ethiopia has a long tradition 
of cattle herding and is believed to have the largest stock of cattle head in SSA [36] with more than 
12 million households owning cattle [37], milk is not regularly consumed in the country because it is 
a luxury product. When milk is consumed by households, it is mainly intended for children or other 
vulnerable population groups (such as elderly and pregnant or lactating women) [6, 7].  
The dairy sector is interesting from a development perspective for various reasons, i.e. because of 
(1) its potential to improve food security and nutrition, (2) its ability to combat poverty, (3) its gender 
inclusiveness and (4) the various employment opportunities it generates throughout the value chain. 
ASFs are valuable and dense sources of several micro and macronutrients which are hard to retrieve 
in adequate amount from plant source foods only [38]. Of all ASFs, milk is the largest source of 
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animal-based protein in developing countries, and it accounts for 60% of the total per capita 
consumption of primary ASFs (i.e. meat, milk, and eggs) [3]. Compared to other plant and animal 
protein sources, milk has one of the lowest production costs [39]. Stimulating the development of a 
supply chain that provides milk at low costs is thus a desirable strategy to improve nutritional and 
health outcomes, especially in SSA where half of the world’s malnourished population is residing, 
and where diets predominantly consist of cereal or root staple crops [40]. Dairy development is not 
only a powerful tool for improving food security and nutrition, it is also a valuable strategy to reduce 
poverty. More than half of the extremely poor worldwide – who live with less than one USD per day 
– depend predominantly on livestock, and notably small-scale dairying, so as to produce food, to 
generate cash income, but also to manage risks and to build up assets [41]. Moreover, many of 
these smallholders are women – in East Africa, women account for more than 70% of the smallholder 
dairy farmers [42]. Finally, small-scale milk production also creates numerous employment 
opportunities throughout the dairy chain for small-scale processors, intermediaries (transporters, 
traders, collectors), and retailers [43]. 
Before presenting our main research objective and research questions in more detail, we first 
conceptualize religion within economic literature. We specifically highlight the intertwined relation 
between religion and food and how economic research has looked at the role of religion in consumer 
behaviour and in the food supply chain.  
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2. Theoretical literature review 
2.1. Conceptualizing religion within economic literature 
“The word ‘religion’ comes from the Latin root religio which signifies a bond between humanity and some 
greater-than-human power. Scholars identify at least three historical designations of the term: a supernatural 
power to which individuals are motivated or committed; a feeling present in the individual who conceives 
such a power; and the ritual acts carried out in respect of that power [44].” 
From Hill et al. [45] 
Religion has been defined as a “shared set of beliefs, activities and institutions premised upon faith 
in supernatural forces” [46]. Religion is a complex phenomenon and multidimensional in nature. It 
has been extensively studied in a variety of disciplines, notably philosophy, theology, history, 
anthropology, and sociology. Religion only recently regained interest from economists [47]1. For a 
long time, mainstream economics depicted humans as rational agents with stable preferences that 
maximize utility in any given situation and pursue their own self-interest. But, starting from the early 
1990s, this homo economicus model came to be questioned [49]. Economists increasingly 
acknowledge that individual preferences, decisions and actions, but also institutional structures are 
influenced by a larger socio-cultural context, of which religion is a part, and therefore should not be 
omitted from economic analyses [30]. 
Yet, economic literature on religion is still thin because research on the topic is challenging due to 
the limited availability of reliable data, the difficulty to operationalise religion, and the challenge to 
establish causal relationships. Because religion is part of a larger socio-cultural context and thus not 
an isolated phenomenon, one cannot readily isolate the impact of religion nor pinpoint the exact 
channels through which religion operates2. Most research thus has established correlational patterns 
between religion and outcome variables, among others, marriage patterns [50], educational 
attainment [51, 52], migration intention [53], sanitation practices [54], fertility rates [55], female labour 
force participation [56], aid allocation [57], service supply [58], resource management [59], corruption 
[60], happiness [61], economic growth [48, 62], and agricultural productivity [63, 64]. 
Taking stock of the current state of knowledge is difficult because economic literature on religion is 
highly fragmented. Religion has been studied within various economic branches (among others 
identity economics, labour economics, public economics, behavioural economics, health economics, 
institutional economics, development economics, consumer behaviour, marketing research and 
                                               
1 As early as 1776, Adam Smith explains why religion might have economic advantages and thus influence 
economic transactions. In his book ‘Wealth of nations’, Smith claims that an individual’s reputation and 
trustworthiness might be deduced from his or her membership in a religious group, which thus reduces 
uncertainty and risks in transactions. Furthermore, he argues that religious groups provide extra-legal means 
to establish trust and to sanction free-riders [48].  
2  We acknowledge that economic studies also have treated religion as a dependent variable examining, among 
other things, the individual incentives for religious beliefs. 
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economics of religion). Compiling an overarching literature review of these religious studies is 
outside the scope of this dissertation. In what follows, we elaborate on the link between religion and 
food.   
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2.2. Religion and food  
What we eat, how and why we produce, process, store, distribute, obtain, prepare, share, present, 
and eat food, mirrors long-lasting religious traditions [65-67]. Religion affects food consumption, 
production, and marketing practices in various and complex ways. We will highlight a few potential 
pathways through which religion can operate. First, religion informs norms and values that are highly 
persistent over time and which in turn shape attitudes and preferences [30]. A prominent example in 
this regard is the influence of religion in shaping gender roles, family structures, and decision power 
dynamics which influence a household’s food production, purchase and especially food allocation 
among household members [67]. Second, religion can also be seen as a determinant of one’s social 
identity. Identity-based inclusion or exclusion still occurs widely and affects participation in and 
access to opportunities, resources, and activities [68]. What might be relevant here is not only the 
exclusion from agricultural inputs that affects production, and the exclusion from jobs that might 
impact economic access to food, but also the exclusion from food assistance programmes. Third, 
certain religious groups have specified procedures on livestock slaughtering and food preparation 
(Judaism and Islam). Finally, many religious groups lay out formulated rules on dietary intake with 
prescriptions on what food can be consumed and proscriptions on what cannot be consumed, and 
when one should abstain from consumption of all or particular foods. 
Scholarly studies have predominantly focused on religious dietary rules. Dietary rules not only affect 
food choices, but also affect what food is produced and marketed. Some of these rules are absolute 
while others only tackle certain population groups [69]. Religious prescriptions and proscriptions can 
be permanent or temporal. Permanent food prescriptions can be found within the Jewish and Islamic 
traditions, who impose their members to limit consumption to kosher and halal foods. A permanent 
food proscription is the avoidance of pork in Islam and Judaism, beef in Hinduisms and meat at large 
in Buddhism. Fasting rituals are an example of temporal food restrictions, such as Ramadan 
observed by Muslims, which requires total abstinence of any food and drink from dawn till sunset or 
fasting among Orthodox Christians, during which believers abstain from consuming ASFs.  
The type, importance, and impact of these dietary rules are highly context-dependent [67]. First, 
while some religious groups share similar food proscriptions and prescriptions, dietary rules still vary 
significantly. The type of religious dietary rules practiced will thus depend on which religious groups 
are present in specific localities. Second, religious groups are non-randomly distributed which results 
in a variety of religious settings where religious groups, with their own set of dietary rules, are not 
equally represented. The importance and impact of religious dietary rules will thus depend on the 
density of religious practitioners being present. Third, compliance to dietary rules varies which also 
affects the importance and impact of religious dietary rules. Strong social norms can lead to strict 
enforcement and make food barely accessible, despite it being available and affordable [69]. 
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Moreover, dietary laws can also become highly internalized. Individuals may not consume certain 
foods (e.g. pork) and highlight that feelings of disgust mainly drive this aversion, rather than explicit 
religious rules [70]. If enforcement is flexible, the impact on food choice will depend on the costs and 
benefits an individual derives from observing religious rules [67]. 
Different explanations have been put forward as to why religious groups regulate food intake. 
Iannaccone [71] postulates that prohibitions are a solution to free-rider problems. By prescribing 
distinct rules, less committed members (i.e. potential free-riders) are discouraged to remain part of 
the religious group. Moreover, he posits that the more prohibitive the imposed rules are, the greater 
the participation of the respective group members and the greater the provision of public goods to 
the group as a whole, which ultimately impacts group cohesion. Coşgel and Minkler [72] argue that 
prescriptions and proscriptions assist in the communication of a religious identity and help to 
differentiate from out-group members and to foster in-group cohesions. Moreover, it serves as a 
device to show the degree of commitment to a certain religious belief and helps to mark social status. 
Other commonly cited reasons for religious food prescriptions are related to food safety3, animal 
welfare (mostly domesticated animals), health, and ecological concerns [69, 73-75]. 
Economic research has largely neglected the link between religion and food. In what follows, we will 
highlight the available literature that has linked religion and consumer behaviour as well as religion 
and the food supply chain. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to compile such an overview 
on the topic, and we could only find one study that detailed a part of it, i.e. the paper by Briones 
Alonso et al. [67] that reviews the impact of culture on food availability, access, utilization, and 
stability.  
                                               
3 A well-known example is the religious restriction on the consumption of pork, as pigs are known to bear a lot 
of sickness-causing parasites [69]. 
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2.2.1. Religion and consumer behaviour 
Consumer choices are complex and steered by a multitude of factors: product or service 
characteristics, individual determinants but also external factors such as sociological, ecological, 
environmental and cultural factors [76]. The influence of religion has, until recently, often been 
overlooked in consumer and marketing research. More evidence is now published, but studies on 
the effect of religion on consumption patterns remain scarce and scattered [77].  
Table 1-1 and Table 1-2 provide a snapshot of the literature that has been published on the link 
between religion and consumer behaviour. By no means these overviews are a complete record of 
all papers published on the topic. The papers show that all major religions influence consumer 
behaviour. Research has predominantly assessed the impact of religion on an individual level 
focusing on either single (Table 1-1) or multiple religious groups (Table 1-2) within different religious 
settings (dominant, minority or diasporic). Studies focusing on a single religious group have 
operationalized religion as a religious practice, while studies focusing on multiple religious groups, 
instrumentalize religion as a combination of religious affiliation (i.e. what you believe) and religiosity 
(i.e. how strong you believe), with some papers focusing solely on the impact of religious affiliation 
or religiosity, while others include both.  
Research studying a single religion has largely looked at the Islam, evaluating purchase and 
consumption intentions of halal products (particularly meat) as well as food intake during Ramadan. 
Studies on other religious groups predominantly investigate the link between religious food beliefs, 
laws, and diets. Majority of the papers have been carried out in Western developed countries (e.g. 
Canada, United States, Greece, Belgium) and some in South Asia and the Middle East. The existing 
literature on Orthodox Christianity focuses predominantly on Greek Orthodoxy and looks at how 
Orthodox fasting rituals affect food intake [78-80].  
Studies across multiple religious groups have directed shopping behaviour and other key aspects of 
consumer behaviour more, such as product preferences, consumer innovativeness, information 
seeking, and ethical concerns. This research strand compares consumer attitudes, preferences and 
behaviour across different religious groups and/or different intensities of beliefs. Such research is 
interesting for marketing purposes as it allows to characterize different consumer segments [81]. 
Evaluation of substance use (e.g. tobacco and alcohol) across religious groups and levels of 
religiosity is also common. Many of the listed studies have been carried out in the United States.  
A second, different, stream of literature – which we do not attempt to elaborate extensively in this 
dissertation – discusses how religion, through its impact on dietary intake, influences health and 
performance outcomes. Papers in this area connect religious dietary rules and practices to body 
weight, metabolism, diseases, mental health, and cognitive and physical performances, to name but 
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a few (Table 1-3). In this literature stream, primarily fasting practices are studied, with a lot of 
publications on the effect of Ramadan fasting.  
  
Table 1-1: Scholarly studies that have published on the link between religion and consumer behaviour within a single religious group 
Religious 
affiliation 
Research topic Research 
country 
Data Respondents Author(s) 
Islam Determinants of halal meat 
consumption within a Muslim 
migration population  
France Scale type questions 576 Muslims currently living in 
France, aged above 18 and involved 
with meat purchasing decisions 
within the household 
Bonne et al. [82] 
Islam Preferences for shopping halal 
meat in supermarkets versus local 
shops 
United Kingdom Multiple choice questions 
and scale type questions  
300 Muslims Ahmed [83] 
Islam Level of dietary practices 
(Ramadan and halal) 
Belgium Scale type questions 981 second-generation Turkish and 
Moroccan respondents aged 
between 18 and 35 years old 
Güngör et al. 
[84]  
Islam Willingness to buy and pay for 
certified halal labelled meat at the 
supermarket and the Islamic 
butcher 
Belgium Consumption frequency 
scale and scale type 
questions 
202 Muslim consumers aged above 
18 
Verbeke et al. 
[85] 
Islam Determination of major dietary 
patterns among fasting subjects 
Iran Food frequency 
questionnaire  
587 fasting subjects  Shadman et al. 
[86]  
Islam Effect of Ramadan on beer 
consumption 
Turkey Quantitative data on, 
among others, beer sales 
and number of Ramadan 
days for each month 
50 monthly observations on 11 
brewery products 
 
Çelen [87]  
Judaism Influence of Jewish religion and 
Jewish dietary laws on family food 
habits 
Canada a. Food frequency 
questionnaire and 
food habits list 
b. 2-day food record 
a. 250 ultra-orthodox households 
b. 250 adults (subsample from a.) 
Shatenstein et 
al. [88]  
Judaism Link between religiosity and 
influence of each family member on 
the type of food purchased 
Israel Number of meals each 
week that contain a certain 
meat product and 
312 adults responsible for shopping Just et al. [89]  
1
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preferences of family 
members for several types 
of meat 
Judaism Link between religiosity and health 
behaviour, use of medical check-
ups, and eating habits 
Israel Food frequency 
questionnaire  
3,056 adult (18+) urban citizens Shmueli and 
Tamir [90]  
Buddhism Link between religiosity and health 
practices (including dietary 
behaviour) 
US Yes/no questions 
regarding the adherence 
of a vegetarian diet and 
the exclusion of specific 
animal food sources 
886 respondents aged 18 or older Wiist et al. [91]  
Seventh-Day 
Adventists 
Characterize and compare food 
consumption patterns of several 
vegetarian and non-vegetarian 
diets 
US and Canada Food frequency 
questionnaire  
89,455 subjects from Adventist 
Health Study 2 cohort  
Orlich and 
Fraser [92]  
Seventh-Day 
Adventists 
Link between religiosity and diet Malaysia Food frequency 
questionnaire 
574 respondents aged above 18 
years old 
Tan et al. [93]  
Eastern Orthodox 
Christianity 
Beliefs and practices with regard to 
fasting 
US Field notes, open ended 
questionnaire regarding 
belies and stated practices 
during fasting and 
secondary data 
58 respondents aged 18 or above 
that attends a local parish 
Quinton and 
Ciccazzo [94]  
Greek Orthodox 
Christianity 
Description and evaluation of three 
traditional diets of Crete  
 
 
 
 
Greece 7-day weighted food 
record 
1 food sample from each traditional 
diet 
Kafatos et al. 
[95]  
Greek Orthodox 
Christianity 
Impact of fasting on dietary habits  Greece 24 hours dietary recall and 
3-day weighted food 
record  
120 respondents aged between 20 
and 60 years old, having no chronic 
diseases and taking no medication 
Sarri et al. [79] 
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or dietary supplements; 60 of the 
120 were fasters, while the other 60 
were non-fasters 
Greek Orthodox 
Christianity 
Assessment of calcium, nutrient 
and food intake during fasting and 
normal (non-fasting) week 
Greece 7-day weighted food 
record 
10 monks aged between 20 and 60 
years old in good health, non-
smokers, taking no medication that 
influences Ca bioavailability 
Papadaki et al. 
[80] 
Ethiopian 
Orthodox 
Christianity 
Frequency of fasting, extent of 
obedience to fasting rules, and food 
consumption during fasting and 
non-fasting periods 
Ethiopia a. 7-day weighted record 
b. Food intake (24 hours 
recall) 
a. 9 households having at least 1 
child below 3 years or age from 
the sample of the Ethio-Swedish 
Children’s Nutrition Unit in Addis 
Ababa and Ijaji 
b. 20 factory workers in Addis 
Ababa 
Knutsson and 
Selinus [78] 
1
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Table 1-2: Scholarly studies that have published on the link between religion and consumer behaviour across multiple religious groups 
Research topic Research 
country 
Data Respondents Author(s) 
Effect of religious affiliation (Catholicism, 
Judaism and Protestantism) on shopping 
behaviour (furniture case) 
 
US Recorded presence as well 
as whether anything was 
purchased in the shop  
854 households visiting specific furniture 
shop 
Thompson and 
Raine [96] 
Effect of Jewish ethnicity on selected 
aspects of consumer behaviour (e.g. 
information seeking, product information 
transfer) 
US Open questions, frequency 
scales and scale type 
questions 
a. 298 university students majoring in 
Business Administration 
b. 363 adult consumers residing in NY 
metropolitan area  
Hirschman [97] 
Link between religion (Catholicism and 
Judaism) and religiosity and the role of 
husbands and wives in households’ 
consumer decision making processes 
(automobile case) 
US Perceived influence on eight 
dimensions of purchase by 
each spouse (Likert-type 
scale) 
207 households that purchased a new 
automobile in the past year prior to the 
interview 
Delener [98] 
Influence of nationality and religiosity on 
aspects of shopping behaviour (radio set 
case) 
Japan and US Scale type questions 230 respondents between 18 and 45 years 
old (125 Japanese and 105 Americans) 
Sood and Nasu 
[99] 
Influence of religiosity (Catholicism, 
Fundamentalism, Protestantism and 
others) on propensity to outshop and to 
Sunday shop 
US Scale type questions  338 respondents who do most of the 
shopping for the household from area  
Siguaw and 
Simpson [100] 
Impact of religiosity on cigarette smoking US 
 
Quantitative cigarette use 3968 respondents aged 65 or older Koenig et al. 
[101] 
Influence of Irish Catholic descent on 
dietary pattern 
Scotland Food frequency 
questionnaire 
985 Irish descendants of the 35-age cohort 
in the ‘west of Scotland Twenty-07 study’ 
Mullen et al. 
[102] 
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Influence of religious affiliation (Hinduism, 
Islam, and Catholicism) on shopping 
behaviour (television set case)  
Mauritius Scale type questions 1,000 household heads Essoo and Dibb 
[103] 
Impact of religious affiliation and religiosity 
on newspaper readership frequency and 
uses (Mormonism, Orthodox Judaism, and 
Methodism) 
US Scale type questions 70 respondents from each of the 3 different 
affiliations 
German [104] 
Impact of religious affiliation (Judaism, 
Islam, and Christianity) and religiosity on 
consumer preference of various chicken 
products and meat types 
Israel Open questions and scale 
type questions 
388 households Heiman et al. 
[105] 
Impact of religious affiliation and religiosity 
on alcohol drinking 
US Alcohol frequency use 7,370 adults (18 or older) Michalak et al. 
[106] 
Impact of religiosity on ethical attitudes US Scale type questions 127 adult consumers Vitell et al. [107] 
Comparing body composition and nutrient 
intake among Buddhist vegetarian and 
omnivore Catholic nuns 
South Korea 3-day dietary record  54 Buddhist nuns and 31 Catholic nuns 
who are healthy, did not take any 
medication, and no dietary supplements 
for the past 6 months 
Lee and 
Krawinkel [108] 
Link between religious affiliation 
(Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestantism, 
and non-affiliation) and religiosity and 
product- and store-switching behaviour 
South Korea Scale type questions 496 working individuals above 18 years old Choi [109] 
Consumption rituals during central holy 
days (Christmas, Ramadan, and 
Passover) across three different cultural 
settings of the religious community 
(dominant, minority, and diasporic) 
Israel, Tunisia, 
and US 
Qualitative in-depth 
interviews 
43 respondents Hirschman et al. 
[110] 
Difference between the impact of religiosity 
on ethical consumer behaviour among two 
religious affiliations (Christianity and Islam) 
Germany and 
Turkey 
Scale type questions 471 university students in the field of 
Business Administration (231 Turkish 
Muslims and 240 German Christians) 
Schneider et al. 
[111] 
1
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Impact of religiosity on brand reliance US Choice experiment where 
participants need to choose 
between two different 
products: one with national 
brand and another one with 
store brand  
45 participants from public university Shachar et al. 
[112] 
Impact of religiosity on alcohol and tobacco 
use 
Brazil Quantitative alcohol and 
tobacco use 
383 respondents aged 18 or older Lucchetti et al. 
[113] 
Impact of religiosity on alcohol use US Quantitative alcohol use, 
attitude and perception of 
policies and norms 
2,312 undergraduate college students Burke et al. [114] 
Impact of religiosity on alcohol and tobacco 
use 
Brazil Alcohol and tobacco 
frequency use 
363 respondents aged 18 Queiroz et al. 
[115] 
1
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Table 1-3: Scholarly studies measuring health and performance outcomes of religious practices within religious groups 
Religious 
affiliation 
Religious 
practice 
Measured outcome(s) Author(s) 
Islam Fasting Body weight and composition, 
metabolism, blood concentration levels, 
breast milk composition, and diseases 
and disorders 
Temizhan et al. [116], Bogdan et al. [117], Leiper et al. [118], Salti et al. [119], Benaji 
et al. [120], Dewanti et al. [121], Rakicioğlu et al. [122], Ziaee et al. [123], Bouhlel et al. 
[124], Haouari et al. [125], Ibrahim et al. [126], Maughan et al. [127], Khaled and 
Belbraouet [128], Lamri-Senhadji et al. [129], Al-Arouj et al. [130], Hui and Devendra 
[131], Farooq et al. [132]  
Performance (e.g. educational, cognitive, 
physical, behavioural) 
Kadri et al. [133], Karaagaoglu and Yucecan [134], Roky et al. [135], Chaouachi et al. 
[136], Aziz et al. [137], Aziz et al. [138], Chtourou et al. [139], Aloui et al. [140], 
Oosterbeek and van der Klaauw [141], Shephard [142], Bouhlel et al. [143], Fenneni 
et al. [144], Muhamed et al. [145], Rebai et al. [146], Almond et al. [147], Baklouti et al. 
[148], Havenetidis [149], Talib et al. [150], Chamari et al. [151], Cherif et al. [152], 
Laatar et al. [153], Ovayolu et al. [154], Zarrouk et al. [155]   
Judaism Fasting  Metabolism, blood concentration levels, 
delivery, breast milk composition, and 
diseases and disorders 
Drescher and Elstein [156], Marcus et al. [157], Zimmerman et al. [158], Lurie et al. 
[159], Grajower and Zangen [160], Becker et al. [161], Metzger et al. [162], Shalit et al. 
[163]  
Buddhism Fasting and 
vegetarianism 
Body weight and composition, 
metabolism, blood concentration levels, 
mental health, and diseases 
Ho-Pham et al. [164], Wayment et al. [165], Jung et al. [166], Kuramasuwan et al. 
[167], Zhang et al. [168], Stewart et al. [169], Choi et al. [170], Tanaka et al. [171] 
Seventh-
Day 
Adventists  
Vegetarianism 
Veganism 
Body weight and composition, 
metabolism, blood concentration levels, 
diseases, disorders, and mortality 
Vang et al. [172], Chan et al. [173], Rizzo et al. [174], Pettersen et al. [175], Thygesen 
et al. [176], Orlich et al. [177], Thygesen et al. [178], Kwok et al. [179], Le and Sabate 
[180], Orlich and Fraser [92], Fraser et al. [181], Schneekloth et al. [182] 
Mormons Prohibited 
consumption 
of tobacco, 
alcohol, 
coffee and tea 
Mortality, mental health, obesity, fertility, 
and diseases 
Enstrom and Breslow [183], Mason et al. [184], Stanford and Smith [185], Sanders et 
al. [186]  
 
Greek 
Orthodox 
Christianity 
Fasting  Blood concentration levels, obesity, 
mental health, and anthropometric 
measures 
Sarri et al. [187], Sarri et al. [188], Sarri et al. [189], Sarri et al. [190] 
Christianity  Fasting Blood concentration levels, mental and 
physical health, body composition, 
anthropometric markers, and metabolism 
Bloomer et al. [191], Bloomer et al. [192], Alleman et al. [193] 
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2.2.2. Religion and the food supply chain 
The food supply chain involves all the actors and activities that bring food from farm to fork: 
production, storage, distribution, processing, packaging, and marketing [194]. While many studies 
acknowledge the influence of religion on the food supply chain, barely any study includes religion’s 
role as its main focus. From the studies we found that include religion as a main focus, the majority 
elaborates on the impact of religious dietary rules on the food supply chain, mainly focussing on 
religious labelling. We retrieved two studies in SSA that looked at the impact of religious work taboos 
on food production. Finally, while we found two studies in Malawi and Niger-Nigeria that detailed the 
effect of ethnic ties on food trade, so far, no study has looked into religious market segmentation. 
Available literature mainly addresses the influence of religious dietary rules on the food supply chain. 
Most studies examine how the food industry has or can adjust its practices so as to serve the Jewish 
and Muslim consumer segment. We found studies carried out in the United States [195], Europe 
[196-198], the United Kingdom [197], and Israel [5]. Part of these studies focus on the specific case 
of meat. All these studies focus particularly on religious labelling. Both halal and kosher are credence 
quality attributes that cannot be readily evaluated or ascertained by consumers. This has led to a 
proliferation of labels issued by various certification bodies and religious authorities. The study of 
Heiman et al. [5] also discusses how retail has adjusted to different religious consumer segments 
with specialized supermarket chains serving particular consumer groups (secular Jews and Muslims, 
religious Jews, or religious Muslims). These chains vary in, among other things, their product 
assortment, where they are located, and their opening hours (whether or not they are open on 
Saturday, the day of rest for Jews, known as Sabbath). This shows how local food markets adapt to 
preferences of the present religious groups and modify their business practices in line with these 
preferences. 
In Ethiopia, while some reports mention important effects of fasting on the value chain, there is a 
lack of quantitative and in-depth studies that map value chain actors’ responses to Orthodox fasting 
practices. The few studies that exist, list anectodical evidence on the impact of Orthodox fasting 
practices on farmers, processors, and retailers. As such, ADP-LMDP [12] and Herego [199] report 
that focus group discussions with farmers selling to cooperatives and processors revealed that these 
farmers experience drops in prices for milk of 18-56%. Limited demand as well as lower prices for 
milk reduce market incentives of dairy producers and it has been estimated that milk sales reduce 
by 20-25% during long fasting seasons [42]. Land O'Lakes [200] indicates that interviews with milk 
processors revealed that these producers cut down their capacity during long fasting periods with 
reductions of 25% being reported. Processors reduce their processing capacity during fasting by 
limiting the supply of milk during fasting using quota systems [12], paying lower prices, and/or 
requiring a higher milk quality [201]. Finally, Avery [202] reports that in the capital of Ethiopia, Addis 
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Ababa, 85% of the butcheries closes on traditional Wednesday and Friday Orthodox fasting days 
and 43% of the supermarkets reports a drop in meat sales on those days. Orthodox fasting thus 
does not only directly affect consumption of milk and other ASFs, but also availability and pricing of 
these foods. The upshot of previous studies is that they demonstrate how Orthodox fasting practices 
might affect the value chains of ASFs in Ethiopia. However, there is limited quantitative analysis on 
the effects of fasting and especially on how milk producing households deal with declining milk 
demand during fasting. A research gap we address in this dissertation. 
Besides the impact of religious dietary rules, two studies in SSA have looked at the effect of religious 
work taboos on agricultural production in Madagascar [63] and Ethiopia respectively [64]. Stifel et al. 
[63] found that each additional day of religious work prohibition resulted in a 5% decrease of rice 
yield. In Ethiopia, Kijima and Gonzalez [64] find some evidence that during prolonged religious 
holidays with work prohibition, households shift from crop production to livestock production which 
is considered to be less labour intense.  
Other studies have looked at the impact of cultural similarity (sharing cultural ties, such as common 
language, religion, or ethnicity) on bilateral trade volumes [203, 204]. Economic agents might decide 
to trade with trading partners that are part of the same cultural group or network because of 
preference motives and/or cost-reduction motives [205].  
Preference motives arise because of the presence of intergroup bias, which in turn is the outcome 
of in-group favoritism, out-group hostility or both [206]. Whereas in-group favouritism represents 
preferential evaluation and treatment of the in-group relative to the out-group (to which the individual 
is indifferent), out-group hostility relates to (explicit) negative attitudes and behaviour towards out-
group members. Intergroup bias can arise solely from in-group favouritism without any presence of 
negative feelings towards out-group members, and conversely it can also arise solely from out-group 
hostility [207]. Research has shown that intergroup bias occurs more often in the form of in-group 
favouritism rather than out-group hostility [208]. Intergroup bias ultimately affects intergroup 
behaviour and it has been extensively documented that people exhibit more in-group cooperation 
than out-group cooperation (for a recent review, check Balliet et al. [209]), although out-group 
cooperation does not necessarily fall to zero [210]. For trade, preference motives imply that 
economic agents value each other’s products higher compared to products offered for trade by more 
culturally dissimilar trading partners. Such preferences, however, are absent for homogenous goods 
that are traded in anonymous transactions [204]. 
Cost-reduction motives can also explain why individuals resort to culturally similar trading partners. 
If trading partners that are more culturally similar trust each other more, this ultimately reduces 
transaction costs. As such, Guiso et al. [203] found that religious similarity in Europe positively 
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impacts trust: if 90% of the citizens in two countries share the same religion, trust increases by 15 
percentage points compared to the case when the two countries do not share a common religion.  
In SSA, we found two studies that evidence the existence of market segmentation along ethnic lines 
between farmers and traders in the maize value chain in Malawi [20], and the millet and cowpea 
value chain in Niger and the Niger-Nigeria border [19]. Robinson [20] found, using qualitative data, 
that this ethnic market segmentation arises most probably from limited interethnic trust. Since 
interpersonal trust is central to the functioning of markets and especially in SSA, where direct and 
arm-length trade is still common, it is also expected that religious market segmentation might occur, 
but this has not yet been studied.  
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2.3. Literature gaps 
Economic literature on religion is highly fragmented and religion has been studied within various 
economic branches. We identify six major gaps. First, the impact of religion on food demand and 
supply is still underemphasized in economic literature [5]. Second, the available economic research 
on religion and food is biased towards high-income and Western developed countries. Third, 
research has predominantly focused on Islam. Fourth, scholarly studies have looked at either the 
link between religion and consumer behaviour or between religion and food supply, resulting in two 
separate literature streams. Fifth, most studies that looked at particular items, focused on meat or 
substances. And finally, available studies only detailed the impact of religious dietary rules within a 
particular group.  
We aim to fill these academic voids and we contribute to literature in several ways. (1) We cast light 
on the role of religion in food system development; (2) we study this in Ethiopia, a low-income 
country, where the influence of religion might be particularly prevalent given its religiously active 
population that is highly observant; (3) we focus on a large, yet neglected, group of Orthodox 
Christians; (4) we take a comprehensive approach and focus on three elements of the milk system, 
that are intertwined and can therefore not be studied separately: consumption, production, and 
transactions; (5) we focus on a non-conventional product (milk); and finally (6) we detail the wider 
societal impact of the Orthodox fasting by focusing also on non-Orthodox households.  
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3. Main objective and research questions 
In this dissertation, we take the case of Ethiopia and (cow) milk. Several reasons motivate this 
choice. Ethiopia hosts a large Orthodox community numbering to 36 million individuals, the second 
largest community of Orthodox Christians in the world. Research so far has neglected this religious 
group, while it has investigated smaller religious groups, notably Jews. The country has a strong 
connection with the Orthodox Church that established as early as the fourth century [64]. Besides 
Orthodox Christians, the country is home to 29 million Muslims, 16 million Protestants, 2 million 
people adhering to traditional faiths, and 600,000 Catholics [211]. We take the specific case of milk, 
because of the explicit association between the Orthodox religion and ASFs through the fasting 
practices. Additionally, milk is the main animal protein source in the country [8] and Ethiopia has a 
long standing tradition of cattle herding – its cattle herd is believed to be the largest in SSA [36] – 
and cow milk consumption.  
Our central objective is to examine how the Ethiopian milk system has evolved within a diverse and 
long-standing religious context. To fulfil this objective, we adopt a comprehensive approach and we 
disentangle three main research areas within the milk system that require further investigation: milk 
consumption, production, and transactions. As we have shown above, food takes a special position 
in many religions, and various religious regulations specify which types of food can be consumed 
(by whom and when), and how food should be produced and handled. Yet, religion may also 
influence where people shop for food as well as to whom people sell their food.  
The three research questions are summarized in the box on the following page. We answer these 
research questions in five chapters. For the first two research questions, we specifically look at the 
impact of Orthodox fasting rituals. In the third research question, we focus on religious affiliation, and 
investigate if sharing religious ties, by being member of the same religious group, affects milk 
transaction preferences of both milk producers and milk consumers. In what follows, we elaborate 
more on how we unpacked the different research questions in the respective chapters.  
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Main objective 
Examining how the Ethiopian milk system has evolved within a diverse and long-standing religious 
context  
Research question 1: How does religion influence milk consumption? 
Chapter 3: Religion, food choices, and demand seasonality: Evidence from the Ethiopian milk market 
Research question 2: How does religion affect milk production and output use?  
Chapter 4: Fasting, food, and farming: Evidence from Ethiopian milk producers 
Chapter 5: Milk in the city: Profiles and development paths for urban dairy holders in Ethiopia 
Research question 3: Does religion interfere with milk transactions? 
Chapter 6: Unravelling preferences for religious ties in milk transactions: A buyer perspective 
Chapter 7: Is religion cueing trading behaviour of Ethiopian milk producers? 
 
In Chapter 3, we examine how fasting rituals embedded within the Orthodox community affect 
household milk intake decisions. We focus on Orthodox Christian, Protestant, Muslim, and other 
religious households (i.e. Catholics and adherents of traditional faiths) so as to study whether fasting 
practices also affect milk consumption of non-Orthodox households. No study so far has detailed the 
quantitative impact of fasting on milk demand at a national level in the country. Literature review as 
well as interviews with key informants during our first field visit in January-February 2016, revealed 
that milk markets largely dissolve during Orthodox fasting periods, specifically in localities with large 
concentrations of Orthodox Christians. Therefore, we further investigate for households who indicate 
to consume milk, whether fasting, and especially increasing densities of Orthodox Christians, 
negatively affects their probability to source milk from the market.  
Decreasing milk demand during Orthodox fasting obviously impacts milk producing households. In 
Chapter 4 and 5, we thus investigate how milk producing households have adjusted to these periods 
of reduced milk demand caused by fasting. We look at two different milk sheds: the Great Addis milk 
shed (Chapter 4) and the Mekelle milk shed (Chapter 5). While the Addis milk shed is the most 
market-oriented centre of the country, the Mekelle milk shed is much less developed but it is rapidly 
transforming. Both milk sheds host a majority of Orthodox Christians, 75% and over 95% 
respectively. Orthodox fasting will thus undeniably impact milk production systems in both areas. 
Finally, we wonder whether the religious affiliation of potential trading partners plays a role in milk 
transactions. Particularly, we investigate if sharing religious ties, by being member of the same 
religious group, facilitates or inhibits milk exchange, both from a consumer (Chapter 6) and a 
producer (Chapter 7) perspective. Several reasons make us hypothesize that religion might be an 
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important factor in a consumer’s/producer’s (initial) selection of milk sellers/buyers: (1) the milk 
market that operates predominantly informally, (2) the religious symbolism of ASFs, (3) the 
widespread occurrence of co-religious networks due to low levels of trust in other religious groups 
and the geographical dispersion of religious groups, (4) and the occurrence of informational 
asymmetries that require trust from consumers/producers in milk sellers/buyers. This might result in 
coordination problems between different religious groups, which affects the willingness to trade 
among each other, resulting in market inefficiencies. Economic agents might decide to trade with 
trading partners that are part of the same religious group or network because of preference motives 
and/or cost-reduction motives [205]. Since milk is a homogeneous product, we expect that in the 
Ethiopian context, cost-reduction motives will be the most dominant underlying factor driving milk 
market transactions. Given the dominance of arm-length informal milk trade in the country, we 
hypothesize that trust is a crucial underlying condition of milk transactions. Trust can be established 
in various ways, of which one is shared membership in a social group. Milk transactions might 
therefore arise more easily among individuals that share the same religious affiliation.  
Figure 1-1 visualizes the different building blocks upon which we focus in this dissertation. We look 
at three elements of a milk system: consumption, production, and transactions. This dissertation 
includes five chapters that each tackle a specific element. Chapter 3 will focus on the impact of 
Orthodox fasting on milk consumption decisions and from which sources this consumed milk is 
acquired (purchase or own production; both sourcing channels are visualized in Figure 1-1). Chapter 
4 and 5 will investigate how milk producing households operate within a context of religious fasting, 
paying specific attention to the heterogeneity in adaptation strategies to Orthodox fasting periods. 
Finally, we will look at milk transactions, where Chapter 6 assesses consumer preferences for co-
religious milk suppliers, while Chapter 7 evaluates milk producer preferences for co-religious milk 
buyers. 
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Figure 1-1: Dissertation overview  
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4. Data and methodology 
During this dissertation, we collaborated with different researchers both within the department as 
well as outside of Ghent University (KU Leuven and the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI)). These collaborations are highlighted at the beginning of each of the chapters. In this 
section, it is important to highlight the operational choices that were made in this dissertation so as 
to answer the three research questions.  
As indicated above, we operationalize religion in two ways: as a religious fasting ritual and as 
religious affiliation. We look at the effect of the presence of an Orthodox fasting season on milk 
consumption (Chapter 3), and milk production and output use (Chapter 4 and 5) and we investigate 
if the religious affiliation of potential trading partners affects trading preferences of both and milk 
consumers (Chapter 6) and milk producers (Chapter 7). Orthodox fasting spells consist of one-day 
fasts and longer fasting seasons, covering multiple days or weeks (which will be elaborated more on 
in Chapter 2). In this dissertation, we only focus on the impact of a long Orthodox fasting season. 
This dissertation focuses both on milk consuming and milk producing households, residing in rural 
and urban areas. We use both secondary and primary data to fulfil our research objective. For our 
own fieldwork, we deliberately focused on urban producers and consumers, who remain a black spot 
within academic literature. Urbanization is proceeding rapidly in SSA and the total number of African 
dwellers is projected to rise from 400 million in 2010 to 1.3 billion by 2050 [212]. Urban farmers are 
still key to ensure a city’s food security. Yet, urban agriculture is largely practiced informally, with 
farmers being mostly tolerated rather than supported by city governments. Urban food producers 
face many challenges, particularly regarding land access, tenure security and input provision. But, 
there is a growing awareness and appreciation for local urban food production, and therefore a need 
to gain a better understanding of the actors involved in the urban food sector [212]. 
This dissertation is innovative not only because of its subject (as elaborated in the previous sections) 
and study population (not only Orthodox Christians, but also non-Orthodox households and the 
particular focus on urban producers and consumers), but also because of the use of different 
datasets (secondary and primary data), study methods (i.e. observational studies with surveys 
(Chapter 3 to 5) versus controlled experiments (Chapter 6 and 7)), and modelling strategies. An 
overview is provided in Table 1-4. 
We used two datasets from secondary sources: a first one that is part of the Living Standard 
Measurement Survey (LSMS) programme in Ethiopia, a household survey programme housed within 
the World Bank’s Development Data Group, and the other one was collected within the project 
‘Improving the evidence and policies for better performing livestock systems in Ethiopia’ lead by 
IFPRI as part of the Feed the Future Innovation Lab for Livestock Systems. These data sets were 
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used in the third and fourth chapter respectively. For the remaining chapters, I collected my own data 
in the city of Mekelle, northern Ethiopia. I conducted two separate fieldwork rounds, one in January-
February 2016 and one in August-September 2017. In both phases, a team of enumerators, which I 
supervised, facilitated the data collection. These enumerators received a one-day training in which I 
familiarized them the research objective and research questions, and research design. More 
information on the practicalities of the interviews and collected data are discussed in the respective 
chapters.  
To analyse the cross-sectional data, we employed various econometric models and techniques: 
linear probability models (Probits), linear regression models (Ordinary Least Squares regressions 
and Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations), and choice modelling techniques (Discrete Choice 
Experiments). These methods are all predictive in nature and allow to estimate the impact of a 
variable of interest. We also employed a data mining strategy, cluster analysis, which is exploratory. 
The aim of such a technique is to sort and allocate observations in clusters and thus tries to identify 
similar behavioural patterns.  
In what follows, we will highlight how we unpacked each research question into a specific research 
design. 
  
Table 1-4: Overview of the data and modelling strategies employed in the different chapters 
 
 
 
Chapter Research 
question 
Data 
source 
Data type Respondents Sample 
size 
Geographical 
focus 
Area Econometric 
methods 
3 1 LSMS  Survey  HHs (both 
producing and 
consuming) 
5,262 National All – rural and 
(peri-)urban 
Probit models 
4 2 IFPRI Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Producing HHs 870 Great Addis 
area 
All – rural and 
(peri-)urban 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
regressions  
and Seemingly 
Unrelated 
Regressions 
Equations 
5 2 Own data Survey Producing HHs 304 Mekelle city Urban Cluster analysis 
6 3 Own data  Survey and 
discrete choice 
experiment 
Consuming 
(purchasing) 
HHs 
221 Mekelle city Urban Random 
parameter 
models 
7 3 Own data Survey and 
discrete choice 
experiment 
Producing HHs 222 Mekelle city Urban Random 
parameter 
models 
3
0
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4.1. Research question 1 
To answer our first research question, we used secondary data collected by the LSMS programme, 
a household survey programme housed within the World Bank’s Development Data Group. We use 
data from the second collection round, which took place in 2013-2014. Data within this programme 
are nationally representative and include observations from 5,262 households spread over the 
country. This survey collects detailed data on household consumption of selected food items, 
including milk, using a seven-day recall period. It also details from which sources the consumed milk 
is acquired (production or purchase).  
While the data collected in the LSMS programme were not intended to study the effect of long 
Orthodox fasting seasons on milk consumption, we could use this dataset because of the partial 
overlap of the timing of collection (February-April 2014) with the longest continuous fasting period of 
the Orthodox community, i.e. Lent, a 55-day fast preceding Easter. This timing allows us to compare 
milk intake decisions and milk acquisition strategies outside and during Orthodox fasting periods 
among the different religious groups in the country: Orthodox Christians, Protestants, Muslims, and 
others (i.e. Catholics and traditional faiths).  
The results from the econometric analyses employed to answer this research question (see Chapter 
3) reveal the importance of the density of Orthodox Christians in localities, with stronger impacts 
observed on milk consumption and milk acquisition in dominantly Orthodox localities. We therefore 
focus for the remaining two research questions on two milk sheds that host an Orthodox majority, 
i.e. the Great Addis milk shed with 75% Orthodox Christians and the Mekelle milk shed where over 
95% of the population adheres to the Orthodox faith. In dominantly Orthodox settings, most of the 
milk producing households will be Orthodox Christian, which implies that these households will be 
affected twice by fasting spells: (1) they reduce their own milk intake during fasting which creates 
excess milk, and (2) due to reduced milk demand during fasting periods in these dominantly 
Orthodox settings, milk producing households will have less market outlets to sell their milk too. 
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4.2. Research question 2 
To investigate how religion affects milk production and output use, we focus on dairy farming 
households in two different milk sheds in Ethiopia that host an Orthodox majority: the Great Addis 
milk shed and the Mekelle milk shed. We specifically focus on commercially-oriented dairy farming 
households that primarily produce for the market, while surplus milk is used for own consumption. 
The interviews in the Great Addis milk shed were carried out by a programme led by IFPRI, while 
the ones in Mekelle originate from own fieldwork. Each of these chapters casts a different light on 
how milk producing households have adapted to a context of (expected) milk demand seasonality 
caused by Orthodox fasting practices.  
In Great Addis milk shed, a total of 870 milk producing households were interviewed: 30 urban, 240 
peri-urban, and 600 rural farms. This data collection round was part of the project “Improving the 
evidence and policies for better performing livestock systems in Ethiopia” lead by IFPRI as part of 
the Feed the Future Innovation Lab for Livestock Systems. Interviews were conducted in January-
February 2018. The survey assembled data on milk production, processing, and sales in the month 
prior to the interview. This past month coincided partially with either the Lent fast or the Advent fast, 
a 40-day fast preceding Christmas. The survey also covered household milk consumption in the 
week prior to the interview with separate data for milk intake of the youngest child within these 
households. The recall period of these data again partially overlaps with the Orthodox Lent fasting 
period, as was the case in the third chapter. We single out the impact of a long fasting period on milk 
production using an Ordinary Least Square approach, while the impact of fasting on output use (how 
much of the produced milk is processing, sold, consumed and given out) and volumes of sales and 
consumption is detailed using Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations. We detail consumption 
volumes not only at household level, but also for the youngest child in the household separately, 
using an Ordinary Least Squares regression. Including the impact of fasting on the milk intake of 
young children is relatively new, and not well studied so far. While children below the age of seven 
are officially exempt from fasting, the few studies that have been performed, found negative effects 
of Orthodox fasting on children’s milk intake [213, 214]. We extend our analyses by exploring 
potential heterogeneity in the way dairy farming households have adapted to a context of fasting. 
Since the interviewed households were located at different distances from the capital Addis Ababa, 
we use the travel time needed to reach the capital to proxy market accessibility assuming that 
households located closer to the capital have better access to the market. 
In a fifth chapter, we investigate how urban dairy holders within the Mekelle milk shed have adapted 
to a context of Orthodox fasting. We sampled 304 dairy farming households in Mekelle city, the 
centre of the milk shed. Dairy farms in this urban centre are the most market-oriented and therefore 
the most interesting in order to study how fasting affects milk sales. Contrary to dairy farmers in the 
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Addis milk shed, little is known about the producers that operate within Mekelle city. The objective 
of this chapter was thus twofold: gaining insight in the diversity of urban milk production systems and 
exploring how these production systems have evolved within an almost exclusively Orthodox locality. 
In this chapter, we sketch who engages in urban dairy farming, how urban production systems are 
managed, how productive and profitable these systems are, and what kind of interventions would 
benefit the development of these systems. Therefore, we cluster urban producers along three 
dimensions: input efficiency, market integration, and resilience towards demand seasonality caused 
by Orthodox fasting.   
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4.3. Research question 3 
Finally, to investigate whether religion plays a role in milk market exchanges, we conducted a series 
of experimental choice tasks with both milk consumers (Chapter 6) and milk producers (Chapter 7) 
in Mekelle city.  
For consumers, who purchase milk from the market, we constructed potential milk seller profiles that 
included five relevant attributes: temporal distance to the selling point, type of supplier (producer or 
milk shop), gender and religious affiliation of the supplier. In a series of choice tasks, we asked 
producers to choose among three seller profiles. Religious affiliation in these choice tasks was 
signalled via names or religious symbols. 
We constructed a quasi-identical choice experiment for milk producers, in which we profiled potential 
milk buyers using the following attributes: milk price, payment terms (payment on the spot or 
delayed), type of buyer (individual consumer, trader, or milk shop), gender and religious affiliation of 
the buyer.   
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5. Dissertation structure 
The core of this dissertation consists of the five chapters unpacked in the Sections 3 and 4 of this 
Introduction chapter. Before turning to the five chapters, a contextual background is given in Chapter 
2 so as to cast light on the religious landscape in Ethiopia, Orthodox fasting practices, as well as on 
the country’s milk system. Additionally, this contextual background chapter provides more 
information on the two selected milk sheds and milk chain actors investigated within this dissertation. 
The following chapters, Chapters 3 to 5, answer the first two research questions and Chapter 6 and 
7 provide answers to the third research question. 
The chapters answering the research questions are presented in their original format as published 
or submitted for publication. While reading the manuscript, the reader will thus encounter overlap in 
the literature, research context, and data collection sections of the chapters. We prefer to stay close 
to the original papers, to keep the chapters as stand-alone reading material.  
At the end of this dissertation, we will summarize the overall conclusions of the different chapters 
and highlight how these answer our three research questions. We will ponder on the contribution of 
this dissertation to academic literature, the implications of our research findings and we will formulate 
some policy recommendations. We conclude this dissertation by putting forward future directions for 
research.  
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Ethiopia is a landlocked country in the Horn of Africa bordering Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan 
and Sudan (Figure 2-1). Ethiopia inhabits the second biggest population (109 million in 2018) of 
Africa after Nigeria [215]. Its population is still growing fast at 2.7% annually in 2018, with its urban 
population growing even faster, i.e. 4.8% in 2018. Ethiopia is among the top ten of fastest urbanizing 
countries in the world [215]. The country’s economy is rapidly expanding with average growth rates 
in Gross Domestic Product of 9.9% a year in the period 2007/08 to 2017/18. This economic growth 
increases purchasing power, and trends in the Gross National Income follow those of the Gross 
Domestic Product. Still, the country remains one of the poorest in Africa. Annual income per person 
only reached 790 dollar in 2018, half of the SSA average that year [216].  
 
Figure 2-1: Geographical location of Ethiopia in the African continent 
Note: figure created with Mapchart.net
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1. Sketching Ethiopia’s religious landscape  
1.1. A rich Orthodox Christian and Islamic tradition 
As early as the fourth century, an Aksum king converted to Orthodox Christianity along with his 
people, which signalled the start of a very strong Ethiopian connection to the Orthodox Church [217]. 
Only three centuries later (in 615), Prophet Muhammad’s first followers immigrated to Ethiopia, and 
Islam mainly spread via trade routes to lowland coastal areas inhabited by pastoralists and the 
Somali and Afar regions [64, 218, 219]. Other Christian beliefs, particularly Protestantism, were 
introduced by foreign missionaries as was the case in other African countries, mainly converting 
those adhering to traditional faiths in the southern and western regions [220].  
For a long time, Orthodox Christianity was privileged over other religions in the country because of 
its official status as state religion, and several Ethiopian emperors attempted to ban the practice of 
Islam and to enforce mass conversion to Orthodox Christianity. The Islamic community has stayed 
within the margins of political life for centuries, contributing to the rivalry between Islam and Orthodox 
Christianity in the country [221]. Only in 1995, Ethiopia became a secular state by law with freedom 
of religious choice where religious discrimination is prohibited. Yet, religious tensions are still widely 
prevalent in the country [222, 223].  
As in the rest of SSA, Christianity and Islam are the two dominant religious groups in the country 
[224], with Christians representing 64% of the Ethiopian population and Muslims 34%. Only 3% of 
the population adheres to traditional faiths. Ethiopia’s population is highly religious. 98% of the 
population values religion as very important in their daily lives, 82% attends religious services at 
least weekly, and 65% prays daily. No age gap is observed in either of these measures implying that 
young people are as religious as older people [29]. 
Christians form a majority in most Ethiopian regions, except for the Afar, Somali, Dire Dawa and 
Harari region in the eastern part of the country (Figure 2-2). In the Benishangul-Gumuz and Oromia 
region, Muslims and Christians are equally present.   
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Figure 2-2: Christian-Muslim representation in Ethiopia based on census data 2007 
Note: figure created with Mapchart.net 
Most Christians in Ethiopia affiliate to the Orthodox Church (representing 71% of all Christians). 
Catholics and Protestants account for 1% and 27% of the Christian community respectively [225]. 
The country hosts the second largest community of Orthodox Christians in the world after Russia4. 
Orthodox Ethiopians are part of the Oriental branch of Orthodox Christianity, along with the Oriental 
Orthodox Churches in Egypt, India, Armenia, Syria and Eritrea. Orthodox Ethiopians, who constitute 
14% of the global Orthodox population, are much more religiously observant than are their 
counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe and the United States. For example, 78% of Orthodox 
Ethiopians say they attend church at least weekly, compared with a median of 10% and 31% of 
Orthodox Christians in Europe and the United States, respectively. Moreover, 98% of Orthodox 
Ethiopians say religion is very important to them in their daily lives, compared with 52% and 28% of 
Orthodox Christian in the United States and Europe, respectively [32]. 
Orthodox Christians are largely concentrated in the Tigray (>95% of the population), Amhara and 
Addis Ababa regions (between 75%-85% of the population) (Figure 2-3). The limited spread of 
Orthodox Christianity in the southern part of the country, and notably in the Afar and Somali regions, 
has been attributed to different livelihoods, with many people depending on animal husbandry in 
both regions, where a ban on the consumption of ASFs for about half a year is a major barrier to 
become Orthodox Christian [226]. Overall, urban areas host more Orthodox Christians (59% of its 
population is Orthodox versus 40% in rural areas), while rural areas are inhabited by more Muslims 
(35% versus 26% in urban areas) [15]. 
 
                                               
4 Three-quarters of the world’s Orthodox population lives in Central and Eastern Europa, where they make up 
about 57% of the region’s population. These Orthodox Christians affiliate to the Eastern branch of Orthodox 
Christianity. Most Other Orthodox Christians live in the Middle East and Africa, notably Ethiopia and Egypt 
[32]. 
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Figure 2-3: Orthodox Christian representation in Ethiopia based on census data 2007  
Note: figure created with Mapchart.net  
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1.2. Orthodox fasting practices 
Both the Orthodox and Islamic traditions prescribe fasting practices to their followers. Protestants, 
conversely, do not have specific regulations on fasting. The major fasting period in the Islamic faith 
is the Ramadan, which lasts 28 to 30 days. During this holy month, Muslims should refrain from food 
and drinks from dawn to sunset [227]. This fasting interpretation differs greatly from the Orthodox 
Christian church, where fasting refers to abstinence from ASFs during several official fasting periods, 
spread throughout the year. This means that during those periods, no consumption of meat, eggs, 
or milk is allowed. Fasting spells consist of one-day fasts and longer fasting seasons, covering 
multiple days or weeks, often preceding holy events. An overview of the compulsory fasts in the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Christian church is given in Table 2-1. Fasting rules are strict, but pregnant and 
lactating women, severely ill or weak persons, as well as children below the age of seven are fully 
exempt from fasting [78]. In addition to these commonly imposed fasts, a large variety of 
spontaneous individual fasts is applied, making it difficult to assess the exact number of fasting days. 
Yet, it has been estimated that the total number of fasting days amounts to 166-250 days a year [8, 
16, 17]. Fasting is seen as an integral part of the Orthodox identity and serves as a measure of 
devoutness [78]. 
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Table 2-1: Overview of the obligatory fasting events and feasts in Ethiopia according to the Orthodox 
Church doctrine (based on Knutsson and Selinus [78], Ware [228], and The Ethiopian Orthodox 
Tewahedo Church [229]) 
Fasts Timing  Feasts Timing  
  New Year September 11 
  Meskel September 28 
Advent fast 40 days, from November 28 – 
January 6 
Christmas January 7 
Epiphany fast Fast on the eve of Epiphany Epiphany January 19 
Nineveh fast Three days (Monday to 
Wednesday), two weeks before the 
start of Lent 
  
Lent fast (Easter 
fast) 
55 days, starts on Monday, movable 
start (between February 8 – March 
14) 
Easter Movable date (between April 4 – 
May 5), always on Sunday 
  Ascension Movable date (40th day after Easter, 
between May 13 – June 16), always 
on Thursday 
  Pentecost Movable date (between May 23 – 
June 26), always on Sunday 
Sene fast 
(Apostles fast) 
10-40 days, starts Monday after 
Pentecost and ends July 12 
Feast of the 
Apostles 
July 12 
Felseta fast 
(Assumption 
fast) 
15 days, from August 7 – August 21 Assumption feast August 22 
Weekly fasting Every Wednesday and Friday 
(except for the period between 
Easter and Pentecost)  
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2. Unpacking the Ethiopian milk system 
The Ethiopian milk system is predominantly traditional, with milk being mainly sourced from home 
production or purchased from informal markets with short supply channels. Different actors operate 
within this system, notably the milk producers and milk consumers [194]. Yet, some milk sheds, 
especially the one located close to the capital, Addis Ababa, are rapidly transforming, where informal 
and formal markets start to co-exist. In what follows, we will detail current milk production systems, 
milk processing and marketing, and milk consumption patterns.  
2.1. Milk production 
Livestock, and especially cattle, are an important backbone of the Ethiopian economy, and almost 
all Ethiopian farms hold some livestock. Cattle account for three-quarters of the total value of the 
livestock stock. It is estimated that about 70% of the households in Ethiopia keep cattle with cattle 
serving different functions: they are a source of income, food, they serve as draft power, a source of 
insurance and savings, a form of social capital, but they also deliver other goods besides milk (e.g. 
manure, hides) [37]5. Recent figures estimate the annual national milk production at 5.2 billion L. 
About 80% of this milk is produced by cows and the remaining 20% is camel milk. Goat milk only 
represents a marginal share of the total annual milk production (i.e. 152 million L/year) [230]. 
Throughout this dissertation we will only focus on the cow milk value chain. 
While Ethiopia has the fifth largest cattle herd of the world (estimated at 57.8 million head of cattle) 
and favourable agro-ecological conditions for cattle rearing (especially in the highlands), milk 
productivity, defined as the output per animal, is extremely low in the country as compared to its 
nearby countries [230, 231]. The latest figures show that the average annual milk yield per cow was 
261 kg in 2017, while productivity was 36%-50% higher in Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan, and 
127% higher in Kenya [232]. Furthermore, milk productivity levels have been stagnant in the last 
decade, while milk output grew significantly over the past 15 years, with approximately 50%. The 
latter can be attributed to a growing cattle stock and number of cattle farmers [231].  
Most cows are reared in the central highlands of the Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and SNNP regions, 
which cover 11% of Ethiopia’s landmass. Moreover, half of the cattle stock is raised within a 10 km 
radius from major livestock markets and all-weather roads as can be seen from Figure 2-4 [233].  
 
  
                                               
5 In the LSMS data we used in this dissertation, we found that for the households who reported to own cattle, 
half of them indicated they owned dairy cows that gave milk in the past year.   
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Figure 2-4: Milking cow density in Ethiopia (number per square kilometre) (adapted from Jabbar et 
al. [234]) 
Most milk in the country is produced by smallholder farmers, and 95% of the farms have less than 
five head of cattle [201]. Cattle are raised in three different production systems: pastoral and 
agropastoral grazing systems in the Ethiopian lowland, mixed livestock-crop production systems in 
the highlands where cattle are important for traction and manure, and specialized production 
systems (smallholders and commercial farms) in and around Addis Ababa and other regional 
capitals. Most cattle are local breeds, and only 1.6% and 0.2% are hybrid and exotic breeds 
respectively [235]. These hybrid and exotic breeds are kept in specialized production systems that 
almost exclusively rely on feed procurement outside the farm [230].  
Mixed production systems are the most important systems in terms of head of cattle (70% of total 
cattle herd) as well as milk output (67% of total annual milk production), lowland grazing comes 
second (28% of the cattle and 20% of milk output) and specialized production units are still relatively 
scarce, housing 3% of all cattle in the country, yet producing 12% of total milk output. The latter can 
be explained by the higher milk productivity in these specialized units reaching 3050 L/lactation and 
2150 L/lactation in medium and small specialized farms respectively compared to 256 L/lactation in 
the grazing system and 464 L/lactation in the mixed system [230]. The low productivity of the mixed 
production and lowland grazing systems limits the amount of excess milk left to market, which 
contributes to the low commercialization level of the traditional production systems. The milk demand 
seasonality caused by Orthodox fasting practices reduces commercialization incentives even further 
[16]. 
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2.2. Milk processing and marketing 
Zijlstra et al. [201] estimated that of the total national milk production, 68% is used for human 
consumption (Figure 2-5). Post-harvest losses of milk are low, only 3.4%, because of the rather short 
supply channels [230]. Producing households mostly consume the milk at home and process it to 
butter, yoghurt, or cheese. Only 6.6% of the produced milk intended for human consumption ends 
up directly in the market in its liquid form. Yet, producing households also sell part of milk indirectly 
in the form of self-processed milk, especially butter and cheese (with 14.4% and 36.6% of the total 
production of these products being sold respectively) [201]. Market orientation varies across 
production systems with rural systems mainly producing for home consumption and farms in (peri-) 
urban areas selling three-quarters of their produced milk [12]. 
 
Figure 2-5: Usage of the produced milk in Ethiopia (adapted from Zijlstra et al. [201]) 
Traditional or home processing is often done by women using traditional methods and starts from 
fermented milk. Milk is left to ferment for 3-5 days. This fermented milk, ergo, which is semi-solid 
and therefore resembles yoghurt, can be processed further into butter, kibe, and buttermilk (the 
residual liquid after butter production). The buttermilk can be converted into a local soft cottage 
cheese, known as ayib. The traditional processing is labour-intense and rather inefficient; 16.5 L of 
milk is needed to produce 1 kg of butter [13, 236]. 
Industrial processing is not widespread (an estimated 40 plants operate in the country) and is mainly 
concentrated around the capital Addis Ababa. These industrial plants produce pasteurized milk, 
butter, cheese, and yoghurt. Most plants still operate below capacity. The lack of technical know-
how and proper equipment, insufficient milk supply, and Orthodox fasting constrain the further 
industrialization of milk processing. Most processors indicate that the lack of supply of raw milk is 
the most important for their sub-optimal performance, while on the other hand many dairy farmers 
perceive that (1) there is a lack of demand which makes them reluctant to invest in milk production 
and (2) their cost price is higher than the market price [201]. 
Liquid milk and traditional fermented butter are the main commodities entering the Ethiopian milk 
market. 17% of the national milk production is processed to butter resulting in the production of 51.2 
million kg of butter, of which 2% is lost post-harvest. Traditional fermented butter processed by 
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smallholder producers is mostly traded informally in rural areas [230, 236]. Limited market 
accessibility in remote areas makes it more attractive to process milk into butter, since butter has a 
longer shelf life. Marketing of liquid milk is therefore often restricted to peri-urban and urban areas. 
Liquid milk reaches the end consumer through six different sub-chains, of which two are formal 
(Figure 2-6). The formal chains market pasteurized milk, while in the informal sub-chains raw or 
unpasteurized milk is traded [230]. 10.8 million L of pasteurized milk reaches end consumers of 
which 38% flows directly from processors to consumers. 367.8 million L milk is marketed through 
the four informal channels, 49% being traded directly from producers to consumers, 30% channels 
from producers to food service providers (FSPs) i.e. milk shops, cafés, restaurants, and hotels, to 
consumers, and the remaining 21% from producers to traders, who either directly sell to consumers 
or sell to FSPs. Smallholders in the lowland grazing system mainly sell their milk to milk traders, 
while farms in the mixed system sell to both traders and processors. Specialized production units on 
the other hand sell mostly to processors and FSPs [230]. 
 
Figure 2-6: Graphical representation of the formal pasteurized milk (top) and the informal raw milk 
sub-chains (bottom)  
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2.3. Milk consumption and prices 
Rising incomes and urbanization are shifting Ethiopian diets towards the inclusion of high-value 
products such as ASFs [237]. Yet, total ASF intake is still low in Ethiopia and remains rather stagnant. 
The total volume consumed per capita only increased by 1.1 kg between 2005 and 2011, and is 
currently assessed at 20.6 kg per adult equivalent per year of which 14.7 kg is milk (both liquid and 
processed) [8]. Milk intake in the country is only half of the sub-Saharan African average [9]. The 
food-based dietary guidelines for healthy diets prescribe an average daily consumption of 250 mL of 
liquid milk for adults (and 500 mL and 600 mL for children and adolescents respectively), which 
equals a yearly consumption of minimum 90 L per capita (249). Ethiopia’s per capita milk intake thus 
falls short of the prescribed intake by more than four-fifth. Problems of structural supply, poorly 
developed local markets, low purchasing power, high prices, Orthodox fasting practices, and lack of 
consumer awareness regarding the nutritional benefits of ASFs have been advanced to explain low 
consumption levels [11-14].  
Not only is the contribution of ASFs to total energy intake low (1.7% and 3% in rural and urban diets 
respectively [238]), consumption is also subject to significant seasonal fluctuations, mainly caused 
by religious fasting (Figure 2-7). Intake drops during the main Orthodox fasting months in March and 
December, while consumption peaks are observed during religious festivities (notably, for Easter in 
April and New Year and Meskel in September, and to a lesser extent Christmas in January) (see 
Table 2-1) [17]. Per capita calorie intake fluctuates much more among urban households as 
compared to rural households and urban households consume significantly more ASFs during 
religious festivities. Per capita consumption of ASFs in urban areas is almost twice as high as the 
consumption in rural areas, which is linked to income differences and the resulting changes in 
household preferences as increasing income levels have been associated with a shift from diets 
dominated by starchy staples to diets that increasingly include ASFs (Bennett’s law) [8].  
 
Figure 2-7: Consumption of animal-source foods in Ethiopia by month  
(Source: Bachewe et al. [17]) 
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Low prices and income increases could improve consumption of milk, but also other ASFs, in 
Ethiopia significantly [8]. The income elasticity of milk has been estimated at 1.8 [239], which implies 
that any increase in household income leads to a bigger increase in milk consumption. Milk can 
therefore be considered as a luxury good, that is increasingly consumed by the better-off 
households. Detailing milk consumption by income group shows that fewer households consume 
milk and milk products in the poorest quintile, only 30%, while up to 57% of the households consume 
milk in the richest quintile. Average per capita intake of milk is about 300 g each week in the poorest 
quintile and reaches nearly 800 g per week in the richest quintile. Moreover, households in the richest 
quintile source the majority (three-quarters) of their consumed milk from purchase and only one 
quarter from own production. Households in the poorest quintile on the other hand source about two-
thirds from own production. Increasing income thus rises milk consumption levels and decreases the 
share of milk consumed from own production [37].  
Although per capita income levels have been increasing in Ethiopia, total intake volumes of ASFs 
did not. Yet, annual per capita expenditure on animal protein has increased rapidly in the country, 
by 50% between 1996 and 2011 [8]. The increasing prices of ASFs explain this trend, which we 
detail more below. ASF expenditure patterns vary greatly along the rural-urban divide as well as 
along wealth quintiles. Urban households and households in the richest quintile spend twice and ten 
times as much on ASFs compared to rural and the poorest households respectively [8]. The food 
budget share spent on ASFs does not differ significantly between urban and rural households (13.6% 
and 10.5% respectively), while in the richest households this share is three times higher than in the 
poorest households (16.5% versus 4.9%). High prices limit the affordability of ASF products for non-
producing households and explain why only the relatively better-off non-producing households can 
afford to consume these products regularly, who are mainly found in urban areas [240].  
The price elasticity of milk a national level is close to -0.5, which implies that a doubling of prices 
reduces milk consumption by almost half (in urban areas, this elasticity rises even to -1.1) [17]. Prices 
differ among different milk products with unpasteurized milk being the cheapest milk product in the 
country. The price of yoghurt is about 65% higher than that of unpasteurized milk, while pasteurized 
milk and cheese are twice as expensive as unpasteurized milk. Butter is the most expensive milk 
product in the county and its price is ten-fold that of unpasteurized milk [17].  
Prices of liquid and processed milk have been rising greatly over the past decade (Table 2-2). Urban 
retail prices of unpasteurized milk have increased by 36% since 2007. Also, for other milk products, 
urban retail prices rose by about 20%. Rural producers’ prices for unpasteurized milk and cheese 
rose even faster, by 41% and 46% respectively between 2007-2016. This makes milk, and other 
ASFs, expensive products in Ethiopia, which cost on average ten times as much per calorie and per 
kg than cereals [17].   
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Table 2-2: Price evolution of liquid and processed milk in Ethiopia (source: Bachewe et al. [17]) 
 Urban retail prices Rural producer prices 
 2007 2011 2016 2007 2011 2016 
Median real prices (2011 
ETB) 
      
Unpasteurized milk (ETB/L) 7 9 10 6 7 8 
Pasteurized milk (ETB/L) 14 17 17 - - - 
Yoghurt (ETB/kg) 13 15 16 - - - 
Cheese (ETB/kg) 18 18 22 15 16 22 
Butter (ETB/kg) 83 101 100 71 82 85 
Comparison with national median in 2007 (%)  
Unpasteurized milk (%) - 118 136 - 130 141 
Pasteurized milk (%) - 122 122 - - - 
Yoghurt (%) - 115 122 - - - 
Cheese (%) - 101 125 - 105 146 
Butter (%) - 122 120 - 116 120 
Not only have prices been rising over the past year, also within a year prices fluctuate greatly. These 
price fluctuations are driven by seasonal changes in demand for milk as well as supply. The periodic 
occurrence of Orthodox fasting and feasts makes milk demand vary, while the annual rainfall pattern 
affects milk supply due to its impact on feed availability and milk yields. Figure 2-8 outlines the rainfall 
pattern and associated agricultural seasons as well as timing of the main Orthodox fasts and feasts 
throughout the year.  
Bachewe et al. [17] studied price data collected within a consumer price survey from the Central 
Statistical Agency of Ethiopia. The survey collected prices of 116 urban retail markets from traders, 
retailers, and consumers in all regions of Ethiopia between January 2007 and December 2016. They 
report that market prices for liquid and processed milk are low during periods of abundant supply 
(from the summer until the end of the year6) and low demand (the Advent and Lent fasting periods). 
Conversely, prices are at their highest level when high demand (feasts like Christmas and Easter) 
interacts with a declining availability of milk (in the beginning of the year)7. Price fluctuations are most 
outspoken for butter and, to a lesser extent, for cheese. Liquid milk and yoghurt prices seem to be 
barely affected by seasonality in milk supply or demand (Table 2-3). Important to keep in mind is that 
the prices reported in Table 2-3 are averages over the country. We however expect different local 
patterns of demand and supply and thus divergent local price fluctuations since markets in Ethiopia 
are highly fragmented.   
                                               
6 Except for the month of September when prices increase because of New year and Meskel. 
7 Prices, however, drop again during the Orthodox Lent fasting period in March. 
CHAPTER 2 
52 
Table 2-3: Seasonal price indices of liquid and processed milk in Ethiopia, 2007-2016 (source: 
Bachewe et al. [17]) 
 Milk Yoghurt Cheese Butter 
January 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.97 
February 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.96 
March  1.00 1.00 0.97 0.99 
April 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.11 
May 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.11 
June 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.05 
July 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 
August 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 
September 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.01 
October 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.95 
November 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.93 
December 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.93 
Amplitude 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.18 
Note: Seasonal price indices were calculated using the percentage moving average method. First, a twelve-month moving 
average of the real price for each item was calculated. Then the price series so constructed are normalized by dividing it 
to its January 2007 values. Accordingly, the price index has a value of one in January 2007 and it is greater/less than one 
in months with de-seasonalized prices greater/less than January 2007 prices [17]. 
  
 
Figure 2-8: Visual representation of the rainfall pattern, agricultural seasons and timing of the main Orthodox fasts and feasts throughout a year 
Note: (1) Christmas, (2) Epiphany, (3) Nineveh fast, (4) Lent fast, (5) Easter, (6) Ascension, (7) Pentecost, (8) Apostles fast, (9) feast of the Apostles, (10) Felseta fast, (11) 
Assumption feast, (12) Ethiopian New Year, (13) Advent fast 
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Besides these temporal price fluctuations, prices also have spatial patterns and vary significantly 
across regions (Table 2-4). Prices of liquid and processed milk are the lowest in Benishangul-
Gumuz, as well as other western regions in the country, i.e. the Gambella region and the Southern 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ region (SNNP), followed by Amhara and Oromiya regions. Liquid 
and processed milk prices are on the other hand very high in the Harari and Dire Dawa regions, as 
well as the Somali and Afar regions to some extent. Prices in the Addis Ababa region are also high, 
except for pasteurized milk, due to its better developed formal processing infrastructure, and yoghurt. 
In general, prices are higher in cities [17]. 
Table 2-4: Prices in Ethiopian ETB (ETB) for liquid and processed milk by region, 2007-2016 (source: 
Bachewe et al. [17]) 
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Unpasteurized milk (ETB/L) 9 11 8 9 11 8 9 8 12 11 12 
Pasteurized milk (ETB/L) 21 25 15 18 25 15 18 17 24 16 23 
Yoghurt (ETB/L) 22 15 13 16 18 15 15 19 18 13 15 
Cheese (ETB/kg) 24 32 21 19 23 6 19 21 47 39 50 
Butter (ETB/kg) 105 109 90 96 109 74 96 98 116 113 107 
Note: 1 USD= 17.2 ETB 
 
Key figures of the Ethiopian milk system 
▪ 4.16 billion cow milk is produced each year 
▪ Milk productivity in the country is extremely low as compared to neighbouring countries 
▪ 95% of the milk is produced by small-scale farmers owning less than five head of cattle  
▪ 3% of the milk is produced in specialized dairy units, located in (peri-)urban areas 
▪ 68% of the produced milk nationally is used for human consumption 
▪ Of the milk used for human consumption, 48.5% is consumed by milk producing households, 
44.6% is processed and only 6.6% of the produced milk is sold as such 
▪ In (peri-)urban areas, milk producers sell at least 75% of their produced milk 
▪ 78% of the marketed milk ends up in informal channels 
▪ 49% of the milk traded in informal channels is sold directly from producers to consumers, while 
45% passes through FSPs 
▪ Intake of milk is low and estimated at 14.7 kg/capita/year 
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3. The Great Addis and Mekelle milk sheds: A descriptive glimpse of our two dominantly 
Orthodox study areas 
Nine major milk production areas, so called milk sheds, can be distinguished in Ethiopia (Figure 2-
9). In this dissertation, we focus on two: the Great Addis (Chapter 4) and Mekelle milk shed (Chapter 
5, 6, and 7), that both host an Orthodox majority (Figure 2-3). The milk sheds we study are located 
close to the cities of Addis Ababa and Mekelle, the first and third largest city in the country 
respectively. Addis Ababa, the capital city, is home to about 4 million citizens [201], while Mekelle 
city – the capital of the northern Tigray region – is one of the fastest growing urban areas in the 
country, inhabiting a bit more than 400,000 people [241].  Compared to other milk production areas 
situated in the central highlands of Ethiopia, especially the Great Addis milk shed, the Mekelle milk 
shed has received far less scholarly attention.  
Before turning to core of this dissertation, we would like to give some descriptive information on 
these two study areas. We do so specifically for the milk producing households interviewed by IFPRI 
of whom we use the secondary data in Chapter 4. For the Mekelle milk shed, we provide details on 
urban milk producing households, as well as two other important actors in the urban milk chain we 
interviewed during our own fieldwork data collection rounds in Mekelle city: i.e. milk shops, an 
increasingly important FSP, and urban milk consumers. 
 
Figure 2-9: Geographical location of the nine major milk sheds in Ethiopia 
Note: image source: USAID [242], adaptations based on Zijlstra et al. [201].  
Bigger dots represent more important milk sheds in terms of their contribution to the total national milk output  
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3.1. Milk producing households in the Great Addis milk shed 
Annual consumption of milk significantly increased – by 31% – in the last decade in the metropolitan 
area of Addis Ababa because of income and population growth. Still, intake per adult equivalent of 
liquid milk and milk products remains low: 8.5 litres and 10.2 kg, respectively. The milk shed has 
witnessed a rapid rise in the number of milk processing firms – their number tripled over the last 
decade, from 8 to 25 plants – and an increasing number of traders operate today within the rural-
urban interface. In the period 2016/17, almost 200,000 litres of milk were processed every day. Yet, 
significant concentration exists in the processing sector with four firms supplying three-quarters of 
all the pasteurized milk products in the market. Moreover, over 40% of the processing capacity is 
still not used. Most commercial farms, as well as milk processing industries are located in this milk 
shed, and the production of processed milk amounts to about half of the yearly production of raw 
milk. Yet, the informal dairy sector remains important and acts as an important buffer when there is 
an oversupply of milk during long Orthodox fasting periods [243].  
In what follows, some key figures and characteristics are summarized of the dairy producers that 
were interviewed by IFPRI as part of the research project ‘Improving the evidence and policies for 
better performing livestock systems in Ethiopia’. The research project covered rural producers in the 
two major milk production zones, North and West Shewa, suburban producers and producers within 
the capital city Addis Ababa. The data presented are a summary of the data included in the Ethiopia 
Strategy Support Program working paper written by Minten et al. [244]. 
Smallholder dairy farms are the most important suppliers of milk to the capital, supplying 89% of all 
the milk. According to official records, 52% of the households in the two rural zones own dairy cows, 
while 34% and 0.1% of the households are engaged in dairy farming in suburban and urban Addis 
respectively. The total number of dairy cows in the three areas is estimated at 1,419,000 heads – 
1,030,000 in the two rural zones, 360,000 in suburban Addis and 29,000 in the city of Addis Ababa. 
The 29,000 heads of dairy cows supply 31% of the total urban liquid milk and the suburban and rural 
areas make up 31% and 37% of the overall liquid milk market, respectively. Urban dairy farms thus 
remain important, also in Addis Ababa. 
Milk yields vary significantly with urban dairy farming households achieving three- to two-fold the 
yields of rural and suburban producers respectively. Milk yields are higher for farmers in well-
connected areas with transport links to Addis Ababa, who increasingly adopt cross-bred cows and 
commercial feeds, and who benefit from better access to services (health and extension). Still, the 
adoption of cross-bred cows remains limited, especially in rural and suburban areas. This may be 
attributed to differential access to artificial insemination, high costs of acquisition and maintenance 
of cross-bred cows, high risks associated with these cows (i.e. vulnerability to diseases and climatic 
shocks). 
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Dairy producers get increasingly market-oriented and less than one-quarter of the produced milk on 
the farm is used for own consumption – in urban households this drops to 11%. Dairy producers in 
these two zones thus mainly produce for the market, and remaining milk is used to satisfy own 
household needs. Milk supply in rural and suburban areas has been rising over the last decade with 
13% and 19% of the rural and suburban households currently selling liquid milk on the market. Still, 
products sold by producing households differ significantly with urban farmers specializing in liquid 
milk sales, while rural and urban households still sell a significant share of processed milk products. 
Traders are the main buyers for most rural and suburban buyers, while urban producers mostly sell 
directly to consumers. 
Table 2-5: Main descriptive statistics of the interviewed milk producing households in the Great Addis 
milk shed by IFPRI (Source: Minten et al. [244]) 
  Producing households 
 Unit Rural Suburban Urban 
Dairy cows # 1.8 2.0 5.3 
Farms that have cross-bred cows % 27.0 26.6 97.9 
Milk yield L/day/cow 3.3 4.8 9.9 
Dairy farms selling liquid milk % 13.3 19.2 95.6 
Of total liquid milk produced during a non-fasting period:     
   Used for own-consumption % 21.2 24.5 11.1 
   Sales of liquid milk % 11.0 16.8 82.6 
   Processed milk % 67.1 57.7 4.9 
   Given out % 0.7 1.0 1.4 
   Spoiled % 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Butter, average share of sales during non-fasting period % 42.0 34.9 0.0 
Farms reporting as main buyer:     
   Consumer % 11.2 21.0 66.9 
   Processing company % 22.1 20.0 18.2 
   Trader % 65.7 52.9 0.7 
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3.2. Important actors in the milk value chain of Mekelle city 
Since the Mekelle milk shed has received far less scholarly attention as compared to the Great Addis 
milk shed, no accurate figures are available on milk consumption patterns in this area, as well as the 
total dairy cow herd and production output. Official records cite 12,600 milking cows in the city of 
Mekelle [245], while figures of the surrounding peri-urban and rural areas are incomplete. Yet, it is 
believed that most of the dairy cow population of the Mekelle milk shed is found within the city of 
Mekelle [245].  
In the Mekelle milk shed, the raw milk market largely dominates. Only 5-8 supermarkets are 
operating in the city of Mekelle, yet these are not the major outlets for milk. Milk shops on the other 
hand are numerous in the city and thus represent the main sales outlets for liquid and processed 
milk. During data collection we found only one active milk processor in the Mekelle milk shed which 
has faced many difficulties in starting up, and still operates below capacity (Figure 2-10)8. This milk 
area is frequently plagued by feed problems both in terms of quantity and quality, due to drought, 
limited availability of industrial by-products, and limited use of improved forages. In contrast to the 
Great Addis milk shed, where rainfall is bimodal (most precipitation falls in June-early September 
and short rain showers in March-mid May), the Mekelle milk shed is confronted with an extended dry 
period of nine to ten months [245].  
 
 
Figure 2-10: From left to right: Mekelle milk processing plant, storage of processing plant, 
pasteurized milk package sold, advertisement of the pasteurized milk 
                                               
8 During a discussion I had with the plant manager, he reported that the plant employs 12 people and processes 
600-700 litre per day. During fasting periods, capacity is reduced and only 400 litre of liquid milk is processed. 
Milk is collected from 9 primary cooperatives which are located 40-50 km away from Mekelle city. This plant 
thus does not source milk from urban dairy producers. 
Contextual background 
 
59 
Table 2-6 summarizes some of the main characteristics of the urban milk producers we interviewed 
during the first data collection round in 2016. As was the case for urban producers in Addis Ababa, 
we find that most of the urban dairy farms in Mekelle city are small-scale production units, with 
producing households reporting to own, on average, 3 dairy cows. All farms owned cross-bred cows 
which (partially) explains the high milk yields reported. Urban producers in Mekelle have specialized 
in liquid milk sales, and only a small percentage (less than 1%) of the produced milk is processed 
within the household during non-fasting periods. Urban producers in Mekelle were found to sell 
mostly to FSPs, although individual consumers remain also here an important buyer of milk in the 
city. 
Table 2-6: Main descriptive statistics of the interviewed milk producing households in the city of 
Mekelle during own fieldwork 
 Unit Urban producing 
households 
Dairy cows # 3.2  
Farms that have cross-bred cows % 100 
Milk yield L/day/cow 11.0  
Dairy farms selling liquid milk % 100 
Of total liquid milk produced during a non-fasting period:   
   Used for own-consumption % 3.4  
   Sales of liquid milk % 94.4  
   Processed milk % 0.9  
Farms reporting as main buyer:   
   Consumer % 35.4 
   FSPs % 54.1 
   Trader % 10.5 
In Chapter 5, we come back to these producing households, where we make a characterization of 
the different dairy farm types we sampled in the city of Mekelle. In what follows we will provide more 
details on milk shops and the urban milk consumers. During informal discussions with the urban milk 
producing households, we noticed that milk shops are an increasingly important FSP in the city. We 
therefore interviewed 40 of these milk shops in January-February 2016. We also take a closer look 
at the different types of milk consumers: those who rely on own production to satisfy their milk needs 
and others who exclusively rely on milk purchases, we therefore rely on data we collected during a 
second round in 2017.  
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3.2.1. Milk shops are the new black: Gaining insight in modernizing traditional food retail in 
Ethiopia 
Food systems are rapidly transforming in developing countries due to changing diets and rapid 
urbanization. Diets get more diversified with a higher inclusion of non-staples, especially processed 
foods and ASFs, and households become increasingly dependent on purchased produce rather than 
home-produced food. Both processes have contributed to a significant transformation of food 
markets in urban areas [1]. Food is mainly marketed through informal channels with 70% of the 
urban households regularly purchasing food from the informal market [246]. Many small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) are operating in these informal markets in wholesale, logistics, processing, 
and/or retail. Since many of actors involved in the informal food economy operate unregulated, little 
is known about these actors, and they are often referred to as the hidden middle [247]. Yet, the 
informal economy is crucial to urban food security for several reasons: i.e. its physical proximity, its 
lower food prices, its employment generating capacity, and its inclusion of smallholder producers 
[248]. SMEs have grown and proliferated rapidly in the past years and are expected to play a key 
role over the next 10-20 years. Yet, these SMEs remain a blind spot within academic literature and 
policy debates [247].  
Literature on retail transitions has largely focused on the rise and expansion of supermarkets [249-
251]. The informally9 operating SMEs involved in retail, however, have been largely ignored because 
of the predominant speculation that modern retailers, such as supermarkets, would largely replace 
these traditional outlets. Yet, empirical evidence shows that this is not the case [253, 254]. Moreover, 
these traditional retail outlets are modernizing steadily to better fit the changing consumer needs. 
Traditional retail outlets have a number of advantages over supermarkets. First, traditional retailers 
are more convenient than supermarkets for most urban consumers because these outlets are 
located closer to consumers’ houses, they allow to buy smaller quantities of food, at lower prices, 
and often on credit [248]. Second, traditional outlets create more employment opportunities, offer 
greater flexibility to respond to business opportunities, and require little investment. They are thus 
open to people with limited assets and constrained access to finance. Informal trade is especially 
important for women, who are the primary suppliers of street food and perishable goods, such as 
milk [255]. Third, whereas supermarkets require large and uniform volumes of food to be supplied 
by producers, informal channels are better adapted to the African reality of subsistence agriculture 
and production seasonality. Furthermore, traditional outlets are believed to offer higher margins to 
producers given their smaller operational costs [248, 256].  
                                               
9 Informal activities are unlicensed or unregulated activities [252].  
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In Ethiopia, milk and associated products end up in three major market outlets: open markets, milk 
shops, and supermarkets [257]. Open markets, defined as the sum of direct sales from producers to 
neighbouring households, as well as door-to-door sales by itinerant milk traders, are the most 
important market outlet for Ethiopian households. Supermarkets, seen as modern retailers, are still 
not widespread in Ethiopia. Bekele et al. [257], who interviewed 600 households in Addis Ababa and 
surrounding peri-urban towns, find that more than 80% of the households never frequent 
supermarkets. Milk shops, i.e. specialized milk retailers, are the only frequently used alternative to 
open markets. Milk shops have emerged as a hybrid market outlet in between the traditional open 
market and the modern supermarkets. They can be considered as modernized traditional actors 
selling traditionally produced milk. These shops, also termed milk bars or milk kiosks, are 
increasingly emerging in town and city centres, especially where dairy farming is common. As 
opposite to open markets, these shops have a physical location and also possess fridges to preserve 
the milk, while contrary to modern retailers, they do not have cash register machines [257].  
Bekele et al. [257] further studied consumer preferences for traditional (i.e. milk shops and open 
markets) versus modern retailers (i.e. supermarkets), and found that Ethiopian consumers still prefer 
traditional outlets because of their lower prices, the local variety offered, the perceived better quality 
of milk products (especially in terms of freshness and flavour) and the proximity of these outlets since 
these outlets are numerous and scattered over towns and cities. Another advantage of these 
traditional retailers is that they allow to purchase milk products in variable quantities, which is 
important given the low coverage of fridge ownership forcing households to make frequent 
purchases of small quantities of milk [16]. Ethiopian consumers still prefer traditional milk products 
over the industrially processed milk (e.g. pasteurized milk and butter, milk with reduced fat content, 
and milk powder) typically offered by supermarkets. Pricing seem to minimally affect consumer 
preferences and resource-rich households still prefer traditional outlets over supermarkets [258]. 
Similar findings were reported by Francesconi et al. [16]. And although there is a growing consumer 
awareness on food safety hazards and food quality concerns, trust in traditional retailers keep 
attracting consumers to these outlets [259]. 
Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no study has characterized milk shops so far. Therefore, we 
undertook an explorative study to describe shop ownership, management and retail activities. During 
the data collection in January-February 2016, we conduced structured interviews with 40 milk shops 
in Mekelle. The questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1. Milk shops are spread over the seven 
sub-cities of Mekelle, yet, we found a significantly larger concentration in two sub-cities: Kedamay 
Weyane, the most central sub-city, and Adi Haqi, a sub-city known for its dairy production activities. 
Most milk shows interviewed were located in these two sub-cities (Figure 6-1). The pictures in Figure 
6-2 give a glance on the traditional features of how the milk shops are organized and advertised.  
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Figure 2-11: Map of Mekelle city with it seven sub-cities
 
 
Figure 2-12: From left to right: entrance of two different milk shops; banner advertising a nearby 
milk shop; banner with list of milk shop products; butter sold at shop and preserved in fridge 
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Shop owners 
Having a closer look at milk shop owners (Table 6-1), we find that all the shops interviewed 
were privately owned and the majority had only one owner (34 out of 40). Single owners were 
mostly female and not married (either single or divorced). Owners are relatively young with 
more than half of the shop owners being under 30 years old. Owners mostly enjoyed either 
secondary or higher education. Vocational training was also not exceptional. All shop owners 
indicated to affiliate to the Orthodox Christian religion. 
Table 2-7: Descriptive characteristics of the milk shop owners 
 Number of owners 
 
 Single ownership 
(n=34) 
Shared ownership  
(n=6) 
  Head Spouse 
Sex    
Female 26 0 6 
Male 8 6 0 
Age    
20-29 21 0 2 
30-39 9 2 4 
40-49 2 4 0 
50-59 2 0 0 
Marital status    
Single 21 0 0 
Married 6 6 6 
Divorced/separated 7 0 0 
Educational attainment    
No education 2 3 2 
Vocational training 11 0 0 
Primary education 3 2 2 
Secondary education 13 0 2 
Higher education  5 1 0 
Religious affiliation    
Orthodox 34 6 6 
Shop management and retail activities 
Table 6-2 summarizes some descriptive characteristics of the interviewed milk shops. Shops 
were opened relatively recently, and no shop existed longer than 3 years. More than half of 
the shops employs 1 or 2 workers on a daily basis. These workers are exclusively women, and 
we found only one shop that hired a male worker next to a female worker. None of the shops 
is currently member of a cooperative or association, and 3 shops indicated to have been a 
member in the past. The most important reasons mentioned not to join an association are the 
lack of an association nearby, lack of trust, and negative worth-of-mouth. Half of the shops 
took credit, mostly from a microfinance institution and three-quarters had already repaid the 
loan. Owners seem to be embedded within a network of fellow shop owners as more than two-
thirds of the shops indicate to know at least 1 other milk shop owner personally. Furthermore, 
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13 of the interviewed shop owners indicated that they have (a) relative(s) also owning a milk 
shop. 
Milk shops source their milk exclusively from milk producers with whom they have 
predominantly unwritten agreements. Milk quality seems to be the most important specification 
in this agreement, which is of utmost importance to maintain their store reputation. Milk quality 
is usually determined using a lactometer. Milk is bought daily from milk producers. Most shops 
seem to establish personalized linkages with their milk providers, suggested by the fact that 
two-thirds of the shops use upfront or delayed payment, which can only be established if there 
is sufficient interpersonal trust (Table 6-2).  
During non-fasting periods, shops purchase about 60 L of milk daily with milk producer prices 
fluctuating around 13 ETB per litre (Table 6-3). During Orthodox fasting, shops buy only half 
of this volume and producers are payed about 3.5 ETB less. Both during fasting and non-
fasting half of the purchased milk is converted to milk products, mostly yoghurt and butter. Only 
two of the shops we interviewed processed milk to cheese10. Milk sales are barely affected by 
fasting and daily sales reach about 20 L of liquid milk, 1.5 kg of butter and 8-10 L of yoghurt. 
Yet, it seems that a bias has occurred in data reporting by the shop owners. When detailing 
the difference between quantity of milk purchased on the one hand and quantity of purchased 
milk being processed and/or sold on the other hand, we found that this difference was equal 
to zero for only 21 out of the 40 shops. For the other shops, there was a tendency to report 
higher milk sales and processing volumes compared to the amount of milk purchased from 
farmers during fasting periods (the difference was 7.23 L on average), while the opposite holds 
during non-fasting periods (e.g. part of the milk purchased seems not to be sold nor processed, 
with the difference being 8.13 L on average). This might thus explain the strange patterns 
popping up in Table 6-3, i.e. reduced purchase of milk, while milk sales are not affected by 
fasting periods. For the 21 shops that did not under- or overestimate the milk being sold and 
processed, it appears that supply is cut by 62% during fasting, and milk sales go down with 
58%, while the amount of milk being processed is reduced by 67%. 
Prices charged for liquid milk in the shop are 1-2 ETB higher than the prices paid to milk 
farmers. Shop owning interviewees mention that prices of liquid milk and yoghurt drop with 3 
ETB during fasting, while butter prices are 13 ETB lower during Orthodox fasting. Yoghurt 
prices are twice the price of liquid milk while butter prices are 13 times the price of liquid milk. 
The yoghurt is made by letting raw milk ferment naturally for about 2-4 days in traditional 
utensils [260]. Part of the fermented milk is used to process it further to butter or cheese.  
                                               
10 Since we have only 2 observation for cheese production, sales and prices, we do not elaborate on 
these numbers in the text. 
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Shops’ clientele is not very large. 7 shops indicate to have less than 10 customers. Half of the 
shops has 10-29 customers. This highlights that milk shops are still quite niche outlets in the 
dairy value chain. Only 5 shops claim to have more than 40 customers, with a reported 
maximum of 100 customers. 42.5% of the shops knows more than 10 of these customers 
personally, while only 5 of the interviewed shops recognized that they do not know any 
customer personally. 
Table 2-8: Descriptive characteristics of the interviewed milk shops 
 Percentage of shops (n=40) 
General characteristics  
Ownership  
Single 85 
Shared 15 
Shop existence   
<1 year 22.5 
1 year 32.5 
2 years 30 
3 years 15 
Use of hired workers (yes) 62.5 
Member of cooperative/association/group 0 
Credit uptake (yes) 50 
Number of relatives having a milk shop  
0 67.5 
1-2 22.5 
>2 10 
Number of fellow milk shop owners known personally   
0 27.5 
1-4 47.5 
5-10 25 
Milk sourcing arrangements  
Terms of agreement   
Written 7.5 
Unwritten 92.5 
Agreement specifications   
Quantity supplied 40 
Price 37.5 
Milk quality 95 
Payment arrangement   
Upfront 2.5 
Daily 35 
Delayed 62.5 
Number of milk farmers known personally   
0 2.5 
1-2 30 
3-4 35 
>5 32.5 
Retail activities  
Sold milk products  
Liquid milk 100 
Yoghurt 100 
Butter 80 
Cheese 5 
Number of customers  
<10 17.5 
10-19 25 
20-29 30 
30-39 15 
>40 12.5 
Number of customers known personally  
0 12.5 
1-4 32.5 
5-9 10 
>10 42.5 
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Table 2-9: Descriptive statistics on milk procurement, processing and sales during Orthodox 
fasting and outside long fasting periods (n=40; recall by all shop owners) 
 Mean (Standard error) 
Fasting Non-fasting 
Milk sourced (L/day) 23.98 (2.91) 59.25 (5.12) 
Producer milk price (ETB/L) 9.88 (0.26) 13.23 (0.17) 
Milk processed (L/day) 12.55 (1.57) 29.55 (3.01) 
Sales quantities   
Liquid milk (L/day) 18.65 (2.80) 21.58 (2.87) 
Butter (kg/day) 1.34 (0.31) 1.66 (0.47) 
Yoghurt (L/day) 8.28 (1.24) 10.01 (1.49) 
Cheese (kg/day) 0.53 (0.35) 0.28 (0.25) 
Sales prices    
Liquid milk (ETB/L) 11.62 (0.35) 14.68 (0.29) 
Butter (ETB/kg) 176.36 (10.32) 189.46 (12.18) 
Yoghurt (ETB/L) 24.89 (8.03) 27.97 (8.39) 
Cheese (ETB/kg) 110 (70) 120 (80) 
Note: 1 USD= 23 ETB at the time of the survey 
Conclusion 
Milk shops, small sales point for liquid and processed milk, are increasingly present in urban 
areas. Most milk shops were recently established. These shops procure raw milk daily from 
milk producers. Half of this milk is sold, after boiling and cooling, and the other half is 
processed, mostly to yoghurt and butter using local processing techniques.  
Milk shops provide an alternative market that establishes a short supply chain between 
producers and consumers. Moreover, these shops offer a lot of potential for value addition. 
Interestingly, these milk shops, although they cut their milk supply by half during fasting, still 
operate during long fasting periods. This is surprising, especially in the context of Mekelle, 
where over 95% of the population is Orthodox Christian, and by default is obliged to fast during 
several long fasting spells. Yet, reducing their prices during fasting allows them to maintain 
their milk sales. Important to nuance here is that we found evidence that a large group of shop 
owners we interviewed overreport their milk sales during fasting, and for those who did not, we 
find that milk sales are cut by 58% during fasting periods. 
Another interesting result is that we find that milk shops are gender inclusive and more than 
half of the shops were owned solely by women. Furthermore, these shops offer employment 
mainly to other women. Shop owners are relatively young and well-educated.   
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3.2.2. Urban milk consumers: Do they look alike? 
Next in this section, we take a closer look at urban milk consumers. Some of these consumers 
source milk from own production, while others exclusively rely on the market to purchase their 
milk. Producing households have better access to milk, which might affect their milk intake 
volumes relative to those households who exclusively rely on the market for sourcing milk. 
Furthermore, households engaged in dairy production might have different socio-demographic 
profiles. During the data collection of August-September 2017 in Mekelle, we interviewed 250 
households that are exclusively purchasing milk and 250 milk producing households. In the 
survey we collected descriptive data for the household head, the household at large and the 
household’s milk intake and milk sourcing strategies in the week prior to the interview. This 
enables us to compare both households on a number of key household characteristics (Table 
6-4)11. 
We find that heads of milk producing households are, on average, significantly older and less 
educated than heads of milk purchasing households. Milk producing households have a rather 
traditional family structure, i.e. with head, partner and children, while a significantly larger 
proportion of heads in milk purchasing households is single. Milk producing households are 
larger (on average 1.5 extra household members) and children are more represented in these 
households than in milk purchasing households. High prices for milk probably make it 
interesting for households to keep their own milking cows especially when they have many 
children, who are commonly prioritized for milk intake in households throughout the country 
[7]. Household incomes do not differ significantly between both types of households, but more 
milk producing households report to earn income in kind.  
Regarding consumption of liquid milk, we find, as expected and also described in World Bank 
[261], that a higher proportion of milk producing households indicated to have consumed milk 
in the week prior to the interview. Likewise, the total milk intake volume as well as the intake 
volume per member (accounting for different household sizes) is significantly higher for milk 
producing households given their direct availability of milk. This indicates that cow ownership 
is still key in Ethiopia to satisfy household’s milk needs, even in urban areas which have rather 
well-developed local markets for milk. This to some extent contradicts the findings of Hoddinott 
et al. [27] who argue that market development can substitute for household cow ownership. 
High milk prices, in part driven by increasing production costs and milk shortage (especially in 
urban areas), still limit the affordability of milk and associated products, especially for those 
that exclusively rely on milk purchases.  
                                               
11 Two sample t-tests (continuous variables) and chi-square tests (categorical) were used to detect 
significant differences on key variables between both groups. 
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Table 2-10: Demographic characteristics and milk intake pattern among milk producing and 
milk purchasing households in the city of Mekelle 
 Milk producing households 
(n=253) 
 
Milk purchasing households 
(n=251) 
Demographics – HH head   
Proportion female  0.20a 0.24a 
Age (years) 47.55 (0.83)a 43.23 (0.80)b 
Educational background (proportion)   
No schooling 0.19a 0.06b 
Religious education 0.05a 0.03a 
Junior primary 0.19a 0.08b 
Senior primary 0.30a 0.27a 
General secondary 0.08b 0.15a 
Preparatory secondary 0.06a 0.08a 
Higher education 0.12b 0.32a 
Marital status (proportion)   
Single 0.04b 0.11a 
Married 0.83a 0.74b 
Divorced/separated 0.07a 0.06a 
Widowed 0.05a 0.08a 
Proportion working for income 0.96a 0.91b 
Demographics – HH    
HH size (number) 6.16 (0.14)a 4.71 (0.13)b 
Share of children on total HH size 0.69 (0.05)a 0.56 (0.03)b 
Dependency ratio  0.34 (0.11)b 0.40 (0.14)a 
Total monthly income (ETB/HH member) 2,740.03 (178.79)a 2,977.33 (344.72)a 
Proportion earning in-kind income 0.19a 0.06b 
HH milk consumption   
Proportion that consumed liquid milk in the 
week prior to the interview  
0.85a 0.63b 
Liquid milk consumption per HH member 
past week conditional on HH consuming 
milk (L/member) 
1.21 (0.08)a 0.92 (0.07)b 
Note: a-b Means or proportions with different superscripts differ significantly (p<.05). Where applicable, standard 
errors are given in parentheses. 
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Abstract 
The impact of religious behaviour on food systems in developing economies has been understated 
in scholarly studies. With its different Christian, Islamic, and traditional faiths, Ethiopia emerges as a 
natural experiment to investigate the impact of religious practices on demand. The inclusion of 
animal-sourced foods in Ethiopian diets is extremely low, even by African standards; a phenomenon 
often explained by supply and marketing problems combined with low-income levels. We deviate 
from this dominant narrative and single out the impact of religion. We show how fasting practices of 
Orthodox Christians, the largest religious group, affect milk intake decisions. Employing country wide 
data collected by the Living Standards Measurement Studies, we find, as expected, that Orthodox 
fasting adversely affects milk consumption in Orthodox households, an effect we quantify in this 
chapter. Moreover, we observe spill-over effects of Orthodox fasting on other religious groups in 
dominantly Orthodox localities. Our findings improve the understanding of the broader societal 
implication of religiously inspired consumption rituals and underscore the challenges resulting from 
religion-induced demand cycles to design policies that aim at developing the livestock sector.  
Keywords: Orthodox Christian, demand seasonality, fasting, Ethiopia, milk acquisition, milk intake, 
national 
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1. Introduction 
The term ‘Livestock Revolution’ was introduced by Delgado et al. [262] to point to the 
unprecedentedly rapid increase in demand for livestock produce noted in the developing world since 
the 1970s. Population growth, progressive urbanization and growing per capita income levels are 
thought to be the revolution’s driving forces [262]. While individual intake of ASFs indeed exploded 
in some transforming and urbanised economies of Asia and Latin-America (particularly in China, 
India, and Brazil), the livestock revolution surpassed the majority of developing countries. Annual 
growth rates of per capita milk, meat and egg consumption in SSA were -0.2%, 0.2%, and 0.3% 
respectively for the period 1987-2007 [3]. Problems of structural supply, poorly developed local 
markets, low-income levels, and lack of consumer awareness regarding the nutritional benefits of 
ASFs have been advanced to explain this stagnation. Yet, the association of low intake of ASFs with 
cultural values and practices in general, and religion in particular, has been largely neglected and 
understudied; a research gap we address in this chapter.  
The significance of including an appropriate level of ASFs in diets to improve dietary quality and 
nutritional outcomes is underpinned in an abundant number of studies, see for example Muslimatun 
and Wiradnyani [263] and Zhang et al. [264]. ASFs are valuable and dense sources of several micro 
and macronutrients which are hard to retrieve in adequate amount from plant source foods only [38]. 
Livestock-based interventions are therefore deemed to be a decisive strategy to reduce malnutrition, 
especially in SSA where half of the world’s malnourished population is residing, and where diets 
predominantly consist of cereal or root staple crops [40]. Of all livestock produce, milk is the largest 
source of animal-based protein in developing countries. It accounts for 60% of total per capita 
consumption of primary ASFs (i.e. meat, milk, and eggs) [3]. Particularly the fact that milk production 
has one of the lowest production costs when compared to other plant and animal protein sources, 
makes it a desirable source of nutrients for improved nutritional and health outcomes in developing 
countries [39]. 
Within SSA, Ethiopia hosts the largest estimated livestock herd [36], yet Ethiopian diets contain 
relatively little ASFs. Animal produce account for only 1.7% and 3% of the total energy intake of rural 
and urban households respectively [238], whereas starchy staples provide three-quarters of the total 
calorie intake [237]. Desiere et al. [265] reported that only 19% of the households interviewed by the 
LSMS programme in Ethiopia consumed meat or fish. In August 2015, the Ethiopian government 
launched the national Livestock Master Plan to boost livestock production and productivity. 
Roadmaps were developed for different key livestock value chains. Although the plan acknowledges 
the importance of promoting livestock produce consumption, the core of the proposed interventions 
relates to improving livestock production and productivity through enhanced herd management, 
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genetic resources, feed, and health care [266]. With this one-sided policy focus on supply side 
factors, the gap between demand and supply of ASFs is likely to widen further in the future. 
By contrast, our study emphasises the importance of the demand side of the milk market. Changes 
in ASF consumption patterns in SSA societies not only depend on changing income levels, but also 
reflect prolonged cultural processes that are influenced by deeply embedded religious traditions. 
Robinson and Pozzi [267] point out that particularly cultural and religious values and practices have 
slowed down the substitution of high value foods such as ASFs for starchy staples in African food 
baskets. So far, consumption-oriented research has mostly ignored or underestimated the role of 
the diverse cultural and religious traditions in everyday life decisions [5].  
In terms of faiths, Christianity (63%) and Islam (30%) are the two dominant religious affiliations in 
SSA [224]. Both religions have been co-existing for centuries and are among the fastest growing 
religious faiths in SSA [268]. Ethiopia, the second most populous country of the continent, is home 
to Orthodox (44% of the population), Muslim (34%), Protestant (19%), Catholic (1%), and traditional 
faiths (3%) [15]. The country hosts the second largest community of Orthodox Christians in the world 
after Russia [269]. The particular fasting rituals are one of the main identifying factors of the Orthodox 
Church. During fasting spells, which are scattered throughout a religious year, Orthodox followers 
are presumed to pursue a vegan diet, hence to abstain from consuming any ASF. With around half 
of the Ethiopian population being member of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and a total sum of about 
166-250 Orthodox fasting days per year [8, 16, 17], religion inevitably influences demand for animal 
produce in the country. Although several studies mention that fasting undeniably impacts livestock 
consumption patterns as it is causing a seasonal demand cycle [8, 17], none has attempted to 
quantify the effect of fasting practices on livestock consumption decisions of households at a national 
level. 
This chapter aims at evaluating the impact of religion on household’s milk intake decisions and milk 
sourcing strategies in Ethiopia. This chapter aims at evaluating the impact of religion on household’s 
milk intake decisions and milk sourcing strategies in Ethiopia. Using country wide data collected by 
the Living Standards Measurement Studies (LSMS), we address the following three research 
questions: (1) do Orthodox households limit their milk consumption during fasting and will they limit 
their milk consumption more when surrounded by an increasing density of Orthodox Christians?; (2) 
do non-Orthodox households limit their milk consumption during fasting?; and (3) does fasting limit 
market development and thus consumption outside fasting periods? While the data collected in the 
LSMS programme are not intended to study the effect of Orthodox fasting seasons on food intake 
and food market development, we could use this dataset because of the partial overlap of the data 
collection (February-April 2014) with the longest continuous fasting period of the Orthodox 
community, i.e. Lent, a 55-day fast preceding Easter. This timing allows us to compare milk intake 
decisions and milk acquisition strategies outside and during Orthodox fasting periods among the 
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different religious groups in the country: Orthodox Christians, Protestants, Muslims, and others (i.e. 
Catholics and traditional faiths).  
Our results show important impacts of fasting. First, Lent fast reduces the likelihood of Orthodox 
households to consume milk by one-third as compared to the period outside Lent fast, ceteris 
paribus. Lent fast especially impacts Orthodox households who have no young children (aged 0-6 
years), and these households see their probability to consume milk reduced by two-thirds during the 
Lent fast. An increasing concentration of Orthodox Christians reduces the likelihood of Orthodox 
households to consume milk both during and outside the Lent fast period, but Lent fast does not 
decrease their likelihood to consume milk more as compared to outside the Lent fast period when 
they are increasingly surrounded by Orthodox members. This seems to suggest that there is no 
difference in the strictness with which Orthodox households adhere to fasting practices between 
Orthodox minority or Orthodox majority settings, at least not for the Lent fast period.  
Second, fasting rituals not only affect the practicing Orthodox group, but spill over to other religious 
communities, and in particular to the Ethiopian Muslim community. Such an impact was not found 
among Protestant households – we rather observe an opposite trend – which seems to suggest that 
fasting norms mainly spill over to the Muslim community.  
Third, we find evidence that increasing densities of Orthodox Christians significantly reduce the 
probability of households to consume milk, irrespective of the religious affiliation of households. As 
such we find that a 1% increase in Orthodox concentration reduces the probability of a household to 
consume milk by 10 percentage points, ceteris paribus. We find that if households consume milk in 
dominantly Orthodox settings, they are significantly less likely to source this milk from the market. 
These observations point to hampered local market development and reduced milk availability in 
dominantly Orthodox settings which impact milk consumption among Orthodox and non-Orthodox 
households even outside fasting periods. 
Based on these findings, we argue that religious values and practices – along with other factors – lie 
at the root of the observed low and stationary consumer demand for animal produce in the country 
and contribute to an intentional demand seasonality. Further research is needed to address the 
limitations of the dataset we use (cross-sectional and recall data) and to assess more in detail the 
impact of fasting on the supply chain and milk market, which we address later on in this dissertation 
(Chapter 4 and 5). 
Our research contributes to the literature on economic and societal impact of religion in food systems 
in four important ways: (1) we study fasting among Orthodox Christian households and its impact on 
milk consumption in an African context, while most research was done on religion and food habits 
and consumer choices in a Western context within the predominant studied religion of Islam; (2) we 
present results from a nationwide study, while other studies are limited to case studies of a few 
CHAPTER 3 
74   
villages or cities; (3) Ethiopia hosts households of different religious affiliations, which allows the 
setting of a natural experiment to investigate the impact of religious practices; and (4) the study 
shows the broader societal impact of Orthodox fasting which is due to important spill-over effects on 
consumption and sourcing patterns of households across religious affiliations. This should draw 
attention of policy makers when designing livestock programmes.  
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2. Background  
2.1. Linking religion and consumer behaviour  
Research has tried to link habits, norms and/or customs to various outcomes at household, regional, 
sectorial, national and international levels. Cultural factors have been linked to (among other): 
marriage patterns [50], educational attainment [51, 52], migration intention [53], sanitation practices 
[54], fertility rates [55], female labour force participation [56], wages differentials [270], aid allocation 
[57], service supply [58], resource management [59], technological innovation [271], state 
governance [272], corruption [60, 273], happiness [61], economic growth [48, 62], poverty [274], and 
agricultural productivity [63, 64]. How culture in general, and religion in particular, influences 
consumption behaviour, however, is vastly understudied. Religion influences consumers both 
directly via explicit instructions laid out in holy texts and/or by religious leaders and indirectly through 
beliefs and attitudes established within the larger religious group [275]. Quantitative analyses on the 
impact of specific religious beliefs and practices on consumer behaviour and associated market 
outcomes remain scarce and scattered [5, 77].  
A large majority of the studies to date unravel behavioural intentions rather than revealed behavioural 
actions and have a predominant focus on Islamic traditions. Furthermore, the available empirical 
research is mostly business oriented. These studies are informative for advertising strategies, store 
and brand image building, product decisions, and establishing (new) market channels. Fam et al. 
[276] and Putrevu and Swimberghek [277] find that offensiveness vis-à-vis advertising controversial 
product groups (like gender related produce) differs significantly across religious groups and levels 
of religiosity. Some studies give valuable insights that can guide the establishment of particular 
religiously guided market channels e.g. Verbeke et al. [85] and Heiman et al. [5] who focus on 
different halal and kosher certification systems and accompanying supply channels.  
Consumption behaviour for products that are linked to religious practices is also mirrored by demand 
differences towards specific product characteristics, e.g. environmentally friendly produce [278], 
fairtrade products [279], genetically modified products [280], and whole fresh chicken versus cut or 
frozen chicken [105]. While the diverse range of topics reflected in the literature shows the desire of 
researchers to gain insight into traditional values and religious patterns from the point of view of 
marketing and consumer communication, it also shows that the broad impact of religion in shaping 
individual and collective food consumption choices has been understated in scholarly studies [5]. 
Rather than focusing on the narrow perspective of religious food specifications, we intend to improve 
our understanding of religiously inspired consumption rituals and their broader societal implications.
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2.2. Costly religious food restrictions 
Rules and restrictions are inherent to religious institutions and often relate to dietary practices. These 
food restrictions give rise to distinct consumption patterns and are established either temporarily 
(such as fasting) and/or permanently (e.g. restriction to kosher and halal food in Jewish and Islamic 
traditions respectively) and require either abstinence from all (e.g. Ramadan from dawn to sunset) 
or certain foods (e.g. by the abstinence from ASFs for Orthodox Christians) [281]. 
Fasting is a fundamental pillar of several religious groups. Various studies analyse how participation 
in Ramadan, the Islamic fasting month, affects outcomes, such as dietary and nutrient intake [127, 
282], mental and physical health [283, 284], educational performance [141, 285], physical 
performance [286, 287], foetal development [285, 288], and output growth [289]. 
The existing literature on Orthodox Christians mainly concentrates on the Greek community and 
examines how religious fasting impacts physical and biochemical body parameters through changing 
food and nutrient intake patterns [190, 290, 291]. Only one previous study directly addresses the 
fasting practice of the Orthodox Church in Ethiopia. Knutsson and Selinus [78] elaborate on the 
longest Orthodox fasting period preceding Easter, known as Lent, and how it impacts food intake 
among households and factory workers in the capital, Addis Ababa, and one village in the Oromia 
region. They detect a substantial drop in the total volume and quality of protein intake by small 
children between the age of six months and three years, which can be attributed to the exclusion of 
milk and other ASFs from their diet during Lent fasting. Given the modest appearance of animal 
produce in non-fasting periods, fasting resulted in a deficiency of 25% compared to recommended 
total protein intake, which might be harmful for children’s growth and development.  
Other authors indirectly controlled for Orthodox fasting practices in their papers. Hirvonen et al. [238] 
who studied seasonality trends in Ethiopian diets, uncovered that the average energy intake and 
diversity of urban households’ diets sharply fell during the two main Orthodox fasting periods (Lent 
and Advent). This trend was not observed in rural areas, possibly because ASFs are not as regularly 
incorporated in rural diets. Other studies mention how Orthodox fasting practices affect ASF 
purchases, availability, and sales. Negassa [6] evaluates the determinants of purchasing raw milk 
and butter within two towns of the Oromia region, accommodating 200 urban households. They 
observe that households who participated in fasting were less likely to purchase raw milk and butter. 
Moreover conditional on household’s purchases, the quantity of raw milk purchased declined 
significantly for households practicing fasting, although the effect of fasting on the quantity of 
purchased butter was not significant, probably because of the small purchase volumes of butter. 
Ayenew et al. [292], who studied the supply side of the milk market in (peri-)urban areas, found that 
milk sales and prices were significantly higher during non-fasting days, while there was no such 
effect of fasting versus non-fasting on the volume of butter sales. Only butter prices were slightly 
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higher in non-fasting periods. Both observations imply that the reduced milk sales are not 
compensated for by an increased sale of butter nor is the reduced milk intake during fasting events 
offset by a rising butter consumption. An older study by Avery [202] on the meat value chain in Addis 
Ababa reveals that 85% of the butcheries close on traditional Wednesday and Friday Orthodox 
fasting days and 43% of the supermarkets report a drop in meat sales on those days. Moreover, the 
France Vétérinaire Internationale-Institute de l’Elevage [293] found that Orthodox fasting practices 
put great pressure on abattoirs’ capacity in Addis Ababa as the number of cattle, sheep, and goats 
slaughtered fell by 75% during the Orthodox Lent fasting period. Such drop was not observed during 
Muslim major fasting season (Ramadan). Finally, Aklilu et al. [294] who examined village poultry 
consumption and marketing in the Tigray region, established that religious fasts and feasts 
periodically shift local demand, sales, and prices of poultry.  
In sum, the above-mentioned literature agrees that fasting rituals in Ethiopia have an undeniable 
impact on demand seasonality in milk and meat markets which has a costly impact on the livestock 
sector. This chapter builds on these findings by providing a nationwide quantification of the impact 
of Orthodox fasting and by estimating the spill-over effects across religious groups.   
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2.3. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church and fasting practices 
Fasting is a ritual commonly practiced within the Orthodox Church. It is seen as an integral part of 
religious identity, and serves as a measure of piousness [78]. As Boylston [295] witnesses, Ethiopian 
people would rather ask a person first whether he/she would fast instead of asking this person 
whether he/she is Christian. Unique to Ethiopian Orthodox Church (and broad Orthodox Christian 
Church by extension) is that fasting is performed during different periods throughout a religious year. 
Orthodox traditions prescribe their members not to eat any food from animal origin. The fasts 
performed differ in duration and can be categorised into two main types: one day fasts occurring on 
Wednesdays and Fridays all year round (except for the two months after Ethiopian Easter) and 
longer fasting seasons around or preceding holy events. Lent is the longest continuous and most 
important of all fasts (55 days). Other major fasting periods occur in December-January (40 days) 
and August (16 days). Besides commonly imposed fasts, a large variety of spontaneous individual 
fasts is applied which makes it very difficult to assess the exact number of fasting days. Estimates 
published on the number of fasting days each year in the country vary between 166-250 days [8, 16, 
17]. Although fasting rules are strict, pregnant and lactating women, severely ill or weak persons, as 
well as children below the age of seven can be fully exempt from fasting [292]. 
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3. Materials and methods 
3.1. Data 
We use data from the LSMS programme, a household survey programme housed within the Survey 
Unit of the World Bank's Development Data Group that provides technical assistance to the Central 
Statistical Agency of Ethiopia for conducting the actual survey on the territory of Ethiopia. The 
empirical analysis is based on data collected from a total of 5262 households in 2013-2014, the 
second data collection wave. We did not consider the first (2011-2012) or the third (2015-2016) wave 
as the first wave did not include all urban areas (only rural and small-town areas were surveyed), 
while the third wave had only 599 observations during Lent across all religious groups, whereas 
these amount to 1771 in 2013-2014. The data set covers all regional states including the capital, 
Addis Ababa. Respondents are selected by means of a stratified two stage cluster sample design 
[296]. A minimum number of enumeration areas (EAs) is set per regional state, using the Probability 
Proportional to Size sampling method. The EAs correspond to (parts of) municipalities or kebeles, 
the smallest administrative entities in Ethiopia. In total, 433 EAs are covered by the survey, 290 in 
rural areas, 43 in small town areas and 100 in major town areas. Within each EA, households are 
randomly selected.  
The LSMS questionnaire provides information on the individual attributes of the household members, 
including religious affiliation, and household consumption of selected food items using a the seven-
day recall period. Respondents were asked whether the household consumed milk in the week prior 
to the interview. If a household consumed milk in that week, it was asked how much of the consumed 
milk was sourced from own production and how much was purchased on the market. Only detailed 
consumption data were available for liquid milk but not for butter. The interviews were implemented 
between February-April 2014, which was before, during and after Lent (24 February 2014-19 April 
2014), the longest continuous fast of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. As we do not have information 
about household’s actual involvement in fasting rituals, we matched dates of the fasting period with 
the individual recall period: a household record is labelled fasting if at least part of the seven-day 
recall period coincides with Lent fasting days, and non-fasting otherwise. This is a reasonable 
assumption since 87% of the Ethiopian Orthodox Christians report that they fast during holy times 
such as Lent [32]. We find that a third of the consumption survey records occur during the Orthodox 
Lent fasting season. This allows us to compare consumption patterns outside and during the fasting 
season. Ramadan took place later that year outside the data collection period (28 June 2014-28 July 
2014). No data were available on the production and/or processing of milk within that seven-day 
recall period, hence we could only approximate what happens at the local milk market level by 
looking into milk sourcing strategies by milk consuming households.
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3.2. Methodological approach 
We start from the premise that religious affiliation – and thus fasting – only influences the decision 
of a household whether or not to consume milk. We have no reason to expect that, ceteris paribus, 
religious affiliation or fasting as such would influence the level of consumption, conditional on the 
household consuming milk.  
To test which household characteristics are associated with a household’s likelihood to consume 
milk, we apply a Probit regression to model the binary outcome of a household’s decision to consume 
or not to consume milk: 
                                                                        𝑌𝑖,𝑧 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑌
∗
𝑖,𝑧 ≤ 0                                                     eq. 1 
𝑌𝑖,𝑧 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖,𝑧
∗ > 0                            eq. 2 
𝑌𝑖,𝑧
∗ = 𝛼0  +  𝛼1𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑂𝑒𝑎 +  𝛼3𝐶ℎ𝑖 +  𝛼4𝑀𝐶𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑖𝑅𝑖 +∑𝛼𝑖𝑅𝑖  𝐹𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑂𝑒𝑎 + ∑𝛼𝑖𝐹𝑖𝑂𝑒𝑎 + ∑𝛼𝑖𝑅𝑖𝐹𝑖𝑂𝑒𝑎 +
∑𝛼𝑖𝐹𝑖𝐶ℎ𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑖𝑅𝑖𝐹𝑖𝐶ℎ𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑖𝐹𝑖𝑀𝐶𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑖𝑅𝑖𝐹𝑖𝑀𝐶𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑖 𝐻𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑖 𝐿𝑧 + 𝜀𝑖                                 eq. 3 
In the above equations, the dependent variable (𝑌𝑖,𝑧) takes a value one if the household consumed 
milk during the seven days prior to the survey, zero otherwise. The probability that a household i in 
locality z chooses alternative one depends on the net utility (𝑌∗𝑖,𝑧) a household derives from 
consuming milk. Only when the net utility of drinking milk is positive, a household will decide to 
consume. This net utility, in turn, is shaped by the household’s religious affiliation (𝑅𝑖), whether it is 
a fasting period (𝐹𝑖), the density of Orthodox Christians in an enumeration area (𝑂𝑒𝑎), whether or not 
a household has young children (𝐶ℎ𝑖)
12, and whether or not a household has direct access to milk, 
i.e. whether or not a household owns milking cows (𝑀𝐶𝑖), a vector of other household (𝐻𝑖) and 
location (𝐿𝑧) controls, and the error terms (𝜀𝑖).  
Based on empirical studies focusing on determinants of milk consumption, see for example Negassa 
[6], Njarui et al. [297], Trung et al. [298], and Kusiluka et al. [299], and the available data within the 
LSMS, we include the following household level controls in our analysis: gender, age, marital status, 
and educational background of the household head, household’s living standard, children between 
the age of seven and nine, older people (aged 65 and above) and remaining household members. 
Vulnerable groups such as young children, and elderly people are often prioritized and exempt from 
religious prescriptions when it comes to milk intake at household level [6, 7] and thus will increase 
the likelihood of a household to consume milk both during and outside fasting. We also consider 
dairy goat ownership to further control for the household’s direct access to milk. Milk can also be 
                                               
12 The dummy variable for young children takes a value one if the household has at least one young child aged 
between 0-6 years old, zero otherwise. 
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sourced from sheep and camel. However, none of the households in the sample held dairy sheep 
and 1.29% of households in the sample had camel, but these were exclusively Muslim households. 
We thus dropped dairy sheep and camel ownership in the analyses as their contribution in milk intake 
is negligible. Finally, we add location level controls by incorporating the household’s residence (be it 
in a rural village, a small town or a large town), the milk price to control for market accessibility, and 
a regional state dummy to adjust for possible variations in milk consumption and production across 
the regions due to differences in livestock population densities [36] and tribal practices [300]. A 
detailed description of the dependent and explanatory variables used in the models can be found in 
Supplementary material A.1, Table S3-1. 
More extended statistical analyses to test the robustness of Probit regressions modelling the 
likelihood of a household to consume milk can be found in the Supplementary material A.2. 
Finally, to study the impact of fasting rituals on market development, we extend our analyses and 
investigate if fasting causes shifts in the probability that a household sources consumed milk from 
the market13. Therefore, we restrict our sample to households who have consumed milk in the week 
prior to the interview and we study how fasting impacts households’ decisions to consume milk from 
purchase (𝑊𝑖,𝑧).  
𝑊𝑖,𝑧  = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑊𝑖,𝑧
∗  ≤ 0                                        eq. 4 
𝑊𝑖,𝑧 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑊𝑖,𝑧
∗ > 0                          eq. 5 
𝑊𝑖,𝑧
∗  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑒𝑎 + ∑𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑖 + ∑𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑖𝐹𝑖 + ∑𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑂𝑒𝑎 + ∑𝛽𝑖𝐹𝑖𝑂𝑒𝑎 + ∑𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑖𝐹𝑖𝑂𝑒𝑎 +
                                                                                   ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐻𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑖𝐿𝑧                                       eq. 6 
In the above equations, the dependent variable 𝑊𝑖,𝑧 takes a value one if (part of) the milk that a 
household consumed originated from purchase, and zero otherwise. The probability that a household 
i in locality z chooses alternative one depends on the net utility a household derives from purchasing 
the milk it consumes (𝑊𝑖,𝑧
∗ ).  
                                               
13 We find in our dataset that households who consume milk either source the consumed milk from own 
production or from the market, but rarely source it both from own production and from the market. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive results  
To test whether religious affiliation or fasting indeed only affect the decision of a household to 
consume, we restrict our sample to only consuming households, and we find that average 
consumption levels per adult equivalent do not differ significantly across religious groups both during 
and outside fasting periods (Figure 3-1). Fasting thus affects the decision to consume milk, but once 
a household has decided to consume milk, milk volumes consumed are not affected by fasting 
seasons.  
 
Figure 3-1: Average observed milk consumption for those households indicating to have consumed 
milk in the week prior to the interview; with confidence intervals drawn at α=0.05 
When average milk consumption is calculated irrespective of a household’s religious affiliation, 
volumes consumed significantly decrease during Lent: from 1.55 L/household during a non-fasting 
week recorded in the interviews compared to 1.04 L/household during fasting time. Figure 3-2 gives 
a comparison of the consumption patterns across the different religious groups (i.e. Orthodox, 
Protestant, Muslim, and other). Overall, Orthodox households seem to consume less milk compared 
to other religious communities (Figure 3-2, left part), which can partly be explained by the smaller 
proportion of Orthodox households that consume milk (Figure 3-2, right part). The left part of Figure 
3-2 shows that Orthodox Christians consumed almost 30% less milk during Lent compared to their 
religious peers outside the fasting season – milk intake drops from 0.66 L/household to 0.48 
L/household. This drop might seem small as we would expect consumption to drop to zero, yet, we 
also still find a large proportion of Orthodox households that consume milk during Lent (Figure 3-2, 
right part). Comparing the household characteristics of Orthodox households that consumed milk 
during fasting with those that abstained from milk, reveals that those households that maintain their 
milk consumption during Lent have significantly larger households with significantly more young 
children – on average, consuming households had twice as many young children. Moreover, milking 
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cow herds of these households are twice as large as the herds of Orthodox households refraining 
from milk intake (Table 3-1).  
 
Figure 3-2: Average observed milk consumption (left) and the proportion of households consuming 
milk (right) across religious groups at Orthodox fasting and non-fasting; with confidence intervals 
drawn at α=0.05 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Table 3-1: Descriptive household characteristics of liquid milk consuming and non-consuming 
Orthodox households during Lent 
 Mean (SE) 
 Non-consuming 
Orthodox households 
Consuming Orthodox 
households 
Proportion of male heads 0.58 (0.02)a 0.64 (0.03)a 
Age heads (year) 43.17 (0.59)a 41.72 (1.01)a 
Proportion of married heads  0.54 (0.02)a 0.70 (0.03)b 
Proportion of heads with   
Illiterate or informal education 0.40 (0.02)a 0.30 (0.03)b 
Primary education 0.26 (0.02)a 0.29 (0.03)a 
Secondary education 0.23 (0.02)a 0.31 (0.03)b 
College/university education 0.10 (0.01)a 0.10 (0.02)a 
Number of young children (0-6)             0.46 (0.03)a 0.86 (0.06)b 
Number of children (7-9) 0.27 (0.02)a 0.35 (0.04)a 
Number of elderly (65 and above) 0.17 (0.01)a 0.12 (0.03)a 
Number of remaining members 2.93 (0.07)a 3.34 (0.13)b 
Milking cow herd size 0.20 (0.02)a 0.44 (0.08)b 
Milking goat herd size 0.00 (0.00) 0 (0) 
Household income (ETB/week) 403.65 (11.92)a 683.62 (35.54)b 
Proportion residing in   
Rural area 0.32 (0.02)a 0.26 (0.03)a 
Small-town area (urban) 0.06 (0.01)a 0.04 (0.01)a 
Large-town area (urban) 0.62 (0.02)a 0.70 (0.03)b 
Note: a-b Means within a row with different superscripts differ significantly (p ≤ 0.05).  
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Moreover, not only Orthodox households seem to reduce their consumption. The difference in milk 
consumption levels outside and during Lent across Muslim households is notable (left part of Figure 
3-2). The right part of Figure 3-2 reveals that the proportion of Muslim households drinking milk 
reduces from 57% to 49%, which partially explains this sizable drop. An opposite trend is observed 
among Protestant households. As explained in Section 2.3., consumption, availability, and sales of 
ASFs alter sharply during fasting. If the milk market unravels during Orthodox fasts, we would expect 
that milk intake of both Protestant and Muslim households is equally affected by fasting. Yet, this is 
not what we observe. A tentative explanation for these findings could be that the spill-over of social 
norms (in this case respecting the Orthodox fasting) is stronger for non-Christian groups, in our case 
Muslims. Protestants, who belong to the broad class of Christianity, show higher interpersonal 
similarity with the Orthodox community and thus the social distance between both groups is smaller 
compared to the distance between Orthodox Christians and Muslims. A vast body of literature on in- 
and out-group interactions has assessed differential attitude/behaviour/treatment of one group vis-
à-vis the other group (which is elaborated more on in Chapter 6 and 7). These studies, however, 
implicitly consider the out-group to be homogenously composed. We argue that considerable 
heterogeneity exists within the out-group, especially in terms of social distance and literature has 
shown that social distance affects judgments and behaviour towards others. Yet, the limitations of 
our datasets do not allow us to investigate the social norm channel in further detail.  
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4.2. Modelling results 
Results from the Probit regression modelling the likelihood of a household to consume milk as 
elaborated in Section 3.2 are presented in Table 3-2 (i.e. Probit 1, first column). We gradually build 
up this model to test the robustness of our significant results. Average marginal effects of the main 
interest variables in the full Probit model (i.e. Probit 1, first column in Table 3-2) are presented in 
Table 3-3. Furthermore, predicted probabilities to consume milk at household level at the means of 
the covariates are shown in Table 3-4 and Table 3-5. As a robustness check, we re-ran the Probit 
regressions of Table 3-2 but now having continuous variables for both young children and dairy 
cows. The results can be found in the Supplementary material A.2. 
In the discussions below, we focus on the Orthodox, Protestant, and Muslim communities as the 
group with other religious affiliations was too small (n=143) to draw non-fallacious conclusions.  
Fasting clearly impacts household’s milk intake as it alters the likelihood of a household to drink milk 
(Table 3-2). The effects are multiple and not limited to the Orthodox community, and remain fairly 
constant when gradually building up the model. In what follows, we will focus on the results from the 
full Probit model, i.e. Probit 1.  
First, fasting reduces the likelihood of a household to consume milk by 5 percentage points, ceteris 
paribus (Table 3-3). Although this drop might seem small, part of the household consumption data 
which are labelled as fasting, reflect consumption both during Lent and non-fasting days, which might 
happen if a household was interviewed in the beginning of the Lent fasting period or after Lent 
fasting. When we detail the impact of Orthodox fasting across the different religious groups, we find 
that the probability of milk intake decreases by 11 and 3 percentage points for Orthodox and Muslim 
households respectively, while Protestant households’ probability increases by 6 percentage points 
(Table 3-4). Since the Orthodox and Muslim community jointly represent 80% of the Ethiopian 
population, this observation implies a non-negligible impact of fasting on national milk demand.  
Second, when detailing the impact of fasting on households without young children versus 
households with at least 1 young child, we observe, as expected, that fasting especially impacts 
households without young children and fasting reduces their likelihood to consume milk by 10 
percentage points (Table 3-4). The impact of fasting is the biggest for Orthodox households without 
young children, who see their likelihood to consume milk cut by two-thirds – from 29 to 11 percentage 
points, ceteris paribus (Table 3-4).  
Third, we find evidence that increasing densities of Orthodox Christians significantly reduce the 
probability to consume milk. A 1 percent increase in the density of Orthodox Christians in an 
enumeration area reduces the likelihood of a household to consume milk by 10 percentage points, 
ceteris paribus (Table 3-3). When detailing the impact over religious groups and fasting/non-fasting 
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periods, we observe that an increasing concentration of Orthodox Christians reduces the likelihood 
of Orthodox households to consume milk both during and outside fasting periods (Table 3-5). Fasting 
reduces Orthodox households’ probability to consume milk slightly more than one-third on average, 
irrespective of the concentration of Orthodox Christians (Table 3-5). This suggests that there is no 
difference in the strictness with which Orthodox households adhere to fasting practices between 
Orthodox minority or Orthodox majority settings, at least not for the Lent fast period. For Protestant 
and Muslim households, we observe that an increasing density of Orthodox Christians especially 
reduces their likelihood to consume milk outside the Lent fast period (Table 3-5). 
Fourth, we find a large effect of dairy cow ownership. Households who own dairy cows, are 24 
percentage points more likely to have consumed milk in the week prior to the interview (Table 3-3). 
Fasting seems to impact especially those households with dairy cows. These households are 10 
percentage points less likely to consume milk during Lent fast, while households without dairy cows 
are 4 percentage points less likely to consume milk during Lent fast (Table 3-4). Yet, having dairy 
cows makes households more likely to consume milk even during fasting periods. When detailing 
the impact of fasting and dairy cow ownership across the different religious groups, we observe that 
the likelihood of consuming milk by Orthodox households owning dairy cows is almost cut by half 
during fasting periods, whereas it is only cut by one-third for those Orthodox households without 
dairy cows. The impact of fasting on other religious groups owning dairy cows is on the other hand 
neglectable which seems to suggest that dairy cow ownership can help to reduce the impact of 
Orthodox fasting practices on these households (Table 3-4). 
  
  
 
Table 3-2: Results from Probit models modelling the likelihood of a household to have consumed milk in the last seven days prior to the interview 
 Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 3 Probit 4 Probit 5 Probit 6 Probit 7 
        
Religious affiliation (Orthodox Christian omitted)        
Protestant -0.23 (0.18) -0.01 (0.15) -0.09 (0.16) -0.17 (0.18) -0.03 (0.15) -0.06 (0.14) 0.10 (0.08) 
Muslim 0.28 (0.17)* 0.32 (0.15)** 0.31 (0.15)** 0.28 (0.16)* 0.31 (0.15)** 0.28 (0.14)** 0.34 (0.08)*** 
Other 0.67 (0.31)** 0.47 (0.23)** 0.46 (0.25)* 0.68 (0.29)** 0.46 (0.23)** 0.43 (0.21)** 0.39 (0.14)*** 
Interview period (non-fasting omitted)        
Fasting  -0.65 (0.23)*** -0.58 (0.23)** -0.46 (0.23)** -0.69 (0.23)*** -0.50 (0.23)** -0.57 (0.16)*** -0.22 (0.05)*** 
EA Orthodox concentration -0.38 (0.17)** -0.38 (0.17)** -0.38 (0.17)** -0.38 (0.17)** -0.38 (0.17)** -0.41 (0.15)*** -0.38 (0.10)*** 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period)  
(Orthodox Christian omitted) 
       
Protestant * fasting 0.72 (0.32)** 0.36 (0.27) 0.49 (0.29)* 0.68 (0.31)** 0.43 (0.27) 0.53 (0.16)*** - 
Muslim * fasting 0.37 (0.28) 0.17 (0.25) 0.14 (0.25) 0.47 (0.27)* 0.24 (0.25) 0.32 (0.16)** - 
Other * fasting -0.29 (0.63) 0.63 (0.43) 0.05 (0.57) 0.21 (0.55) 0.68 (0.43) 0.76 (0.30)** - 
Interaction (religious affiliation * EA Orthodox concentration)  
(Orthodox Christian omitted) 
       
Protestant * EA Orthodox concentration 0.03 (0.30) -0.08 (0.30) 0.01 (0.30) -0.03 (0.30) -0.05 (0.30) 0.03 (0.24) - 
Muslim * EA Orthodox concentration -0.20 (0.29) -0.22 (0.29) -0.19 (0.29) -0.22 (0.29) -0.20 (0.29) -0.15 (0.23) - 
Other * EA Orthodox concentration -1.21 (0.59)** -1.20 (0.58)** -1.18 (0.59)** -1.22 (0.59)** -1.19 (0.58)** -1.15 (0.46)** - 
Interaction (interview period * EA Orthodox concentration)  
(non-fasting omitted) 
0.11 (0.27) 0.15 (0.27) 0.21 (0.27) 0.09 (0.27) 0.20 (0.27) 0.28 (0.18) - 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period * EA 
Orthodox concentration)  
(Orthodox Christian * non-fasting  omitted) 
       
Protestant * fasting * EA Orthodox concentration 0.20 (0.50) 0.33 (0.48) 0.11 (0.49) 0.30 (0.49) 0.22 (0.48) - - 
Muslim * fasting * EA Orthodox concentration 0.28 (0.43) 0.21 (0.43) 0.18 (0.43) 0.22 (0.43) 0.13 (0.42) - - 
Other * fasting * EA Orthodox concentration 1.09 (1.05) 0.20 (0.93) 0.91 (1.05) 0.44 (0.96) 0.11 (0.92) - - 
Young children (no young children omitted)        
1 or more young children 0.00 (0.08) 0.08 (0.06) 0.18 (0.05)*** 0.01 (0.08) 0.19 (0.05)*** 0.19 (0.05)*** 0.18 (0.05)*** 
Interaction (interview period * young children)  
(non-fasting * no young children omitted) 
 
       
Fasting * 1 or more young children 0.63 (0.13)*** 0.29 (0.09)*** - 0.59 (0.13)*** - - - 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period * young 
children) (Orthodox Christian* no young children omitted) 
 
       
Protestant * non-fasting * 1 or more young children 0.26 (0.15)* - - 0.27 (0.14)* - - - 
8
7
 
    
Protestant * fasting * 1 or more young children -0.42 (0.21)** - - -0.40 (0.21)* - - - 
Muslim * non-fasting * 1 or more young children 0.10 (0.12) - - 0.09 (0.12) - - - 
Muslim * fasting * 1 or more young children -0.62 (0.17)*** - - -0.57 (0.17)*** - - - 
Other * non-fasting * 1 or more young children -0.29 (0.32) - - -0.29 (0.31) - - - 
Other * fasting * 1 or more young children 0.16 (0.53) - - 0.26 (0.49) - - - 
Dairy cows (no dairy cows omitted)        
1 or more dairy cows 2.41 (0.45)*** 2.55 (0.43)*** 2.38 (0.45)*** 2.54 (0.43)*** 2.53 (0.43)*** 2.53 (0.43)*** 2.53 (0.43)*** 
Interaction (interview period * dairy cows)  
(non-fasting * no dairy cows omitted) 
 
       
Fasting * 1 or more dairy cows -0.34 (0.16)** -0.09 (0.11) -0.22 (0.16) - - - - 
        
Protestant * non-fasting * 1 or more dairy cows 0.11 (0.15) - 0.14 (0.15) - - - - 
Protestant * fasting * 1 or more dairy cows 0.23 (0.25) - 0.14 (0.24) - - - - 
Muslim * non-fasting * 1 or more dairy cows -0.08 (0.14) - -0.06 (0.14) - - - - 
Muslim * fasting * 1 or more dairy cows 0.49 (0.21)** - 0.38 (0.21)* - - - - 
Other * non-fasting * 1 or more dairy cows -0.01 (0.32) - -0.02 (0.32) - - - - 
Other * fasting * 1 or more dairy cows 1.53 (0.73) - 1.53 (0.72)** - - - - 
        
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
n 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 
Log likelihood -2,361.59 -2,376.14 -2,376.83 -2,367.35 -2,381.50 -2,381.62 -2,392.07 
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 3-3: Average marginal effects of the main interest variables on the probability to consume milk 
at household level calculated from the Probit 1 regression in Table 3-2  
 dy/dx (SE) 
Religious affiliation (Orthodox Christian omitted)  
Protestant 0.04 (0.02)* 
Muslim 0.09 (0.03)*** 
Other 0.07 (0.04)* 
Interview period (non-fasting omitted)  
Fasting -0.05 (0.01)*** 
EA Orthodox concentration -0.10 (0.03)*** 
Young children (no young children omitted)  
1 or more young children 0.05 (0.01)*** 
Dairy cows (no dairy cows omitted)  
1 or more dairy cows 0.24 (0.03)*** 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
Table 3-4: Average predicted probability to consume milk at household level evaluated at the means 
of the covariates calculated from the Probit 1 regression in Table 3-2 
 Average predicted 
probability to consume 
milk (SE) 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period)   
Orthodox Christian* non-fasting 0.29 (0.02)*** 
Orthodox Christian * fasting 0.18 (0.02)*** 
Protestant * non-fasting 0.27 (0.03)*** 
Protestant * fasting 0.33 (0.04)*** 
Muslim * non-fasting 0.37 (0.04)*** 
Muslim * fasting 0.34 (0.04)*** 
Other * non-fasting 0.26 (0.08)*** 
Other * fasting 0.44 (0.12)*** 
Interaction (interview period * young children)  
Non-fasting * no young children 0.30 (0.02)*** 
Fasting * no young children 0.20 (0.02)*** 
Non-fasting * 1 or more young children 0.32 (0.02)*** 
Fasting * 1 or more young children 0.32 (0.03)*** 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period * young children)   
Orthodox Christian * non-fasting * no young children 0.29 (0.03)*** 
Orthodox Christian * fasting * no young children 0.11 (0.02)*** 
Orthodox Christian * non-fasting * 1 or more young children 0.29 (0.03)*** 
Orthodox Christian * fasting * 1 or more young children 0.27 (0.04)*** 
Protestant * non-fasting * no young children 0.23 (0.04)*** 
Protestant * fasting * no young children 0.29 (0.05)*** 
Protestant * non-fasting * 1 or more young children 0.32 (0.04)*** 
Protestant * fasting * 1 or more young children 0.36 (0.06)*** 
Muslim * non-fasting * no young children 0.35 (0.04)*** 
Muslim * fasting * no young children 0.34 (0.05)*** 
Muslim * non-fasting * 1 or more young children 0.39 (0.04)*** 
Muslim * fasting * 1 or more young children 0.34 (0.05)*** 
Other * non-fasting * no young children 0.31 (0.11)*** 
Other * fasting * no young children 0.29 (0.12)** 
Other * non-fasting * 1 or more young children 0.22 (0.08)*** 
Other * fasting * 1 or more young children 0.59 (0.16)*** 
Interaction (interview period * dairy cows)  
Non-fasting * no dairy cows 0.24 (0.02)*** 
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Fasting * no dairy cows 0.20 (0.02)*** 
Non-fasting * 1 or more dairy cows 0.57 (0.04)*** 
Fasting * 1 or more dairy cows 0.47 (0.05)*** 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period * dairy cows)  
Orthodox Christian * non-fasting * no dairy cows 0.22 (0.02)*** 
Orthodox Christian * fasting * no dairy cows 0.15 (0.02)*** 
Orthodox Christian * non-fasting * 1 or more dairy cows 0.55 (0.05)*** 
Orthodox Christian * fasting * 1 or more dairy cows 0.31 (0.05)*** 
Protestant * non-fasting * no dairy cows 0.20 (0.03)*** 
Protestant * fasting * no dairy cows 0.26 (0.04)*** 
Protestant * non-fasting * 1 or more dairy cows 0.56 (0.06)*** 
Protestant * fasting * 1 or more dairy cows 0.55 (0.09)*** 
Muslim * non-fasting * no dairy cows 0.30 (0.04)*** 
Muslim * fasting * no dairy cows 0.26 (0.03)*** 
Muslim * non-fasting * 1 or more dairy cows 0.61 (0.06)*** 
Muslim * fasting * 1 or more dairy cows 0.64 (0.07)*** 
Other * non-fasting * no dairy cows 0.20 (0.08)** 
Other * fasting * no dairy cows 0.26 (0.10)*** 
Other * non-fasting * 1 or more dairy cows 0.51 (0.12)*** 
Other * fasting * 1 or more dairy cows 0.92 (0.10)*** 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
Table 3-5: Average predicted probability to consume milk at household level in areas with 25%, 50%, 
and 75% Orthodox Christians evaluated at the means of the other covariates calculated from the 
Probit 1 regression in Table 3-2 
 Average predicted probability to consume milk (SE) 
 25% Orthodox 
Christians 
50% Orthodox 
Christians 
75% Orthodox 
Christians 
Religious affiliation    
Orthodox Christian 0.28 (0.03)*** 0.25 (0.02)*** 0.22 (0.01)*** 
Protestant 0.31 (0.02)*** 0.29 (0.03)*** 0.27 (0.04)*** 
Muslim 0.40 (0.02)*** 0.36 (0.03)*** 0.32 (0.04)*** 
Other 0.43 (0.06)*** 0.32 (0.07)*** 0.22 (0.08)*** 
Interview period    
Non-fasting  0.35 (0.02)*** 0.31 (0.02)*** 0.27 (0.02)*** 
Fasting 0.27 (0.03)*** 0.25 (0.02)*** 0.24 (0.02)*** 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period)    
Orthodox Christian * non-fasting 0.32 (0.04)*** 0.29 (0.02)*** 0.26 (0.02)*** 
Orthodox Christian * fasting 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.18 (0.02)*** 0.17 (0.02)*** 
Protestant * non-fasting 0.30 (0.03)*** 0.27 (0.03)*** 0.25 (0.05)*** 
Protestant * fasting 0.33 (0.04)*** 0.33 (0.04)*** 0.32 (0.06)*** 
Muslim * non-fasting 0.42 (0.02)*** 0.37 (0.04)*** 0.31 (0.06)*** 
Muslim * fasting 0.36 (0.03)*** 0.34 (0.04)*** 0.32 (0.06)*** 
Other * non-fasting 0.40 (0.07)*** 0.26 (0.08)*** 0.15 (0.09)* 
Other * fasting 0.48 (0.11)*** 0.44 (0.12)*** 0.40 (0.17)** 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
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Next, we study how fasting impacts on the milk market development by reviewing the changes in the 
likelihood to source consumed milk from purchase (Table 3-4). This allows us to assess how a 
seasonal change in demand affects milk markets. As seen from Table 3-2, we observe that a higher 
concentration of Orthodox Christians in an enumeration area makes households less likely to 
consume milk, irrespective of their religious affiliation. For those households that indicated to have 
consumed milk in the week prior to the interview, we find that these households are significantly less 
likely to buy this milk from the local market if the concentration of Orthodox Christians rises in the 
enumeration area. Only Muslim households are increasingly likely to source milk from purchase in 
dominantly Orthodox settings as compared to Orthodox households. This seems to suggest that due 
to repeating fasting spells, local milk market development in such settings is hampered.  
Table 3-6: Results from a Probit model modelling the likelihood to source consumed milk from 
purchase for those households that indicated to have consumed milk in the week prior to the 
interview 
 β (SE) 
Religious affiliation (Orthodox Christian omitted)  
Protestant -0.05 (0.32) 
Muslim -0.22 (0.31) 
Other 0.44 (0.43) 
Interview period (non-fasting omitted)  
Fasting  -0.62 (0.51) 
EA Orthodox concentration -0.78 (0.37)** 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period) (Orthodox Christian omitted)  
Protestant * fasting -0.02 (0.59) 
Muslim * fasting 0.59 (0.54) 
Other * fasting -0.03 (1.03) 
  
Interaction (religious affiliation * EA Orthodox concentration) (Orthodox Christian 
omitted) 
 
Protestant * EA Orthodox concentration 0.71 (0.70) 
Muslim * EA Orthodox concentration 1.26 (0.61)** 
Other * EA Orthodox concentration -2.18 (1.89) 
Interaction (interview period * EA Orthodox concentration) (non-fasting omitted) 0.95 (0.63) 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period * EA Orthodox concentration) 
(Orthodox Christian  omitted) 
 
Protestant * fasting * EA Orthodox concentration -0.13 (1.13) 
Muslim * fasting * EA Orthodox concentration -0.99 (1.01) 
Other * fasting * EA Orthodox concentration 2.76 (3.60) 
  
Household controls Yes 
Locations controls Yes 
  
n 1,700 
Log likelihood -575.47 
Pseudo R2 0.50 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
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5. Discussion and conclusion 
Using country wide data from the LSMS, we accentuate the so far underexplored impact of religiously 
inspired consumption rituals. We study the impact of fasting rituals among Orthodox households not 
only on consumption decisions, but also on sourcing strategies of consumed milk. Including 
consumption and sourcing patterns of households of different religious affiliations in the study allows 
us to account for spill-over effects across the society. We are the first to detail this impact of Orthodox 
fasting at the national level – other studies performed in the country are limited to case studies of a 
few villages or cities – and across the different religious groups in the country.  
In this chapter, we addressed the following three research questions: (1) do Orthodox households 
limit their milk consumption during fasting and will they limit their milk consumption more when 
surrounded by an increasing density of Orthodox Christians?; (2) do non-Orthodox households limit 
their milk consumption during fasting?; and (3) does fasting limit the market development and thus 
the consumption outside fasting periods?  
Our results show important impacts of fasting. First, fasting reduces the likelihood of Orthodox 
households to consume milk by more than one-third as compared to non-fasting periods, ceteris 
paribus. An increasing concentration of Orthodox Christians is not associated with a larger impact of 
Lent fasting on Orthodox households’ probability to consume milk, suggesting that there is no 
difference in the strictness with which Orthodox households adhere to fasting practices between 
Orthodox minority or Orthodox majority settings, at least not for the Lent fast period. Furthermore, 
fasting especially impacts Orthodox households who have no young children (aged 0-6 years), 
whose probability to consume milk is cut by two-thirds during Lent fast.  
Second, fasting rituals not only affect the practicing Orthodox group, but spill over to other religious 
communities, and in particular to the Ethiopian Muslim community. Such an impact was not found 
among Protestant households – we rather observe an opposite trend – which seems to suggest that 
fasting norms mainly spill over to the Muslim community.  
Third, we find evidence that increasing densities of Orthodox Christians significantly reduce the 
probability to consume milk, irrespective of the religious affiliation of households and both during and 
outside fasting periods. As such we find that a 1% increase in Orthodox concentration reduces the 
probability of a household to consume milk by 10 percentage points, ceteris paribus. We find that if 
households consume milk in such settings, they are significantly less likely to source this milk from 
the market. These observations point to hampered local market development and reduced milk 
availability in dominantly Orthodox settings which impact milk consumption among Orthodox and 
non-Orthodox households even outside fasting periods.  
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Based on these findings, we argue that religious values and practices – along with other factors – lie 
at the root of the observed low and stationary consumer demand for animal produce in the country 
and contribute to an intentional demand seasonality. Further research is imminent, which can also 
address the limitations that our study faces.  
The consumption records used in this chapter are cross-sectional and recall data, which obviously 
have some shortcomings. Even though the LSMS data are not intended to map the impact of fasting 
(as it focuses on collecting multi-topic panel household level data to improve agricultural statistics), 
this lack of focus on fasting proved to be beneficial as it reduces the chance that respondents answer 
consumption questions in a socially desirable manner. The way in which the survey was 
implemented allowed us to construct a fasting indicator that labelled a household record as fasting 
if at least part of the seven-day recall period coincided with the official Lent fast period, and non-
fasting otherwise. Because the LSMS data are cross-sectional this implies that the households 
whose consumption data were gathered during the Orthodox Lent period are not the same as those 
households interviewed outside Lent. This could lead to potential biases, which we assume to be 
small given the random sampling procedure employed during the LSMS data collection. By including 
households and location controls in our analyses, we further control for potential biases.  
Ideally one would compare the consumption data of the same household both within and outside the 
Lent fast period. We tried to construct panel data, using the data from the third LSMS wave in 
Ethiopia (2015-2016). Yet, the LSMS data are not intended to compare food intake of households 
during and outside an Orthodox fasting season, therefore only few households could be properly 
matched, making the sample not nationally representative anymore. Follow-up studies would benefit 
from focusing on a cohort of households before, during, and after fasting, using (supervised) diaries 
to map consumption at household member level and incorporate information on households’ actual 
involvement in religiously inspired rituals, such as fasting. Although such data are obviously more 
detailed than the recall data we use, it might become more complex to control for social desirability 
bias, especially among Orthodox households. Moreover, further research is needed to assess more 
detailed the impact of fasting on the milk market and the milk supply chain actors. We address this 
later on in this dissertation (Chapter 4 and 5). 
Our research adds important insights to the literature. Most research so far focused on religion and 
food habits and consumer choices in a Western context and mainly looked at Islamic traditions, while 
food habits are especially prevalent within African societies. Our research addresses religiously 
inspired food habits in the context of Ethiopia and shows that such habits not only affect food 
consumption patterns but also seem to impact food production and market development. The impact 
of religiously inspired food habits is not limited to the practicing group but increasingly spills over to 
other religious groups, the more dominant the practicing group becomes. Still, more studies are 
required to assess the societal impact of religion on food systems by studying other religious 
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practices and settings. Moreover, future studies should try to map through which pathways religion 
impacts various consumer groups to better understand why we observe a differential impact of 
Orthodox fasting on the Muslim and Protestant community. 
Our results invite the policy question of how to mitigate the impact of Orthodox fasting on the dairy 
supply chain, which we discuss further and more in-depth throughout the next chapters. Ethiopian 
policy makers should be aware of this broader societal impact of Orthodox fasting, which is now 
insufficiently accounted for in the livestock programme. Our study presents evidence that religious 
practices can have negative repercussions on the development of an effective functioning milk value 
chain. Orthodox fasting lowers the demand for milk and milk products, which in turn adversely affects 
the sales opportunities of dairy producers and retailers. Such demand-side inefficiencies should be 
addressed and accounted for in order to promote the development of agriculture and food 
production, notably the Ethiopian dairy sector in this specific case. We can expect that religious 
values and related fasting practices will persist in the near future, since religion is rather static and 
steadfast while factors such as income, urbanization, and population are dynamic.  
We provide three examples of soft measures that may mitigate the impact of Orthodox fasting, in the 
belief that hard measures, such as the prohibition of fasting practices in consumption, are unlikely to 
be accepted by the Ethiopian society and are therefore bound to fail. First of all, dairy producers can 
try to cope with Orthodox fasting by overlapping cows’ dry periods with Orthodox fasting. However, 
given the multiple fasting periods within the Orthodox community that are scattered throughout the 
year, such a strategy may at best only partially tackle the demand–supply mismatch. Second, the 
government might create alternative market outlets for dairy products during fasting periods, for 
example by expanding school milk programmes. Since children below the age of seven are exempt 
from fasting, such programmes could be a very effective policy action not only to lower the demand–
supply mismatch during Orthodox fasting, but also to improve food security and adequate nutrition 
amongst children. Finally, the government might invest or incentivize private investors to invest in 
strategies that structurally raise the shelf life of milk and milk products to overcome the fasting 
periods through the accumulation of a stock of milk produce. Specifically, efforts to stimulate the 
further development and adoption of dairy conservation and processing technologies are needed. 
To date, processing is largely small-scale using traditional methods. Only 40 industrial-scale dairy 
processors are operating in the country (although often below their optimal capacity), and these are 
located principally around the capital Addis Ababa. Moreover, it has been reported that during 
Orthodox fasting, these dairy processing plants reduce their supply of milk by requiring higher quality 
or paying lower prices to their milk suppliers [201].  
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Abstract 
The impact of widely present food taboos on consumption and the functioning of food value chains 
is understudied and not well understood. In the case of Ethiopia, religious fasting by Orthodox 
Christians is seen as an important impediment for the required higher milk consumption (especially 
by young children) and for the sustainable development of a competitive dairy industry. However, 
empirical evidence on the effects of fasting in this environment is limited. Relying on unique producer 
data, we shed light on the impact of fasting on production, marketing, and consumption decisions in 
dairy farming households in a dominantly Orthodox and commercially-oriented setting. Using a 
combination of Ordinary Least Square and Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equation models, we 
find that farmers adopt a combination of different strategies to overcome periods of slack demand 
and the importance of these strategies varies with how far these farmers are located from the capital 
of Addis Ababa. Our results call for further investment infrastructure facilities to integrate markets, 
as well improved processing and storage so as to mitigate the impact of fasting on the dairy value 
chain. 
Keywords: adaptation strategies, child milk consumption, milk producers, Ethiopia, fasting, Great 
Addis milk shed  
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1. Introduction 
Since ages people practice religion through food choices as various religious groups lay out food 
recommendations to their adherents [301]. Yet, the role of religion in shaping food choices and the 
food supply chain is not well understood [5], while it is believed that the impact of religion on food 
system development will remain important, especially given the growing share of religious people 
worldwide [302]. Religious practices are especially prevalent for ASFs [69], possibly leading to lower 
consumption, less availability, and higher prices of such products. This is unfortunate as a strong 
link has been shown worldwide between the consumption of ASFs on the one hand and improved 
nutritional outcomes on the other hand [27, 303, 304].  
In the previous chapter, we detailed the impact of fasting on a household’s decision to consume milk. 
We showed that fasting practices not only affect the practicing Orthodox community, but spill over to 
other religious groups, especially in dominantly Orthodox settings. The religiously-induced demand 
seasonality impacts the development prospects of the dairy sector in the country and can therefore 
not be neglected. In contrast to the rapid growth in crop output and productivity recorded in Ethiopia, 
ASF output has grown slowly and productivity has stagnated, seemingly due to low availability and 
adoption of improved inputs in the sector [31]. Yet, the widespread occurrence of fasting practices 
in the country could possibly have prohibitive effects on investments in the dairy sector thereby 
impacting availability and pricing of milk. Fasting practices in the country could thus contribute to the 
underdevelopment of the dairy sector as compared to other dairy sectors in the region [13, 18].   
Milk demand seasonality in Ethiopia affects all actors along the supply chain, i.e. retailers, 
processors, and milk producers. Yet, few studies have detailed how supply chain actors cope with 
periods of reduced demand for milk. The few, mostly qualitative studies that exist detail reduced 
activities of retailers and processors during fasting periods, see for example Avery [202] and Land 
O'Lakes [200]. Industrial processing companies have been shown to cut down their capacity during 
fasting periods by 25% by limiting the supply of milk using quota systems, paying lower prices, and/or 
requiring a higher milk quality [12, 201]. A small fraction of these processors has managed to adapt 
by building up stocks of processed milk products that they can sell outside the fasting period or 
transport to areas where fasting is less prevalent [200]. Since end consumers, retailers and 
processors limit the quantity of milk purchased, fasting necessarily also affects the milk producers. 
Anectodical evidence shows that many producers indicate a reduced or even a complete lack of 
market access as well as lower prices during fasting [13, 199, 305]. Focus group discussions with 
farmers selling to cooperatives and/or processors revealed that farmers are confronted with drops 
in prices for milk of 18-56% during long fasting periods [12, 199]. Farmers face reduced milk sales 
with sales volumes being reported to decline by 20-25% during fasting seasons [42]. Driven in part 
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by this culture of fasting that reduces market opportunities of milk during fasting, traditional 
processing at the level of the primary producer is widespread in Ethiopia [42].  
Fasting thus seems to create excess milk at the farm-level, hence one might wonder whether 
children, who are – in principle – exempt from fasting, benefit from this excess milk. Previous studies 
have illustrated negative repercussions of fasting on dietary diversity and intake of animal proteins 
for children [213, 214, 306]. Even when ASFs are available, caregivers are reluctant to feed them to 
their children during Lent, either because they believe children should participate in fasting rituals or 
because they fear objection of neighbours, and/or contamination of cooking utensils with non-fasting 
foods [306]. These trends are worrisome given the low dietary diversity and ASF consumption even 
outside fasting periods for children. According to the Ethiopian Demographic and Health Survey of 
2016, only 14% of the children aged 6-23 months old received diets that met the recommended 
minimum dietary diversity score. Only 14% of the children under the age of two that are not breastfed, 
consumed meat, fish, or poultry while this drops to 8% for breastfed children. Although milk intake is 
somewhat higher, it is still low – 13% for the breastfed children and 24% for non-breastfed children 
[307]. The low inclusion of ASFs in children’s diets is believed to be a main driver, among other 
factors, of the high prevalence of malnutrition in SSA [23].  
Despite these trends being reported, there is still limited quantitative evidence on the value chain 
effects of fasting and specifically on the adjustments made by producing households to overcome 
periods of reduced demand. Particularly important here is to detail the impact of fasting on children’s 
milk intake in dairy farming households. Additionally, no attention has been paid so far to the 
differential effects fasting might have depending on the degree of market access of milk producing 
households. 
We aim at filling these voids. The main objective of this chapter is to investigate how fasting impacts 
production, marketing, and consumption decisions of milk producing households in the dominantly 
Orthodox and commercially-oriented setting of the Great Addis milk shed. Many farmers in this milk 
shed have established specialized milk production systems and these farmers mainly produce for 
the market, while the remaining milk is used to satisfy own household needs (see also Chapter 2, 
Section 3.1). We rely on cross-sectional data collected by a programme led by IFPRI that aimed at 
mapping the supply chain of milk to the capital city of Addis Ababa. The survey covers recall data 
that partially overlap with two fasting periods, i.e. Lent fast and Christmas fast, which allowed us to 
construct fasting indicators, as we did in the previous chapter. The programme interviewed milk 
producing households located in two commercially-oriented dairy zones close to the capital Addis 
Ababa, i.e. North and West Shewa. The impact of fasting in these zones is expected to be big, given 
the majority of Orthodox Christians residing in these zones (75% on average). Detailing the impact 
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of fasting on these commercially-oriented dairy producing households is crucial so as to formulate 
fit interventions that aim at sustainably developing a competitive dairy industry.  
We are specifically interested in answering the following four research questions: (1) how does 
fasting impact total milk production at the farm, as well household decisions to allocate produced 
milk to different uses: i.e. own consumption, processing, and sales; (2) does fasting reduce sales 
volumes of liquid and processed milk?; (3) how does fasting impact milk consumption volumes in 
producing households, and especially the consumption of milk by young children?; and (4) does the 
impact of fasting on production, sales, and consumption vary with market access?  
Overall, we find that farmers in this milk shed have specialized in liquid milk sales, due to the lack of 
value addition that can be created when processing milk, as farmers use traditional processing 
techniques and materials making the process labour-intense and input-inefficient [13, 236]. Long 
fasting seasons reduce the market opportunities for liquid milk, yet the way farmers have adapted to 
these reduced market opportunities differs with their degree of market access, which we proxy in 
this chapter by remoteness of the households to the capital Addis Ababa. We find that remote 
farmers mainly rely on reducing the production of milk by their dairy herd during long fasting periods. 
The milk that is still produced by these households is processed or channelled to their young children. 
As a result, these households sell significantly smaller quantities of liquid milk during fasting periods, 
but we observe no effect of fasting on sales volumes of processed milk. While these households 
overall consume significantly less liquid and processed milk during long fasting periods, the intake 
of milk by their youngest children is not affected by the presence of a long fasting period. The 
youngest children seem to be the ones that still consume milk during fasting periods. Liquid milk 
sales opportunities of non-remote farmers on the other hand are significantly less affected by long 
fasting periods. But we observe considerable heterogeneity among these farmers in their ability to 
maintain milk sales during fasting seasons. Some of these farmers seemingly benefit from being 
better connected to buyers that continue purchasing milk during fasting periods. As a result, non-
remote farmers, on average, do not reduce the total production of milk at their farms significantly. 
Yet, to compensate for (some) forgone market opportunities during fasting, these farmers process a 
significantly larger share of the produced milk during fasting and they feed significantly more milk to 
their young children. As opposite to remote farmers, consumption volumes of liquid and processed 
milk in non-remote households are not affected by long fasting seasons. 
Our findings contribute to literature by detailing quantitatively how fasting impacts production, 
marketing, and consumption decisions among commercially-oriented milk producing households in 
a dominantly Orthodox setting. We show that the impact of fasting on milk marketing by producing 
households depends on the degree of market accessibility and that fasting practices are beneficial 
for most young children in dairy farming households. 
CHAPTER 4 
 
100 
Our findings have a number of important implications. First of all, we find that household intake of 
milk remains low, even when milk is available at the household level, and that milk is mainly 
channelled to young children. Still, the intake of milk by young children in these producing 
households does not meet the required intake for healthy diets as laid out by Willett et al. [23]. 
Nutritional awareness creation is thus needed to increase the intake of milk in these dairy farming 
households by all members outside fasting periods as well as during fasting periods for those 
members that are exempt from fasting. Second, further investments are needed to intensify milk 
production systems and increase milk productivity so that more milk becomes available at lower 
prices. As long as milk remains a luxury product, nutritional awareness creation will not be sufficient 
to make producing households consume more milk, especially outside fasting periods. Such 
investments however will only be attractive to producing households if the effects of seasonal 
demand swings are smoothened. Therefore, further efforts are needed towards (1) improving 
transportation facilities to assure market integration and marketing to areas where fasting is less 
prevalent especially to link remote farmers better to milk markets during fasting, (2) enhancing 
processing practices so that more milk is being processed during fasting seasons, as well as (3) 
ensuring availability of improved (cold) storages to stock processed milk products during periods of 
slack demand.  
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2. Demand seasonality, producer adaptation strategies, and market development 
Demand and supply of food produce in developing nations are affected by a number of factors. As 
such the quantity of food produce that consumers are willing to purchase from the market depends 
on various factors, among others the price of the food product and the prices of competing food 
products, tastes and preferences, income, number of consumers, and the range of food products 
available to consumers. The quantity that producers supply on the other hand is affected by the price 
of the product on the market, the costs of production, technology, climate, storage possibilities, and 
their own consumption to name a few. 
Consumer demand changes constantly, both in the short-term and in the long-term. Short-term 
changes in food demand can be caused by weather14 and festivities, while long-term changes are 
caused by changes in preferences, attitudes, and society. In the case of Ethiopia, fasting practices 
by the large Orthodox community create recurrent short-term changes in milk demand –  with 
reduced demand during fasting periods – but simultaneously depress long-term milk demand as 
well, especially in areas where large concentrations of Orthodox Christians reside (see Chapter 3).  
Such trends in demand ultimately affect market development. In Chapter 3, we found evidence that 
the local milk market development is hampered in dominantly Orthodox settings. The prevalence of 
fasting practices seems to impact the availability of milk in these settings and milk producers might 
invest less in their dairy farms because they lack stable and predictable outlets for their milk.  
In this chapter, we study the impact of fasting on the milk market in the Great Addis milk shed, the 
most developed milk shed in the country. Producers in this milk shed benefit from being located 
close to the capital of Addis Ababa, the largest and most affluent population centre of Ethiopia [245]. 
While the average per capita consumption of liquid and processed milk reaches 20 litres in the 
country, this rises to 52 litres per capita in Addis Ababa, due to the larger concentration of high-
income households as well as foreigners [201]. The Great Addis milk shed offers different market 
outlets for milk producers who not only sell their milk directly to individual consumers, but also to 
traders, cooperatives and unions, processors, and FSPs. Many farmers in this milk shed thus have 
established specialized milk production systems and liquid milk sales. These farmers mainly produce 
for the market, while remaining milk is used to satisfy their own household needs (see also Chapter 
2, Section 3.1). Yet, also here, Orthodox fasting practices impact the dairy value chain given the 
large concentration of Orthodox Christians (75% of the population). 
                                               
14 This also holds for Ethiopia and van der Valk and Tessema [243] report that people tend to consume less 
milk when it is rainy and cold. 
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We conceptualize the impact fasting on producer adaptation strategies and milk market development 
for the Great Addis milk shed relying on a simple demand and supply framework for liquid and 
processed milk.  
During non-fasting periods, prices and quantities meet at an equilibrium price, PNF  and P*NF , and 
quantity, QNF and Q*NF, in the liquid and processed milk market respectively (Figure 4-1). Abstinence 
from dairy products by some people in Ethiopia during the fasting period leads to a shift downward 
in the overall demand curve for liquid milk – from DNF to DF  – and processed milk – from D*NF to D*F. 
If the supply of liquid milk stays constant during fasting periods, prices of liquid milk would drop to 
PF making the liquid milk more accessible for those people that do not fast. Yet, what seems more 
likely, also based on earlier findings of qualitative studies, is that the supply of liquid milk on the 
market adjusts as well during fasting periods. Sales volumes of liquid milk might decrease (1) 
because producers decide to reduce total milk production at the farm by feeding cows poorer quality 
diets during fasting and/or drying off their milking cows15, and/or (2) because producers increasingly 
transform the liquid milk to a more storable product (e.g. butter), and/or (3) because producers 
consume more milk themselves, especially when they have young children. During fasting periods, 
increased consumption by young children in these households might become more interesting due 
to the reduced marketing opportunities for milk. In all three cases, on top of liquid milk demand shifts, 
there will be a shift in the supply curve of liquid milk – from SNF to SF. A simultaneous reduction in 
the supply of liquid milk, on top of a demand shift, reduces the impact of fasting on the market prices 
of liquid milk, as can be seen in the smaller differences between (PNF - P’F) than (PNF - PF).  
The impact of fasting on the market for processed milk, will depend on the decisions made by dairy 
farming households. Farmers in this milk shed have specialized in liquid milk sales and the surplus 
milk is consumed and/or processed. Therefore the supply of processed milk depends on the 
decisions made by producing households on what to do with the liquid milk that cannot be sold during 
fasting periods. If the majority of the farmers decides to increasingly process produced milk to more 
storable milk products during fasting, a supply shift in the market of processed milk products will 
occur to the right – from S*NF to S*’F – putting extra downward pressure on prices of processed milk 
that are now reduced from P*NF to P*’F16. Increased processing of liquid milk will thus magnify the 
                                               
15 Part of the Orthodox fasting events coincide with periods of potential feed shortage problems (see Figure 2-
8, Chapter 2). This is most obvious for the Apostles fast, which overlaps with the lean season during which the 
probability of acute feed shortages is high. But also during Lent fasting, feed availability continuously 
decreases causing economically rational producers to reduce milk production during this period. However, 
given that the multiple fasting periods within the Orthodox community are scattered throughout the year, such 
a strategy may at best only partially tackle the demand–supply mismatch. 
16 The expected downward pressure on prices in processed milk markets is partly explained by opportunity 
costs for the storage of processed milk products and should in more complete models be addressed by more 
sophisticated storage models and costs of processing and storage (such as in e.g. Williams and Wright [308]). 
However, these considerations are beyond the scope of this analysis.  
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effects of fasting in the market of processed milk. On the other hand, if the majority of farmers decides 
to reduce total milk production on the farm and/or increasingly consume the milk themselves, we 
expect to observe a supply shift to the left instead of the right in the market of processed milk 
products – from S*NF to S*’’F – and price swings caused by fasting will be lower ((P*NF – P*’’F) instead 
of (P*NF – P*’F)). 
We expect to find divergent fasting adaptation strategies by farmers who have differential access to 
the Addis Ababa milk market. We hypothesize that farmers who are located closer to the capital and 
who are thus better connected to and integrated in the Addis Ababa milk market, will be more likely 
to continue supplying milk to the market during fasting periods. These farmers probably benefit from 
being better connected to buyers that assure stable purchase volumes of milk both during and 
outside fasting periods (e.g. processors, FSPs, and individual, non-Orthodox consumers). We 
expect that the impact of fasting demand will be smaller in both the liquid and processed milk market 
in the area close to Addis Ababa, which reduces the impact on the supply of liquid milk as well as 
the supply of processed milk. Farmers who are far from the capital and who face higher transaction 
costs to market their produce, especially during fasting periods, face a higher risk of not being able 
to sell their liquid milk during fasting periods. To reduce this risk, these farmers can opt to reduce 
total milk production, process the liquid milk to milk products with a longer shelf life – that can be 
stored and consumed or sold when demand rises again – and/or feed more milk to their young 
children. These actions will cause a larger supply shift on the liquid milk markets in these areas. 
Increasingly using the liquid milk for own consumption (and especially to feed young children) helps 
producers to reduce the impact of fasting on demand by internalizing the value of milk within the 
household. If liquid milk is increasingly processed, the supply curve of processed milk will shift to the 
right. Still, producers might wait to sell the processed milk products to avoid too large price drops for 
processed milk products. 
The simple diagrams give an indication of the forces at play because of fasting. The predicted effects 
all depend on the magnitude of fasting adherence of the population at large and the level of market 
integration, as they determine the size of these demand and supply shifts. Of interest in this chapter 
is to study how producers deal with the changes that are induced by fasting. The purpose of this 
simple conceptual framework is to help set the stage for some of the expected results of our analysis. 
First, we expect that the supply of liquid milk on the market will adjust during fasting periods and that 
particularly remote farmers will decide to reduce their sales volumes. Second, consumption of milk 
by those not affected by fasting (i.e. children below the age of seven) is likely to go up because 
reduced market opportunities for liquid milk and price decreases.  
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Figure 4-1: Demand and supply framework illustrating the impact of fasting on the liquid milk and 
processed milk markets  
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3. Materials and methods 
3.1. Data 
We use unique data collected within the project ‘Improving the evidence and policies for better 
performing livestock systems in Ethiopia’ led by IFPRI as part of the Feed the Future Innovation Lab 
for Livestock Systems. Data collection was focused on the zones of North and West Shewa as dairy 
production in these zones is the highest of all surrounding zones of Addis Ababa. Stratified random 
sampling was employed to select milk producing households, focusing on three strata: producers in 
the city of Addis Ababa, suburban producers and rural producers. More details on the sampling 
procedure can be found in Supplementary material B.117. 870 milk producing households with at 
least one cow in milk were surveyed during January 22 and February 15, 2018 – 30 urban, 240 
suburban, and 600 rural producers. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in the local language 
and data were recorded by enumerators on paper. The survey collected information on household 
characteristics, details on cows and dairy activities, as well consumption volumes (for the household 
as a whole, but also for the youngest child below the age of five separately)18.   
                                               
17 We also compared the dairy farming households in our sample with Addis Ababa sub-sample of the LSMS, 
more details are found in Supplementary material B.2. 
18 The survey also detailed fasting adherence by individual household members and beliefs about fasting 
adherence of young children, we detail these data descriptively in Supplementary material B.3. 
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3.2. Methodological approach 
To study how fasting affects production, marketing, and consumption decisions of dairy farming 
households, we constructed two fasting indicators. We needed two fasting indicators so as to 
accommodate for the fact that production and marketing variables were recorded using a recall 
period of one month prior to the interview, while consumption variables were recorded using a recall 
period of one week. First, we calculated for each household surveyed, the number of consecutive 
official fasting days in the month and week prior to the interview using the official fasting calendar as 
reflected in Table 4-1. The number of consecutive official fasting days in the past month varied 
between 3 to 17 days and those in the past week between 1 to 7 days. A cut-off was set at the 
average amount of consecutive fasting days in the past month and past week so as to distinguish 
between short and long fasting episodes. By dividing the sample in this way, we construct two 
dummy variables with the variables being equal to one if the number of consecutive official fasting 
days in the past month or past week prior to the interview is at least 10 or 4 days respectively, zero 
otherwise. 
Table 4-1: Timing of official fasting periods and data collection 
Dates 
28/11/2017 
- 
06/01/2018 
07/01/2018 
- 
21/01/2018 
22/01/2018 
- 
28/01/2018 
29/01/2018 
- 
31/01/2018 
01/02/2018 
- 
11/02/2018 
12/02/2018 
- 
25/02/2018 
26/02/2018 
- 
07/04/2018 
Fasting Advent Weekly only Nineveh 
Weekly 
only 
Lent 
Data 
collection 
   
 
Besides fasting, we identified other explanatory variables that have been shown to impact dairy 
production and marketing [309-312] as well as dairy consumption [6, 297-299]. These studies show 
the importance of including the following household characteristics: age, gender, schooling, and 
marital status of the household head; religious affiliation and ethnicity of the household; household 
size and composition; household income; number of local cows and number of crossbreed cows 
owned; cooperative membership; total milk production by milking cows19; and households’ access 
to markets (in our case the Addis Ababa market). We proxy market accessibility by remoteness to 
Addis Ababa20, assuming that households located closer to the capital have better market access. 
Additionally, we include within-sample concentrations of Orthodox Christians in the village where a 
household resides. We found in Chapter 3 that the religious diversity in the immediate vicinity of a 
                                               
19 Total milk production was not included in the regressions modelling daily milk production at the farm. 
20 The variable is defined and calculated in line with Vandercasteelen et al. (2018) using the Ethiopian road 
network and quality data (obtained from the Ethiopian Road Authority) combined with the farmer’s self-reported 
travel time to the nearest road segment. The obtained measure thus captures the travel time (expressed in 
hours) from the farm’s location to Ethiopia’s capital city. 
Fasting, food, and farming: Evidence from Ethiopian milk producers 
  
107 
household, and particularly the concentration of Orthodox followers, impacts milk consumption and 
most likely also affects milk production and milk output use decisions.  
We start by detailing the impact of fasting on total milk production at the farm and decisions of 
households to allocate produced milk to different uses: i.e. own consumption, processing, sales, 
and/or giving the milk away. In the survey, producing households were asked to detail how much 
milk was produced by their dairy herd in the month prior to the interview as well as how much of this 
produced milk was sold, processed, consumed, and/or given out21. We use an OLS regression to 
assess the impact of a long fasting period on the daily milk production at the farm in the month prior 
to the interview (𝑃) while a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations (SURE) model is employed 
to assess the impact of fasting on the shares of produced milk being sold (𝑆𝑠), processed (𝑆𝑝), 
consumed (𝑆𝑐), and/or given out (𝑆𝑔). The OLS (eq. 1) and SURE (eq.2) models are defined as 
follows: 
 
𝑃 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀                                                                               eq. 1 
 
{
 
 
𝑆𝑠
𝑆𝑝
𝑆𝑐
𝑆𝑔
= 𝛽0  + 𝛽1 𝐹 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀                                                                               eq. 2 
 
𝐹 refers to the constructed fasting indicator, while  𝑋𝑗 is a set of j explanatory variables which includes 
a list of household controls as summarized above (we descriptively detail these variables in Section 
4.1, Table 4-2). 𝜀 is the random error term that is clustered at the village level. 
Having studied the impact of fasting on total milk production and produced milk output decisions, we 
further detail how a long fasting season impacts the transaction/sales volumes of milk (𝑇𝑚), butter 
(𝑇𝑏), and cheese (𝑇𝑐) during the month prior to the interview
22. Also here we employ a SURE model 
since the transaction volumes decisions are interrelated. The model is defined by: 
{
𝑇𝑚
𝑇𝑏
𝑇𝑐
= 𝛾0  +  𝛾1𝐹 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑋𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀                                                                               eq. 3 
                                               
21 Wastage of milk and related products is not really an issue in our sample. A recent study by Minten et al. 
[313], using the same producer data as this chapter, assessed that the percentage of all produced milk being 
spoiled at farm level was as little as 0.003–0.008%. 
22 We did not consider the sales of buttermilk since buttermilk is usually not sold in the market. Produced 
buttermilk is fed to the calves, consumed by adult household members, and/or processed further to produce a 
soft cottage cheese, called ayib. 
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We additionally ran double-hurdle models to assess whether fasting impacts producer decisions to 
sell liquid or processed milk – i.e. the participation decision modelled by 𝑇′ – and/or sales volumes if 
producers decided to sell liquid or processed milk – i.e. the quantity decision modelled by 𝑇∗. The 
double-hurdle models are defined by: 
𝑇∗ = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐹 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑋𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀   with T* observed only if  𝑇′ = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝐹 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑋𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇 > 0               eq. 4 
 
To detail the impact of fasting on household consumption volumes of liquid milk (𝐶𝑚), butter (𝐶𝑏), 
cheese (𝐶𝑐), and buttermilk (𝐶𝑏𝑚), we again apply a SURE model, defined as: 
{
𝐶𝑚
𝐶𝑏
𝐶𝑐
𝐶𝑏𝑚
= 𝛿0  + 𝛿1𝐹 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀                                                    eq. 5 
Since we expect that the impact of fasting will be different for young children in milk producing 
households, we assess the impact of fasting on the liquid milk consumption of children (𝐶𝑚,𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑) in 
a separate OLS regression. In the survey, respondents were asked to map separately the intake of 
liquid milk by the youngest child below the age of five in the week prior to the interview. For this latest 
regression, the list of explanatory variables is extended with child-specific controls (𝑋𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑,𝑗), i.e. age, 
gender, whether the child is breastfed and whether the child received vitamins or oral rehydration 
salts (ORS). Including vitamin supplementation allows to control for the level of nutrition knowledge 
of the household. Research in Ethiopia has shown that better nutrition knowledge significantly 
improves children’s dietary diversity with children being more likely to have consumed ASFs [314]. 
Including supplementation of ORS on the other hand allows to control for whether or not the child 
was sick, which could potentially reduce their intake of milk. The model is defined by: 
𝐶𝑚,𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 = 𝜂0  + 𝜂1𝐹 + ∑ 𝜂𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑗 + ∑ 𝜂𝑗𝑋𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑,𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀                                 eq. 6 
Having detailed the impact of fasting on production, marketing, and consumption decisions, we 
further explore in a second stage, the potential heterogeneity in adopted adaptation strategies by 
producing households. We specially focus on heterogeneity dependent upon the household’s degree 
of market access. We therefore categorize producers in two groups, remote and non-remote, using 
the median of 1.54 hours travel time to Addis Ababa as a cut-off between the two groups. For both 
groups, remote and non-remote producing households, we re-estimated the models as laid out 
above but now for each group separately. We tested a full-sample approach by including interaction 
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effects with the variable remoteness, yet this approach did not improve the analytical power. 
Therefore, we restrict the reported results to those of the split-sample analysis.  
Finally, to assess how fasting adaptation strategies of dairy farming households affect the market of 
both liquid and processed milk, we descriptively look into dairy prices reported by milk producing 
households. In one part of the survey, respondents were asked to detail average market prices for 
liquid milk, butter, and cheese during different specified time spans over the 12 months preceding 
the survey: (1) in the middle of Lent fasting, (2) during Easter feast, (3) the period after Easter until 
May, (4) June until the beginning of Advent fasting, (5) in the middle of Advent fasting, (6) during 
Christmas festivities and finally (7) in the period after Christmas until the time of the survey. To 
descriptively appraise price effects linked with fasting, we construct two-way graphs that display 
market prices for liquid milk, butter, and cheese over the different specified time spans. Yet, the 
prices reported by farmers might mask larger fluctuations as the price questions included in the 
survey ask farmers to detail average prices over quite large time spans. Later in the survey, farmers 
were asked to report the prices they obtained for liquid milk, butter, and cheese that they sold in the 
middle of the most recent long fasting season and two weeks after this fasting season, when they 
had cows in milk. Taking the difference between both prices might give a more clear indication of 
the price swings at stake. Furthermore, we also studied whether remoteness causes larger price 
swings. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics of producing households  
An overview of the dependent variables, the constructed fasting indicators, and explanatory variables 
is found in Table 4-2.  
Average daily milk production in our sample is 6 L per producing household. 55% of this produced 
milk is processed into cheese, butter, and/or buttermilk, 25% is sold, 19% is used for own 
consumption, and a minor share (0.5%) is given away. Sales volumes vary considerably for all 
products. Still, it can be observed that producers have specialized in milk sales with 124 L of liquid 
milk being sold monthly on average, while butter and cheese sales volumes only reach 1 kg and 8 
kg respectively. Processing at the farm level is thus mainly intended for own consumption.  
Liquid milk and processed milk consumed within the households are almost exclusively sourced from 
own production (99.8% on average). Average household liquid milk intake fluctuates around 3 L in 
the week prior to the interview, of which the youngest child consumes on average 2 L. Our data thus 
confirm that young children are prioritized when it comes to milk consumption, which is in line with 
the prevailing assumption in Ethiopia that milk is mainly meant for children [315]. Buttermilk, on the 
other hand, is mostly consumed by other household members – mostly women and elderly [316]. 
In our sample, 31% and 60% of the households is confronted with a long fasting period in the last 
week and month respectively. The difference can be explained by the presence of the Advent fasting 
period, which is covered in the monthly fasting indicator, but not in the weekly indicator. 
Table 4-2: Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables, the constructed fasting indicators, and 
explanatory variables used in the analyses 
 Unit Household Youngest child 
Dependent variables    
Past month    
      Milk production  L/day 6.08 (16.18) - 
      Share produced milk home processed  % 54.98 (37.83) - 
      Share produced milk sold  % 25.62 (40.31) - 
      Share produced milk home consumed  % 18.78 (21.74) - 
      Share milk given out  % 0.50 (3.59) - 
      Sales quantities past month    
Liquid milk L 123.9 (351.70) - 
Butter kg 1.08 (2.87) - 
Cheese kg 7.90 (31.18) - 
Past week    
      Consumption    
Liquid milk L 3.16 (4.44) 2.04 (2.67) 
Buttermilk  L 1.70 (3.30) - 
Butter  L eq. 2.16 (5.79) - 
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Cheese  L eq. 1.64 (3.57) - 
Weekly fasting indicator 0/1 0.31 0.28 
Monthly fasting indicator 0/1 0.60 - 
Household controls    
Sex household head: male 0/1 0.92 - 
Age household head years 48.95 (13.71) - 
Schooling household head years 3.76 (4.27) - 
Marital status household head: married 0/1 0.91 - 
Marital status household head: widowed 0/1 0.06 - 
Marital status household head: 
divorced/separated 
0/1 0.02 - 
Marital status household head: single 0/1 0.01 - 
Monthly household income ‘000 ETB 3.68 (4.52) - 
Infants (<1 year old) # 0.08 (0.28) - 
Children (1-6 years old) # 0.63 (0.79) - 
Children (7-9 years old) # 0.52 (0.66) - 
Adolescents (10-19 years old) # 2.11 (1.52) - 
Adults (20-64 years old) # 2.44 (1.12) - 
Elderly (65+ years old) # 0.24 (0.51) - 
Religious affiliation: Orthodox Christian 0/1 0.85 - 
Religious affiliation: Protestant 0/1 0.12 - 
Religious affiliation: Catholic 0/1 0.01 - 
Religious affiliation: Muslim 0/1 0.02 - 
Religious affiliation: Traditional faith 0/1 0.00 - 
Religious affiliation: Other religion 0/1 0.00 - 
Ethnicity: Oromo 0/1 0.86 - 
Ethnicity: Amhara 0/1 0.12 - 
Ethnicity: Tigrayan 0/1 0.00 - 
Ethnicity: Gurage 0/1 0.01 - 
Ethnicity: Other ethnicity 0/1 0.01 - 
Total milk production L/month 400 (597) - 
Local cows # 1.68 (1.61) - 
Cross-bred cows # 1.14 (2.10) - 
Cooperative member 0/1 0.04 - 
Remoteness hours 1.98 (1.46) - 
Orthodox concentration  % 84.45 (20.64) - 
Child controls    
Age youngest child years - 2.01 (1.32) 
Sex youngest child : male 0/1 - 0.56 
Youngest child breastfed yesterday 0/1 - 0.56 
Youngest child vitamins yesterday 0/1 - 0.04 
Youngest child ORS yesterday 0/1 - 0.03 
n  870 311 
Note: When applicable, means are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. For comparison purposes, kilogram 
(kg) amounts of processed products are transformed into L of milk equivalents. The conversion rates used are 20 L/kg for 
butter and 1.33 L/kg for cheese. The control variable total milk production is not included in the OLS regression modelling 
daily milk production at the farm. 
 
  
CHAPTER 4 
 
112 
4.2. Fasting and production, marketing, and consumption decisions 
4.2.1. Producer adaptation strategies 
Dairy farmers reduce their total milk production at the farm during long fasting periods by one-fourth 
on average, yet significant heterogeneity exists around this estimate, with some farmers reducing 
milk production at the farm more than others (Table 4-3). Still, this reduced milk production indicates 
that producers are somehow aligning their production strategies with fasting periods. Reduced total 
milk output is likely to occur during the Lent fasting period, since it coincides with the dry period 
(Figure 2-8, Chapter 2). Yet, part of the data overlap with the Advent fasting, a period where milk 
output should be at its highest level given the abundance of feed (Figure 2-8, Chapter 2). Therefore, 
it seems that reduced milk production is not only the result of reduced feed availability and/or quality, 
but also that farmers are aligning the number of cows in milk and plan calving so that lactation periods 
do not overlap too much with periods of slack in demand.  
Long fasting seasons reduce marketing possibilities of liquid milk and producers sell a significantly 
smaller share of the produced milk during these periods. Farmers turn the non-sold milk into products 
with a longer shelf life and process nearly 60% of their produced milk during long fasting spells (Table 
4-3). The share of produced milk being consumed does not change with the presence of long fasting 
periods. We further observe no change in the already low share of milk being given away (Table 4-
3). 
Table 4-3: Effect of the presence of a long fasting season in the last month on the milk production 
at the farm and the output use of produced milk one month prior to the interview 
 Milk production at the farm and output use of produced milk last month 
 
Total milk 
production 
(L/day) 
Produced milk 
sold 
(%) 
Produced milk 
processed 
(%) 
Produced milk 
consumed 
(%) 
Produced milk 
given out 
(%) 
 OLS SURE 
      
Fasting past month 
(0/1) 
-1.65* -15.65*** 15.29*** 0.68 -0.32 
(0.96) (5.04) (4.63) (1.68) (0.35) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Non-fasting mean 7.03 40.44 41.66 17.40 0.50 
n 855 855 855 855 855 
R² 0.72 0.54 0.42 0.13 0.05 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. For a complete 
list of controls, see Table 4-2. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Regarding sales volumes, we find that only liquid milk sales are significantly affected by long fasting 
periods (p value is 0.056) and reduce on average by 28% (Table 4-4), which confirms the predicted 
effect from the conceptual model in Section 2. Butter sales seem to go up slightly, while cheese 
sales are not affected by long fasting seasons (Table 4-4). Liquid milk sales do not completely drop 
to zero, since a considerable part of the milk buyers continue purchasing milk during Orthodox 
fasting. This is the case for about 18% of the producers in our sample. For the farmers that continue 
selling milk during fasting, we find that 48% sells to retailers, 30% to processors and 17% to 
consumers. Continuing buying milk during Orthodox fasting seasons helps buyers to link them with 
dairy farmers. As such, Valk and Tessema (246) observed during discussions with small-scale 
processors in the Great Addis milk shed that some of these processors continue buying milk from 
their farmer suppliers even if they cut down their processing capacity during fasting. They do so 
because they fear that producers will stop selling milk to them if they would reduce the input of milk 
during fasting periods. Therefore, some of these processors prefer to continue buying milk during 
fasting, even if that means that milk has to be thrown away. 
Table 4-4: Effect of the presence of a long fasting season in the last month on processed volumes 
as well as sales volumes of liquid and processed milk one month prior to the interview 
 Total sales volumes last month 
 
Liquid milk 
(L) 
Butter 
(kg) 
Cheese 
(kg) 
 SURE 
    
Fasting past month (0/1) -48.33* 0.58 3.92 
(25.26) (0.36) (3.47) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Non-fasting mean 173.35 0.70 5.37 
n 855 855 855 
R² 0.77 0.24 0.26 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. For a 
complete list of controls, see Table 4-2. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
  
CHAPTER 4 
 
114 
As a robustness check, we ran two double-hurdle models to assess the impact of fasting on dairy 
market participation and dairy sales volumes (Table 4-5). As expected, long fasting spells only 
impact the decision of farmers to sell milk significantly.  
Table 4-5: Effect of presence of a long fasting season in the previous month on likelihood to sell 
dairy products (first hurdle) and total dairy product sales over the month prior to interview, conditional 
on dairy market participation (second hurdle) 
 Liquid milk  Processed milk products 
 Likelihood to sell Sales volume 
(L) 
Likelihood to sell Sales volume  
(kg) 
     
Fasting past month 
(0/1) 
-0.85*** 
(0.26) 
1.63 
(1.64) 
39.13 
(57.11) 
4.31 
(8.26) 
     
Controls Yes Yes 
   
n 855 855 
Log likelihood -1750.57 -1982.24 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. For a 
complete list of controls, see Table 4-2. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
Finally, we take a closer look at the consumption volumes of liquid and processed milk at household 
level. If there was a long fasting event in the week prior to the interview, households’ consumption 
decreases, but not significantly (Table 4-6). We further observe no effect in the consumption of 
processed milk products. The limited impact of fasting on weekly consumption of milk could indicate 
that the Orthodox adult household members – which represent a large majority in our sample since 
85% of the producing households indicates to be Orthodox Christian – compensate the forgone 
consumption of milk (and other ASFs) during non-fasting days (which is possible given the 
construction of our fasting indicator23). Alternatively, it is also possible that we observe only a small 
effect of a few fasting days a week, simply because the intake of milk by adult members is limited 
anyway. We find evidence that supports both arguments (a detailed analysis can be found in 
Supplementary material B.4), yet it seems most likely that adult members in producing households 
consume little milk anyway as milk is mainly intended for young children in Ethiopia. Furthermore, 
we observe that households’ milk consumption during long fasting episodes would be even lower, 
were it not for the fact that the youngest children are given considerably more milk. Their milk 
consumption increases by 40% during long fasting spells, and they consume on average about 0.80 
                                               
23 The fasting indicator we constructed equalled one if there were at least four fasting days in the week prior 
to the interview. This implies that for some households who are labelled as being interviewed during a long 
fasting week, there are still some non-fasting days part of that ‘long fasting week’ (i.e. one, two or three). 
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litre of milk more24 (Table 4-6). This confirms the predicted effect from the conceptual model in 
Section 2. 
Table 4-6: Effect of the presence of a long fasting period (more than four days) in the last week on 
consumption of liquid and processed milk one week prior to the interview 
 Consumption volumes past week 
 
Liquid milk 
household 
(L) 
Butter 
household 
(L eq.) 
Cheese 
household 
(L eq.) 
Buttermilk 
household 
(L) 
Liquid milk 
youngest child 
(L) 
 SURE OLS 
      
Fasting past week 
(0/1) 
-0.81 -0.49 -0.58 -0.15 0.77** 
(0.54) (0.57) (0.49) (0.28) (0.36) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Child controls No No No No Yes 
      
Non-fasting mean 3.77 2.18 1.41 1.34 1.90 
n 848 849 841 847 297 
R² 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.26 0.17 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Household 
amounts are expressed per adult equivalent to account for household size and composition. For a complete list of controls, 
see Table 4-2. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
One of the strategies that households have developed to overcome long Orthodox fasting periods, 
is thus to allocate part of the excess milk to their young children, who by default are exempt from 
fasting participation. These findings contradict those reported by Kim et al. [306], who observed that, 
only 18% of the children consumed milk during Lent while 66% of the households reported to own 
dairy cows. There is some evidence that the farmers in our sample have more liberal attitudes when 
it comes to the fasting participation of children (see Supplementary material B.3). Yet, another 
important reason for the increased consumption of milk by children is that fasting increases excess 
milk in these milk producing households due to reduced market opportunities for liquid milk, since 
the producers we interviewed mainly produced milk for the market. Marketing opportunities for liquid 
                                               
24 We showed in Supplementary material B.3 that fasting participation among Orthodox producing households 
is far from homogenous. We wondered how this varying strictness in fasting adherence affects a household’s 
intake of liquid milk and processed milk. As expected, we observe a larger negative impact of household’s 
intake of both liquid milk and processed milk, the stricter a household adheres to Orthodox fasting events. 
Children’s intake on the other hand is not affected. A detailed analysis can be found in Supplementary material 
B.5. Moreover, in another module of the survey, respondents were also asked to recall and report the 
household’s intake of milk, cheese, and butter (all sourced from own production) in the middle of the latest 
long fasting period during which they had (at least) one cow in milk, with consumption two weeks after this 
fasting period. The same assessment was asked for the youngest child’s milk intake. The results can be found 
in Supplementary material B.6. 
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milk drop significantly during fasting (Table 4-3) with buyers purchasing less or no milk during these 
periods. This increases transaction costs dramatically if farmers would still want to search for 
alternative buyers to sell their milk to. Since market prices of milk do not increase during fasting, it is 
more interesting for farmers to channel part of the non-sold milk to their children. It seems that mostly 
children are the ones consuming milk during long fasting seasons. Of course, there is a limit to how 
much milk young children can consume. In our data, there appears to be an upper limit of about 7 L 
per week for the youngest child. This implies that even during long fasting periods, allocating more 
milk to children can only partly solve the excess milk supply problem.   
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4.2.2. Heterogeneity in producer adaptation strategies 
We further assess heterogeneity of adaptation strategies with respect to remoteness. When 
comparing the production and output use adaptation strategies of remote and non-remote 
households (Table 4-7), we find that remote households have predominantly adapted to a culture of 
fasting by considerably reducing their milk production at the farm, with total milk output falling by 
60% during long fasting seasons. A smaller share of the produced milk is sold (p value is 0.061), 
while more produced milk is being processed (p value is 0.068). Non-remote households on the 
other hand seem to have better access to buyers who continue purchasing liquid milk during fasting, 
which enables them to maintain their milk production. However, we also observe a slightly negative, 
yet not significant, trend in total milk production in these households. The average share of produced 
milk being sold decreases significantly in these households, mostly caused by non-remote farmers 
who stop selling milk during long fasting periods. As a result, both remote and non-remote 
households rely significantly more on processing to overcome Orthodox fasting events. The share 
of produced milk being consumed is not significantly affected by the presence of a long fasting 
season, but if anything, it seems that non-remote households allocate slightly more milk to own 
consumption. 
Table 4-7: Heterogeneity in total milk production at the farm and output use of produced milk by 
remoteness to Addis Ababa 
 Milk production at the farm and output use of produced milk last month 
 
Milk production 
(L/day) 
Milk sold 
(%) 
Milk processed 
(%) 
Milk consumed 
(%) 
 Remote 
Not 
remote 
Remote 
Not 
remote 
Remote 
Not 
remote 
Remote 
Not 
remote 
         
Fasting past 
month (0/1) 
-1.39** -1.51 -8.63* -23.44*** 9.08* 20.78*** -0.45 3.08 
(0.63) (1.40) (4.60) (5.62) (4.50) (4.85) (2.85) (1.98) 
         
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Non-fasting 
mean 
2.32 10.42 13.93 59.56 63.30 26.06 22.26 13.88 
n 427 428 427 428 427 428 427 428 
R² 0.39 0.77 0.31 0.55 0.20 0.46 0.10 0.22 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Remote / 
Not remote = Below / Above median travel time to Addis Ababa (1.54 hours). For a complete list of controls, see Table 4-
2. Remoteness is not included as control variables. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Regarding sales volumes, we find that remote households sell significantly smaller quantities of milk 
during long fasting seasons, and volumes go down by three-quarters on average (Table 4-8). For 
non-remote households, we observe that the considerable heterogeneity in the ability to sell milk 
during fasting seasons is reflected in the total sales volumes of these farmers and overall it seems 
that liquid milk sales volumes tend to go down slightly, but not significant. Re-running a double-
hurdle model for these non-remote households shows that fasting significantly affects the decision 
to sell milk, yet not the milk sales quantities when households are selling milk. For neither remote 
nor non-remote households, sales volumes of processed milk seem to increase during long fasting 
spells, but for non-remote households they seem to go up slightly.  
Table 4-8: Heterogeneity in sales volumes by remoteness to Addis Ababa 
 Total sales volumes last month 
 
Liquid milk 
(L) 
Processed milk 
(kg) 
 Remote Not remote Remote Not remote 
     
Fasting past 
month (0/1) 
-34.05** -35.67 3.10 3.18 
(15.96) (33.99) (4.03) (2.72) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Non-fasting 
mean 
46.12 265.14 7.41 5.10 
n 427 428 427 428 
R² 0.29 0.86 0.60 0.20 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Remote / 
Not remote = Below / Above median travel time to Addis Ababa (1.54 hours). For a complete list of controls, see Table 4-
2. Remoteness is not included as control variables. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
Regarding consumption volumes (Table 4-9), remote households significantly reduce the amount of 
liquid and processed milk consumed – by 43% and 53% on average respectively. Consumption 
volumes of liquid and processed milk in non-remote households on the other hand are barely 
affected by fasting periods. Yet, both types of households allocate more milk to children during 
fasting, and significantly so among non-remote households. Since we found that remote households 
cut down their milk production significantly during long fasting seasons (Table 4-7), we find that 
children’s milk intake does not increases significantly during fasting. As stated in the introduction, 
the households sampled in the survey mainly produce for the market while surplus milk is used for 
own consumption. Therefore, if market opportunities dwindle during fasting seasons, and especially 
so for remote households, this makes farmers decide to reduce their milk production at the farm. 
Non-remote households on the other hand seem to be better connected with buyers that continue 
buying milk during fasting periods which allows them to maintain their milk production levels more or 
less during fasting periods, but they also compensate for some forgone market opportunities during 
fasting by channelling significantly more milk to their youngest children.  
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Table 4-9: Heterogeneity in consumption volumes by remoteness to Addis Ababa 
 Consumption volumes last week 
 
Liquid milk household 
(L) 
Processed milk household 
(L eq.) 
Liquid milk child 
(L) 
 Remote Not remote Remote Not remote Remote Not remote 
        
Fasting past week 
(0/1) 
-1.24*** -0.04 -0.62*** -0.23 0.63 1.20*** 
(0.45) (0.13) (0.15) (0.20) (0.91) (0.41) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Child controls No No No No Yes Yes 
    
Non-fasting mean 2.88 4.40 1.16  0.73  1.33  2.36  
n 417 419 417 419 134 141 
R² 0.20 0.16 0.24 0.17 0.25 0.34 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Remote / 
not remote = below / above median travel time to Addis Ababa (1.54 hours). For a complete list of controls, see Table 4-
2. Remoteness is not included as control variable. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
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4.2.3. Market prices of dairy products  
Looking at the price effects linked with fasting (Figure 4-1), we find that market prices of liquid and 
processed milk as reported by the producing households are low during periods of abundant supply 
(from the summer until the end of the year) and low demand (the Advent and Lent fasting periods). 
Conversely, prices are at their highest level when high demand (feasts like Christmas and Easter) 
interacts with a declining availability of milk (in the beginning of the year). Figure 4-1 also shows that 
price fluctuations are most outspoken for butter and, to a lesser extent, for cheese. Milk prices seem 
to be barely affected by seasonality in milk supply or demand – ranging from 12 ETB/L to about 12.8 
ETB/L – although milk prices are slightly lower during Lent.   
The prices reported by farmers might mask larger fluctuations as the price questions included in the 
survey ask farmers to detail average prices over quite large time spans. Therefore, we further detail 
price swings by comparing market prices that farmers obtained in the midst of the latest long fasting 
period when they had at least one cow in milk with the price obtained two weeks after this fasting 
period. Also here we find that that market prices of liquid milk do not vary significantly, but seems to 
vary a bit more for remote households. As such we observe that mostly producing households 
located more than 1 to 1.25 travel hours from Addis Ababa report larger price swings for liquid milk, 
with price drops 6% being reported. Farmers located less than 1 hour from Addis Ababa on the other 
report price swings of only 2%. Price swings for butter and cheese seem not to be affected by market 
accessibility and drop by one-third during fasting periods on average. The reduced supply of liquid 
milk on the market explains why we observe only small price swings for liquid milk, predicted by the 
conceptual model in Section 2. The larger price swings that occur for processed milk products on 
the other hand can be partly explained by the increased processing of milk as well as opportunity 
costs that arise because of storage of processed milk products.  
The price drops reported by the famers in this sample are smaller than those we found in the 
literature. However, the latter price drops were found through focus group discussions with a small 
sample of dairy farmers. Therefore, the price declines we found in literature are indicative but cannot 
be considered representative for the producer milk prices in the country. It is possible that the 
questions in the survey asking farmers to detail market prices are not sensitive enough to capture 
true price swings occurring in the market since farmers were asked to report prices over specified 
time periods and prices might peak more immediately after fasting during important religious 
festivities (such as Easter and Christmas). Yet, we still expect that price changes are small in the 
study area since farmers are aligning milk production volumes with fasting periods, produced milk is 
increasingly processed to more storable milk products and/or fed to young children, which all reduce 
the supply of liquid milk on the market. 
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Figure 4-2: Average market prices of liquid and processed milk reported by our respondents 
throughout the year 
Note: 1 USD = 27 ETB at the time of the survey 
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5. Discussion and conclusion  
The impact of food taboos on food consumption and value chains is not well understood. Fasting 
practices embedded within the largest religious community of Ethiopia, the Orthodox Christians, 
create significant seasonality in milk demand. However, quantitative evidence on the implications for 
dairy farming households is limited. In this chapter, we detail the impact of fasting on production, 
marketing, and consumption decisions of producing household located in the dominantly Orthodox 
and commercially-oriented setting of the Great Addis milk shed. Choosing this target group allows 
us to measure the simultaneous impact of fasting on production, processing, and marketing 
decisions of milk producers as well as on milk intake (the latter one unhampered by availability 
constraints). No such comprehensive study has been undertaken in the Ethiopian context before.  
We find that dairy farming households adopt diverse strategies to help them overcome periods of 
reduced milk demand and the importance of these strategies vary with market accessibility, which 
we proxy in this chapter by remoteness of the households to the capital Addis Ababa. We find that 
remote farmers mainly rely on reducing the production of milk by their dairy herd during long fasting 
periods. The milk that is still produced by these households is processed or channelled to their young 
children. As a result, these households sell significantly smaller quantities of liquid milk during fasting 
periods, but we observe no effect of fasting on sales volumes of processed milk. While these 
households consume significantly less liquid and processed milk during fasting periods, the intake 
of milk by their youngest children is not affected by the presence of a long fasting period. The 
youngest children seem to be the ones that still consume milk during fasting periods. Liquid milk sale 
opportunities of non-remote farmers on the other hand are significantly less affected by long fasting 
periods. But we observe considerable heterogeneity among these farmers in their ability to maintain 
milk sales during fasting seasons. Some of these farmers seemingly benefit from being better 
connected to buyers that continue purchasing milk during fasting periods. As a result, non-remote 
farmers, on average, do not reduce the total production of milk at their farms significantly. Yet, to 
compensate for (some) forgone market opportunities during fasting, these farmers process a 
significantly larger share of the produced milk during fasting and they feed significantly more milk to 
their young children. As opposite to remote farmers, consumption volumes of liquid and processed 
milk in non-remote households are not affected by long fasting seasons. 
Furthermore, we observe that even if milk is available at the household level, household intake of 
milk remains low and that milk is mainly channelled to young children. While young children seem to 
benefit from long fasting seasons, their intake of milk still falls short by 1.6 and 0.8 L during non-
fasting and fasting weeks respectively as food-based dietary guidelines recommend a weekly 
consumption of 3.5 L of milk [23]. Producing households need to trade-off between nutrition and 
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income generation objectives and fasting seems to impact this trade-off in favour of nutrition 
objectives due to the reduced opportunities for marketing liquid milk during fasting seasons.  
Our findings have a number of important implications. First of all, improved nutritional knowledge 
could influence the trade-off producing households make between consumption and income 
generation objectives. Therefore, nutritional awareness creation can help to increase milk 
consumption by all household members outside of fasting seasons but also to increasingly allocate 
excess milk during fasting to those members that are officially exempt from fasting, i.e. not only 
children, but also pregnant/lactating women, and elderly. Increased consumption of milk by these 
vulnerable groups during long fasting seasons could further help to avoid the seasonal halting of 
milk production as well as the need for households to process milk, which is labour-intense and 
input-inefficient since farmers use traditional processing techniques and materials. The potential 
value addition that can be created is thus low [13, 236]. This also explains why farmers in this milk 
shed have specialized in liquid milk sales. 
Second, further investments are needed to intensify milk production systems and increase milk 
productivity so that more milk becomes available at lower prices. As long as milk will remain a luxury 
product, nutritional awareness creation will not be sufficient to make producing households consume 
more milk, especially outside fasting periods. Lower prices of milk will make milk more accessible to 
household members that are currently not prioritized when it comes to milk intake. Such investments 
however will only be attractive to producing households if transaction costs are reduced both during 
as well as outside fasting and the effects of seasonal demand swings are smoothened. Inefficiencies 
in the milk market raise transaction costs for producers to market milk and thus reduce their profit 
margins. If such costs could be reduced by investing in improved market functioning, it would not 
only make milk cheaper for consumers, but simultaneously guarantee remunerative and stable 
incomes for producing households. Investing in better market functioning – not only physical facilities 
but also enforcement of property rights and the law of contract – could thus indirectly contribute to 
productivity gains. 
To smoothen demand swings, interventions should focus on maintaining a rather constant demand 
for milk during fasting periods. At the consumer side, nutrition awareness creation could help to raise 
the consumption of milk by non-Orthodox households, but also of Orthodox members who are 
officially exempt from fasting. Studies have found that social norms might still force these groups to 
engage in fasting practices with negative repercussions for nutritional and health outcomes [306]. 
Furthermore, the establishment of school milk programmes could also help to create a guaranteed 
market outlet during fasting periods. Furthermore, as markets of milk are still highly fragmented in 
Ethiopia, improving transportation facilities could help to assure market integration and marketing of 
liquid and processed milk to areas where fasting is less prevalent especially for remote producing 
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households. Having guaranteed market outlets will incentivize these producers to maintain – rather 
than cutting down – their production during fasting, or better make them invest in expanding and 
intensifying their milk production activities. 
Also public and private investments to support and expand processing facilities would help farmers 
to continue selling milk during fasting spells, without requiring these farmers to specialize and invest 
in home-processing activities which are time- and input-inefficient and do not create substantial value 
addition [13, 236]. This need has been recognized in the Livestock Master Plan of the Ethiopian 
government of 2015. Even though milk processing plants are popping up increasingly in Ethiopia, 
there are still too few (about 40 industrial processing plants spread over the country) and many of 
these plants operate below capacity. Having a higher number of fully operational small-scale and 
industrial-scale processing plants not only rises the demand for milk both during and outside fasting, 
it would simultaneously increase efficiency, productivity, and safety of the produced milk products 
because of their use of modern processing technologies and economies of scale. Yet, enhancing 
processing practices will not be sufficient, and further efforts will be needed so that the produced 
milk products can be properly stored during periods of slack demand and further efforts are needed 
to integrate markets that enable processors to maintain their sales of processed milk products during 
fasting periods. 
Our findings point to new areas for further research. First, our sample is not representative of the 
population at large, since we only sampled milk producing households within the Great Addis milk 
shed. This sample should be expanded to include milk producing households in other regions and 
milk sheds. Since the milk shed of Great Addis is the most commercially developed milk shed in the 
country, with more market opportunities for farmers to sell their milk, one would expect to observe 
potentially larger effects of fasting on production and output use decisions in other milk sheds with 
possibly negative repercussions on the milk intake of children among these producing households. 
Second, further research should collect repeated observations over time and focus on a cohort of 
producing households before, during, and after fasting. We used cross-sectional data where the 
households sampled during and outside of a long fasting season are not identical. We control for 
household and individual characteristics so as to make both groups interviewed during and outside 
a long fasting period as comparable as possible and therefore reduce the probability of having biased 
fasting estimates. Yet, to check the robustness of our findings, it is advised to re-run the analyses 
with panel data that capture producing households’ behaviour both during and outside fasting. 
Furthermore, repeated observations over time will allow to further assess the differential impact that 
might be present for different fasting periods (additional analyses in Supplementary material B.6 
seem to hint in that direction but are based on recall data of the households and can therefore be 
subjected to biases). Moreover, further research could benefit from using diaries instead of recall 
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data so as to more accurately assess the impact of fasting on milk production, milk output use, dairy 
sales and consumption volumes. 
Third, future research would benefit from more focus on quantifying the nutritional and health impacts 
of fasting adherence by children but also by other vulnerable population groups (pregnant/lactating 
women, elderly) who are officially exempt from fasting. Having such evidence can help to give more 
weight to the importance of awareness creation and improve information dissemination on the 
potential adverse nutritional and health effects of fasting. 
Fourth, only liquid and processed milk have been looked at in this study. It would be good to broaden 
up the study to other ASFs such as meat and eggs. Since slaughtering of animals can be more easily 
planned, one would expect that the impact of fasting on meat producing households is smaller (i.e. 
these households will wait to sell or slaughter their animals until fasting periods are over). The impact 
of fasting on egg producing households is also likely to be smaller compared to milk producing 
households given the lower perishability of eggs compared to liquid milk.  
Finally, future studies, in other countries, could target different religious groups and assess how their 
food habits and beliefs are related to consumption and food value chains. 
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Abstract 
Demand for milk is growing fast in urban areas. Due to poorly developed rural infrastructure, urban 
dairy farms are pivotal in making milk available and affordable in towns and cities. Yet current supply 
fails to meet the increasing demand. In order to formulate fit interventions that can expand urban 
milk production, a detailed understanding of urban production systems is needed. Using a cluster 
analysis approach, we profile 304 urban dairy farms in Mekelle, Northern Ethiopia, along three 
dimensions: input efficiency, market integration, and resilience towards demand seasonality. Our 
results suggest five distinctive farm types: surviving farms, processing farms, young male 
entrepreneurs, established output-efficient farms, and established output-input-efficient farms. We 
observe large discrepancies in terms of dairy enterprise’s productivity, profitability, and suitability in 
future urban policy planning. For each of the identified production systems, we sketch potential 
intervention approaches that can feed into more tailored dairy development programmes.  
Keywords: Ethiopia, farm system, intervention approach, Mekelle city, milk production, typology, 
urban agriculture  
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1. Introduction 
Economic progress is shifting the starchy-staple diets in the African continent towards food baskets 
that increasingly include nutrient-dense foods like animal-based produce. This nutritional transition 
occurs the fastest in urban areas [317]. Depending on the considered ASF, consumption is expected 
to have a three- to sevenfold increase by 2050 in SSA. Alarmingly, growth in local production is not 
keeping up with this increasing demand [318]. Particularly urban areas are at risk of food and nutrition 
insecurity, given the rapid urbanisation trends; the total number of African dwellers is projected to 
rise from 400 million in 2010 to 1.3 billion by 2050 [212]. Identifying appropriate measures to mitigate 
the negative impact of urbanisation on food and nutrition security is thus pivotal. 
Since ASFs are highly perishable and rural infrastructure is often poorly developed, production of 
such products in (peri-)urban areas is thriving in many African countries [319]. Yet, agricultural 
activities in town and city centres are often unplanned and informal (e.g. Thornton [320]). At the 
same time, policy makers and development practitioners are increasingly aware of the need of 
steering urban milk production to safeguard supply of ASFs in urban centres [212]. Scholarly studies 
have identified barriers and opportunities of urban livestock production in general (e.g. Hippolyte et 
al. [321], Gororo and Kashangura [322], Roessler et al. [323], and Crump et al. [324]), but have 
insufficiently covered how these vary across different types and forms of livestock activities within 
cities. Urban dwellers keep livestock for different reasons and in different ways than farmers in rural 
areas. Additionally, there is a substantial degree of variation within the group of urban livestock 
keepers, as well as among those who specialize in particular livestock practices such as dairy. 
Establishing a comprehensive overview of such farm diversity25, is essential in order to propose fit 
regulatory or supportive measures for policy making and programme development. 
                                               
25 To our knowledge, only one paper has specifically addressed peri-urban dairy diversity (i.e. Toure et al. 
[325]). 
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2. Background 
Within SSA, Ethiopia hosts the largest estimated livestock herd and represents the second most 
populous country. Moreover, Ethiopia is among one of the fastest urbanizing countries in the world; 
its urban population is about to triple, from 15.2 million in 2012 to 42.3 million by 2034 [326]. Recent 
figures estimate the annual national milk production at 5.2 billion L of which 80% originates from 
milking cows [230]. Despite this large volume of cow milk produced, milk productivity remains 
extremely low (yearly average of 125 kg milk/cow in lowland grazing zones to about 200 kg/cow in 
highland mixed farming zones) [327]. Availability and access to high-quality inputs and services 
(such as feed, genetics, and health care), as well as poor market infrastructure and support still 
hamper milk production and productivity [42, 328]. Average per capita milk consumption has been 
estimated at around 20 L, although large variations can be found across towns and cities [201]. 
These low intake levels are in part due to limited supply, but can also be attributed to a variable 
demand. Demand seasonality of milk is high in Ethiopia because of fasting rituals that are 
traditionally embedded in the Orthodox Christian Church, the dominant religious community within 
the country. Fasting rituals make milk demand highly variable which is hard to cope with for milk 
producers and other actors in the dairy value chain [42, 328]. 
Although rural milk production is the main provider of milk in Ethiopia accounting for about 98% of 
the total national milk production [201], smallholder farm systems are rapidly emerging in urban and 
peri-urban areas and differ greatly from their rural counterparts. Rural dairy farms operate extensive 
low-input low-output mixed crop livestock systems, where indigenous cattle are predominantly held 
to provide traction power. The milk produced is mainly used for household consumption and excess 
milk is processed into butter and cheese. Urban dairy farming, on the other hand, consist of 
specialised production units often operated within the farming household’s residence compound, 
adopting zero-grazing systems due to land scarcity. Most of the feed is purchased, and agro-
industrial by-products are often supplemented to the diet. Urban producers typically own improved 
crossbreeds or pure grade exotic cattle, which give higher milk yields than local breeds. The bulk of 
produced milk is marketed to neighbours through informal channels or to FSPs (milk shops, cafés, 
restaurants, and hotels) [201, 245, 329].
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3. Materials and methods  
3.1. Data  
A cross-sectional study was conducted in the seven sub-cities of Mekelle city, the regional capital of 
the Tigray region, between January and February 2016. Urbanisation in this region is slightly higher 
than the country’s average (16%) with one out of five living in urban areas [245]. Mekelle is the sixth 
largest city of the country with a population of around 247,000 people aged 10 years and above 
[296]. In Tigray, about 95% of the population adheres to the Orthodox Church [15], which creates a 
suitable context to analyse resilience of urban dairy farm systems towards demand shocks such as 
Orthodox fasting events.  
To get a representative sample of producers for Mekelle city as a whole, we collected estimates of 
the number of active milk producers from the different sub-city administrations so as to get an 
overview of the total population of dairy producers in the city. According to these estimates about 
1,400 dairy farms are (officially) active in Mekelle of which 30% operates in the sub-city Hawelti, 26% 
in Hadnet, 13% in Quiha, 13% Adi Haqi, 12% Ayder, 3% Semien, and 3% Kedamay Weyane (a 
visual representation of the different sub-cities of Mekelle can be found in Chapter 2, Figure 2-11). 
To obtain a margin of error of 5% and a confidence level of 95% that the actual population mean 
falls within the margin of error, we had to sample 302 dairy producers in total. To know how many 
producers needed to be sampled within each sub-city to get a total sample of 302 producers, we 
multiplied the shares of dairy holders in each sub-city by the total sample size. Since no detailed lists 
are available summarizing the details of these urban dairy producers, we had to trace producers in 
another way. Therefore, we adopt a pragmatic approach so as to assure we draw a random sample 
of dairy producing households in each sub-city. To do so, we adopted a combination of the following 
strategies: (1) milk producing households in Mekelle often let their manure to dry outside their homes, 
which we could use to trace them, (2) we asked around in the respective sub-cities, usually a causal 
passer-by, where we could find milk producers; (3) and after having interviewed the dairy producers, 
we asked them where we could find other producing households in the sub-city. Our final sample 
included 304 dairy farmers. 
Interviews were done with the household member responsible for dairy farming (household head or 
spouse). No monetary incentives were given to participate in the survey. Four trained enumerators 
interviewed the farmers in the local language and a supervisor guided and closely monitored the 
data collection. An informed consent was obtained from all respondents. The semi-structured 
questionnaire used covered information on household characteristics, herd size and structure, 
farmer experience and training, labour force and labour division, milk production and marketing, feed 
purchase, land and credit usage, asset and service ownership, social capital, and household income 
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sources. The questionnaire was piloted before the actual survey took place. Only minor modifications 
were made after testing. The questionnaire can be found in Appendix 2.  
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3.2. Methodological approach and theoretical framework 
Various exploratory statistical tools have been developed to gain insight in farm diversity. A popular 
method is typology construction that classifies farms into different clusters using multivariate 
techniques [330]. We used different clustering methods as it was shown that clustering algorithms 
may result in different grouping structures of a dataset [331]. We report the results of a two-step 
cluster analysis using a log-likelihood distance measure as it yielded a meaningful classification of 
the dairy farms with a fairly high goodness-of-fit. Moreover, this method proved to be robust when 
incorporating different combinations of discriminatory variables. The advantage of a two-step 
clustering procedure is that it efficiently handles large data sets and that it does not require to 
predetermine the number of clusters to be generated [332]. The algorithm assumes normality and 
independence of the included attributes, but remains fairly robust when these assumptions are 
violated [333].  
A predefined set of discriminating variables was included in the cluster analysis. We deliberately 
focus on performance indicators26 so as to help policy makers making better informed interventions 
to strengthen the urban dairy sector. In the context of Ethiopia, and specifically the city of Mekelle, 
one is particularly interested to see how farmers have adapted to fasting periods and which 
strategies they have developed to overcome periods of reduced milk demand. Next to resilience 
towards demand seasonality, it is also important to include input efficiency. We focus on feed 
efficiency as feed typically represents the highest production cost (about 65-70%) [335]. 
Furthermore, detailing feed efficiency in the context of Mekelle is especially relevant given the regular 
occurrence of (acute) feed shortages. Labour productivity could also have been a good indicator, yet 
we only have detailed data on costs for hired labour. Since we have no detailed data on time spend 
on the dairy farm by different household members, we can only roughly estimate the total labour 
costs. Finally, market integration of farmers is also crucial, so as to formulate interventions that 
reduce transaction costs. Reducing transaction costs will allow farmers to fetch remunerative and 
stable milk prices and it will simultaneously allow consumer to buy cheap(er) milk. The 
operationalisation of these indicators (resilience towards demand seasonality, input efficiency, and 
market integration) is explained below. We did not perform a factor analysis to reduce the number 
of explanatory variables in the cluster analysis as the attributes we included are not highly correlated 
(absolute values were below 0.6). The included indicators allow us to gain insight in the productivity 
and profitability of urban dairy enterprises as well as their suitability in future urban policy planning. 
 
                                               
26 We did not focus on internal factors such as e.g. resources owned, management skills, experience in 
farming, or time spent earning off-farm income, since internal factors have been shown to affect farm 
performance and therefore represent a more indirect way of measuring farm performance [334]. 
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As mentioned above, Orthodox fasting has a decisive impact on the dairy farm system in the study 
region. Fasting greatly affects milk prices and marketability leaving the farmers with few options 
during fasting: selling milk at reduced prices (that might not always cover production costs), 
processing milk to increase its shelf life, aligning the number of milking cows to the occurrence of 
fasting periods, consuming the milk themselves, giving it away for free or just spoiling it. In our 
sample, the dominant strategies adopted by producers is selling milk below production costs or 
processing the milk to more storable milk products27. Therefore, we assess the robustness towards 
demand shocks resulting from Orthodox fasting, with the percentage of produced milk being sold 
and the percentage of produced milk being processed during fasting.  
As urban dairy farm businesses are largely dependent on purchased feed, we included the milk 
production:feed cost ratio to gain insight into the production-economic viability of farm businesses28. 
This variable was calculated based on the daily milk production and daily cost of purchased feed per 
animal (accounting for calves, heifers and milking cows). We only considered the feed purchased29 
and not that acquired through cut-and-carry or exchange, as their contribution was found to be 
negligible in the total feed uptake. High milk production:feed cost ratios signal higher input 
efficiencies of the dairy farms as more milk is produced per unit of feed cost.  
Finally, we included two variables reflecting how well the farmers have integrated in the market, 
namely the minimum30 producer price for liquid milk (which correspond to prices observed during 
fasting periods) and the milk price fluctuation experienced by farmers during fasting periods (which 
we proxied using the difference between the maximum (i.e. non-fasting price) and minimum milk 
producer price). Farmers who have made good market agreements with their milk buyers, are 
expected to be more likely to experience smaller price variations and higher milk prices. Moreover, 
having reliable market outlets encourages producers to invest more in commercial farm systems 
[336]. 
Once the clusters were identified using the discriminatory variables mentioned above, we assessed 
the differences between the identified farm clusters. For continuous variables, both parametric 
                                               
27 Average percentage of produced milk that is consumed by farming households amounts to barely 4% during 
Orthodox fasting. 15% of the households indicated to give away milk for free, but only 16 out of the 304 
interviewed farms indicated to give away milk more ‘frequently’, which was on average less than 2 L of milk a 
week. 
28 We did not collect data on the dry matter intake of milking cows due to accuracy problems; as such we could 
not use the feed conversion rate. Farmers are more likely to accurately report feed costs, hence our choice for 
milk production:feed cost ratio. 
29 Calculations based on our collected data from the milk producers revealed that 95% of the feed fed to the 
cattle herd is acquainted through purchase. 
30 We did not include the maximum price of liquid milk because of its smaller deviation across different farms. 
Moreover, when including this variable in the cluster analysis instead of the minimum price, we came up with 
only 2 farmer clusters which showed high intracluster heterogeneity across several farm characteristics. 
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(ANOVA, Tukey) and non-parametric (Kruskal-Wallis, Chi-square, Mann-Whitney, Fisher’s exact) 
tests were applied. All analyses were performed using the SPSS 22 software. Having characterised 
the farm clusters, we disclose development prospects for each of the identified production systems. 
First, we try to identify the livelihood strategies adopted by the production systems based on the 
framework developed by Dorward et al. [337]. We determine which farms are hanging in at 
subsistence level, who is able to step up and improve, and who is most likely to step out of dairy 
business. Using insights from the Situational Leadership Theory of Hersey and Blanchard [338] 
(Figure 5-1), we single out required intervention styles for each production system to enhance farm 
businesses and performances. This theory argues that depending on the competence (ability) and 
commitment (willingness) of individuals (in this case farms), a leader (policy maker or a non-
governmental organisation) should adapt its leadership style and vary the degree of direction and 
support that is given to the recipients. As such, four distinctive leadership approaches can be 
defined, which vary from a very tight and top down supervision and control (directing approach) to a 
merely laissez-faire and bottom-up approach (delegating style). In between these two extremes lie 
the coaching and supporting approach, more participatory approaches with interaction between the 
leader and the individuals. The main difference in both styles lies in the fact that coaching requires 
more close supervision and direction. 
 
Figure 5-1: Four leadership styles as set out by the Situational Leadership Theory (elaborated from 
Hersey and Blanchard [338])
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4. Results and discussion  
4.1. Identifying and characterizing of urban milk production systems 
Despite some common features and characteristics, milk production systems score differently in 
terms of input efficiency, fasting adaptation strategies, and market integration (Table 5-1 and Figure 
5-2). The cluster analysis categorised the producers into five distinctive clusters which we qualified 
as follows: processing farms (cluster 1; 21% of the sampled farms), surviving farms (cluster 2; 24%), 
young male entrepreneurs (cluster 3; 13%), established, output-efficient farms (cluster 4; 31%) and, 
established output-input-efficient farms (cluster 5; 12%).  
Overall it seems that farms in cluster 5 outperform the other production systems (Figure 5-2). Besides 
being thrice as input efficient compared to its peers, this farm cluster has developed proper fasting 
adaptation strategies, and manages to sell about 50% of their produced milk during fasting. They 
seem to have established good arrangements with their milk buyers and they are fairly well 
integrated in the market, reflected by the stable and remunerative milk price. Next in line are the 
producers in cluster 4 who score best in terms of market integration and linkages. Producers in this 
cluster face the smallest price fluctuations and receive higher milk prices than the other clusters. 
Furthermore, this cluster manages to sell about 70% of its produced milk during fasting periods, the 
highest share of all clusters. While all production systems seem to cope well with the Orthodox 
fasting events, producers in cluster 3 do not and they cease milk sales and do not process produced 
milk during fasting. This observation implies that the produced milk is largely spoiled, a big profit loss 
considering a total number of 166-250 fasting days a year [8, 16, 17]. Farms in cluster 1 on the other 
hand specialised in milk processing during Orthodox fasting and have fairly good price arrangements 
with its milk buyers. Finally, producers in cluster 2 are worse off as their milk prices are highly volatile 
and they receive far less for the milk they produce.  
Table 5-1: Average values (mean ± standard error) of the discriminatory variables used in the cluster 
analysis for the identified farmer clusters  
 Cluster 1  
(n = 63) 
Cluster 2  
(n = 73) 
Cluster 3  
(n = 38) 
Cluster 4 
 (n = 93) 
Cluster 5 
 (n = 36) 
Produced milk: feed cost ratio 
(ETB/L) 
0.2b ± 0.0 0.2b ± 0.0 0.2b ± 0.0 0.2b ± 0.0 0.6a ± 0.0 
Share of produced milk being 
processed during fasting (%)  
96.2a ± 0.9 51.4b ± 3.1 0.5d ± 0.5 24.6c ± 2.0 44.2b ± 5.0 
Share of produced milk being 
sold during fasting (%) 
1.6c ± 0.8 44.0b ± 2.7 0.5c ± 0.5 68.9a ± 2.0 47.0b ± 4.7 
Minimum milk producer price 
(ETB/L) 
10.1bc ± 0.2 7.0d ± 0.1 9.6c ± 0.3 11.4a ± 0.2 10.3b ± 0.2 
Milk price fluctuation (ETB/L) 3.0bc ± 0.2 6.0a ± 0.1 3.5b ± 0.2 2.0d ± 0.1 2.7c ± 0.2 
Note: a-d Means within a row with different superscripts differ significantly (p < 0.05). 
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Figure 5-2: Radar chart showing how the different identified dairy holder groups score relatively in 
terms of each other for the discriminatory variables and compared to the dairy holder 
Note: For each discriminatory variable, the relative scores were calculated by dividing the average value of each farmer 
group by the maximum observed value among all farmer groups 
When looking into the socio-economic profiles (Table 5-2), the following patterns emerge. As such, 
cluster 1 is found to be characterised by a larger share of female household heads. Farming 
households in cluster 2 almost exclusively rely on dairying to sustain their households, whereas dairy 
farming, on average across the sample, contributes half to two-thirds to total household income. 
Households in this second cluster tend to have more illiterate or poorly schooled household heads. 
Cluster 3, on the other hand, is found to be dominated by young, educated, male entrepreneurs, who 
start up a dairy business because of lucrative reasons. Their household income per member is twice 
as high compared to that in the other farm clusters31. Finally, producers in clusters 4 and 5 share a 
rather similar socio-economic profile and both host households with significantly larger family sizes 
compared to the other production systems. But cluster 4 displays a significantly higher level of 
income diversification compared to all the other clusters as 4 out of 5 of their household heads is 
engaged in secondary and/or tertiary occupations. Moreover, clusters 4 and 5 are distinct on their 
social embeddedness, with producers in cluster 5 having significantly larger network sizes and higher 
participation rates in finance groups32.
                                               
31 Income data are self-reported by farmers and reflect average income in the past month. The survey was 
rolled out between 27/1/2016 and 12/2/2016. Therefore, income data do not cover a fasting period and should 
be seen as income data outside fasting periods. 
32 With finance groups we refer to the informal finance groups (iqubs and idirs) that are widespread in Ethiopia. 
These groups are traditional ways of saving and operate completely outside the formal financial system.  
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Table 5-2: Socio-demographic characterization of the sampled dairy farming households and their 
heads 
 Cluster 1  
(n = 63) 
Cluster 2  
(n = 73) 
Cluster 3  
(n = 38) 
Cluster 4 
 (n = 93) 
Cluster 5 
 (n = 36) 
Household size (number) 4.8ab ± 0.3 4.4b ± 0.3 4.1b ± 0.4 5.4a ± 0.2 5.2ab ± 0.5 
Household income  
(ETB/ member/month) 
2,846.7b ± 
295.5 
2,513.4c ± 
422.9 
5,429.2a ± 
666.0 
1,899.3c ± 
162.8 
1,434.0d ± 
292.5 
Dependency ratio4  0.6a ± 0.0 0.5a ± 0.0 0.5a ± 0.05 0.5a ± 0.0 0.5a ± 0.1 
Share dairying income in total 
household income (%) 
67.0b ± 3.2 87.4a ± 2.7 64.7b ± 3.75 65.1b ± 2.0 55.2b ± 4.2 
Household close network size5 (%)      
1-2 people 3.2b 53.4a 0b 62.0a 5.6b 
3-4 people 3.2b 17.8a 0b 5.4b 2.8b 
5 or more people 93.7b 21.9a 100b 30.4a 91.7b 
Household participation (%)      
neighbourhood committee 19.1ab 8.2bc 31.6a 2.2c 0c 
religious group 7.9a 5.5a 2.6a 11.8a 13.9a 
finance group 85.7a 16.4c 100a 52.7b 88.9a 
Age distribution head (%)      
18-39 34.9ab 30.1bc 50.0a 18.3c 16.7bc 
40-59 54.0a 45.2a 44.7a 60.2a 47.2a 
60 and above 11.1bc 24.7a 5.3cd 21.5ab 36.1a 
Female head (%) 28.6a 19.2ab 10.5b 15.1b 5.6b 
Marital status head (%)      
  married 62.9bc 61.6b 52.6b 78.5a 80.6ac 
single 8.1bc 20.6a 21.1ab 5.4c 8.3abc 
Divorced/separated/widow 29.0a 17.8a 26.3a 16.1a 11.1a 
Educational background head (%)      
no schooling 19.1b 36.1a 13.2b 28.0ab 13.9b 
informal education 11.1a 12.5a 7.9a 11.8a 25.0a 
junior primary 14.3a 16.7a 18.4a 15.1a 30.6a 
senior primary 42.9a 12.5b 39.5a 18.3b 13.9b 
general secondary 4.8a 9.7a 18.4a 18.3a 11.1a 
preparatory secondary 4.8a 2.8a 0a 4.3a 2.8a 
  higher education 3.2a 9.7a 2.6a 4.3a 2.8a 
Secondary/tertiary occupation 
head (%) 
61.9b 23.3c 60.5b 79.6a 36.1c 
Note: mean ± standard error for the continuous variables and frequencies for the categorical variables.  
a-d Means and frequencies within a row with different superscripts differ significantly (p < 0.05). 
4 Dependency ratio was calculated by dividing the number of non-working household members by the total household size. 
5 Close network size of a household was measured by asking how many people are willing to assist the household when 
facing difficult time periods (such as death of household head) (see Grootaert et al. [339]). 
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A comparison across the clusters on selected characteristics of the dairy farm system is given in 
Table 5-3. Overall, urban dairy farms are quite young enterprises with limited prior knowledge 
underscored by the observation that few households keep milking cows because of family tradition 
and have on average only 1 or 2 relatives that are also engaged in milk production. Clusters 4 and 
5 share that they host the most experienced farm households. These producers have been operating 
the dairy business for 10 years, roughly 3 years more than average producers in the other production 
systems. Most farms indicate the generation of cash income as the most important reason for 
keeping milking cows, while a significant fraction of farms in cluster 5 motivate their business as an 
investment opportunity. Herd sizes are relatively small (attributed by the farmers interviewed to 
obvious land scarcity), about 2-5 heads, although producers in clusters 4 and 5 own one head more 
on average. All households predominantly keep crossbreeds, although the more experienced farm 
clusters 4 and 5 might occasionally have a cow from indigenous breed in their farming compound. 
Producers in clusters 4 and 5 tend to run their business together with their partner, whereas a larger 
proportion of single owners is found in the other clusters.  
Regarding the network, we clearly see that only farms in cluster 3 know little other dairy farming 
households. But, producers in this cluster as well as those in cluster 1 have a wide network of feed 
sellers and milk buyers, whereas an opposite trend is observed for those in clusters 2, 4, and 5. 
Livestock extension services, artificial insemination, and trading dairy animals is common practice 
among urban farms, although farms in cluster 4 are significantly less involved in the latter two 
activities. Labourers are hired by around one-third of the farms across all clusters. These labourers 
are mainly young boys that take care of the daily feeding, milking, and cleaning tasks. 
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Table 5-3: Characterization of the dairy farm systems 
 Cluster 1  
(n = 63) 
Cluster 2  
(n = 73) 
Cluster 3  
(n = 38) 
Cluster 4 
 (n = 93) 
Cluster 5 
 (n = 36) 
Engagement in dairy farming 
(years)  
7.3b ± 0.7 7.9b ± 0.7 6.7b ± 0.8 9.6a ± 0.6 9.7ab ± 1.2 
Dairy herd size (number) 3.5c ± 0.2 4.5abc ± 0.4 3.9bc ± 0.4 4.8ab ± 0.4 5.4a ± 0.6 
Share of local breeds (%) 0bc 0c 0abc 2.3ab ± 1.1 2.5a ± 1.4 
Main motivation for farm (%)      
cash income 67.2b 86.3a 97.4a 60.2b 36.1c 
investment opportunity 18.0b 6.9c 0c 23.7b 41.7a 
saving opportunity 4.9a 0a 2.6a 3.2a 11.1a 
family tradition 9.8a 6.9a 0a 11.8a 11.1a 
Household heads being sole 
owner of farm (%) 
38.1a 38.4a 47.4a 21.5b 16.7b 
Relatives in dairy farming 
(number) 
1.2a ± 0.2 2.1a ± 0.4 1.0a ± 0.2 1.3a ± 0.2 1.5a ± 0.2 
Fellow dairy farmers known 
personally (number) 
7.3c ± 1.7 13.7a ± 1.3 1.6d ± 0.6 7.6b ± 0.5 12.6a ± 1.8 
Feed sellers known personally 
(number) 
7.4a ± 0.5 4.1b ± 0.3 8.3a ± 0.4 3.6b ± 0.2 3.4b ± 0.3 
Dairy buyers known personally 
(number) 
11.3a ± 1.1 5.1b ± 0.8 12.8a ± 1.0 3.2c ± 0.2 2.4c ± 0.4 
Selling and purchasing dairy 
animals (%) 
100a 94.5a 100a 49.5b 94.4a 
Artificial insemination (%) 85.7bc 94.5ab 94.7ab 78.5c 100a 
Livestock extension services (%) 81.0c 97.3a 81.6c 94.6ab 86.1bc 
Hired labour (%) 30.2a 42.5a 34.2a 38.7a 27.8a 
Dairy farm costs 
(ETB/animal/month)  
     
animal health 105.5a ± 16.3 91.4a ± 12.4 87.7a ± 15.7 103.4a ± 17.7 56.8a ± 11.7 
hired labor3 155.5ab ± 16.2 121.5bc ± 15.7 232.9a ± 34.3 118.5c ± 13.6  98.6c ± 10.1 
feed 1,396.0a ± 
147.9 
923.4b ± 44.7 1,504.3a ± 
128.4 
844.3b ± 42.2 263.7c ± 31.1 
Note: mean ± standard error for the continuous variables and frequencies for the categorical variables.  
a-d Means and frequencies within a row with different superscripts differ significantly (p < 0.05). 
3 This cost is only for those farms that use hired labour. 
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4.2. Differences between urban milk production systems 
In this paragraph, we provide insights into why certain farm clusters perform better in terms of input 
efficiency, resilience towards demand shocks, and strength of market linkages.  
The high feed efficiency of producers in cluster 5 seems to be mainly explained by their low feed 
costs as compared to the other cluster, while their cow milk productivity is found to be lower than 
that of cluster 1 and 3 (Figure 5-3). Yet, for the feed expenses they have, they manage to have a 
relatively high milk production, and producers in cluster 5 spent about 4 times less on purchased 
feed to achieve the same milk output as those in the other clusters (Figure 5-3). This can be 
explained by the usage of relatively cheap feed resources in this cluster that are known to increase 
milk production: i.e. hay, food and vegetable leftovers, as well as common salt. 
First, as compared to the other clusters, farms in cluster 5 predominantly give a basal diet of hay to 
their herd (Table 5-4). The other farm clusters mainly give crop residues (from e.g. cereals, pulses 
and oilseeds), and hay is used to a lesser extent and often operates to replace crop residues33. Crop 
residues are known to be poorly digestible and protein-deficient, which in turn limits milk productivity, 
while hay has slightly higher crude protein levels [340]. Furthermore, farmers in cluster 5 pay lower 
prices for the hay (80-100 ETB/donkey; see Supplementary material Table S5-1) they purchase as 
compared to crop residues (225-260 ETB/donkey; see Supplementary material Table S5-2). 
Second, farms in cluster 5 offer more diverse diets, including 4 to 5 feed types on average. Leftovers 
from food or vegetables and salt, both cheap feed sources, are increasingly included by this cluster 
to supplement the diet next to wheat bran and atella. Diets in other clusters. The usage of leftovers 
as non-conventional feed resource reduces feed costs for cluster 5, but simultaneously enriches 
animals’ diets [341]. The supplementation of sodium, on the other hand, tackles the subclinical 
sodium deficiency, that dairy animals are often faced with which hampers milk production [342, 343].  
 
Finally, farms in cluster 5 report more often to feed prepared feed mixtures, which generally is the 
most expensive part of the diet and thus might contradict the low feed costs reported by this cluster 
(Figure 5-3). This latest figure should be interpreted with caution given the size of this cluster (36 
farms). 7 out of these 36 farms report to give prepared feed mixtures to their animals. Yet, these 
farmers, when compared to other farmers in other clusters that also buy feed mixtures, buy on 
average only half of the quantities bought by other clusters (170 kg roughly every month) and prices 
paid are also half the prices paid by other farmers purchasing feed mixtures (2.5 ETB per kg).  
 
 
                                               
33 Less than one-third of the farmers use both crop residues and hay. 
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Table 5-4: Feeding practices within the identified farm clusters: mean ± standard error for the 
continuous variables and frequencies for the categorical variables 
 Cluster 1  
(n = 63) 
Cluster 2  
(n = 73) 
Cluster 3  
(n = 38) 
Cluster 4 
 (n = 93) 
Cluster 5 
 (n = 36) 
Number of feed types used  3.5cd ± 0.2 3.9c ± 0.2  3.1d ± 0.2 4.3b ± 0.1 4.6a ± 0.2 
Farmers who report to feed (%)      
green grass 1.6c 16.4ab 5.3bc 20.4a 8.3abc 
grass hay 36.5d 54.8c 18.4d 69.9b 94.4a 
crop residues 82.5a 80.8a 89.5a 80.7a 36.1b 
wheat bran 95.2a 97.3a 100a 97.9a 94.4a 
atella 73.0b 95.9a 73.7b 95.7a 86.1ab 
salt 33.3b 30.1b 18.4b 31.2b 77.8a 
prepared feed mixture 1.6b 2.7b 0b 12.9a 19.4a 
molasses 1.6a 5.5a 5.3a 1.1a 0a 
fresh cultivated forage 1.6a 2.7a 5.3a 1.1a 0a 
leftovers (food, vegetable) 17.5b 4.1c 0c 14.0b 44.4a 
Share of purchased feed in diet 
(%) 
94.7bc ± 1.3 97.0b ± 0.9 100a 93.5c ± 1.1 91.2c ± 2.0 
Farmers reporting feed shortage 
problem (%) 
82.5bc 90.4b 76.3c 98.9a 100ab 
Reported feed shortage coping 
strategy (%)6 
     
destocking 55.8b 24.2c 31.0c 71.7ab 86.1a 
storage of feed 26.9b 33.3b 55.2a 20.7b 5.6c 
no coping strategy 5.8b 34.9a 0b 3.3b 8.3b 
Note: mean ± standard error for the continuous variables and frequencies for the categorical variables.  
a-d Means and frequencies within a row with different superscripts differ significantly (p < 0.05). 
6 Percentages reported are only applicable for those farms that indicated that they faced feed shortage problems. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Average daily milk production and feed cost for the different identified dairy holder 
groups and the average dairy holder (indicated by the black line) 
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Not only do farmers in cluster 5 use relatively cheap feed resources, they also succeed in sourcing 
feed at the lowest prices. Investigating the feed market arrangements of the different clusters (of 
which we provide details in Supplementary material Table S5-1, S5-2, S5-3 and S5-4), reveals that 
overall, producers in cluster 2 experience the largest feed price fluctuations among all production 
systems, which confirms their vulnerable status; while farms in cluster 5 succeed in sourcing feed at 
the lowest prices. Moreover, producers in clusters 1, 3 and 5 consider quality as the most important 
contract detail in arrangements made with feed suppliers, whereas households in clusters 2 and 4 
value the volume and price more. Households in clusters 1, 3 and 5 also make considerably more 
upfront payments for feed than those in clusters 2 and 4 who mainly pay at the time of transaction. 
Furthermore, producers in clusters 1, 3 and 5 purchase significantly smaller quantities of feed. These 
production systems seem to invest in high-quality feeds which they purchase frequently, especially 
so for the roughages, which are known to deteriorate quick due to improper storage and conservation 
[329, 344]. Moreover, producers in clusters 1 and 3 source more from rural producers and less from 
traders and buy atella more often from local breweries. Despite these differences, producers in 
clusters 1 and 3 seem to be less confronted with higher feed prices, hence the high feed costs they 
report might arise from the fact that they buy more feed per animal than do clusters 2 and 4.  
Also, in terms of market integration and fasting adaptation strategies, we find clear differences 
between the clusters. Selling and processing milk during Orthodox fasting seem to be two opposite 
adaptation strategies (suggested by the negative correlation term in Table 5-5). High price 
fluctuations and low prices of liquid milk drive producers to process their produced milk, whereas an 
opposite trend is observed for liquid milk marketing. Traditional milk processing is a rather labour-
intense and time-consuming activity. Studies by LIVES have revealed that in order to produce 1 
kilogram of butter, on average 15.5 L of milk is needed (Hoekstra, 2014). Butter producer prices in 
our sample vary between 160-200 ETB/kg. Liquid milk prices on the other hand fluctuate between 
10-13 ETB/L. The value addition achieved by processing is thus almost negligible, which might 
explain why producers barely process milk during non-fasting periods (Table 5-6). Except during 
Orthodox fasting, when milk demand drops significantly, processing of milk into butter might be 
interesting for urban producers as it increases the shelf life of the produced milk so as to bridge the 
fasting period. As such, we observe that during fasting all milk production systems, except for cluster 
3, process at least half of their milk production. Yet the processed milk is only marketed by 
households within clusters 1 and 2, who sell (excess) butter to neighbours34. Also, for butter, 
producers in cluster 2 receive lower prices and experience bigger price fluctuations as compared to 
cluster 1 (Supplementary material Table S5-5).  
                                               
34 In our sample of 304 urban farms, only 4 farms sell other dairy produce besides butter (e.g. cheese, yoghurt 
or buttermilk). Moreover, only 12 farms had other buyers than neighbours (e.g. trader or FSP). 
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Table 5-5: Correlation matrix of marketing variables and fasting adaptation strategies 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1.  Produced milk being sold during fasting (%) 1 
    
2. Produced milk being processed during fasting (%) -0.54** 1 
   
3. Size of milk price fluctuation (ETB) -0.14* 0.14* 1 
  
4. Minimum liquid milk price (ETB/L) 0.16** -0.13* -0.90** 1 
 
5. Maximum liquid milk price (ETB/L) 0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.44* 1 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Studying the liquid milk arrangements reported by the producers across the clusters, reveals that 
more producers within clusters 4 and 5 sell their milk to different types of buyers, i.e. neighbours, 
cafés or traders (Table 5-6). Producers included in these two clusters market their milk relatively 
more to neighbours compared to other farm clusters, which might explain the better price 
arrangements they get. Moreover, the payment frequencies they report are less frequent (i.e. weekly 
or less than weekly), which might suggest that they have closer relationships with their milk buyers 
as delayed payment is often based on trust. Households in cluster 3 on the other hand sell about 
80% of their produced milk to FSPs, which partially explains their higher frequency of written 
arrangements. These milk buyers source significantly less milk during Orthodox fasting, which forces 
the entrepreneurs within cluster 3 to spoil most of the milk they produce during fasting. Again, we 
observe that producers in clusters 1, 3 and 5 pay much more attention to milk quality than those in 
clusters 2 and 4, as was the case for feed as well.
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Table 5-6: Milk use and marketing strategies among the identified farm clusters 
 Cluster 1  
(n = 63) 
Cluster 2  
(n = 73) 
Cluster 3  
(n = 38) 
Cluster 4 
 (n = 93) 
Cluster 5 
 (n = 36) 
Produced milk being consumed 
during non-fasting (%) 
5.1a ± 0.8 2.4bc ± 0.6 1.9c ± 0.9 2.8b ± 0.5 6.0a ± 1.6 
Produced milk being consumed 
during fasting (%) 
0.5c ± 0.4 2.7b ±1.0 3.4c ± 2.7 7.0a ± 1.0 4.9b ± 1.7 
Produced milk being processed 
during non-fasting (%) 
3.3a  ± 1.7 0.4a  ± 0.3 0.1a  ± 0.1 0.3a  ± 0.3 1.1a  ± 1.1 
Producers processing milk (%) 100a 98.6a 5.3c 73.1b 80.6b 
Producers selling butter (%) 76.2a 69.9a 2.6b 8.6b 11.1b 
Milk buyer (%)      
neighbours  39.7b 34.3b 23.7b 62.4a 44.4ab 
FSPs 50.8bc 63.0ab 79.0a 54.8bc 41.7c 
traders 7.9bc 15.1b 0c 11.8b 36.1a 
Farmers who have more than 1 
type of milk buyer (%) 
4.8c 15.1b 2.6c 33.3a 22.2ab 
Arrangement for milk (%)      
written 3.2b 2.7b 23.7a 3.2b 0b 
about milk volume  12.7c 58.9b 2.6c 74.2a 5.6c 
about milk price 7.9b 82.2a 5.3b 72.0a 13.9b 
about milk quality 82.5ab 50.7c 94.7a 21.5d 77.8b 
Payment frequency for milk (%)      
upfront 20.6a 0b 2.6b 0b 0b 
daily 38.1b 19.2c 60.5a 18.3c 44.4ab 
weekly 22.2b 61.6a 5.3c 25.8b 30.6b 
less than weekly 20.6c 23.3c 34.2bc 65.6a 41.7b 
Note: mean ± standard error for the continuous variables and frequencies for the categorical variables.  
a-d Means and frequencies within a row with different superscripts differ significantly (p < 0.05). 
CHAPTER 5 
 
146 
Table 5-7: Short summary of the identified urban milk production systems  
Cluster Cluster name Input efficiency and market 
integration   
Main characteristics 
1 Processing farms Low milk:feed ratio 
Medium-strong market integration 
Specialized in milk processing, especially during 
fasting periods 
Attention for milk and feed quality 
Extended feed supplier network 
2 Surviving farms Low milk:feed ratio 
Weak market integration 
Dairy is main or only income generating activity 
Illiterate or poorly educated household heads 
Adverse and volatile milk and feed prices 
3 Educated male 
entrepreneurs 
Low milk:feed ratio 
Medium market integration 
Educated, young, male entrepreneurs 
Dairy as a lucrative business 
Attention for milk and feed quality 
Extended feed supplier network 
Main milk buyers are FSPs 
4 Established 
output-efficient 
farms 
Low milk:feed ratio 
Strong market integration 
Long dairy experience 
Large herd size 
Dairy as a side business 
Extended milk buyer network 
5 Established 
output-input-
efficient farms 
High milk:feed ratio 
Strong market integration 
Long dairy experience 
Large herd size 
Attention for milk and feed quality 
More diversified dairy diets (inclusion of leftovers 
and common salt) and hay as main basal feed 
Extended milk buyer network 
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4.3. Development prospects of the identified urban milk production systems 
Having characterised the farm clusters, this section aims at gaining insight in the development 
prospects of the identified urban production systems and elicits required interventions for each 
production system by using the livelihood strategies framework developed by Dorward et al. [337], 
combined with the Situational Leadership Theory of Hersey and Blanchard [338] (Figure 5-4). We 
show that people who engage in urban dairy production aspire divergent livelihood strategies (from 
a merely survival strategy towards purely commercial interest). This results in large discrepancies 
among urban dairy enterprises in terms of productivity, profitability and their suitability in future urban 
policy planning. 
 
Figure 5-4: Livelihood strategies (left) and required intervention styles (right) for the different 
identified farm groups 
A quarter of the farms we interviewed was trapped into subsistence dairy activities, facing low returns 
on their investments. These farms, which we termed the surviving farms, are hanging in, and are 
trapped in a low productivity and efficiency cycle as they lack resources to invest [345]. This cluster 
of producers lacks knowhow and is incapable of achieving good dairy cow performances albeit these 
producers are definitely willing and persistent to engage in dairy production as it constitutes their 
major or only source of household income. Improving their farm performance would require directing 
interventions, in which the producers are closely and extensively followed up and told what to do and 
how, when and where to do it, and therefore this cluster might not be a priority subgroup from an 
intervention programme perspective.  
Farms in clusters 1 and 3, processing farms and educated male entrepreneurs respectively, on the 
other hand are capable and willing to intensify their dairy businesses, and step up, although farms 
in cluster 3 want it only partially suggested by the fact that they have not developed proper adaptation 
mechanisms for Orthodox fasting periods. Therefore, this cluster requires a more directive 
intervention approach compared to cluster 1 and should specifically be coached to help them 
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develop proper market channels during Orthodox fasting. A potential strategy could be to link this 
production system to (formal) processing facilities and hence outsource dairy processing. These 
farms show interest in more formal arrangements suggested by their close cooperation with FSPs. 
Both farm clusters 1 and 3 seem to be most promising for development programmes. They have 
fairly good input and output market arrangements, in which specific attention is paid to feed and milk 
quality, an ever-increasing issue for both consumers and producers35. Producers in cluster 3 have 
the potential to pave the way towards a more formal operation of the dairy value chain, given their 
interest of in commercial dairy farming. Farms in cluster 1 on the other hand could be particularly 
interesting given their specialisation in small-scale milk processing, a traditional task assigned to 
women. Ensuring women’s inclusion in scaling up and intensification of dairy production will be 
crucial to develop a gender-sensitive dairy sector, a key target for the Ethiopian government [199]. 
It has been shown that urban agriculture empowers women thereby creating positive societal spill-
over effects [346]. Training and technology provision on milk processing might be the entry point in 
this farm cluster.  
Farms in cluster 4, the established output-efficient farms, are a particular cluster. Even though these 
farms receive the highest milk prices, experience significantly smaller price fluctuations and are still 
able to sell a large part of their milk during fasting, their input efficiency is rather low. These farms 
have two options: either they will step out of dairy farming or they will step up. In the former scenario, 
these farms keep dairy animals primarily to accumulate resources which will allow them to move into 
other activities that generate higher or more stable returns [345]. If these farms want to step up, they 
need supporting interventions such as training on good feeding practices to help them improve their 
milk:feed ratio and information provision on the importance of qualitative feed and milk. This farm 
cluster should be convinced about the opportunities they have to expand their farm businesses so 
that they might shift their focus towards dairy farming as the majority of their household heads are 
involved in secondary and/or tertiary occupations predominantly in the non-farm sector (e.g. trade, 
construction, transport). 
Finally, of all milk production systems, producers in cluster 5, the established output-input-efficient 
farms, seem to perform best on all three dimensions simultaneously – i.e. input efficiency, market 
integration and resilience towards demand seasonality. Therefore, these farmers seem to pave the 
way for other producers. They need little directive intervention, although they could still use 
supportive measures to raise their milk productivity so as to further improve their feed efficiency. 
Moreover, these farmers would benefit from interventions that strengthen their market integration so 
that they are able to sell larger quantities of liquid milk during fasting periods.
                                               
35 The Livestock Master Plan launched by the Ethiopian government in 2015 pays specific attention to quality 
improvement both in the input and output livestock markets, see Shapiro et al. [266]. 
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5. Conclusion 
Our empirical research profiled 304 urban producers in Mekelle, Northern Ethiopia, along three 
dimensions: input efficiency, market integration, and resilience towards demand seasonality. Based 
on these data, farms were classified into five distinctive urban milk production systems. These are 
(1) surviving farms, (2) processing farms, (3) young male entrepreneurs, (4) established output-
efficient farms, and (5) established output-input-efficient farms. Thus, on one extreme are surviving 
farms who are trapped into subsistence dairy activities, facing low returns on their investments. On 
the other extreme of the productivity spectrum, a small cluster of established output-input-efficient 
farms are found to be highly input efficient, well integrated into the dairy market and fairly resilient 
towards demand shocks, needing only small nudges to further enhance their farm operations. In 
between, there are three clusters of farms that all cope with a low input efficiency and could use 
supportive measures to strengthen their market integration and resilience towards demand shocks. 
For each of the identified farm types, we sketch potential intervention methods which account for 
competences and willingness of the targeted production systems. While clustering is a valid method 
to characterize the dairy farmers in our sample, one cannot readily extrapolate our findings to the 
whole population of dairy producers in Mekelle. Moreover, we tried to assure that the sample of dairy 
farmers was randomly drawn from the total population of producing households in the city of Mekelle. 
Yet, we cannot adequately assess whether we achieved a completely random sample given the lack 
of official registration and record keeping of dairy producing households in the city. Therefore, more 
studies are needed to validate our findings. But although the present research was case study-
based, similar farm profile types may be identified in other urban localities.
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Unravelling preferences for religious ties in milk transactions: 
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Abstract 
Individuals have the tendency to interact with similar others, a phenomenon that has been termed 
homophily. When trust is low and uncertainty is high, a common setting in developing countries, 
individuals might preferentially trade with members that belong to the same social group to reduce 
transaction costs. Such preferential transaction flows ultimately result in market coordination 
problems. Yet, there is arguably insufficient scholarly attention to the presence of trade breakdown 
across social groups and standard economic analysis has very often eschewed to incorporate group 
membership when modelling individual behaviour and market outcomes. We contribute at filling this 
void, by examining if religion impacts milk transactions in the Ethiopian value chain. Using a discrete 
choice experiment, we study whether milk consumers discriminate against potential milk sellers 
based on their religious affiliation. In the choice tasks, milk seller profiles were constructed using five 
relevant attributes: milk price, distance to the selling point, type of seller, gender and religious 
affiliation of the seller. We observe clear consumer preferences for lower milk prices, shorter 
distances, and milk producers over milk shops. When accounting for attribute non-attendance, our 
findings show that about half of the consumers take religion into account when deciding among seller 
profiles and preferred co-religious sellers. These consumers display clear preference for co-religious 
sellers, but seem not to trade it off to other important attributes such as distance and price. Our 
results add important nuances on the role of religion in consumer purchase behaviour and market 
segmentation. 
Keywords: buyers, choice experiment, Ethiopia, market segmentation, milk transactions, Mekelle 
city, religious ties, trading preferences 
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1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we have shown how religion affects milk intake, milk production and dairy 
farming systems, by focussing on the impact of Orthodox fasting practices. In this chapter as well as 
in the next chapter, we will investigate if sharing religious ties is an important determinant in people’s 
transaction decisions, taking the specific case for milk. In this chapter we take a buyer perspective, 
while the next chapter focuses on the producer perspective.  
The tendency of individuals to interact with similar others e.g. based on ethnicity, gender, or religion, 
has been termed homophily. Homophily involves some degree of discrimination towards others 
[347]. This differential treatment can result from intrinsic preferences for a particular group over 
others (taste-based discrimination; see Becker [348]) or because of information asymmetries. When 
person-specific information is missing, economic actors use group-level information to make 
inferences on an individual’s characteristics, capacities and/or behaviour (statistical discrimination; 
see Phelps [349], Arrow [350] and Aigner and Cain [351]). Sharing the same group identity signals 
a same set of embedded norms and beliefs, which reduces information costs and risks, and hence 
increases trust and cooperation [352-354].  
Discrimination can result in persistent inequalities. As such, a large body of scholarly literature has 
revealed that employers often discriminate against low-status or minority groups when selecting 
among several identical job applicants (e.g. lesbians in Germany [355], migrants in Austria [356] and 
the United States [357], Muslims in the United States [358], and non-upper-castes in India [359]). 
Similar results are found in the (rental) housing market (see e.g. Bayer et al. [360], Schwegman 
[361], Early et al. [362], and Schwegman (2019)). Few studies have looked at the product market 
(e.g. cars [363, 364], iPods [365], and baseball cards [366]) and very often these studies have turned 
to online platforms (e.g. eBay) for their investigation. Also here discriminatory practices against 
minority groups are evident. Yet, further exploration of such practices is needed, since most studies 
today have focused on high-income countries predominantly exploring race and ethnicity biases.  
Most studies on group affiliation and its impact on behaviour can be found in social psychology 
literature. The importance of including group identity to study economic outcomes was only recently 
recognized with the work of Akerlof and Kranton [367] and so far, few studies have looked at the 
impact of social identity on economic transactions. If transactions predominantly occur among 
individuals who share the same group identity, this contributes to segmented markets which will 
obviously come at a transaction and welfare cost for the society [20]. Available research on 
consumer behaviour that has incorporated the concept of social identity has been directed to two 
important topics: first, the impact of a consumer’s social identity on product and store choices and 
second, the impact of a seller’s social identity on consumer choices. While the first topic on the 
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impact of a consumer’s cultural and religious background on purchase behaviour is discussed in 
numerous papers, the second topic on the seller’s social identity has not yet received sufficient 
scholarly attention. The few studies that have been performed in product markets, all report that 
buyers are less willing to transact with sellers from social minority groups and if they do transact they 
are inclined to pay less than when the product was offered by a seller of the social majority group 
[364-366, 368-370]. This evidences that social identity can explain why people treat others differently 
in economic transactions. 
This chapter seeks to understand if and how religion affects the Ethiopian milk market. The Ethiopian 
milk market is plagued by several problems which result in considerable market inefficiencies. The 
existence of coordination problems that impede a proper market functioning, however, has not yet 
received sufficient attention. In this chapter, we take a buyer perspective and detail if religion affects 
consumer purchase behaviour. More specifically, we aim at answering the following two questions: 
(1) do consumers consider the religious affiliation of a seller when making a choice to purchase from 
this seller and (2) if a consumer does consider the religious affiliation of a seller, does s/he prefers 
sellers from the same religious group? An affirmative answer to both questions, points to 
(in)conscious self-selection to co-religious sellers, contributing to religious market segmentation. We 
focus on the specific case of Ethiopia and milk. Several reasons that enforce each other, make us 
hypothesize that religion might be an important factor in a consumer’s (initial) selection of milk 
suppliers: (1) the milk market that operates predominantly informally, (2) the religious symbolism of 
ASFs, (3) the widespread occurrence of co-religious networks due to low levels of trust in other 
religious groups and the geographical dispersion of religious groups, (4) and the occurrence of 
informational asymmetries that require trust from consumers in milk sellers. 
78% of the traded milk volume in Ethiopia is sold on the informal market [230] making it likely that 
religion acts as an informal coordinating mechanism in the milk value chain both in repeated and 
single transactions. ASFs are religiously loaded in Ethiopia not only because of religious slaughtering 
rituals but also and maybe more important because of the dominant Orthodox fasting practices. 
Many restaurants, bars, and shops portray religious symbols on their windows, in their stores, or 
advertise the presence of ‘fasting foods’. Therefore, one could expect that religion is likely to impact 
ASF transactions with consumers preferentially self-selecting to co-religious ASF suppliers. 
Furthermore, social networks in Ethiopia are often co-religious because of the geographical 
dispersion of Muslim and Christian groups and the low levels of trust in individuals outside the own 
religious group. Religious groups tend to be concentrated geographically in the country, with the 
western regions being more dominated by Christian groups while the Eastern part of Ethiopia has a 
Muslim majority (see Figure 2-2, Chapter 2). General trust is rather low in the country and when 
asked whether individuals trust people from another religious group, only 11% indicates to trust 
religious out-group members completely [371]. Transactions are therefore likely to occur 
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predominantly within these co-religious networks. Such networks are beneficial, especially in weak 
institutional settings, as they reduce transaction costs by reducing information asymmetries. This is 
crucial for consumers who cannot readily assess the quality of milk upon transaction. Consumers 
very often only rely on visual inspection of milk because of the absence of milk quality standards and 
a functional quality control and enforcement system. This asymmetrical quality information has led 
to a general mistrust of consumers towards milk quality [201] making consumers prone to purchasing 
low or bad quality milk. Especially the latter is crucial since milk is mainly given to young children 
and buying bad quality milk could expose them to foodborne pathogens. Both for single and repeated 
transactions (in the latter case this counts for the initial selection), consumers thus have to rely on a 
subjective evaluation of a seller’s trustworthiness and reputation in terms of milk quality when 
purchasing milk. Since consumers cannot readily assess the reliability and credibility of unknown 
sellers, they will use observable information to inform their transaction decisions. Religion is very 
visible in Ethiopia in clothing but also because many people wear religious symbols (crosses or 
headscarves). Since inter-religious trust is low in Ethiopia, it is very likely that consumers thus will 
have more trust in the quality of milk of a co-religious seller36. 
To answer our research questions, we adopt an innovative approach by implementing a discrete 
choice experiment (DCE). Existing studies on preferences and discrimination have very often turned 
to games, audit studies, or correspondence studies to study preferential and discriminatory 
behaviour in markets. As opposed to games, and audit and correspondence studies, DCEs allow to 
calculate the extent of discrimination that might be present. Adopting a DCE methodology on 
individuals is rather new, as it is normally used to evaluate preferences for characteristics of goods, 
services or programmes. We could retrieve only one study that has attempted this before, i.e. 
Eriksson et al. [372] 
We performed this choice experiment with 250 milk consumers in the city of Mekelle, northern 
Ethiopia. We look at milk transactions in urban settings as urban households typically source 85% 
of their dairy products from purchases [8]. In the DCE we constructed, consumers were asked to 
imagine they move to another area (e.g. another sub-city). In this area, they want to buy one litre of 
milk which is offered by different potential and unknown milk sellers. Milk sellers were characterized 
using five different attributes that are relevant within the Ethiopian context: milk price, temporal 
distance to the selling point, type of seller (individual milk producer or milk shop), religious affiliation, 
and gender of the seller. We are particularly interested to see whether consumers use information 
                                               
36 In repeated transactions, producers will have less incentives to sell low or bad quality milk, since long-term 
interests outweigh short-term gains. If the producers would adulterate the milk with water for example (which 
could increase their income by being able to sell larger volumes of ‘milk’) this will negatively affect their 
reputation (i.e. long-term interest), and hence will make them lose clients. While many milk transactions are 
personalized, there are still a large number of occasional clients. In these one-shot transactions, producers 
might decide to not restrain from opportunistic behaviour. 
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about a seller’s religious background in their buying decisions. Importantly, we account in our 
analysis for attribute non-attendance (ANA) as it is widely observed that respondents use simple 
decision rules and might not attend to all attributes included in a choice task. Not properly accounting 
for ANA might hence lead to biased preference coefficients [373, 374]. We use a stepwise approach 
to infer the ANA patterns adopted by our respondents (following the procedure of Lagarde [375]). 
At first sight, the results from the 250 consumers that participated in the experiment do not show a 
dominant consumer preference for the religious background of milk sellers. When we accounted for 
ANA, we found that about half of the consumers did not consider the religious attribute in their 
decision-making process. However, for the subset of consumers that did attend to religion, we find 
evidence of a preference for co-religious sellers. Likewise, we find that although there is no overall 
significant preference for either male or female sellers, accounting for ANA reveals that those who 
attend to the attribute gender show slightly higher preferences to buy milk from female sellers, 
irrespective of the consumer being male or female. Milk price, distance, and type of seller are 
important attributes for all sampled consumers with clear and expected preferences for lower prices, 
shorter distances and buying from milk producers. While some consumers display clear preferences 
for co-religious sellers, they do not seem to trade it off to other important attributes such as distance 
and price.  
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2. Background 
2.1. Religious identity, homophily and intergroup bias  
Individuals categorize themselves in different social groups e.g. based on ethnicity, gender, race, 
religion and so forth. According to the theory of social identity developed by Tajfel et al. [376] and 
Tajfel and Turner [377], this social categorization inevitable involves social comparison, in which 
individuals compare themselves with members of another group (i.e. the out-group). This 
differentiation based on group membership has been linked with homophily, i.e. the tendency to 
interact with similar others, and intergroup bias, i.e. the tendency to evaluate and treat indivuals that 
(are perceived to) belong to the same social group more favorably. Whereas homophily was often 
assumed to arise from anticipated intergroup bias, recent empirical evidence suggests that it is more 
likely that (subjective) uncertainty reduction drives homophily patterns [347].  
Intergroup bias is the outcome of in-group favoritism, out-group hostility or both [206]. Whereas in-
group favouritism represents preferential evaluation and treatment of the in-group relative to the out-
group (to which the individual is indifferent), out-group hostility relates to (explicit) negative attitudes 
and behaviour towards out-group members. Intergroup bias can thus arise solely from in-group 
favoritism without any presence of negative feelings towards out-group members, and conversely it 
can also arise solely from out-group hostility [207]. Research has shown that intergroup bias occurs 
more often in the form of in-group favouritism rather than out-group hostility [208]. Intergroup bias 
ultimately affects intergroup behaviour and it has been extensively documented that people exhibit 
more in-group cooperation than out-group cooperation (for a recent review check Balliet et al. [209]), 
although out-group cooperation does not necessarily fall to zero [210].  
Religion affiliation is one of the factors shaping one’s social identity. The latest figures show that 
84% of the world population identifies with a religious group [302]. Studies have reported that 
religious adherence affects reported attitudes, intentions and behaviour towards individuals adhering 
to the same religious group and individuals adhering to other religious groups. Individuals that belong 
to the same religious group evaluate each other more positively [378-385], and are more likely to 
exhibit prosocial intentions towards one another [386]. Other studies have reported negative affect, 
prejudice and racism towards individuals outside the religious group [381, 387-390].  
Noteworthy is that so far, studies detailing the impact of religious identity on intergroup behaviour 
have almost exclusively focused on Northern American and western European countries. Within the 
African context, the available literature has predominantly studied how religious tensions and 
conflicts affect interreligious behaviour (see for example Oded [391], Prunier [392], Møller [393], Pew 
Research Center [225], and McCauley [394]). 
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2.2. Discriminatory practices in market transactions 
Both homophily and intergroup bias involve some degree of discrimination towards others [347]. 
Literature on discriminatory practices has largely focused on the labour market, where employer’s 
power to select preferred candidates is especially visible, see a recent overview published by Baert 
[395]. Baert [395] reviewed 90 correspondence studies in the labour market conducted between 
2005 and 2016. He found that the majority of the studies were performed in Europe and North 
America, with nearly half of these studies focusing on ethnic discrimination. Most of the cases report 
discriminatory hiring practices against ethnic minorities. Research focusing on discrimination against 
gender, age, and sexual orientation is also common. Having a minority sexual orientation and being 
older is shown to significantly reduce employment opportunities. The evidence for gender is mixed, 
and varies along the considered occupations. Less investigated, however, is discrimination based 
on religious background. When studied, research mainly looked at Christian majority contexts, where 
they observed lower call-back rates for Muslim candidates as compared to Christian applicants [358, 
396-398].  
Discriminatory practices are not limited to the labour market but have also been reported in the 
(rental) housing market. A recent meta-analysis performed by Auspurg et al. [399] on 71 field 
experiments that took place in North America and Europe over the last four decades, revealed that 
nearly all of these trials reported discriminatory practices along ethnic lines in the rental housing 
market. Furthermore, discrimination against same-sex couples in the United States has been 
reported by Schwegman [361]. Early et al. [362] found that black households in the United States 
pay more rent compared to white households for identical houses in identical neighbourhoods and 
that this rent gap rises with the proportion of whites in the neighbourhood. Also Bayer et al. [360] 
found that black and Hispanic buyers pay slightly more when purchasing identical housing units. 
Even on online booking platforms such as Airbnb, discrimination is evident. Ahuja and Lyons [400] 
report that male same-sex couples are less likely to be accepted as guests by Dublin Airbnb hosts 
compared to female same-sex couples and heterosexual couples. Likewise, Edelman et al. [401] 
found discrimination by hosts on Airbnb against African Americans in five metropoles in the United 
States. 
Product market transactions are equally impacted by social identity, but empirical evidence is still 
limited [402, 403]. This literature has mainly directed markets where price negotiations are common 
thereby focusing on differential price outcomes across different social groups. These studies 
document discriminatory practices by both sellers and buyers with minority buyers required to pay 
higher product prices while minority sellers are confronted with lower price offers. Ayres and 
Siegelman [363] detected that car dealers in Chicago offered significantly lower prices to white male 
test buyers compared to black or female candidates. List [368] detailed transactions in the sports 
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cards market and observed discriminatory practices against minority groups (women, non-whites 
and older agents) with dealers making significantly lower offers to minorities as compared to their 
majority counterparts. When minority groups acted as sellers, discrimination was even more evident, 
suggesting that buyer-side discrimination is more pronounced than seller-side discrimination. 
Zussman [364], who studied the Israeli online market for used cars, found that Arab buyers needed 
to make higher bids compared to Jewish buyers to have the same probability of receiving a response 
from Jewish car sellers. Additionally, also Arab car sellers received less phone calls for their online 
advertisements compared to Jewish sellers. Doleac and Stein [365] and Ayres et al. [366] who 
manipulated the skin colour of hands when advertising iPods and baseball cards online respectively, 
found that if the product was held by a dark-skinned hand in the picture, this product was sold at 
lower prices. Moreover, Doleac and Stein [365] reported fewer responses and fewer offers made 
when dark-skinned hands held the product. Nunley et al. [370] did similar research but changed 
names to signal racial background and found that buyers on eBay offered higher prices for a variety 
of products to sellers that shared the same racial background compared to those who had a racially 
distinct name. Ball et al. [404] and Li et al. [369] showed that biases still persist for artificially created 
groups when subjected to trading tasks. Ball et al. [404] one the one hand found that higher prices 
occur in markets with higher-status sellers and lower-status buyers, whereas the opposite is 
observed in market with higher-status buyers and lower-status sellers. Li et al. [369] on the other 
hand observed that sellers were more likely to make offers to buyers with the same group identity 
and vice versa that buyers were more likely to accept offers from sellers from their own group. 
Furthermore, they observed that sellers offered lower prices to buyers from another group thereby 
anticipating buyer’s preferences for in-group sellers. 
Some of the studies mentioned above have attempted to examine the causes of discrimination, by 
providing evidence for taste-based and/or statistical discrimination mechanisms. Differential 
treatment might occur because of aversion towards particular out-groups, i.e. taste-based 
discrimination, or because individuals use group-level information to infer unobservable but 
transaction-relevant information about the other economic agent, i.e. statistical discrimination. When 
crucial information is lacking on an individual, people use their perceptions about the average 
member of the group the individual adheres to so as to inform their decision making. In the labour 
market, for example, employers might use social identity of an applicant to make inferences about 
that person’s productivity. Similarly, landlords can use available group membership information to 
assess the ability to pay rent, while in product markets it can be used to assess reservation values 
of buyers or sellers. To assess which of both discrimination mechanisms are at stake, some studies 
have exploited variation in information availability to economic agents. Hereby, it is assumed that 
statistical discrimination should decrease when more (transaction-relevant) information becomes 
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available. Taste-based discrimination, on the other hand, should not be affected by additional 
information provision. 
In the labour and housing market, evidence supporting both sources of discrimination have been 
reported. The available studies on the product market do instead point more towards statistical 
discrimination patterns [402]. Incomplete or asymmetric information seems to be the main driver for 
discriminatory practices in product markets since price differences converge the more information 
becomes available on the credibility and reliability of sellers and/or buyers. This was confirmed by 
Nunley et al. [370]. In their study on transactions taking place on the online platform of eBay, they 
investigate how adding feedback scores to seller profiles impact buyer bids. eBay’s feedback system 
allows buyers to score their transactions with sellers. The authors report that buyers use this 
information to assess the credibility of sellers. When sellers have high feedback scores, the racial 
background of the seller does not matter anymore for buyers who now make similar prices offers to 
same-race and different-race sellers both having high feedback scores. 
In the above-mentioned literature, we identified three important gaps. First, social identity based on 
ethnicity, race, gender, and sexual orientation has received much more scholarly attention compared 
to religious affiliation. Since religious groups provide their members with moral frameworks, its 
impact on group biases and discriminatory practices might be different, and thus requires further 
investigation [405]. Second, insufficient research has been conducted to study the presence of 
biases in the product markets, and especially the food market. Third, most of the scholarly studies 
so far have been undertaken within high-income countries (mostly North America and Europe). 
There is a growing number of papers that addresses caste- and religion-based discrimination in India 
[352, 406, 407], but there is arguably a dearth of knowledge on the role of religion in discriminatory 
practices in developing countries [408]. We aim at filling these voids by providing empirical evidence 
on both buyer- (this chapter) and supplier-side discrimination (next chapter) using the Ethiopian milk 
system as a case study.   
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2.3. Religion and consumer purchase behaviour 
Different motives drive consumers to buy specific products and to visit specific shops or stores. 
Scholarly literature that targets consumer purchase behaviour typically extends into informing 
marketing practices as it allows to identify consumer segments and to better target advertising and 
marketing strategies to these groups. Yet, the role of religion, and culture at large, is much less 
explored within this literature stream. There seem to be two important, yet separate parts of literature: 
one that has looked at how the social identity of consumers affects consumer purchase behaviour, 
independently of the store’s or seller’s social identity, whereas another part of literature has focused 
on the impact of a seller’s social identity on consumer choices.  
Within this first part, scholarly studies have focused on the impact of consumer’s religion on shopping 
behaviour, looking at product choices (e.g. Sood and Nasu [99], Heiman et al. [105], and Doran and 
Natale [279]) and seller or store choices (e.g. Sood and Nasu [99], Essoo and Dibb [103], 
Swimberghe et al. [409], Choi [109], and Swimberghe et al. [410]). Research acknowledges that 
non-functional criteria impact consumer store loyalty and patronage. As such Segev [411] found that 
immigrants who value the maintenance of their original culture in a host country tend to patronize 
ethnic shops over mainstream stores. Likewise Jamal and Sharifuddin [412] found that part of the 
Muslim community in the United Kingdom values shops that offer halal labelled products. Patronizing 
shops that sell halal-labelled products can help to signal status, help to reinforce their identity, and 
to distinct them from others [413]. In severe cases, religiously inspired consumer boycotts might 
emerge when brands or companies violate religious beliefs and values or when stores or brands are 
(perceived to be) associated with a particular religious group that a consumer opposes [414-416]. 
Examples are the boycott against import of Danish products by several Muslim dominated countries 
in the aftermath of a series of cartoons published by a Danish newspaper in 2005 [417] and the 
Buddhists’ boycott against Muslim businesses in Myanmar [418].  
The other literature stream that targets the impact of a seller’s social identity on consumer purchase 
behaviour, and thus relevant for this chapter, remains largely untapped. Few studies have looked at 
transactions in product markets and document that buyers offer significantly lower prices to sellers 
of social minority groups (e.g. women, non-whites, older people, Arabs) [364-366, 368-370]. Yet, the 
market value of food has been shown to be affected by the identity of the actor supplying the food, 
rather than its physical characteristics (such as context, flavour, texture, to name a few), a process 
that has been termed de-commodification. De-commodification of food implies that consumers are 
willing to pay a premium for food that comes from sellers with shared traits (e.g. religious affiliation) 
even though this food does not differ from milk sold by another seller. De-commodified food products 
are typically exchanged in personalized markets (450).  
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So far, the main focus of the shopping patronage literature has, like the social identity research, been 
on North America and western European countries [419]. Few studies have investigated retail choice 
behaviour in the African context. The studies we found mainly focus on unravelling the factors that 
shape consumer preferences for supermarkets vice-a-vis traditional retail outlets [257, 420-422].  
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3. Materials and methods 
3.1. Data  
We performed our study in the Mekelle milk shed, one of the eight milk sheds in Ethiopia, located in 
the northern part of the country. Data were collected during August-September 2017 across the 
seven sub-cities of Mekelle city, the regional capital of the Tigray province. We specifically focus on 
an urban centre, as milk markets are more developed in urban settings. In this chapter, we focus on 
the data we collected from interviewing urban consumers (aged 18 or above), who exclusively rely 
on the market to satisfy their household milk needs.  
To pre-test the survey so as to optimize our experimental design, we randomly sampled 30 
consumers within the city. Once the pre-test was completed, we sat the total consumers to be 
interviewed at 220. To get a representative sample of consumers for Mekelle city as a whole, we 
collected a copy from the population census of Mekelle to get an overview of the total population in 
each of the seven sub-cities. From this, we were able to calculate the share of the Mekelle population 
living in each sub-city. We used these shares to calculate the number of consumers to be sampled 
within each sub-city. Since we did not have lists summarizing the details of these urban consumers, 
we had to trace them in another way. Therefore, we adopt a pragmatic approach so as to assure we 
draw a random sample of milk consuming households in each sub-city. To do so, we adopted a 
combination of the following strategies: (1) we randomly selected consumers from public places and 
(2) we randomly visited households’ homes in the different sub-cities.  
We only interviewed respondents who were aged 18 years and above and who indicated to be (co-
)responsible for shopping. When the household did not consume milk, the interview was ceased and 
the household was not considered for data analysis. No monetary incentives were given to 
participate in the survey. Interviews were conducted in the local language with the help of two local 
enumerators that received extensive training. Two local enumerators were carefully selected and 
both had community field experience. The questionnaire was translated in the local language 
(Tigrinya) to reduce the bias that might result from different translation and interpretation of the 
enumerators. The questionnaire (see Appendix 3) was implemented in the Qualtrics software and 
enumerators were given tablets on which the questionnaire could be filled in offline. The 
questionnaire consisted of several modules to map respondents’ characteristics (among others 
gender, age, and religious affiliation), household’s milk consumption and purchase and household 
demographics. Skip and displays logics were used to move participants to questions that are 
applicable for their specific situation. Table 6-1 characterizes the milk consumers we interviewed.  
This research was ethically approved by the Health Research Ethics Review Committee of Mekelle 
University as well as the ethical committee of the University Hospital Ghent.
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Table 6-1: Main characteristics of the respondents and their households 
Variable Mean or proportion 
Age of respondent (years) 33.4 (0.85) 
Proportion female respondents  0.57 
Religious background respondent (proportion)  
Orthodox 0.92 
Protestant 0.02 
Muslim 0.05 
Other 0.01 
Proportion of respondents who indicate to be the main shopping 
responsible 
0.67 
Proportion of households that consumed milk in week prior to the 
interview  
0.59 
Household size  4.58 (0.13) 
Number of children  2.73 (0.15) 
Monthly household income (ETB) 16,922.4 (2573.77) 
Milk purchase frequency (proportion)  
Daily 0.43 
4-5 times/week 0.29 
2-3 times/week 0.13 
Once a week or less 0.16 
Main seller (proportion)  
Milk shop 0.58 
Milk producer 0.24 
Other 0.18 
Proportion of respondents that know the name(s) of their milk seller(s)  0.48 
Stated general trust (proportion)  
Most people can be trusted 0.09 
You need to be very careful 0.88 
I don’t know 0.03 
Stated trust in people of another religion (proportion)  
Trust completely 0.11 
Trust somewhat 0.23 
Do not trust very much 0.08 
Do not trust at all 0.10 
I don’t know 0.48 
Note: when applicable, standard errors are given in parentheses. Questions on whether respondents know the name(s) 
of their seller(s) and trust questions were only asked after the choice experiment was conducted. 
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3.2. Methodological approach 
Available studies on discrimination in the labour, housing and product markets have mainly applied 
audit and correspondence methods in their research. However, using real buyers to study 
discriminatory practices requires extensive training which would be too complicated for an 
exploratory study in a developing context. Moreover, correspondence studies in the product market 
have turned to online platforms to study discriminatory practices in transactions [364-366, 370], 
which does not fit with the reality of milk transactions in Ethiopia.  
Hence, we had to adopt an innovative approach. Directly asking respondents to detail their 
preferences for religious in-group or out-group trading partners is not an option, given the likely 
occurrence of social desirability bias. Different approaches exist to collect behavioural data and to 
simultaneously reduce potential social desirability biases such as the use of social desirability scales, 
inferred valuation techniques37, bogus pipeline procedures38, randomized response39 and 
unmatched count techniques40, and implicit association tests41. These methods have often been 
used in lab experiments, which offer a controlled environment. However, their usefulness in a 
developing context is highly questioned as they often require educated subjects and/or technological 
infrastructure. Game theory is another method that is being used for examining human behaviour in 
social situations of cooperation (e.g. prisoners’ dilemmas and public good games), coordination (e.g. 
stag hunt) and conflict (e.g. zero-sum fames) [476]. Experimental economists have been interested 
in behavioural changes that might occur when subjects interact with either in-group or out-group 
members in games. While games have been performed more often in low-income settings, they 
remain highly hypothetical and do not allow for a realistic operationalization of individual choices, 
especially not in the case of milk transactions. Furthermore, games do not allow to determine the 
decision weight that a respondent places on each attribute. Moreover, games might more easily 
trigger social desirable responding because religion is primed more in game settings due to the 
simplistic set-ups of commonly played games. Therefore, we turned to DCEs to elicit and quantify 
religious preferences. 
                                               
37 Techniques that ask respondents to predict or infer others’ values, preferences, choices and behaviour 
rather than their own values, preferences, choices and behaviour [423]. 
38 Procedure that uses objective methods (e.g. lie detector), irrespective of whether actual verification takes 
place, to reveal dishonesty [424]. 
39 In randomized response techniques, respondent can answer two questions, a sensitive question and a 
neutral question. To determine which question will be answered a randomizing device (e.g. coins or a dice) is 
used. Only the respondent knows which of the two questions is answered [424]. 
40 Respondents are divided in two random groups. One group has to answer a set of N questions while the 
other group gets the sample list of N questions plus one sensitive question [475].   
41 Method that indirectly measures the strength of association between two words/concepts (for more 
information check Bertrand and Duflo [404].   
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DCEs are stated preference methods that are used to elicit preferences for goods, services, or 
programmes when no revealed preference data are available. The objective of this method is to let 
individuals choose among hypothetical alternatives. Each alternative is described by a predefined 
and fixed set of characteristics, which are called attributes. The values that the attributes take, are 
called attribute levels. Alternatives are created by varying the levels of the attributes. By asking 
respondents to make choices among sets of alternatives, DCEs allow to quantify the impact of 
changes in the attribute levels on the choices made by respondents. DCEs have been widely applied 
in Western contexts and are increasingly used in developing countries [425]. Compared to other 
stated preferences techniques, DCEs are rather simple and straightforward and therefore more 
closely resemble a decision-making process. To the best of our knowledge, only one study has 
adopted a DCE approach to elicit preferences for individual traits rather than characteristics of goods, 
services or programmes, i.e. the study by Eriksson et al. [372].  
In our context, DCEs have three important assets. First, DCEs offer a realistic operationalization of 
individual choices, since it forces participants to make trade-offs between different attributes and 
their associated levels. This allows to determine the decision weight that each respondent places on 
each attribute. Second, DCEs allow to gain insight into the extent people engage in discriminatory 
practices, by calculating measures such as willingness-to-pay (WTP) and/or the willingness-to-
accept (WTA). Third, sensitive issues such as religion can be wrapped up among several other 
attributes in DCEs, making it less salient to the respondents thereby lowering the chance that 
respondents answer in social desirable ways that do not reflect their true preferences [426].  
For the milk producers, DCEs offer an additional advantage. Since it is possible that buyers self-
select to certain producer groups, one could not readily assess discriminatory practices by milk 
producers. DCEs allow to overcome this potentially existing sample selection by forcing producers 
to choose among unknown buyers.  
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3.2.1. Attribute selection and specification 
We selected five attributes relevant to the Ethiopian dairy context to describe the seller profiles. 
Besides religious affiliation, we also included other non-price attributes. Non-price factors have been 
shown to significantly shape Ethiopian purchasing behaviour of dairy products [257].The attributes 
and levels were identified through a rigorous literature review and key informant interviews. The final 
set of attributes and associated levels was approved appropriate and valid by a panel of local experts 
(Table 6-2).  
Table 6-2: Seller attributes included in the choice experiment and their associated levels 
Attribute Attribute levels 
Religious affiliation Muslim – Christian 
Gender Male – Female 
Milk seller Urban milk producer – Milk shop 
Milk price 17 – 18 – 19 – 20 ETB/L 
Distance to seller 5 – 10 – 15 – 20 minutes 
Note: distance to seller is measured via time needed to get to seller by foot, one way (from the house of the 
household to the seller) 
Our main variable of interest is the attribute religious affiliation with two associated levels: Christian 
and Muslim affiliation. We did not distinguish between different Christian subgroups. We expect to 
find more evidence of discriminatory practices between Christians and Muslims as compared to e.g. 
Protestants and Orthodox. Since the latter two both belong to the broad class of Christianity, they 
share a higher interpersonal similarity. The social distance between both groups is thus smaller 
compared to the distance between Orthodox and Muslims or Protestants and Muslims. This 
hypothesis seems to be confirmed in our earlier study in Chapter 3, where we found that fasting 
practices spill over more strongly to the Muslim community as compared to the Protestant group. 
We signal the religious affiliation of buyers indirectly by using either names or religious symbols, a 
common approach in discriminatory literature [395]. Respondents were randomly assigned to either 
of the two groups: i.e. one group was presented with choice cards that displayed buyer names, while 
the other groups received choice cards in which buyers are depicted wearing religious symbols (an 
overview of all names and symbols included in the choice cards can be found in the Supplementary 
material D.1, Table S6-1 and Table S6-2). We deliberately used two mechanisms to signal the 
religious affiliation to control for potential social desirability bias. It has been shown that subjects tend 
to under- or not report their true preferences when dealing with sensitive issues so as to portray 
themselves more positively or because they want to gain the approval from others by acting in a 
socially acceptable manner [427]. It might be that overt religious preferences are undesirable; a 
reasonable assumption as religious discrimination is prohibited by the Ethiopian constitution. Yet, 
CHAPTER 6 
 
168 
we deliberately controlled for this by not explicitly mentioning the religious background of sellers but 
rather using names and religious symbols to signal the religious background instead. Whereas 
names are commonly used in experiments on social identity and its impact on behaviour, the use of 
visuals is less common. Since religious symbols more clearly indicate the religious affiliation of 
buyers, we expect to observe different outcomes for respondents who received choice cards with 
names versus those that received choice cards with religious symbols if social desirability bias is an 
issue in our sample.  
Since we used names and religious symbols to indicate religious background, we simultaneously 
signalled gender. We anticipate to observe preferences for female sellers as dairy is a traditional 
women’s business in Ethiopia. Mostly women provide day-to-day-care to the dairy herd (milking, 
feeding, herding, watering, cleaning the sheds) and they are the main responsible for milk processing 
and sales in the informal sector [428]. Furthermore, there is a general belief that women handle milk 
more carefully than men and deliver good milk hygiene and quality.  
Third, we consider two types of sellers, namely, individual milk producers and local (specialized) milk 
shops. Direct marketing from milk producers is still widespread, even in urban areas, since 
consumers value the (perceived) freshness of milk when sourcing it directly from producers. Local 
specialized milk shops, on the other hand, are becoming increasingly popular in urban areas. They 
are convenient and allow daily purchases of small quantities of milk, which is especially relevant for 
those consumers that have no electricity or refrigerator [429]. In our sample, 58% of the consumers 
report to buy milk predominantly from milk shops, while one-fourth frequents urban milk producers. 
We did not consider modern retail outlets (such as supermarkets) in our choice experiment as these 
represent a negligible market share in our study area. Ethiopian consumers still prefer traditional 
retail outlets because they offer lower prices, local variety, are more convenient to shop (due their 
proximity) and because they are believed to sell better quality dairy products (especially in terms of 
freshness and flavour) [257]. Findings that were also reported by Francesconi et al. [16]. 
Finally, we included milk prices and distance, two important factors shaping consumer shopping 
behaviour [257]. Prices are commonly included in DCEs to allow calculation of the willingness-to-
pay. In our DCE, price levels changed step-wise with 1 ETB from 17 to 20 ETB, which were the 
prevailing market prices at the time of our survey. Milk price fluctuations of 1 to 3 ETB/L are 
commonly observed in Ethiopia [201, 430]. Milk prices are high and there has been a (worrisome) 
increase in prices for nutritious foods in Ethiopia in the last decade [31, 201]. We also included 
distance to the seller. Whereas prices reflect how much a consumer is willing to spend more on milk 
sold by co-religious sellers (and thus incur extra financial costs), distances additionally reflect the 
time consumers are willing to endure to be able to shop milk from co-religious sellers, assuming that 
there is always a milk seller nearby, a valid assumption in urban areas. We detailed distance as 
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minutes walking one way to get to the seller’s location. We used temporal distance instead of spatial 
distance since it allows to control for different modes of transport used by respondents.   
CHAPTER 6 
 
170 
3.2.2. Experimental design  
Once the attributes and attribute levels were identified, we ran a D-efficient design using the NGENE 
software to construct the seller profiles. Each choice task was composed of three alternative profiles 
(see an example in Figure 6-1). The software generated 12 different choice tasks, which were 
blocked in two groups. Each respondent was randomly allocated to one block with six choice tasks. 
Each choice task also included an opt-out option, to avoid that respondents needed to make forced 
choices. The choice tasks were pre-tested with 30 consumers of which the results were also used 
to calculate priors to improve the experiment’s final design [431]. In the final design, we randomized 
the order in which the choice situations were presented to avoid potential biases of ordering effects. 
As most of the respondents were illiterate, we supplemented the DCE with images that helped 
describing each of the attributes (as recommended by Bennett and Birol [432]). 
Before respondents started the choice experiment, the enumerators gave a short introduction to 
disclose the aim of the choice task. To exclude social network effects, we started this introduction 
by asking participants to imagine they move to another neighbourhood (e.g. another sub-city in 
Mekelle). In this new sub-city, they would like to buy one litre milk. We explained the respondents 
that we would present them with different profiles of unknown potential milk sellers among which 
they can select the one they prefer most based on the described characteristics. Thereafter, we 
explained them elaborately the meaning of all characteristics as well as their associated levels to 
rule out any potential confusion. Figure 6-1 shows an example of a choice set in which religious 
affiliation is signalled with names and religious symbols respectively. 
 
Figure 6-1: Example of choice card with names and religious symbols to choose among potential 
milk sellers 
Note: here English translations of the choice cards are shown. The respondents received choice cards in their local 
language, i.e. Tigrinya.   
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3.2.3. Modelling strategy 
According to the random utility theory of McFadden [433], choice experiments are based on the 
assumption that the utility that each respondent obtains from an alternative is a function of the 
individual characteristics describing this alternative.  
In our case, the utility a milk consumer i gets from choosing a milk seller j in one of the t choice 
situations is expressed as follows: 
Uijt = βj* Xijt + εijt                                                                                                                                                         eq. 1 
where Xijt corresponds to the attributes of the alternative in choice situation t [434]. βj and εijt are not 
observed and treated as stochastic influences [435]. εijt is a vector of error terms with an independent 
and identically distributed extreme value.  
Individuals maximize their utility when making choices. Therefore, an individual will only choose 
alternative when the utility derived from choosing milk seller a is greater than the utilities derived 
from the other alternatives y in the choice set C. The probability of choosing alternative a from a 
choice set C with other alternatives y, is expressed as follows: 
P(a; C)=
U(a)
∑ 𝑈(𝑦)𝑦∈𝐶
                                                                                                                                                                               eq. 2 
Consumers do not have the same tastes and preferences. Therefore, we have to account for 
preference heterogeneity – the extent to which consumer tastes and preferences vary across 
consumers. Latent Class logit (LC) models and Random Parameter logit (RP) models have been the 
most commonly applied methods to capture unobserved preference heterogeneity in choice 
experiments. Both model specifications can lead to similar results, in such a case, authors tend to 
favour LC models since the interpretation and policy recommendations might be more 
straightforward. However, RP models are more flexible to accommodate preference heterogeneity 
and therefore these models are often applied if the research purpose requires a deeper analysis 
[436]. 
LC models assume that unobserved heterogeneity can be captured by a discrete number of latent 
classes in the population. Individual-specific variables such as income, age, attitudes or consumption 
patterns are often included to identify these different classes. These individual-specific variables are 
therefore considered to be the source of heterogeneity and the constructed classes are ought to be 
sufficient to account for the preference heterogeneity across the classes. Within the classes, 
homogeneous preferences are assumed and each class is associated with a different parameter 
vector in the corresponding utility. Once groups are formed, the obtained classes are often further 
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profiled exploring descriptive statistics of the respondents based on the obtained individual 
probabilities of belonging to certain classes.  
Another set of approaches called RP models explicitly account for preference heterogeneity by 
allowing model parameters to vary randomly across individuals. In these models, the individual utility 
coefficients βj vary across respondents, while in LC models βj takes a finite number of values (i.e. 
the same number as the number of classes being identified). RP models thus allow to capture 
random taste variation of the respondents.  
In the results section, we report the analyses of using RP models42. The random parameters in our 
model are assumed to have a uniform distribution if the attributes were categorical, while a normal 
distribution was used for the attribute distance as it is a continuous variables. The distributions 
assigned are common practices in literature. For the attribute milk price on the other hand was 
assumed to be invariant across individuals, because if not it would become problematic when 
calculating willingness-to-pay values. RP logit models assume that participants consider all available 
information (i.e. all the attributes) to make trade-offs and choose their preferred alternative. However, 
it is well documented that in actual decision situations people rather use simple rules instead of 
making full trade-offs. In this way, they might ignore one or more attributes [437]. Moreover, when 
people have dominant preferences, they might systematically ignore information about those 
attributes that they value less. We therefore need to account for potential ANA. 
Both stated and inferred ANA43 approaches have been used to estimate the extent of attribute non-
attendance. Part of the literature favours inferred ANA methods over stated ANA arguing that 
respondents might not be able to reveal their true decision rules e.g. respondents might indicate to 
ignore an attribute while they actually put less weight on the considered attribute compared to the 
other attributes included [438, 439]. LC models allow to infer ANA by singling out different non-
attendance decision rules. The econometric specifications of a LC ANA model can be found in 
Supplementary material D.2. Since these models allocate individuals among 2k classes (with k 
                                               
42 We also applied LC models so as to capture unobserved preference heterogeneity using the following 
individual-specific socio-economic characteristics: age and gender of the consumer, milk consumption 
volumes, number of children and/or number of members in a certain household, religiosity, and income. The 
use of religiosity profiling was also considered despite the fact that the scale selected did not capture the 
differences in religiosity (see more background in Supplementary Material E.3). We tried to use parts of the 
scale that showed sufficient variance among the respondents so as to see whether preference for the attribute 
religion could be explained by different levels of religiosity. Still, the LC models we ran, did not allow us to 
capture the unobserved heterogeneity. In the RP models we also tried to see whether accounting for the same 
individual-specific socio-economic characteristics with interaction terms would allow us to explain further 
preference heterogeneity. Also here, the analyses did not allow us to explain preference heterogeneity better.  
43 Stated ANA approaches ask respondents to identify and state themselves which attributes they ignored, 
while inferred ANA methods rely on econometric models to identify which attributes are not attended to. 
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representing the number of attributes and each class representing a certain ANA decision rule), 
testing all ANA combinations is often computationally infeasible due to sample restrictions [440].  
To reduce computational problems that may arise from excessive decision rules (in our study we 
have 32 potential ANA decision rules), we adopt a step-wise approach to identify the specific ANA 
decision rule patterns that are present in our data following the approach of Lagarde [375]44. In a first 
step, six classes are included, with one class representing full attendance to all attributes, while the 
other five classes cover those decision patterns that ignore one attribute. The algorithm allocates 
respondents to one of these classes. Only those classes that did not have a class probability equal 
to zero, were retained for the second step, in which we added classes representing non-attendance 
to two attributes. In the subsequent rounds, the above ascribed procedure was repeated of deleting 
classes with zero probability and adding classes representing non-attendance to three and four 
attributes respectively. The final stage is the addition of a class that represents non-attendance to 
all five attributes. Eventually, all respondents are classified in the classes and zero attribute 
coefficients are assigned to those attributes that were not attended to, while coefficients for the 
attended attributes take the same values across all classes [441]. Supplementary material D.3 
summarizes this procedure for our data. The final ANA model (last column in Table S6-3 in 
Supplementary material D.3) retained eight classes. 
Once the ANA decision rules present in the data have been modelled45, the estimated individual 
probability of attendance can be inserted as weights in the estimation of the preference coefficients 
so as to further explore the preferences within the population and to estimate the mean preference 
weights [438, 442]. The advantage of this approach allows to include individuals who have low 
preferences for certain attributes, who would otherwise be categorized wrongly as non-attenders 
[443]. We use this weighted approach in a second stage to elicit respondents’ preferences towards 
religion and gender in different RP model specifications. Furthermore, we additionally test for the 
interaction between the attribute religion and gender taking into account the religious affiliation and 
gender of the respondents in an attempt to observe if the interaction of these attributes could explain 
certain shopping patterns.                                        
                                               
44 In the paper of Lagarde [375], which we used as a reference, the DCE had 8 choice tasks for each 
respondent, with two alternatives per choice task and 133 respondents. Therefore they had 2,128 observations 
(since observations = number of choice tasks * number of choice alternatives * respondents). In our case, we 
have 6 choice tasks per respondents with 3 alternatives per choice task and 221 respondents. We therefore 
have 3,978 observations, and almost double the observations of Lagarde [375]. Our sample size is thus 
sufficiently large to adopt the procedure as set out by Lagarde [375]. 
45 Additionally, in a second stage, we tried to uncover if individual-specific variables could explain why certain 
respondents attend a certain attribute, and why others did not. Again, we specifically focussed on the attribute 
religion. Also here we were not able to uncover specific patterns between individual probabilities of attendance 
and  individual-specific characteristics. 
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For those preference coefficients that were found to be significant, we calculated the willingness-to-
pay (WTP) and willingness-to-walk (WTW). For categorical attributes with two levels for which we 
used effects coding – i.e. religious affiliation, gender, and seller type – the WTP and WTW were 
calculated as follows [444]: 
𝑊𝑇𝑃 = (
 βattribute
–𝛽 price
) ∗ 2                                                                                                                           eq. 3 
𝑊𝑇𝑊 = (
 βattribute
–𝛽 distance
) ∗ 2                                                       eq.4 
While for the attribute distance, which is treated as a continuous variable in the analyses, the WTP 
was calculated as follows: 
𝑊𝑇𝑃 = 
 βdistance
–𝛽 price
                                                                                                                               eq. 5 
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4. Results  
4.1. Consumer preferences for milk seller characteristics 
Results from the first RP model we ran, without accounting for ANA, show significant preferences 
for distance, price and type of seller (Table 6-3). In line with our expectations, consumers prefer low 
milk prices and milk sellers that are located close to their homes. Furthermore, consumers prefer to 
buy milk directly from urban milk producers rather than from milk shops. This might be related to the 
perception that producers offer higher milk quality (especially in terms of freshness).  
Significant preferences for the attributes religious affiliation and gender were not found, although we 
observe significant preference heterogeneity for the attribute religious affiliation suggested by the 
significant standard deviation in the second part of the table. This might imply that while overall 
consumers seem to be indifferent towards the religious affiliation of milk sellers, some respondents 
take this attribute into account when choosing to buy milk from a particular seller. Significant 
preference heterogeneity is also found for the attributes distance and type of seller. Although it 
seems irrational that consumers prefer remote sellers, it is possible that some consumers do so, 
potentially because these remote sellers fit better to their preferences e.g. by offering lower prices, 
or because they are producers rather than shops or vice versa, the sellers are female and not male 
(or the other way around) or because these sellers belong to the same religious group.  
Table 6-3: Results from the random parameter logit model without accounting for attribute non-
attendance 
  
β 
 
SE 
 
Religious affiliation (Muslim vs Christian) 
 
-0.05  
 
0.04 
Gender (female vs male) 0.05  0.04 
Seller (producer vs shop) 0.81 *** 0.09 
Distance (minutes) -0.31 *** 0.04 
Price (ETB) -0.48 *** 0.06 
  SD Rand. Pars. 
 
SE Rand. Pars. 
 
Religious affiliation (Muslim vs Christian) 
 
0.32 
 
** 
 
0.13 
Gender (female vs male) 0.03  0.25 
Seller (producer vs shop) 1.17 *** 0.13 
Distance (minutes) 0.22 *** 0.04 
    
Log likelihood -1096.77   
McFadden pseudo ρ2 0.24   
AIC 2203.50   
BIC 2229.50   
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Part of the preference variation we observed for the three attributes religious affiliation, type of seller, 
and distance could be captured by considering the characteristics of the respondents. Yet, we did 
not succeed to fully to capture how respondents’ characteristics shape different preferences. 
Therefore, an ANA inferred method was used to separate consumers with significant preferences 
for the attributes of those with no significant preferences.   
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4.2. Inferred attribute non-attendance 
Table 6-4 gives an overview of the results of the inferred ANA LC model. We observe that only 28% 
of the consumers fully attended to all five attributes when choosing among different seller profiles, 
while nearly 11% of the respondents systematically ignored all attributes. Of the remaining 
respondents, 15% have made their decisions ignoring two attributes (religious affiliation and price), 
18.7% ignored three attributes (seller-distance-price, gender-seller-price, religious affiliation-seller-
distance, and religious affiliation-gender-seller) and 27% only attended to one attribute namely the 
seller type (i.e. class 29).  
Table 6-4: Retained final latent class specification and average class membership share (for full 
detail see Supplementary material D.3) 
Class 
number 
Coefficients estimated Final ANA model 
1 βreligious affiliation βgender βseller βdistance βprice 28.03% 
8 0 βgender βseller βdistance 0 14.90% 
17 βreligious affiliation βgender 0 0 0 2.89% 
19 βreligious affiliation 0 0 βdistance 0 11.41% 
23 0 βgender 0 0 βprice 0.38% 
26 0 0 0 βdistance βprice 3.99% 
29 0 0 βseller 0 0 27.42% 
32 0 0 0 0 0 10.98% 
Summing up the shares of those classes in which a specific attribute was attended to allows to 
calculate average attendance rate for each attribute. Considering those classes where religious 
affiliation is attended to (i.e. class 1, 17, and 19), suggests that a bit more than 40% of our 
respondents attended to the religious affiliation of potential milk seller profiles (Table 6-5, right 
column). The other respondents did not attend to the attribute religious affiliation either because they 
do not care about the religious affiliation of a seller or because they did not notice that the religious 
affiliation of a seller was included in the choice task. Yet, given the limited number of attributes 
included in the choice cards, we think it is very unlikely that religious affiliation would have been 
unnoticed by the respondents, especially because it was incorporated on the first row in the choice 
cards (see Figure 6-1).  
Regarding the other attributes, a large majority of the consumers attended to seller type and 
distance, whereas half of the respondents did attend to gender and only one-third did attend to the 
price attribute. Reasons for the high non-attendance of this latter attribute can be ascribed to 
indifference to changes in the attribute [438] or to a too narrow range of the attribute levels [445]. 
Either forces could play a role here. We did not adopt a broader range of price levels since prices 
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vary little at a given moment in time due to the competitive environment of the numerous milk outlets 
in urban areas [258]46.  
Additionally, we asked respondents in a follow-up of the choice experiment to rank the attributes 
according to their importance when considering a milk seller (Table 6-5, left side). The self-reported 
importance ranking seems to match the average calculated attendance rates. As such 64% of the 
consumers indicated that the attribute seller type is the most important characteristic when choosing 
among different sellers. Distance and milk price were ranked as second and third, respectively, by a 
majority of the respondents. Religious affiliation and gender were deemed less important by most 
consumers. Only for the price attribute, consumers assigned a higher importance than what we 
would expect from the average inferred attendance to price. 
Table 6-5: Comparison of self-reported importance and average attendance rate for the attributes 
we obtained from the inferred attribute non-attendance analysis 
  Self-reported ranking of attributes 
Inferred average 
attendance rate 
                          Share of respondents ranking the respective attribute… (%) 
Share of respondents 
attending to (%) 
 First Second Third Fourth Last  
Religious affiliation 1.4 4.1 5.4 58.1 30.2 42.3 
Gender  6.8 9.0 6.3 60.4 17.1 46.2 
Seller type 64.4 18.0 13.5 3.2 0.5 70.4 
Distance 14.4 38.7 34.7 9.5 1.8 58.3 
Milk price 12.6 29.7 39.6 14.4 3.6   32.4    
Having uncovered the patterns and combinations of attributes attended to, the LC models allow to 
retrieve individual probabilities of attending to the described attributes (Figure 6-2). We find quite 
uniform distributions of the probabilities of having attended to religious affiliation, gender and 
distance, suggesting heterogeneity in decision patterns. Some respondents consistently attend, 
while others attend to none of these attributes. Yet, the probability of having attended to religious 
affiliation is slightly skewed to the right, suggesting that religious affiliation was less likely to have 
been attended to whereas the opposite holds for distance. The distribution for attendance probability 
of seller type and price are more clearly skewed. The left skewness of the price attribute suggests 
that this attribute was less likely to be attended to, whereas the right skewness of the seller type 
attribute indicates that most of the respondents took seller type into account.  
                                               
46 Still, milk prices fluctuate significantly across seasons in Ethiopia. Climatic fluctuations, most importantly 
rainfall patterns, as well as periodic occurrence of Orthodox fasting practices and feasts have been shown to 
affect milk production and price setting [17]. 
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Figure 6-2: Distribution of individual probabilities of having attended to each of the attributes
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4.3. Does religious affiliation matter? 
This section aims at answering the following two questions: (1) do consumers consider the religious 
affiliation of sellers when choosing from whom to buy milk and (2) if they do consider religious 
affiliation, do they prefer co-religious sellers? 
From the results of the RP model detailed above (Table 6-3), we observed that on average, 
consumers do not consider religious affiliation of major importance when choosing among different 
milk sellers. Yet, because we observed significant preference heterogeneity around this attribute, 
which could not be explained by varying consumer characteristics, we argued that non-attendance 
to this attribute could explain significant preference heterogeneity for religious affiliation. Inferring the 
ANA patterns present among the respondents revealed that about half of the consumers did not 
attend to the attribute religious affiliation. 
In this section, we re-ran our RP model weighting the preference coefficients with the individual 
probabilities of attendance we attained from the inferred ANA approach. Furthermore, we defined 
different specifications of the attributes religious affiliation and gender. In the first RP models (models 
1 and 4), we look at the religious affiliation and gender of the seller but not that of the consumer. To 
elaborate our findings, we added two new model specifications (Table 6-6): one in which we model 
preference for sellers with a similar religious background or the same gender as the consumer 
(models 2 and 5); and preference for either the same religious affiliation, same gender or both 
(models 3 and 6). The left panel of Table 6-6 highlights the dominant preferences of the consumers 
(without considering ANA), while the right panel shows the weighted preference coefficients by 
considering individual attendance probabilities for the different attributes.  
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Table 6-6: Random parameter models for different specifications of the attributes religious affiliation 
and gender without (left) and with (right) considering individual attendance probabilities 
 RP models without weighting  RP models with weighting 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  
β  
(SE) 
β 
 (SE) 
β 
 (SE) 
β 
 (SE) 
β 
 (SE) 
β 
 (SE) 
 
Seller (farmer vs shop) 
 
0.81*** 
 
0.81*** 
 
0.80*** 
 
1.48*** 
 
1.42*** 
 
1.42*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Distance (minutes) -0.31*** -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.92*** -0.95*** -0.95*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Price (ETB) -0.48*** -0.48*** -0.49*** -2.64*** -2.79*** -2.79*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Religious affiliation  
(Muslim vs Christian) 
-0.05 - - -0.36*** - - 
(0.04)   (0.09)   
Gender (female vs male) 0.05 - - 0.41*** - - 
 (0.04)   (0.10)   
Same religious affiliation vs 
different religious affiliation 
- 0.04 - - 0.32*** - 
 (0.04)   (0.10)  
Same gender vs different gender - 0.03 - - 0.14 - 
  (0.04)   (0.09)  
Same    religious     affiliation     vs - - 0.08 - - 0.40** 
different religious affiliation and 
gender 
  (0.07)   (0.19) 
  
Same gender vs different religious 
affiliation and gender 
- - 0.06 - - 0.00 
  (0.06)   (0.15) 
Same   religious   affiliation    and  - - 0.01 - - 0.29 
gender    vs    different    religious   
 (0.05)   (0.27) 
affiliation and gender      
  
SD Rand. 
Pars (SE 
Rand. Pars.) 
SD. Rand. 
Pars (SE 
Rand. Pars.) 
SD Rand. 
Pars (SE 
Rand. Pars.) 
 SD Rand. 
Pars (SE 
Rand. Pars.) 
SD Rand.  
Pars (SE 
Rand. Pars.) 
SD Rand.  
Pars (SE 
Rand. Pars.) 
       
Seller (farmer vs shop) 1.17*** 1.18*** 1.15*** 0.014 0.01 0.01 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) 
Distance (minutes) 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.18) (0.04) (0.06) (0.36) (0.06) 
Religious affiliation  0.32** - - 0.33 - - 
(Muslim vs Christian) (0.13)   (0.40)   
Gender (female vs male) 0.03 - - 0.08 - - 
 (0.25)   (0.29)   
Same    religious    affiliation    vs  - 0.3** - - 0.79*** - 
different religious affiliation  (0.15)   (0.28)  
Same      gender     vs     different  - 0.17 - - 0.02 - 
Gender  (0.18)   (0.36)  
Same   religious    affiliation     vs - - 0.53** 
- - 
0.84 
different     religious       affiliation    (0.26) (0.61) 
and gender       
Same     gender     vs      different  
religious affiliation and gender 
- - 0.45* - - 0.13 
  (0.25)   (0.50) 
Same   religious    affiliation    and  - - 0.07 - - 1.16** 
gender    vs    different     religious    (0.37)   (0.53) 
affiliation and gender       
R2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.52 0.51 0.51 
Log likelihood -1052.56 -1053.49 -1052.72 -698.88 -708.71 -709.32 
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
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As expected, we could not detect significant preferences for either religious affiliation or gender in 
any of the specifications if we did account not for ANA (models 1-3). All these RP specifications, 
however, show significant preference heterogeneity around the religious affiliation estimates, 
indicating that preference for religious affiliation varies significantly across our milk consumers in 
Ethiopia. When we account for ANA (models 4-6), we find that consumers significantly prefer co-
religious sellers, while they seem not to care whether or not the sellers share the same gender. We 
rather observe a preference for female sellers, independently of the respondent being male or 
female. Another interesting result is that accounting for the individual attendance probabilities 
removes part of the heterogeneity around the estimated random parameter coefficients which implies 
that part of the preference heterogeneity we observe can thus be explained by ANA patterns. 
For those attributes that were found to be significant, we are able to calculate WTPs and WTWs, so 
as to quantify trade-offs between the price or distance and the rest of the attributes considered. The 
difference in estimated WTPs and WTWs across the models is small. In the RP models without 
weighting (models 1-3), each additional minute walking to the selling point reduces the WTP with 
0.65-0.67 ETB per L of milk. Additionally, consumers are willing to pay 3.27-3.38 ETB more or to 
walk 5-5.23 minutes longer to buy milk from an urban producer as compared to a milk shop. In the 
weighted RP models (model 4-6), the reduction in WTP for each additional minute walking is 0.34-
0.35 ETB, while the WTP and the WTW for a milk producer was 1.02-1.12 ETB more and 2.99-3.21 
minutes longer as compared to a milk shop.  
In the weighted RP model 4, we calculated the WTP and WTW to buy milk from Christian sellers. 
We find that consumers are willing to pay 0.27 ETB more for 1 L of milk sold by Christian sellers 
versus Muslim sellers, and they are willing to walk 0.78 minutes longer for Christian milk sellers. 
Moreover, consumers are willing to pay 0.31 ETB more and walk 0.89 minutes longer when milk is 
sold by female sellers. When consumers and sellers share the same religious affiliation, consumers 
are willing to pay 0.23-0.29 ETB more and walk 0.42-0.84 minutes longer than when they do not 
share the same religious affiliation (model 5 and 6).  
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5. Discussion  
From the above analysis it is clear that the most important attribute for Ethiopian consumer is the 
type of milk sellers, with a clear and strong preference to buy milk from milk producers. Informal 
discussions with our respondents revealed that they attribute a higher quality to the milk bought from 
milk farmers and they seem to trust them more than shop sellers. Consumers argued that milk shops 
sometimes dilute milk so as to increase profits. Furthermore, milk sourced directly from farmers is 
perceived to be fresher. It seems that both trust and perceived quality make urban consumers more 
inclined to shop from dairy farmers. To alter consumer purchase behaviour to milk shops and other 
retail outlets will require public investment in quality standards so as to provide reliable and 
trustworthy information on milk safety and quality to consumers [258].  
Furthermore, we observe that consumers value proximity of milk outlets (convenience). At present, 
there are still more urban milk producers as compared to milk shops, which might also explain why 
consumers still patronize local milk producers. Both gender and religious affiliation of the milk 
producers are no decisive factors when deciding from whom to buy milk. Yet, we observe low 
attendance rates for both attributes, which could explain why we do not find dominant preferences 
for either attributes. Since milk is typically traded in small quantities, consumers can easily shift to 
other sellers if they are not satisfied. This flexibility could explain why not all consumers do not pay 
attention to the social identity of sellers, but rather focus on characteristics they value more, which 
seem to be the type of seller, proximity of the seller and milk prices. Alternatively, since we performed 
this study in an almost exclusive Christian setting, most transactions already occur between Christian 
consumers and Christian sellers which could potentially make the consumers in our sample less 
sensitive for the religious attribute.  
When accounting for ANA, we observe that part of our consumers does take religious affiliation and 
gender into account when deciding to engage in milk transactions and tend to self-select to female 
and co-religious sellers. Since the large majority of our sample is Christian, we observe preferences 
for Christian sellers. Consumers do not self-select to sellers with the same gender. Moreover, while 
consumers seem to have a clear preference for co-religious sellers if they indicate to value religion 
in making their purchase decisions, the type of supplier remains the most important factor when 
deciding from whom to buy milk, as can be seen from the higher WTP and WTW for milk producers 
as compared to the WTP and WTW for Christian sellers. 
Previous studies that focused on discriminatory practices in product markets (mostly online 
platforms) found that buyers are less likely to transact with out-group members and if they do, they 
make significantly lower offers to out-group sellers, while they offer higher prices for in-group sellers 
[365, 366, 368, 370]. Yet, these studies focus on markets with many potential sellers and non-food 
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products. Our findings thus do not refute what is expected from theory (i.e. homophily and 
discriminatory practices in the light of informational asymmetries), but stress the need for more 
studies to be performed, on food transactions in general but also in different religious settings, e.g. 
more mixed settings. Repeating this choice experiment in different settings is also needed to validate 
whether our results also hold for non-Christian consumers, for which we now have too few 
observations to make solid conclusions. Future studies could also benefit from focusing on larger 
sample sizes so as to better assure that the sampled respondents are accurately representing the 
population. Moreover, future studies could benefit from incentivized decisions, where respondents’ 
decisions are coupled with actual payments, so that the decisions made are a more realistic 
representation of the respondents’ true underlying preferences. 
Finally, the actual impact of religion on real-world transaction decisions is expected to be bigger 
especially because many transactions happen within social networks that often are or have been 
established by sharing religious ties. In the DCE we constructed, we avoid that social network effects 
impact the choices of our respondents, by asking respondents to imagine they move to another are 
(e.g. another sub-city). The effect we measure with this experiment thus captures only the impact of 
religion on milk transactions, as we make religion exogenous from social network effects.  
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6. Conclusion 
This chapter adds empirical evidence to the literature on consumer behaviour. Using a discrete 
choice model, we assessed consumer preferences for the religious affiliation of milk sellers together 
with other characteristics describing alternative milk seller profiles in Ethiopia (i.e. gender, seller type, 
milk price and temporal distance to selling point). Running different specifications with random 
parameters models, we could not find significant consumer preferences for co-religious milk sellers. 
We attribute this to respondents not placing dominant preferences for religious affiliation in our 
sample, either due to respondents ignoring the religious attribute or placing low preference on the 
religious background of the seller. Using a stepwise latent class approach, we inferred that less than 
half of our respondents attended to the attribute religious affiliation when making their choices. 
Further analysis considering attribute non-attendance revealed that those consumers who consider 
the religious background when assessing different seller profiles, reveal preferences for co-religious 
sellers, which in our sample corresponded to Christian sellers given the dominance of Christian 
consumers. For the other included seller characteristics, respondents displayed economic rational 
behaviour by selecting those sellers that offer lower milk prices and are closer located to their homes. 
Furthermore, consumers overall prefer to buy milk directly from urban milk producers, which can be 
attributed to the perceived higher quality of milk offered by farmers as compared to shops. 
Consumers did not reveal a dominant preference for female sellers, but those consumers that care 
display a preference for female sellers, irrespective of the consumer being male or female. 
We show that an important sub-set of the consumers we interviewed consider the religious identity 
of potential milk sellers in their purchase decisions and they are willing to pay more and walk further 
to buy milk from Christian sellers. Consumers in our sample thus (in)consciously self-select to co-
religious sellers, which might inhibit a proper milk market functioning and contribute to religious 
market segmentation.  Our findings are in line with what is expected from theory. More studies are 
needed to validate our findings in others religious settings in the country as well as for non-Christian 
consumers. Furthermore, more research in general is needed to elaborate the impact of social 
identity on economic transactions and economic behaviour at large. 
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Abstract 
Low levels of trust and high levels of uncertainty are likely to make individuals preferentially trade 
with members who belong to the same social group so as to reduce transaction costs. This might 
result in trade breakdown across social groups. Ethnic market segmentation has been evidence in 
Africa, but insufficient studies have looked at religious market segmentation. We contribute at filling 
this void, by examining if religion impacts milk transactions in the Ethiopian value chain. In the 
previous chapter, we investigated whether milk consumers discriminate among potential milk seller 
candidates based on their religious affiliation. We find that an important sub-set of consumers 
preferentially selects co-religious sellers. In this chapter, we apply a similar choice experiment (albeit 
with some different attributes) to study whether milk producers discriminate against potential milk 
buyers based on their religious affiliation. Since the pool of potential buyers is large in cities with only 
few producers operating in these areas, producers are able to choose to whom they sell their milk 
to. We expect that discrimination mostly occurs by selecting the buyers on their personal 
characteristics since there is limited possibility for both price and quality differentiation by producers. 
We find that on average, milk producers do not reveal significant preferences for co-religious buyers. 
Yet, we observe significant preference heterogeneity around this attribute. This implies that some 
producers have strong preferences for the religious affiliation of milk buyers, while others have less 
or no preference. The results from our experiment should be seen as a lower estimate. Future studies 
would benefit from repeating this experiment in different religious settings and from including sales 
volumes as an attribute in the experiment to see whether religious preferences become more 
pronounced when larger volumes of milk are involved in the transactions. 
Keywords: choice experiment, Ethiopia, market segmentation, milk transactions, producers, 
Mekelle city, religious ties, trading preferences 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter builds further on the theory of homophily and discriminatory practices in markets that 
were introduced in the previous chapter. The available literature on discrimination in product markets 
usually takes a buyer perspective and studies discriminatory practices in markets where there is 
usually a large pool of potential sellers (online platforms). In this paper, we take a seller approach 
and aim at investigating whether sellers discriminate among buyer groups. The studies that have 
taken this approach as well usually focus on price discrimination and find that sellers require minority 
buyers to pay higher product prices [363, 364]. Li et al. [369] on the other hand focused on offers 
made by sellers to different buyer groups and find that sellers were more likely to make offers to 
buyers with the same group identity. This evidences that not only buyers consider the seller’ social 
identity but that also sellers consider the social identity of potential buyers and treat buyers differently 
in economic transactions. 
Cultural similarity can help to establish the necessary interpersonal trust between two (or more) 
trading agents. Yet, relatively few studies have tried to unravel the role culture plays in facilitating 
market transactions. The available scholarly literature mainly focuses on Europe and North America 
and confirms that cultural similarity fosters cross-border trade [204, 446], cross-border acquisitions 
[447], and cross-border alliances [448, 449]. This cultural sorting process can be beneficial for 
economic performance [448] but might also result in significant costs that lock economic agents in 
inefficient trade relations [449].  
In SSA, there is some evidence of the formation of ethnic trading networks [19, 20, 450-454]. Being 
both member of the same social group (in this case ethnic group), creates expectations of trustworthy 
behaviour between seller and buyer, even when trading agents do not know each other personally. 
These expectations reduce sellers’ search and screening costs for potential trading partners. 
Moreover, social groups typically accommodate moral norms for appropriate behaviour and facilitate 
sanctions in the case of default [455-458]. When social groups are geographically dispersed and 
trust is primarily concentrated within these groups, economic exchange will predominantly occur 
between members of the same social group. Through repeated interactions, trading arrangements 
based on a shared social identity can turn into long-lasting patron-client relations [459]. This results 
in market segmentation, which will obviously come at a transaction and welfare cost for the society 
[20]. While there is some evidence of ethnic market segmentation, the existence of religious market 
segmentation has received insufficient scholarly attention.  
This chapter contributes toward filling this void. We do so by examining if religion interferes with food 
transactions in Ethiopia, taking the specific case of milk. The Ethiopian milk market is plagued by 
several problems which result in considerable market inefficiencies. The existence of coordination 
problems that impede a proper market functioning, however, has not yet received sufficient attention. 
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We therefore look at milk transactions in urban settings characterized by market-oriented milk 
production – with 75% or more of the produced milk being marketed by milk producers [460] – and 
a large and diverse buyer pool – individual consumers, FSPs, and traders. In the previous chapter, 
we detailed the impact of a seller’s religious identity on consumers’ purchase decisions. We find that 
an important sub-set of the consumers we interviewed consider the religious identity of milk sellers 
in their purchase decisions and prefer to purchase milk from co-religious sellers. These consumers 
are also willing to pay more and walk further to buy milk from co-religious sellers. In this chapter, we 
look at the producer side and since it is possible that religious bias also occurs at the producer side. 
Since there are few producers in urban areas versus many potential buyers, producers might be 
picky to whom they sell their milk to and prefer to sell to co-religious consumers.  
As explained in the previous chapter, we hypothesize that religion might be an important factor in a 
seller’s (initial) selection of milk buyers because of (1) the milk market that operates predominantly 
informally, (2) the religious symbolism of ASFs, and (3) the widespread occurrence of co-religious 
networks due to low levels of trust in other religious groups and the geographical dispersion of 
religious groups. Also for producers, informational asymmetries occur that require trust from 
producers in milk buyers, which can be solved by trading within co-religious networks. Additionally, 
these networks lower sales costs and can potentially reduce the effect of fasting periods by creating 
a bonding mechanism. 
Due to the perishability of milk and lack of proper storage and cooling infrastructure, milk sales occur 
daily, with most farmers selling small quantities of milk to various buyers. In the Ethiopian milk market 
both spot market transactions47 and short-term contracts occur. Whereas in anonymous spot market 
transactions milk is directly exchanged and paid, on-credit-sales (delayed payments) and exchange 
of information are common in short-term contracts. As uncertainty increases in these latter 
transactions, especially since there are no intermediate institutions to facilitate transactions and 
enforce agreements, transaction costs rise. Such short-term contracts can only arise when sufficient 
interpersonal trust is established between buyers and sellers and therefore most of these 
transactions are highly personalized. Such personalized transactions very often arise within social 
networks, which in Ethiopia, are often co-religious. But, in urbanized settings with many potential 
buyers and thus a high demand for milk, producers frequently sell to unknown and occasional 
buyers. We hypothesize that when these transactions involve delayed payments, producers will 
preferentially trade with buyers belonging to the same religious group because of the low levels of 
trust reported for people outside the own religious group. Delayed payments are prone to 
                                               
47 Transactions are characterized by asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency [461]. Since milk is a generic 
good, spot markets are likely to emerge as both sellers and buyers can find other trade partners easily. 
Continuity of transaction is thus not required as both trading partners do not depend on each other. Since milk 
transactions are non-asset specific, uncertainty does not affect these transactions largely. 
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opportunistic behaviour of buyers, since buyers have an incentive to default (at least short-term) 
[454]. Producers might only be inclined to accept delayed payment if they believe that the buyer will 
not refrain from paying later. Therefore, the producer will prefer to transact with a buyer who is 
believed to be more trustworthy. Since religion is readily observable, producers might use this 
information when selecting among different potential and unknown milk buyers. If milk producers 
prefer to collude with co-religious milk buyers, producers might make milk, a highly nutritious food 
product, socially inaccessible to certain buyer groups.   
We expect that producers will mostly discriminate when choosing to whom they sell their milk to, 
since they have little possibility to differentiate on quality and price among buyers from different 
religious groups. Based on the findings from studies on discriminatory practices in products markets 
(see Chapter 6), one would expect that producers charge higher milk prices for religious out-group 
buyers. Price differentiation in the Ethiopian milk chain is however not standard. Brands and labels 
are not common in the country which could justify price differentation for milk. Moreover, milk quality 
standards and grades are largely absent, and a functional quality control and enforcement system 
is lacking, thereby making it even more difficult to differentiate milk based on e.g. fat or lactose 
content. All these factors make milk a rather homogenous product, for which it is hard to establish 
and justify price differentiation. 
Next to price discrimination, producers could also deliberately adulterate the milk with water (which 
is a common practice in Ethiopia [201]) when selling milk to other religious groups. This is possible 
since buyers cannot adequately assess the quality of the milk upon transaction, due to the lack of 
proper quality control. Yet, this is also not likely to happen, since milk sold by producers is bulked in 
plastic containers (jerry cans) making it highly unlikely that producers would start to adulterate milk 
for those buyers that do not share the same religious affiliation. 
To answer our research question, we again adopt a DCE. In the DCE we constructed, producers 
were asked to choose among different potential and unknown milk buyers. Milk buyers were 
characterized using five different attributes that are relevant within the Ethiopian context: milk price, 
payment terms (at the time of transaction or delayed), type of buyer (individual consumer, shop, or 
trader), religious affiliation and gender of the buyer.  
Using a sample of 250 milk producers located in the city of Mekelle, we find that milk price, payment 
terms and type of buyer are important attributes to all sampled producers with clear and expected 
preferences for higher prices and immediate payment. We observe that producers prefer to 
exchange with traders over individual consumers, and individual consumers over milk shops. The 
preference for traders is rather surprising, given that only 8% of the milk producers indicated that 
traders are currently their main buyers. We found only a few traders who are operating in the city 
and link urban producers to urban customers, probably because of the lack of (wholesale) demand 
CHAPTER 7 
 
192 
in the area and/or the limited profit margins of traders when they operate within the city. Despite the 
lack of traders in the city, producers still seem to prefer them probably because traders source larger 
volumes of milk as compared to individual consumers and are less strict on milk quality as compared 
to milk shops. Moreover, we suspect that milk producers value interlocked contracts as traders 
usually provide inputs to milk producers, especially feed, which is interesting for urban producers 
who rarely grow feed themselves.  
We find that milk producers on average do not show dominant preferences for co-religious buyers. 
But, we observe significant preference heterogeneity around the attribute religious affiliation, 
suggesting that some producers have strong preferences for the religious affiliation of buyers while 
others have less or no preference. We were not able to statistically explain this heterogeneity by 
accounting for ANA and respondent characteristics in our models. Furthermore, we find that 
producers, when confronted with unknown milk buyers in a single-shot transaction, reveal 
preferences for spot market transactions (signalled by their preference for immediate payment). This 
implies that most producers do not invest high searching and screening costs to find reliable buyers 
when the transaction involves only one litre of milk. The preference for immediate payment might 
also explain why we did not observe a dominant preference for the religious affiliation of milk buyers. 
Future studies would benefit from (1) repeating this experiment in different religious settings, and (2) 
including sales volumes as an attribute in the experiment to see whether religious preferences 
become more pronounced when larger volumes of milk are involved in the transactions.  
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2. Ethnic market segmentation in Africa 
In weakly institutionalized settings, a particular challenge in developing nations, interpersonal trust 
is an important precondition for trade. In many of these countries, market imperfections and the 
absence of an effective legal system to enforce contracts and settle contract disputes result in high 
transaction costs that impede economic exchange [20]. Trading among in-group members is 
associated with more trust even if individuals might incur higher transaction costs [20]. For example, 
Foscaches et al. [462] found that social identity matters more than transactional attributes do when 
rural producers in Brazil have to decide among different marketing channels to commercialize their 
produce.  
Also, other studies have highlighted the importance of shared group membership in establishing 
close personalized trade relationships. Within the African context, Fafchamps [454] observed ethnic 
concentration in agricultural trade in Benin, Malawi and Madagascar. Also in Ethiopia, the importance 
of sharing religious or ethnic ties has been shown among farmers and middlemen in the potato value 
chain [463]. Gelaw et al. [464] report that 28% of the Ethiopian coffee farmers they interviewed 
reported that they had established close trading relations with trader(s) of the same social group. 
Patron-client relations were omnipresent and strong in the research area and 81% of the farmers 
reported that once patron-client relations were established, they never or rarely sold their produce 
to other traders. When such trading preferences result in the establishment of exclusive networks, 
agents might get locked into non-profitable transactions. As such, Ali and Peerlings [465] observed 
that ethnically tied small-scale handloom producers in Ethiopia have significantly lower monthly 
profits.  
Trading preferences based on social identity can reduce intergroup trade, and ultimately result in 
market segregation or segmentation [20]. Market segmentation along ethnic lines has been observed 
within the maize value chain in Malawi [20]. Farmers and traders prefer to trade with co-ethnic 
partners, which they report to trust more. Trust is important to overcome the risks associated with 
maize trade, they highlight. There is a common believe that it is easier to locate and sanction a co-
ethnic trading partner in the case of default. A large majority of the interviewed farmers declare that 
the main cause for intra-national market barriers was the weak trust between ethnic groups [20]. 
Along the same lines, Aker et al. [19] found that price differences in Niger for millet and cowpea are 
smaller in trade flows between ethnically similar regions. Moreover, when looking at the Niger-
Nigeria border trade, they observe smaller price dispersion when markets on either side of the border 
share the same ethnicity.  
As ethnic affiliation, religion may lead to market segmentation. However, religious market 
segmentation has been less studied. The dietary laws laid out by the Muslim and Jewish community 
contribute to the proliferation of separate market and distribution channels. These laws prescribe 
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their members to consume halal and kosher food respectively, thereby imposing followers to 
purchase from sellers that offer halal and kosher products. For meat and poultry, the spread of 
separate halal supply chains (to avoid contamination), halal labels and certification schemes 
targeting local Muslim consumers in non-Muslim majority countries has been discussed in literature 
for Europe see e.g. Lever and Miele [466] and Lever and Fischer [197]. The above studies exemplify 
the impact of religious instructions on market organization. Less clear however is how religion might 
affect trading preferences of producers which could potentially lead to market segmentation.  
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3. Materials and methods  
3.1. Data  
We performed our study in the Mekelle milk shed, one of the eight milk sheds in Ethiopia, located in 
the northern part of the country. Data were collected during August-September 2017 across the 
seven sub-cities of Mekelle city, the regional capital of the Tigray province. We specifically focus on 
an urban centre, as milk markets are more developed in urban settings. Milk producers in urban 
centres typically sell the majority of their production (estimated at 75% or more by Ayenew and 
Wurzinger [460]).  
To pre-test the survey so as to optimize our experimental design, we randomly sampled 30 
producers within the city. Once the pre-test was completed, we sat the total producers to be 
interviewed at 220. To get a representative sample of producers for Mekelle city as a whole, we 
collected estimates of urban milk producers operating in each sub-city from the respective sub-city 
administrations so as to get an overview of the total population of dairy producers in the city. From 
this, we were able to calculate the share of milk producers in each sub-city. We used these shares 
to calculate the number of producers to be sampled within each sub-city. Since no lists are available 
summarizing the details of these urban dairy producers, we had to trace producers in another way. 
Therefore, we adopt a pragmatic approach so as to assure we draw a random sample of dairy 
producing households in each sub-city. To do so, we adopted a combination of the following 
strategies: (1) milk producing households in Mekelle often let their manure to dry outside their homes, 
which we could use to trace them; (2) we asked around in the respective sub-cities, usually a causal 
passer-by, where we could find milk producers; and (3) after having interviewed the dairy producers, 
we asked them where we could find other producing households in the sub-city. Please note that 
this sample is a different group of dairy producers than those on which Chapter 5 is based. 
Interviews were done with the household member responsible for the dairy farm and/or dairy sales 
(household head or spouse). No monetary incentives were given to participate in the survey. These 
milk producers were interviewed at the same time when we conducted the interviews with the milk 
consumers included in the previous chapter. The survey and the choice experiment were very similar 
to the one administered with milk consumers and can be found in Appendix 3. 
This research was ethically approved by the Health Research Ethics Review Committee of Mekelle 
University as well as the ethical committee of the University Hospital Ghent.  
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3.2. Methodological approach 
3.2.1. Attribute selection and specification 
We selected five attributes that are relevant within the Ethiopian milk context to describe the buyer 
profiles. An initial set of attributes and levels were identified through a rigorous literature review. To 
tailor our DCE to the study setting, we interviewed local experts as well as a sample of 30 milk 
producers in Mekelle so that our final set of attributes and associated levels (Table 7-1) was 
appropriate and valid.  
Religious background was signalled using names or religious symbols (the same names and 
religious symbols were used as in Chapter 6, see Supplementary material D.1). Since we use names 
and symbols incorporated in drawings (see Figure 7-1) to indicate religious background, we 
simultaneously signal gender. We hypothesize that gender might play a role in milk transactions. We 
assume that milk producers are more confronted with female buyers since women are the main 
responsible for food purchasing and food preparation [467]. Producers might thus reveal slight 
preferences for female buyers, especially when these buyers are individual consumers.  
Since different buyer types occur, we used this variation so as to mirror reality. Moreover, from earlier 
studies we observed that producers tend to sell their produce to different buyers (see Chapter 4 and 
5). We thus included the three most common milk outlets for producers, i.e. individual consumers, 
milk shops, and traders. Given the growing importance of milk shops, we deliberately focus on this 
FSP. Shops offer advantages to producers, since they can buy larger volumes of milk. Also, traders 
remain important intermediaries in the Ethiopian milk value chain, linking producers with retailers, 
FSPs, or processors. We did not consider modern retail outlets, such as supermarkets, as these 
represent a negligible market share in our research area. 
Finally, we include two instruments to investigate discrimination practices: i.e. milk prices and 
payment terms. Prices are commonly included in DCEs to calculate WTPs. Including prices allows 
to investigate the extent of discrimination of milk producers towards particular buyer groups. Yet, 
since milk prices are market determined, and producers cannot easily set their own prices, it is more 
interesting to use payment terms. Delayed payment is a common practice in Ethiopia, but it is prone 
to opportunistic behaviour of buyers, since buyers have an incentive to default (at least short-term) 
[454]. Producers might only be inclined to accept delayed payment if they believe that the buyer will 
not refrain from paying later. Therefore, the producer will prefer to transact with a buyer who is 
believed to be more trustworthy. We hypothesize that sharing religious ties might act as a proxy for 
trustworthiness in our controlled experimental setting. If discrimination is present, we expect to 
observe that producers allow co-religious buyers to pay later while the opposite would hold for buyers 
with another religious background. The milk price levels in our experiment ranged between 17-20 
ETB (0.73-0.86 USD, accounting for the exchange rates at the time of data collection). This was the 
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prevailing price range at the time of data collection. These prices are high, which is a common 
observation in cities across Ethiopia [17]. On the choice cards, prices vary by 1 ETB following the 
advice of local experts and the milk producers we interviewed while pre-testing the survey. The 
competitiveness of the markets with numerous milk sellers results in such small price variations. 
Similar price fluctuations have been reported by Zijlstra et al. [201] and Brasesco et al. [430]. 
Table 7-1: Buyer attributes included in the choice experiment and their associated levels 
Attribute Attribute levels 
Religious affiliation Muslim – Christian 
Gender Male – Female 
Milk buyer Individual consumer – Milk shop – Trader 
Milk price 17 – 18 – 19 – 20 ETB/L 
Payment terms Immediate (i.e. at the time of transaction) – Delayed 
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3.2.2. Experimental design  
Using the NGENE software, the five attributes were combined into a D-efficient design in which each 
choice task was composed of three alternative profiles (see an example in Figure 7-1). The software 
generated 12 different choice situations or tasks, which were blocked in two groups. Each 
respondent was randomly allocated to one block with six choice tasks. Each choice task also 
included an opt-out option, to avoid that respondents needed to make forced choices. The choice 
tasks were pre-tested with 30 producers of which the results were also used to calculate priors to 
improve the experiment’s final design.  
Also here, we asked to producers to imagine they have moved to another area, so as to avoid that 
social network effects impact the choices of our respondents. The transaction volume again 
consisted of one litre milk, which was explicitly stated to the respondents so as to rule out potential 
expectations about different purchasing volumes associated with different buyer types. 
 
Figure 7-1: Example of choice card with names and religious symbols to choose among potential 
milk buyers 
Note: here English translations of the choice cards are shown. The respondents received choice cards in their local 
language, i.e. Tigrinya.   
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3.2.3. Modelling strategy 
To determine general preferences for milk buyer characteristics, we used the same models as 
detailed in Chapter 6. We report the results from RP models48 which allow to account for the variation 
of preferences across individual respondents [468] (see econometric specifications in Chapter 6). In 
these models, we additionally control for the interaction between the attribute religion and gender 
(taking into account the religious affiliation and gender of the respondents), as well as the interaction 
of religion with payment terms, since we hypothesize that delayed payments might make religion 
crucial when selecting among unknown milk buyers. 
We further explored preference heterogeneity by including interaction terms between choice 
attributes and individual-specific characteristics (age, gender, milk production volumes, number of 
children and/or number of members in a certain household, religiosity, and income), and we account 
for ANA using the same LC ANA approach as detailed in Chapter 6. Both approaches however did 
not improve the results nor the measures of fit and are therefore not reported in the results section.  
 
 
                                               
48 Also here we applied LC models, yet these models did not allow us to capture the unobserved heterogeneity. 
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4. Results  
4.1. Descriptive characteristics of the milk producers 
Table 7-2 describes the main characteristics of respondents and their respective households. The 
milk producers we interviewed were relatively young (40 years old) of which only a small majority is 
male (60%). Milk producers have large households, with 4 children on average. Milk producing 
households own on average 3 milking cows and 1-2 calves. Milk productivity is high (11 L/cow/day) 
compared to the average daily production of 1-2 L/cow in traditional smallholder systems [230]. Milk 
is sold daily mostly to FSPs (53%) followed by individual consumers (39%) and traders (8%). Traders 
are not too common in urban areas as they mainly operate in the rural-urban interface, transporting 
milk from rural to urban centres [469]. About 70% of the milk producers indicate to know the names 
of their milk buyers, suggesting that milk transactions tend to be largely personalized. General trust 
among milk producers is low but 40% of the producers do trust people of another religion to some 
extent. 
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Table 7-2: Main characteristics of the respondents and their households 
Variable Mean or proportion 
Age of respondent (years) 41.37 (0.93) 
Proportion female respondents  0.41 
Religious background respondent (proportion)  
Orthodox 0.97 
Muslim 0.01 
Other 0.02 
Household size  6.11 (0.15) 
Number of children  4.29 (0.16) 
Monthly household income (ETB) 18,162.53 (1539.89) 
Milk selling frequency (proportion)  
Daily 0.99 
Less than daily 0.01 
Main buyer (proportion)  
Individual consumer 0.39 
Trader 0.08 
Milk shop 0.30 
Other FSPs 0.23 
Number of cows owned  3.22 (0.20) 
Number of calves owned  1.64 (0.10) 
Milk productivity (L/cow/day) 11.22 (0.28) 
Proportion of respondents that know the name(s) of their milk buyer(s)  0.69 
Stated general trust (proportion)  
Most people can be trusted 0.16 
You need to be very careful 0.82 
I don’t know 0.02 
Stated trust in people of another religion (proportion)  
Trust completely 0.12 
Trust somewhat 0.27 
Do not trust very much 0.06 
Do not trust at all 0.08 
I don’t know 0.35 
Note: When applicable, the standard errors are given within parentheses. Questions on whether respondents know the 
name(s) of their buyer(s) and trust questions were only asked after the choice experiment was conducted. 
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4.2. Does religious affiliation matter? 
Producers’ preferences for characteristics of milk buyers were estimated using different RP 
specifications (Table 7-3). We used different specifications to explore if there are preferences for a 
particular religious affiliation or gender (model 1), for a similar religious background or the same 
gender as the buyer (model 2) or for preference for either the same religious affiliation, same gender 
or both (model 3). As can be seen from Table 7-3, we did not find evidence of preferences for the 
religious affiliation or gender of the buyer.  
The results of the models reveal that milk producers prefer traders over individual consumers and 
consumers over milk shops. However, when using interactions with current main buyers reported by 
the milk producers, the results show that the observed preference for consumers over milk shops 
only occurs for those producers that currently sell mostly to consumers (last column). The preference 
for traders is rather surprising, given that only 8% of the milk producers indicated that traders are 
currently their main buyers (Table 7-2). Looking descriptively at those milk producers that currently 
mainly sell to traders, we find that 14 out of these 21 producers have daily milk yields above the 
average of 11 L/cow as reported in Table 7-2. Moreover, 14 and 12 out of these 21 producers have 
at least three milking cows, and two calves respectively (again above the average in the sample). 
We also find that these producers are located more in the outer sub-cities, away from the inner sub-
city of Kedamay Weyane. Producers that currently sell to traders are thus based more on the outer 
skirts of the city and have lager dairy herds and daily milk volumes. Probably we observe preference 
for traders over individual consumers because traders source larger volumes of milk at once. 
Moreover, data from traders in the Great Addis area suggest that traders often offer multiple services 
to their customers: continued purchase during fasting, equipment (especially feed), credit, training 
and milk pick-up. Continued purchase during fasting might be especially relevant within the Mekelle 
context to tie milk producers, given its almost exclusively Orthodox population. It is expected that as 
long as there is little wholesale demand for milk, which is particularly true in the city of Mekelle, 
traders will remain active and preferred intermediaries in the chain. 
Furthermore, we observe that milk producers significantly prefer immediate payments, at the time of 
transaction, over delayed payments as well as high prices for their milk, irrespective of the religious 
affiliation of milk buyer candidates. The preference of immediate payment with unknown buyers (a 
deliberate choice within our experimental setting) is expected since delayed payment agreements 
usually arise when both seller and buyer have interacted repeatedly and thus have built up a trust 
relation. Since we hypothesize that delayed payments might make religion crucial when selecting 
among unknown milk buyers, we tested for the interaction of the attribute religion and payment terms. 
Yet, the effect was found to be insignificant.   
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Although we do not observe clear preferences for religious affiliation, we detect considerably 
preference heterogeneity around the attribute, suggested by the significant standard deviations 
around the estimated random parameters. We tried to uncover this by exploiting variation in 
respondent characteristics as well as patterns of ANA49. However, both approaches did not allow us 
to explain the heterogeneity and improve our results. 
 
 
  
                                               
49 Strikingly we observe that the average inferred attendance rate to the attribute religion is very low among 
the milk producers, i.e. 6.5%, while for milk consumers this was found to be as high as 42.3% (see Section 4.2 
Chapter 6). 
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Table 7-3: Results from the random parameter logit models 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
Interaction with 
current buyers 
 
β  
(SE) 
β 
(SE) 
β 
(SE) 
β 
(SE) 
 
Buyer type 1 (shop vs consumer) 
 
-0.15* 
(0.09) 
 
-0.18** 
(0.09) 
 
-0.17* 
(0.09) 
 
0.00 
(0.11) 
Buyer type 2 (trader vs consumer) 
0.21*** 
(0.07) 
0.21*** 
(0.07) 
0.20*** 
(0.07) 
0.28*** 
(0.09) 
Payment (delayed vs immediate) 
-0.96*** 
(0.17) 
-0.90*** 
0.17 
-1.02*** 
(0.17) 
-0.99*** 
(0.18) 
Price (ETB) 
0.50*** 
(0.06) 
0.52*** 
(0.06) 
0.53*** 
(0.06) 
0.50*** 
0.06 
Religious affiliation (Muslim vs Christian) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
 - -  
-0.03 
(0.06) 
Gender (female vs male) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
 -  - 
0.07 
(0.05) 
Same religious affiliation vs different religious affiliation - 
0.01 
(0.06) 
- - 
Same gender vs different gender - 
0.00 
(0.05) 
- - 
Same religious affiliation vs different religious affiliation 
and gender 
 -  - 
-0.11 
(0.16) 
 - 
Same gender vs different religious affiliation and gender  -  - 
-0.12 
(0.17) 
 - 
Same religious affiliation and gender vs different religious 
affiliation and gender 
 -  - 
0.23 
(0.31) 
 - 
Current buyer shop - - - 
-0.29 
(0.27) 
Current buyer trader - - - 
-0.07 
(0.37)  
Current buyer consumer - - - 
0.76*** 
(0.28)  
  
SD Rand. Pars 
 (SE Rand. Pars) 
SD Rand. Pars  
(SE Rand. Pars) 
SD Rand. Pars 
(SE Rand. Pars) 
SD Rand. Pars  
(SE Rand. Pars) 
 
Buyer type 1 (shop vs consumer) 
 
1.43*** 
(0.16) 
 
1.44*** 
(0.16) 
 
1.40*** 
(0.16) 
 
1.40*** 
(0.16) 
Buyer type 2 (trader vs consumer) 
0.95*** 
(0.15) 
0.93*** 
(0.15) 
0.93*** 
(0.15) 
0.90*** 
(0.16) 
Payment (delayed vs immediate) 
2.79*** 
(0.26) 
2.71*** 
(0.25) 
2.74*** 
(0.25) 
2.80*** 
(0.27) 
Religious affiliation (Muslim vs Christian) 
0.56*** 
(0.17) 
 - -  
0.55*** 
(0.17) 
Gender (female vs male) 
0.24 
(0.20) 
 - -  
0.26 
(0.19) 
Same religious affiliation vs different religious affiliation - 
0.52*** 
(0.17) 
- - 
Same gender vs different gender - 
0.07 
(0.24) 
- 
- 
Same religious affiliation vs different religious affiliation 
and gender 
 -  - 
0.32 
(0.30) 
- 
Same gender vs different religious affiliation and gender  -  - 
0.05 
(0.24) 
- 
Same religious affiliation and gender vs different religious 
affiliation and gender 
 -  - 
0.06 
(0.37) 
- 
Log likelihood -996.22 -998.538 -1000.3 -992.2 
McFadden pseudo ρ2 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.32 
AIC 2014.4 2019.1 2030.5 2012.5 
BIC 2071.5 2076.2 2098.0 2085.2 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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5. Discussion 
The available literature on discrimination in product markets usually takes a buyer perspective and 
studies discriminatory practices in markets where there is usually a large pool of potential sellers 
(online platforms). In this paper, we take a seller approach and aim at investigating whether 
producers discriminate among buyer groups. The studies that have taken this approach as well 
usually focus on price discriminations and find that sellers require minority buyers to pay higher 
product prices [363, 364]. Li et al. [369] on the other hand focused on offers made by sellers to 
different buyer groups and find that sellers were more likely to make offers to buyers with the same 
group identity.  
Our study has the same objective as the one of Li et al. [369], i.e. investigating whether sellers (in 
our case milk producers) preferentially transact with buyers from the same religious group. In 
contrast to the study of Li et al. [369], we find that milk producers on average do not show dominant 
preferences for co-religious buyers. But, we observe significant preference heterogeneity around the 
attribute religious affiliation, suggesting that some producers have strong preferences for the 
religious affiliation of buyers while others have less or no preference. We were not able to statistically 
explain this heterogeneity by accounting for ANA and respondent characteristics in our models. 
Below we highlight several reasons that might explain our outcomes. 
First, previous literature that focused on product markets has looked at cars, iPads, and other types 
of goods that can be easily stored. Milk on the other hand is highly perishable which might explain 
why some producers do not want to discriminate among potential buyers. 
Second, we found in the previous chapter that an important sub-set of consumers self-select to co-
religious sellers. If self-selection occurs, some producers might (perceive to) have less bargaining 
power when trying to sell their produce to potential buyers making some producers reluctant to turn 
down buyer candidates.  
Third, religious bias could occur asymmetrical across buyers and sellers as List [368] found that 
buyer-side discrimination is more pronounced than seller-side discrimination.  
Fourth, one could argue that SDB has led some respondents to not report their true preferences. 
Yet, we do not expect that this might be at stake in our experiment because of the following three 
reasons. First, we did not explicitly state the religious affiliation. We deliberately made use of both 
names and religious symbols to signal the religious background of potential milk buyer candidates. 
Second, we used a DCE that includes several other variables that are expected to affect producer 
choices, thereby making the attribute religious affiliation less salient. Third, despite these two actions, 
it is still possible that SDB occurs in our sample. To rule this out, we used a scaled heterogeneity 
model to compare choices made by respondents being confronted with names versus respondents 
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who saw religious symbols. This model showed that both groups of respondents did not make 
significantly different choices, implying that SDB is not at stake.  
Fifth, it is possible that preference for religious affiliation varies in our sample because of the sales 
volume articulated in the experiment (i.e. one litre of milk). It is possible that the financial risk of not 
receiving the money for this milk, in case a buyer defaults, is not high enough for producers to invest 
a lot in screening the potential buyer profiles we constructed. Milk consumers on the other hand 
seemed to have a higher incentive to readily screen and search for reliable milk sellers given the 
common prevalence of milk adulteration, but also (and potentially more important) because of the 
health risk when buying bad quality milk contaminated with foodborne pathogens. Future studies 
should repeat this experiment and include larger transaction volumes as it is likely that discriminatory 
practices will pop up more easily when the transaction volumes involved are larger thereby 
increasing the financial risk for producers. This is also what we would expect from previous studies 
that found evidence of discriminatory practices in the labour and rental housing market, where the 
costs that both employers and landlords can incur are high if they do not properly select among the 
potential candidates.  
 
Sixth, the lack of clear preferences for religion among all producers could also be explained by the 
dominant preference we observe in our sample for immediate payment when producers are 
confronted with unknown milk buyers. Preference for immediate payment cancels out the need to 
assess whether potential buyers are trustworthy. Also when interacting the attribute religious 
affiliation with payment terms, we did not find a significant effect. Potentially here again the low sales 
volume articulated in the experiment could play a role. When producers are confronted with two 
buyers with one of the buyers purchasing small quantities of milk with immediate payment versus 
another buyer purchasing larger volumes of milk but with delayed payment, it might nudge producers 
more to consider the second buyer and therefore it is more likely that in such a situation producers 
will consider the religious affiliation of buyers important. Hence, future experiments would benefit 
from including sales volumes as an attribute in the experiment to explore these hypotheses. 
Seventh, it is possible we do not find an overall significant preference for the religious affiliation of 
milk buyers, since we performed this study in an almost exclusive Christian setting. Therefore, most 
transactions already occur between Christian producers and Christian buyers making producers in 
our sample less sensitive for the religious attribute. When one would repeat this experiment in a 
more mixed setting, it is likely that producers will more readily screen the religious affiliation of 
potential milk buyers. Further research could thus benefit from repeating this experiment in different 
religious settings in Ethiopia to verify this hypothesis, but also to investigate whether Muslim 
producers show preferences for the religious affiliation of milk buyers as our current sample had too 
few observations on Muslim producers to explore this. Alternatively, it is likely that producers in our 
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sample do not want to discriminate against religious out-group members because these out-group 
members might be important buyers during fasting periods, especially in highly dominated Orthodox 
settings. Applying this to our setting, some Christian producers might not want to discriminate against 
Muslim buyers, because they could be potentially important buyers during fasting periods. However, 
we also found in Chapter 3 that the likelihood of Muslim households to consume milk significantly 
reduces during Orthodox fasting, which might downplay this reasoning to some extent. Future 
studies could also benefit from focusing on larger sample sizes so as to better assure that the 
sampled respondents are accurately representing the population. Moreover, future studies could 
benefit from incentivized decisions, where respondents’ decisions are coupled with actual payments, 
so that the decisions made are a more realistic representation of the respondents’ true underlying 
preferences. 
In general, our findings do not refute what is expected from theory (i.e. homophily and discriminatory 
practices in the light of informational asymmetries). Our findings should be seen as a lower estimate 
and future studies are needed to further investigate the presence of religious preferences among 
milk producers. The actual impact of religion on real-world transaction decisions is also expected to 
be bigger especially because many transactions happen within social networks that often are or have 
been established by sharing religious ties. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we singled out whether religion impacts milk transaction flows. Taking a milk producer 
perspective, we tried to uncover what buyer characteristics are important for producers if they want 
to engage in milk transactions. We investigated this in a controlled environment using a DCE. We 
find that on average, milk producers do not reveal significant preferences for co-religious buyers. 
Yet, we observe significant preference heterogeneity around this attribute. This implies that some 
producers have strong preferences for the religious affiliation of milk buyers, while others have less 
or no preference.  
In general, our findings do not refute what is expected from theory (i.e. homophily and discriminatory 
practices in the light of informational asymmetries). The results from our experiment should be seen 
as a lower estimate since the choice experiment investigated preferences for milk transactions that 
involve one litre of milk. Future studies are needed to analyse our findings in greater depth. These 
studies would benefit from (1) including sales volumes as an attribute in the experiment to see 
whether religious preferences become more pronounced when larger volumes of milk are involved 
in the transactions and (2) from repeating this experiment in different religious settings where 
religious preferences are potentially more at stake. 
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1. Overall summary 
In this dissertation, we examined how the Ethiopian milk system has evolved within a diverse and 
long-standing religious context. Accounting for the impact of socio-cultural factors (of which religion 
is one) on ASF demand and supply patterns is pivotal and therefore deserves more attention from 
policy makers and scholars. We unpacked our general objective in three research questions, that 
each tackle a specific element within the milk system: i.e. milk consumption, milk production and 
output use, and milk transactions. This dissertation is innovative for two reasons: (1) because of the 
topic (religion and the food economy, the focus on Orthodox Christians in a low-income setting, and 
the focus on milk and the larger religious community – so not only Orthodox households) and (2) 
because of the methodological approach, using diverse data sets, study methods, and econometric 
models. Both primary and secondary data were incorporated that were either nationally 
representative or geographically confined (Great Addis and Mekelle city), covering either rural and 
(peri-)urban households or only urban households, and focusing on both milk consuming and 
producing households or only one of both. Three of the five chapters used observational studies with 
surveys, while two other chapters incorporated controlled experiments. Data were analysed using 
linear probability models, linear regression models, cluster analysis, and choice modelling. 
In this dissertation, we analyse the impact of religion thoroughly and in and in-dept manner, so as to 
‘take’ the devil ‘out’ of the detail and ‘put’ God ‘in’ the detail50. We make religion’s influences visible 
in two ways by quantifying the impact of religious fasting rituals on milk consumption, production, 
and output use, but also by detailing if producers and consumers consider the religious affiliation of 
potential milk buyers and suppliers respectively. Although the findings of this dissertation are specific 
to the studied research localities and thus cannot be extrapolated as such, we gained a better 
understanding of how religion affects the Ethiopian milk system. This, not only helps us to address 
voids in the academic literature, but also to formulate more effective interventions in the country that 
aim at developing the dairy sector, and improving food security and nutritional outcomes.  
We also gained more insight in the urban milk system, due to fieldwork conducted with urban milk 
producers, milk shops, and consumers in Mekelle city. Again, this helps policy makers to better 
support urban milk production systems as well as to help establish (a gender-sensitive) urban dairy 
sector. Moreover, our exploratory findings enrich academic literature that has insufficiently detailed 
urban milk, but also other ASF systems, in developing nations.   
                                               
50 ‘God is in the detail’ is an idiom that conveys the idea that whatever one does, should be done thoroughly 
as details are important. 
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2. Synthesis of research findings 
In what follows, we will synthesize our answers to the research questions. 
To investigate how religion influences milk consumption, we detailed the impact of the presence of 
a religious fasting period (Lent) on household milk intake. Using nationally representative data from 
the LSMS programme, we find that fasting impacts milk intake and sourcing strategies of consumed 
milk, and that these effects are not limited to the Orthodox community. The presence of a long fasting 
period reduces average probability of a household to consume milk, irrespective of which religious 
group a household adheres to, but it is especially so among Orthodox and Muslim households. This 
impact is larger in dominantly Orthodox settings. Furthermore, we observe that for those households 
consuming milk, Orthodox fasting negatively affects milk purchase intention among all households 
in dominantly Orthodox localities. This suggests that, due to repeating fasting spells, local dairy 
market development in dominantly Orthodox settings has been hampered. It seems that the practice 
of fasting thus affects milk consumption in two ways. First, consumption is directly affected by fasting 
as Orthodox consumers are not allowed to drink milk or eat milk products during fasting periods. 
Second, fasting impacts the availability of dairy produce, especially in dominantly Orthodox areas, 
where less milk can be acquired from the markets during fasting which reduces milk intake among 
non-Orthodox households.  
Since fasting periods are spread throughout the year, with long fasting spells in February-March (55 
days), July (10-40 days), August (16 days), and December-January (40 days), fasting causes 
significant dairy demand seasonality, which adversely affects milk production systems, an effect we 
detailed for two dominantly Orthodox localities. Using data from 870 milk producing households in 
the commercially-oriented Great Addis milk shed, we study the impact of the presence of a long 
fasting season on milk production, marketing, and consumption. We find that producers adopt 
different strategies to cope with long Orthodox fasting seasons, and that these strategies vary with 
farmer’s market access, which we proxy by remoteness. We find that remote farmers mainly rely on 
reducing the production of milk by their dairy herd during long fasting periods. The milk that is still 
produced by these households is processed or channelled to their young children. As a result, these 
households sell and consume significantly smaller quantities of liquid milk during fasting periods. 
The intake of milk by their youngest children is not affected by the presence of a long fasting period. 
Liquid milk sale opportunities of non-remote farmers on the other hand are significantly less affected 
by long fasting periods. But we observe considerable heterogeneity among these farmers in their 
ability to maintain milk sales during fasting seasons. Some of these farmers seemingly benefit from 
being better connected to buyers that continue purchasing milk during fasting periods. As a result, 
non-remote farmers, on average, do not reduce the total production of milk at their farms significantly. 
Yet, to compensate for (some) forgone market opportunities during fasting, these farmers process a 
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significantly larger share of the produced milk during fasting and they feed significantly more milk to 
their young children. As opposite to remote farmers, consumption volumes of liquid and processed 
milk in non-remote households are not affected by long fasting seasons. 
Intrigued by these findings, we wondered how milk production systems have evolved in settings 
where almost exclusively Orthodox Christians reside (over 95%), i.e. in the Mekelle milk shed, an 
area that has barely been studied. We interviewed milk producing households within the city of 
Mekelle, where the milk market is mostly developed. Aligning milk production with fasting periods is 
not widespread in the city, and if practiced, only at best partially solves the demand-supply mismatch. 
All the dairy farmers we interviewed, were Orthodox Christians and less than 5% of the milk they 
produce is consumed within the households (by children and elderly mostly) both within and outside 
fasting periods. These households thus mainly rely on milk processing and continued milk sales to 
overcome fasting events, yet significant variability exists in the importance of these adaptation 
strategies among farms. We therefore clustered farms in five groups, that differed on three important 
dimensions: input efficiency, market integration and resilience towards demand seasonality. Here 
we summarize the main findings to illustrate how farms have adjusted to periods of reduced milk 
demand.  
Farmers from only three out of the five milk producing clusters we found, manage to sell about half 
of their milk output during Orthodox fasting, with one group selling up to 70% of the produced milk. 
This latter group, which we named established, output-efficient farms, shows to be best integrated 
in the market with stable and remunerative milk prices regardless of fasting periods. Members from 
another cluster, processing farms, completely rely on milk processing to overcome fasting events, 
with on average 96% of the produced milk being processed. Yet another group of farmers, the young 
male entrepreneurs, hardly consume, sell nor process milk during fasting. Produced milk is thus 
largely spoiled in these farms during fasting events. Among all groups, we see that farmers barely 
process milk during non-fasting periods. Traditional milk processing carried out at household level is 
labour-intense and time-consuming. Furthermore, the conversion of milk is inefficient. This limits the 
opportunity of value addition opportunity for processing significantly. One could thus argue that 
traditional processing in Ethiopia is so widespread because of Orthodox fasting rituals that are 
practiced by a majority of the population51. Only during Orthodox fasting, when milk demand drops, 
processing of milk into butter and other processed milk products might be interesting for urban 
farmers as it increases the shelf life of milk and thus allows to bridge the fasting period. Furthermore, 
in Mekelle city, we observed that the processed milk products are hardly sold, but mostly consumed 
                                               
51 Of course, in more remote areas, processing is widely practiced to mitigate for poorly functioning or absent 
milk markets [470]. 
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by the households themselves. Only farmers of two clusters sell excess butter. This all suggests that 
processing seems to be mainly consumption stabilizing rather than a sales stabilizing strategy. 
Fasting rituals undeniably impact both milk consumption and production as shown above. We 
showed how Orthodox fasting rituals create considerable market inefficiencies especially in 
dominantly Orthodox settings. Particularly Muslim households seem to be affected in these settings, 
more than Protestant households. As markets dissolve in dominantly Orthodox settings, we would 
expect that both milk intake of both Protestant and Muslim households is equally affected by fasting. 
Yet, this is not what we observe. A tentative explanation for these findings could be that the spill-
over of social norms (in this case respecting the Orthodox fasting) is stronger for non-Christian 
groups, in our case Muslims. Protestants, who belong to the broad class of Christianity, show higher 
interpersonal similarity with the Orthodox community and thus the social distance between both 
groups is smaller compared to the distance between Orthodox Christians and Muslims. A vast body 
of literature on in- and out-group interactions has assessed differential attitude/behaviour/treatment 
of one group vis-à-vis the other group. These studies implicitly consider the out-group to be 
homogenously composed. We argue that considerable heterogeneity exists within the out-group, 
especially in terms of social distance and literature has shown that social distance affects judgments 
and behaviour towards others. In our research, we purposely investigate how the practice of fasting 
within the Orthodox community, which in this case could be considered the in-group, affects three 
different out-groups (i.e. Protestants, Muslims, and other religions). Yet, the limitations of our 
datasets do not allow us to investigate the social norm channel in further detail.  
Besides the spilling over of social norms, it is also possible that market inefficiencies arise from 
coordination problems between different religious groups, which affects the willingness to trade 
among each other. We thus investigated whether the religious affiliation of potential trading partners 
affect trading preferences of both milk producers and milk consumers. Particularly, we have studied 
if sharing religious ties, by being member of the same religious group, facilitates or inhibits milk 
exchange.  
When evaluating trading preferences among milk consumers, we observe clear preferences for milk 
prices, proximity of milk suppliers and type of milk suppliers, while the religious affiliation of milk 
suppliers is no decisive factor, on average, when consumers choose from whom to buy milk. Yet, 
we observe low attendance rates for this attribute, which could explain why we do not find dominant 
preferences for this attribute. Since liquid milk is typically traded in spot market transactions and 
almost daily purchases of small quantities, consumers can easily shift to other suppliers if they are 
not satisfied. This flexibility could explain why not all consumers pay attention to the religious 
background of suppliers, but rather focus on characteristics they value more, which seem to be the 
type of supplier, proximity of the supplier, and milk prices. When we accounted for attribute non-
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attendance, we observe that part of the consumers does take religion into account when deciding to 
engage in hypothetical milk transactions and they tend to self-select to co-religious suppliers. These 
consumers are willing to pay more or walk further to find a co-religious supplier but this extra price 
and effort is smaller than what consumers are willing to pay more or walk further to buy milk from 
milk producing households. For milk producers, we find that, on average, they do not reveal 
significant preferences for co-religious buyers. Yet, we observe significant preference heterogeneity 
around this attribute. This implies that some producers have strong preferences for the religious 
affiliation of milk buyers, while others have less or no preference. More research is needed to repeat 
our experiment and validate our findings, but overall we seem to find evidence that religious 
segmentation might be at stake in the Ethiopian milk market.
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Take home message box 
How does religion influence milk consumption? 
Orthodox fasting reduces milk intake at household level not only among practicing Orthodox 
households but also among non-Orthodox households in dominantly Orthodox settings. In milk 
producing households living in the dominantly Orthodox Great Addis milk shed, young children seem 
to benefit from Orthodox fasting who get excess milk allocated.  
How does religion affect milk production and output use?  
Milk producing households in dominantly Orthodox settings have adapted to periods of reduced milk 
demand by (1) aligning milk production at the farm with fasting periods, (2) by increasingly 
channelling produced milk to their youngest children, and (3) by expanding their milk processing 
activities. The importance of each of these strategies depend on market accessibility and the density 
of Orthodox Christians. 
Does religion interfere with milk transactions? 
Not only do Orthodox fasting periods affect milk consumption, production, and output use, we find 
evidence that religion also impacts milk transactions. Our findings point to religious segmentation in 
the Ethiopian milk market. The impact is most outspoken for milk consumers, where we find that a 
large group of consumers consider the religious affiliation of potential milk sellers when deciding 
from whom to buy milk. These consumers (in)consciously self-select to co-religious suppliers. Milk 
producers on the other hand do not directly discriminate against the religious affiliation of potential 
buyers on average. Yet, we find significant preference heterogeneity around this attribute, which 
suggests that some producers do show strong preferences for the religious affiliation of potential 
buyers, while others have less or no preference.  More research is needed to validate our findings.
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3. Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to literature in various ways. We cast light on the role of religion in food 
system development, a research area that has been vastly understudied. We study this in Ethiopia, 
a low-income country, and focus on a large, yet neglected, group of Orthodox Christians. This 
opposes previous studies that focused merely on high-income countries and Islamic beliefs and 
practices (notably Ramadan). This dissertation takes a comprehensive approach, and focuses on 
three elements of the milk system, that are intertwined and can therefore not be studied separately: 
consumption, production, and transactions. The focus on a non-conventional product (milk) is also 
opposite to earlier investigations that have targeted meat and substances. Furthermore, we detail 
the wider societal impact of the Orthodox religion, by focusing also on non-Orthodox households. 
For the first two elements, milk consumption and production, we focus on religious rituals, (fasting 
practices) and how these cause significant dairy demand seasonality that impacts dairy production. 
We are the first to quantify these effects in detail in the context of Ethiopia. We do so at several 
levels: (1) at the national level, (2) within the most developed dairy hub of Ethiopia (the Great Addis 
milk shed) hosting an Orthodox majority, and (3) for an almost exclusive Orthodox and urban setting 
(Mekelle city). Including this urban perspective is new and a black box within academic literature. 
This dissertation thus allows to get a better understanding of the divergent ways in which dairy 
producers manage their production systems within a city, and how markets have developed in these 
areas.  
Additionally, we investigate how religion, as a part of one’s identity, interferes with milk transaction 
preferences of both producers and consumers. We study this using choice experiments applied to 
individuals rather than the more commonly used way of assessing preferences among products, 
services, or programmes – an innovative approach. The prevalence of market exchange preferences 
based on shared membership within a social group and potential market segmentation that might 
result from such preferences, has received little scholarly attention so far, which is another gap we 
address.  
Furthermore, we are the first that tried to gain insight in exact adherence to fasting practices in 
Ethiopia as well as the intensity of belief (i.e. religiosity). We have studied exact adherence and 
religiosity in two different settings, yet both hosting an Orthodox majority: the Great Addis area and 
Mekelle city. Detailing fasting adherence at household member level in the Addis area revealed that 
effective adherence is lower than what has been estimated in literature and varies significantly along 
the different fasting periods. Furthermore, beliefs about the involvement of children in fasting 
practices are less strict than what has been observed in previous studies and imposed by the 
Orthodox Church. Both trends could suggest that individuals have some flexibility to circumvent the 
formal rules of fasting as laid out by the Orthodox doctrine. Yet, there is still a minority group that 
CHAPTER 8 
 
218 
enforces the participation of all, including children, pregnant and lactating women, elderly or severely 
ill people, who are all, in principle, exempt from fasting. Adhering to Orthodox fasting events might 
thus be a choice to some, while it is a must to others. Strict adherence to fasting habits can be the 
result of strong internalization and/or strong external enforcement. The extent of engagement in 
religious practices is thus not only individual-specific, but also context-specific. The individual- and 
context-specificity can be translated in attitudes and social norms respectively [471]. While attitudes 
are internally motivated judgements (e.g. “I think fasting is crucial be a good Orthodox Christian”), 
social norms are beliefs about what other people do and approve (e.g. “People around me fast and 
find it important that others do so also”). Attitudes and social norms might not be aligned, and the 
resulting behaviour of fasting adherence is thus a complex interaction between attitudes and 
prevailing social norms. The degree of fasting adherence is thus context-specific and might vary 
within the country. Therefore, studies should adopt a case-based approach when evaluating the 
impact of fasting in different localities, as did this dissertation.
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4. Implications  
In what follows, we will conceptualize the implications of our research findings. More specifically, we 
will use the demand and supply framework to the sketch the effect of Orthodox fasting on the market 
of liquid milk in three different settings we studied: i.e. rural dominantly Orthodox Great Addis, urban 
dominantly Orthodox Great Addis and urban dominantly Orthodox Mekelle. As mentioned above, 
our results show that the impact of fasting is highly context specific, especially because milk markets 
are highly localized in nature in the country.  
Demand and supply models are useful to explain prices and quantities traded in market exchanges. 
The demand curve visualizes the highest price consumers are willing to pay for a certain quantity 
and the highest quantity consumers are willing and able to buy at a given price. Supply curves 
represent the lowest price producers are willing to accept for a certain quantity and the highest 
quantity producers are willing to provide at a given price. This price should at least cover the cost of 
producing an additional unit of milk. The intersection of the demand and supply curve determine the 
equilibrium price and quantity. At the same time, demand and supply curves may shift due to 
changes in consumption, production, and market conditions. Of interest in our study is obviously the 
impacts of shift on the market equilibrium induced by fasting. In our figures, PNF and QNF denote the 
equilibrium price and quantity of liquid milk in non-fasting periods, while equilibrium price and quantity 
change to PF and QF during fasting periods. 
Price elasticity of demand and supply varies significantly in our three study areas (Figure 8-1). 
Demand is rather inelastic in rural areas as rural households who consume milk predominantly 
source this milk from own production as shown by Abegaz et al. [8]. Therefore, these households 
will be less sensitive to changes in market prices for milk. Demand is more elastic in urban areas 
given the greater dependence on the market to satisfy household milk needs [8]. Milk demand in 
urban Mekelle is more inelastic as compared to milk demand in urban Great Addis, given the larger 
concentration of Orthodox Christians in Mekelle city. In Chapter 3, we observed that the more 
dominant the Orthodox community is in a particular setting, the less likely households are to 
consume milk and the less likely they are to source consumed milk from the market. Supply on the 
other hand, is assumed to be very elastic in urban Great Addis, as we observed that prices changes 
seem not to affect the milk sales volumes of non-remote farmers significantly (Chapter 4). Aggregate 
supply can easily adjust because of the numerous small-scale specialized production systems in this 
area. Supply in Mekelle is less elastic given the smaller number of specialized production systems 
in the city of Mekelle. Supply in rural Great Addis on the other is more inelastic as compared to 
supply in Mekelle, because of the greater importance of home production in rural areas [8]. 
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The impact of fasting is differential across our three study areas, as we observed throughout the 
different chapters (Figure 8-1). First, the downward shift in demand for liquid milk (from DNF to DF) is 
expected to be the largest in rural Great Addis. We found in Chapter 4 that the average intake of 
liquid milk in remote producing households in the Great Addis milk shed drops significantly during 
fasting by nearly 50%. We expect the aggregate demand drop to be even larger, since there are also 
many rural non-producing (Orthodox) households who reduce their intake during fasting. Demand 
shifts in urban areas are expected to be smaller. As such we found that self-reported adherence to 
fasting practices is more strict among remote households as compared to non-remote households 
(Supplementary material Chapter 4). While most of urban households are Orthodox Christian, they 
might still want to purchase milk for their young children who are exempt from fasting. Furthermore, 
in urban settings, milk buyers are more diverse and we have found in Chapter 4 that retailers and 
processors, who are mostly present in urbanized settings in Ethiopia, are the most important buyers 
who keep on purchasing milk from non-remote farmers during fasting periods. Urban milk buyers are 
thus more likely to keep on sourcing milk from the market as compared to rural milk buyers during 
fasting periods, explaining the smaller shift in demand in urban areas. Yet, in Mekelle city, we expect 
to observe a larger drop in demand during fasting given the higher concentration of Orthodox 
Christian households and because fewer retailers and processors are present in the city as 
compared to the well-established market of Addis Ababa. 
Likewise, fasting also affects the supply of liquid milk. Our findings in Chapter 4 showed that remote 
milk producing households cut down their milk production volumes by 60% during fasting periods, 
explaining the large drop in supply (from SNF to SF) in this area. Producers in Mekelle city and urban 
Great Addis on the other hand align their milk production output much less with fasting periods as 
observed in Chapter 5 and 4 respectively. Urban producers in Great Addis did not significantly 
reduce their milk sales volumes (Chapter 4) while producers in Mekelle increasingly process milk to 
more storable products during fasting (see Chapter 5) because market opportunities for milk are 
more reduced in Mekelle city during fasting as compared to urban Great Addis. This explains the 
larger shift of supply observed in Mekelle as compared to urban Great Addis. 
The impact of fasting on the market equilibria in our three study areas are as expected. Price swings 
of liquid milk are the largest in Mekelle and have been shown to drop by about 25% (Chapter 5). 
Prices in remote and non-remote areas of Great Addis decrease much less (by 6% and 2% 
respectively (Chapter 4)). Likewise, the fluctuation in the volume of liquid milk traded between fasting 
and non-fasting periods is larger in rural areas as compared to urban areas, and larger in Mekelle 
city than urban Great Addis – the reason for this latter observation being the larger drop both in 
demand and supply of liquid milk in Mekelle.  
Conclusion 
  
221 
 
Figure 8-1: Illustrating the impact of fasting on the market of liquid milk in the three study areas of 
this dissertation using the demand and supply framework  
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5. Recommendations  
5.1. How to limit the impact of Orthodox fasting on the Ethiopian milk system? 
From the demand and supply framework above, we observe that fasting impacts the volumes of milk 
being marketed, mostly by its impact on the demand of milk. The limited impact of fasting on milk 
prices is because the downward shifts in demand are compensated for by a reduction in the supply 
of liquid milk. Fasting thus reduces the availability of liquid milk in the market. One could argue that 
prices of liquid milk are kept artificially high during fasting seasons, while price drops would be 
beneficial to low-income households. Yet, producers, but also other supply chain actors, try to limit 
the impact of fasting on their revenues. It seems that farmers reduce the amount of milk being 
marketed as a result of the anticipated drop in milk demand observed during fasting periods. Only in 
urban Great Addis we found that producers close to the market of Addis Ababa are not significantly 
reducing milk sales because (mostly) large buyers (retailers and processors) keep sourcing milk 
during fasting periods. van der Valk and Tessema [243] report anectodical evidence that some of 
these buyers continue to source milk during fasting to maintain buyer-seller relationships, even if 
that entails that these buyers have to throw away the milk. 
Our results invite the policy question of how to mitigate the impact of Orthodox fasting on the 
Ethiopian milk system. We will propose soft measures, in the belief that hard measures (i.e. 
prohibition of religious fasting rituals) are not feasible nor desirable. Crucial will be to either reduce 
the demand shifts observed during fasting and/or deal better with demand fluctuations. Keeping up 
milk demand during fasting periods can be achieved in various ways and we will propose a number 
of interventions that ideally are undertaken simultaneously: nutrition awareness creation, school milk 
programmes, and market integration. Important to note here is that these proposed interventions will 
raise overall demand and not just demand during fasting periods. Enhancing and increasing off-farm 
processing facilities, trainings on (artificially) synchronized breeding as well as stimulating the 
formation of farmer groups on the other hand could help producers to deal better with demand 
fluctuations.  
Nutritional awareness creation 
First, it will be important to increase milk consumption of young children as well as pregnant and 
lactating women during fasting through nutritional awareness creation. Although both are officially 
exempt from fasting observance, social norms still force these groups to engage in fasting practices 
with negative repercussions for nutritional and health outcomes. Raising awareness about the 
nutritional benefits of including milk regularly in children’s, and pregnant and lactating women’s diets 
among the practicing Orthodox households will be crucial, but ineffective without a strong 
involvement of religious institutions and leaders in nutritional programmes [214]. In 2016, the United 
States Agency for International Development together with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, 
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developed a sermon guide that clarifies the religious guidelines around fasting practices for children, 
and pregnant and lactating women, and emphasized the need for continued milk consumption 
among these groups during Orthodox fasting seasons [472]. Such initiatives are crucial to alter 
strong societal norms about fasting observance. Nutritional awareness creation has the potential to 
increase milk consumption during fasting seasons in Orthodox households by vulnerable groups 
who are exempt from fasting – not only children, but also pregnant/lactating women, and elderly. It 
is also an important strategy to increase the intake of milk among non-fasting households during 
fasting periods. Yet, such awareness creation will not be sufficient as long as milk remains a luxury 
product. Therefore, further investments are needed to intensify milk production systems and increase 
milk productivity so that more milk becomes available at lower prices. Only when prices of milk lower, 
milk will become more accessible to household members that are currently not prioritized when it 
comes to milk intake. If prices lower, it will be important to improve the milk market functioning so 
that producer incomes can be guaranteed. 
Guaranteed market outlets during fasting 
Second, establishing guaranteed market outlets that ensure continued demand for milk even during 
fasting periods is called for. We disentangle two potential markets: school milk programmes and 
increasingly channelling milk to areas where fewer Orthodox Christians reside. Penetrating markets 
where the effect of fasting is less present, could be an important strategy. Preferably, these markets 
are located within the country so as to further integrate the national milk market. But market 
integration needs investment in transportation and distribution systems (e.g. cooled transport, the 
establishment of collection centres etc.). The government could play a role here by providing (better) 
public infrastructure (e.g. roads). More guaranteed market outlets would reduce the need to align 
milk production with fasting periods. Yet, it will be important to keep in mind that milk producing 
households now allocate excess milk to children due to lack of marketing opportunities during fasting. 
It is unclear if these producing households would still allocate more milk to their children during 
fasting periods, if there would be alternative market outlets available. To avoid such a practice, 
nutritional education is recommended.  
Since children below the age of seven are exempt from fasting, school milk programmes could be 
very effective not only to lower the demand-supply mismatch during Orthodox fasting, but also to 
improve food security and adequate nutrition among children. In Ethiopia, annual School Milk Days 
are celebrated since 2000, and subsidized by the United States Agency for International 
Development and the U.S. Feed the Future Initiative for food security and nutrition. The aim of these 
School Milk Days is to raise awareness and knowledge about the importance of milk for nutrition 
among children, their parents, and teachers, and to encourage government and school officials to 
develop school milk programmes across Ethiopia [473]. Public school milk programmes are as of 
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yet not well established in Ethiopia. Some initiatives exist and are established under aid-funded 
project assistance, but their geographical scope is rather limited. While such assistance is very 
useful, it is finite and difficult to sustain. To make such programmes sustainable, they should be 
subsidized by the industry, the government, or both. In many countries, school milk programmes 
have been shown to promote the growth of the national dairy sector [474].  
Investing in off-farm processing facilities 
Third, besides creating alternative market outlets, increased diversification of liquid milk into milk 
products so as to structurally raise the shelf life of milk, will also be important to bridge slack periods 
in milk demand both in the informal and formal chain. Public and private investments to support and 
expand off-farm processing facilities would help farmers to continue selling milk during fasting spells, 
without requiring these farmers to specialize and invest in home-processing activities which are time- 
and input-inefficient and do not create substantial value addition [13, 236]. This need has been 
recognized in the Livestock Master Plan of the Ethiopian government of 2015. What is important 
here is that processing should be seen as a way to overcome periods of reduced milk demand, rather 
than only as a tool to achieve price differentiation so as to avoid that prices for processed milk 
products do not become too high, making these products less affordable. Demand for processed 
milk products is high in Ethiopia and processed milk products account for 52.2 percent of the total 
consumption of dairy products [8]. While increased processing might help producers to overcome 
periods of slack demand, processors themselves are also confronted with demand seasonality. 
Therefore, nutritional awareness creation is needed to increase consumption of processed milk both 
during and outside fasting periods, as well as market integration to transport the milk to areas where 
fasting is less prevalent. Further investments in proper storage and conservation facilities are also 
needed so that milk products can be stored at low costs over longer time periods without quality 
reduction. 
Aiming at gradually modernizing the informal milk system will be crucial, not solely because of the 
employment opportunities it creates, but also because this system includes many women, small-
scale producers and operators in Ethiopia. Expanding the processing infrastructure will contribute to 
a continued demand of liquid milk during fasting periods, while simultaneously lowering the prices 
for liquid milk during fasting periods, making it more accessible and affordable for lower-income 
households. To date, processing is largely small-scale using traditional methods that are time- and 
output inefficient. Traditionally processed milk products are usually intended for home consumption 
and only excess products, mainly butter, end up in the market. Home processing could be reduced 
with the expansion of small-scale processing units that efficiently bulk milk from individual farmers. 
Moreover, such units could try to create a branded assortment of traditional products for local 
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markets. Upgrading of traditional processing techniques will be crucial to improve output efficiency, 
hygiene, quality, and marketing potential [243].  
Besides these small-scale processing units, formal processing could also be stimulated. About 40 
formal and industrial-scale milk processors are now operating in the country (yet often below their 
optimal capacity), and these are located principally around Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian government 
should thus promote and incentivize private investors to expand this processing infrastructure, one 
of their ambition as laid out in the Livestock Master Plan of 2015 [266]. It will be important that these 
industrial-scale processors focus on supplying milk products that take into account consumer 
preferences. Research has shown that consumers, even when their income increases, still prefer 
liquid and processed milk offered by informal supply chains over those that are sold in modern retail 
outlets because of the perceived better quality (freshness and better flavour particularly) [257]. 
Another important aspect will be to keep prices for milk low, as milk is still a luxury product that 
cannot be consumed regularly. Milk products marketed in the formal value chain are still more 
expensive compared to those available in traditional market outlets (see Chapter 2). The Ethiopian 
government is making large investments to raise productivity and milk output in the country, which 
will help to push down prices for milk [266]. Yet, further actions will be needed to reduce prices, 
increase the competitiveness of the formal dairy sector, but also solve the inefficient logistics that 
link producers and processors. Furthermore, another problem industrial-scale processors face is the 
lack of long-term commitment from milk producers. In periods of abundant demand and milk 
shortage, e.g. during the religious feast of Easter in April-May, producers can choose to whom they 
sell their milk to, and anecdotical evidence has shown that producers default on agreements made 
with milk processors and pursue higher milk prices. On the contrary, when demand is low and when 
there is an oversupply of milk, especially during Orthodox fasting periods, power dynamics shift and 
processors can decide from whom to buy milk and farmers report that processors stop sourcing milk 
during fasting or reject milk because of milk quality reasons [243]. This cyclical power dynamic arises 
as contracts are rarely enforceable. Therefore, further efforts are needed to make these contracts 
enforceable but more interestingly is that producers and processors make better contracts with 
processors offering continued purchase of milk (even at lower prices to compensate for the extra 
costs processors incur to store dairy products during the fasting season), while farmers in return 
ensure a stable supply of milk. To further reduce supply seasonality, farmer groups could play a key 
role in assembling larger and more stable volumes of milk. Furthermore, processors could try to tie 
producers by providing extra benefits, e.g. by delivering (improved) dairy inputs, a common practice 
now among traders in rural areas. Such a strategy could increase vertical collaboration in the chain, 
which is now almost completely lacking [243].  
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Strengthening individual farmers 
The interventions summarized above (nutritional awareness creation, school milk programmes, 
market integration and enhancing and increasing off-farm processing facilities) will take time to help 
farmers cope better with demand swings observed during fasting periods. Therefore, also producing 
households should be supported to help them cope better with fasting periods. As such, trainings on 
(artificially) synchronized breeding could be an important strategy, especially during the Lent fast, 
which coincides with the dry season in Ethiopia. Furthermore, distributing improved processing 
technologies so as to increase the efficiency of home-processing of milk could also be a good 
strategy. Further stimulating the formation of farmer groups could also be an effective way to reduce 
transaction costs and facilitate market integration of farmers both during and outside fasting periods. 
Furthermore, these groups could jointly invest in small-scale processing facilities and product 
differentiation. Making farmers more resilient towards demand seasonality will incentivize them to 
further invest in their dairy farm and structurally raise milk productivity and input efficiency. This can 
also be concluded from our findings in Chapter 552.   
                                               
52 In Chapter 5, we found that farmers in cluster 5, which we termed the established output-input-efficient 
farms, are fairly good integrating in the market and have a diverse buyer pool which allows them to keep on 
selling part of their milk production during fasting while simultaneously fetching relatively good prices for their 
milk. This good market integration could explain why these farmers are investing in their farms and are trying 
to increase their input efficiency (by feeding more diverse diets to their herd, using hay instead of crop residues 
and adding salt to the diet). 
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5.2. Religious ties and urban agriculture 
Besides studying the impact of Orthodox fasting on the Ethiopian milk system, we also investigated 
how religion interferes with milk market transactions. We find evidence that religious segmentation 
might be at stake in the Ethiopian milk market. We anticipate that with the expansion of the formal 
value chain, that involves an increasing number of actors, anonymized trade will prevail much more, 
reducing the importance of shared group membership for milk market exchange. Furthermore, if 
quality standards are enforced more using formal mechanisms that consumers can trust, consumers 
will tend to resort less to arm-length trade with co-religious milk suppliers. Moreover, as the law of 
contract is likely to be enforced in the future, this also reduces the need for milk producers to readily 
screen for reliable milk buyers. 
Yet, with increasing inter-religious tensions between Muslims and Christians in the country, it is 
possible that consumer boycotts or buycotts might arise, which could lead to effective and strong 
market segmentations [223]. Religion-driven boy- or buycotts can be highly persistent and damaging, 
especially in contexts where people are highly religious and when these campaigns are supported 
by religious leaders [414, 415]. Such boy- or buycotts can easily spread throughout the country, 
because of the support of fellow religious group members [416]. Examples of religiously inspired 
boycotts are the boycott against import of Danish products by several Muslim dominated countries 
(among which Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates) in the aftermath of a series of cartoons 
published by a Danish newspaper in 2005 that negatively depicted the Islamic prophet Muhammed 
[417] and the Buddhists’ boycott against Muslim businesses in Myanmar because of religious 
tensions between both groups [418]. In Ethiopia, religious boy- or buycotts have not yet occurred (at 
least not at a large scale). With the increasing expansion of a formal value chain, it is also expected 
that the likelihood to have such events will be even lower.  
Finally, it is also important to underscore as well the growth potential of urban livestock farmers as 
well as other actors in the urban (informal) livestock supply chain. Ethiopian diets are increasingly 
diversifying with income growth and urbanization. Urban ASF producers will be key to ensure urban 
food security at least in the short term, as poor rural infrastructure still limits the supply of ASFs from 
rural areas to towns and city centres. Policy makers should thus recognize the significance of urban 
livestock production systems and actively support these systems.
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6. Limitations and the way forward 
Religion has revealed itself as a ‘true’ devil in the detail during this dissertation and singling out the 
impact of religion is a laborious and sensitive task that takes time and effort. Survey questions on 
religion – and more specifically religious beliefs and participation in religious practices – might be 
especially prone to social desirability bias. Since we are not able to single out to what extent social 
desirability bias impacts the answers to such questions, we did not use such data as explanatory 
variables in our regression analyses. We rather turned to innovative approaches to overcome social 
desirability biases, which obviously have some shortcomings which we will discuss below.  
First, to study the impact of the occurrence of an official Orthodox fasting period – independent of 
whether or not a household participates – on milk consumption, milk production and milk output use, 
we used two secondary datasets. Even though both datasets are not intended to map the impact of 
fasting, this lack of focus on fasting, proved to be beneficial as it reduces the chance that respondents 
answer milk consumption, production or milk output questions in a socially desirable manner. The 
way in which the surveys were implemented – where part of the recall data collected overlapped with 
two long fasting periods within the Orthodox community – allowed us to construct fasting indicators 
that labelled a household record as fasting if at least part of the recall period for consumption, 
production and/or output use coincided with a long fasting period. Recall periods53 were clearly 
articulated in the studies and asked respondents to indicate consumption in the seven days prior to 
the interview and production and output use in the month prior to the interview. However, it might be 
that farmers are not able to exactly recall the milk amounts they have consumed and/or produced, 
the amounts of processed milk being processed, their sales volumes, and price data. While 
respondents might under- or overreport consumption, production or milk output use, one does not 
expect that the likelihood of misreporting differs across the group of household whose data (partially) 
overlapped with the occurrence of a fasting period versus the group of households where the recall 
period did not overlap (Chapter 3) or overlapped less (Chapter 4) with an official fasting period. Yet, 
we are not able to exactly know the impact of recall biases on the data. We acknowledge this 
limitation.  Furthermore, both datasets include data that are cross-sectional, which implies that the 
households whose data were labelled as fasting are not the same as those households who were 
labelled as non-fasting. The random sampling procedure adopted by the two datasets should avoid 
biases between these two groups. Including household and location controls further reduces 
potential biases as much as possible. Yet, one cannot fully eliminate the presence of biases. 
Therefore, follow-up studies on Orthodox fasting practices should try to focus on a cohort of 
                                               
53 We can expect diaries to suffer less from reporting errors as consumption is able to be recorded soon after 
it occurs. Yet, the extent to which diaries are supervised will remain important to ensure they are filled in 
frequently. There seems to be a trade-off between accuracy and increasing costs for conducting representative 
consumption data. 
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households before, during, and after fasting and use supervised diaries so as to better assess the 
impact of fasting on milk consumption, production, output use as well as nutritional and health 
outcomes. Although cohort data are obviously more detailed than the cross-sectional and recall data 
we used, it might become more complex to control for social desirability bias because of the specific 
timings that these surveys will have to be carried out and the supervision that is required to make 
these diaries data better than the recall data.  
Second, to study the effect of sharing religious ties on milk transactions, we used an innovative 
approach by employing DCEs. Since no data are available on milk transaction details, we had to 
collect our own data. Directly asking respondents to detail their preferences for religious in-group or 
out-group trading partners is not an option, given the likely occurrence of social desirability bias. 
Different approaches exist to collect behavioural data and to simultaneously reduce potential social 
desirability biases such as the use of social desirability scales, inferred valuation techniques, bogus 
pipeline procedures, randomized response and unmatched count techniques, and implicit 
association tests. These methods have often been used in lab experiments, which offer a controlled 
environment. However, their usefulness in a developing context is highly questioned as they often 
require educated subjects and/or technological infrastructure. Game theory is another method that 
is being used for examining human behaviour in social situations of cooperation (e.g. prisoners’ 
dilemmas and public good games), coordination (e.g. stag hunt) and conflict (e.g. zero-sum fames) 
[475]. Experimental economists have been interested in behavioural changes that might occur when 
subjects interact with either in-group or out-group members in games. While games have been 
performed more often in low-income settings, they remain highly hypothetical and do not allow for a 
realistic operationalization of individual choices, especially not in the case of milk transactions. 
Furthermore, games do not allow to determine the decision weight that a respondent places on each 
attribute. Moreover, games might more easily trigger social desirable responding because religion is 
primed more in game settings due to the simplistic set-ups of commonly played games. Therefore, 
we turned to DCEs to elicit and quantify religious preferences. When DCEs are conducted in low-
income settings, it is recommended to augment secondary sources used to define the attributes with 
primary data to ensure that the experiment is tailored to the study setting. During a first data collection 
round in January-February 2016, we interviewed 304 milk producers which allowed us to gain insight 
in their current milk marketing strategies and transaction details. This set the stage to accurately 
determine the most valid attributes in the study area of Mekelle. Also for the set-up of the DCE 
among consumers, various informal discussions with purchasing households informed the selection 
of the attributes. Attributes included for both consumers and producers were checked with a panel 
of local experts and pre-tested with 30 consumers and 30 producers to further finetune the included 
attributes and their associated levels. Still one could question whether the DCEs we constructed are 
the most appropriate tool for measuring religious preferences. Moreover, DCEs display hypothetical 
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preferences and it is still possible that people would react differently in real life. Further studies are 
needed to finetune our design but also to validate our findings by repeating the experiment. As such 
future experiments should include sales volumes as an attribute in the experiment to see whether 
religious preferences become more pronounced when larger volumes of milk are involved in the 
transactions. Furthermore, this experiment should be repeated in different religious settings with 
larger sample sizes so as to better assure that the sampled respondents are accurately representing 
the population. Moreover, future studies could benefit from incentivized decisions, where 
respondents’ decisions are coupled with actual payments, so that the decisions made are a more 
realistic representation of the respondents’ true underlying preferences. 
Finally, the findings of this dissertation are specific to the studied research localities and thus cannot 
be extrapolated as such. We largely focused on urban and dominantly Orthodox settings, studying 
only two of the milk sheds in the country. Furthermore, the impact of fasting was studied for only a 
particular period in the year (December-April). Therefore, it would be good to collect detailed data 
across several locations in the country and repeated observations over time. Moreover, this 
dissertation focused solely on milk producers within the milk supply chain. Yet, it would be interesting 
to study the impact of Orthodox fasting on other supply chain actors in more detail, and particularly 
the processing chain. Our findings hold for the Ethiopian milk system, yet might differ across other 
ASF systems in the country. For meat products, for example, market segmentation will be strong, 
given the different set of livestock slaughtering rituals. Future research should thus tackle other food 
commodities, other religious communities, and other countries so as to get a comprehensive 
overview of the different ways in which religion influences food system development. Although we 
studied the impact of religion in a low-income setting, religious food laws will continue to shape food 
systems worldwide. Future research should therefore further explore how religion can positively 
impact food systems in high-income countries. Tieman [476] has opened this discussion by claiming 
that religious (Jewish, Christian, and Islamic) food laws can provide answers to current issues with 
the industrialized food production as well as consumerism, and can move a society to a more 
sustainable and healthy food system. 
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A. Supplementary material - Chapter 3 
A.1. Table with dependent and independent variables included in the Probit regressions 
Table S3-1: Variables names, definitions and descriptive statistics  
Variable  Definition Mean or proportion  
Dependent variables    
Milk consumption Dummy variable equal to 1 if a household consumed milk in the week prior to the 
interview; 0 otherwise 
0.34 
Consumed milk sourced from purchase Dummy variable equal to 1 if (part of) the milk consumed by the household is 
sourced through purchase; 0 otherwise 
0.40 
Independent variables   
Religious affiliation  Nominal variable equal to 1 if the religious affiliation of the household head is 
Orthodox, 2 for Protestant, 3 for Muslim, and 4 for other religious affiliations (e.g. 
Catholic, Pegan, Wakifata and traditional faiths); we assumed that the religious 
affiliation of the household head corresponds to the prevailing religious 
orientation within a family. 
 
 Proportion Orthodox households 0.50 
 Proportion Protestant households 0.18 
 Proportion Muslim households 0.29 
 Proportion Other households 0.03 
Interview period 
 
As we have no information on whether or not a household participated in the 
Lent fasting, we matched the one-week period of consumption data with the Lent 
period. This resulted in a dummy variable equal to 0 if records reflect 
consumption during non-fasting days, and 1 if (part of) the records were 
collected during fasting days. 
0.34 
EA Orthodox concentration Continuous variable (ranging from 0 to 1) representing the share of Orthodox 
households relative to the other religions at enumeration area-level; this variable 
was calculated by dividing the number of interviewed Orthodox members by the 
total number of religious members (irrespective of religious affiliation), 
accounting for household size. 
0.50 (0.01) 
EA church concentration  Continuous variable (ranging from 0 to 1) representing the share of churches 
relative to the total number of churches and mosques at enumeration area-level 
0.61 (0.01) 
Household controls   
Sex head  Dummy variable equal to 1 if household head is male; 0 otherwise 0.70 
2
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Age head Continuous variable reflecting the age of the household head (years) 44.15 (0.22) 
Marital status head  Dummy variable equal to 1 if household head is married (monogamous or 
polygamous); 0 otherwise 
0.68 
Educational background head  Ordinal variable equal to 0 if household head is illiterate or received 
informal/non-regular education (e.g. Koran education); 1 if household attended 
primary education; 2 for secondary education; and 3 for college/university 
education 
 
 Proportion illiterate or informal education 0.53 
 Proportion primary education 0.28 
 Proportion secondary education 0.14 
 Proportion college/university education 0.06 
Number of young children Continuous variable representing the number of household members less or 
equal to 6 years old  
0.88 (0.01) 
Dummy young children Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has at least one young child; 0 
otherwise 
0.52 
Number of children Continuous variable representing the number of household members between 7 
and 9 years old  
0.45 (0.01) 
Number of elderly  Continuous variable representing the number of household members greater or 
equal to 65 years old  
0.18 (0.01) 
Number of remaining members Continuous variable representing the number of household members greater 
than 9 years and less or equal to 64 years old  
3.31 (0.03) 
Dairy cow herd size Continuous variable representing the number of female cows owned by the 
household and that gave milk during the past 12 months prior to the interview  
0.38 (0.01) 
Dummy dairy cows Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has at least one female cow that 
gave milk during the past 12 months prior to the interview; 0 otherwise 
0.24 
Dairy goat herd size Continuous variable representing the number of female goats owned by the 
household and that gave milk during the past 12 months prior to the interview  
0.20 (0.02) 
Logarithm of income Continuous variable representing the logarithm of the nominal weekly 
consumption of a household. It is used to proxy a household’s living standard. 
The variable is included in the LSMS dataset and is calculated based on the 
consumption from three sources: food, non-food purchases, and education 
expenses (ETB/week) 
5.82 (0.01) 
Credit  Dummy variable equal to 1 if someone within the household borrowed on credit 
during the past year prior to the interview; 0 otherwise 
0.25 
Location controls   
Location  Nominal variable equal to 0 if a household resides in a rural area,1 for urban 
small-town area, and 2 for urban large town area 
 
 Proportion rural 0.63 
 Proportion small town (urban) 0.09 
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 Proportion large town (urban) 0.28 
Region Nominal variable representing the regional state where the household resides  
 Proportion Tigray 0.12 
 Proportion Afar 0.03 
 Proportion Amhara 0.20 
 Proportion Oromia 0.20 
 Proportion Somali 0.06 
 Proportion Benshagul Gumuz 0.02 
 Proportion SNNP 0.23 
 Proportion Gambelia 0.02 
 Proportion Harari 0.03 
 Proportion Addis Ababa 0.06 
 Proportion Diredwa 0.04 
Milk price Continuous variable representing the prevailing milk price for a household. The 
variable was calculated using the approach adopted by LSMS. First, prices were 
calculated for those households that had purchased milk (amount paid/amount 
purchased). Then the price was set as the median price at the lowest 
geographical unit for which there were at least 10 price observations (ETB) 
12.03 (0.03) 
Distance to the nearest market Continuous variable representing the distance of a household to the nearest 
market (in kilometres) 
54.05 (0.70) 
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A.2. Robustness check of Probit regressions 
To test the robustness of our results shown in Table 3-2, we ran an additional Probit regression 
(Table S3-2) that now includes continuous variables for both young children and dairy cows, instead 
of two dummy variables as included in Table 3-2. The results of including two continuous variables 
instead of two dummy variables show to be fairly similar to those reported in Table 3-2.
  
Table S3-2: Results from Probit models modelling the likelihood of a household to have consumed milk in the last seven days prior to the 
interview now including continuous variable for young children and dairy cows 
 Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 3 Probit 4 Probit 5 Probit 6 Probit 7 
        
Religious affiliation (Orthodox Christian omitted)        
Protestant -0.16 (0.18) -0.04 (0.15) -0.07 (0.16) -0.14 (0.17) -0.05 (0.15) -0.09 (0.14) 0.08 (0.08) 
Muslim 0.24 (0.16) 0.34 (0.15)** 0.27 (0.15)* 0.29 (0.16)* 0.32 (0.15)** 0.29 (0.14)** 0.34 (0.08)*** 
Other 0.53 (0.29)* 0.39 (0.23)* 0.37 (0.25) 0.53 (0.28)* 0.37 (0.23) 0.33 (0.21) 0.33 (0.14)** 
Interview period (non-fasting omitted)        
Fasting -0.53 (0.29)** -0.46 (0.23)** -0.39 (0.23)* -0.53 (0.23)** -0.40 (0.23)* -0.50 (0.16)*** -0.21 (0.05)*** 
EA Orthodox concentration -0.36 (0.17)** -0.36 (0.17)** -0.36 (0.17)** -0.35 (0.17)** -0.36 (0.17)** -0.40 (0.15)*** -0.38 (0.10)*** 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period)  
(Orthodox Christian * non-fasting omitted) 
       
Protestant * fasting 0.54 (0.31)* 0.34 (0.27) 0.43 (0.28) 0.50 (0.30)* 0.41 (0.27) 0.54 (0.16)*** - 
Muslim * fasting 0.27 (0.27) 0.10 (0.25) 0.16 (0.25) 0.27 (0.26) 0.17 (0.25) 0.27 (0.16)* - 
Other * fasting -0.39 (0.64) 0.63 (0.43) -0.03 (0.56) 0.26 (0.54) 0.68 (0.43) 0.80 (0.30)*** - 
Interaction (religious affiliation * EA Orthodox 
concentration) (Orthodox Christian omitted) 
(Orthodox Christian omitted) 
       
Protestant * EA Orthodox concentration -0.02 (0.30) -0.08 (0.30) -0.03 (0.30) -0.05 (0.30) -0.06 (0.30) 0.04 (0.24) - 
Muslim * EA Orthodox concentration -0.15 (0.29) -0.19 (0.29) -0.12 (0.29) -0.21 (0.29) -0.17 (0.29) -0.11 (0.23) - 
Other * EA Orthodox concentration -1.16 (0.60)* -1.17 (0.60)* -1.16 (0.60)* -1.19 (0.60)** -1.17 (0.60)* -1.09 (0.46)** - 
Interaction (interview period * EA Orthodox concentration)  
(non-fasting omitted) 
       
Fasting * EA Orthodox concentration 0.04 (0.27) 0.05 (0.27) 0.12 (0.27) -0.03 (0.27) 0.06 (0.27) 0.18 (0.18) - 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period * EA 
Orthodox concentration)  
(Orthodox Christian * non-fasting omitted) 
       
Protestant * fasting * EA Orthodox concentration 0.29 (0.50) 0.37 (0.48) 0.18 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49) 0.27 (0.48) - - 
Muslim * fasting * EA Orthodox concentration 0.22 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.13 (0.43) 0.28 (0.43) 0.18 (0.42) - - 
Other * fasting * EA Orthodox concentration 1.40 (1.07) 0.27 (0.93) 1.11 (1.05) 0.61 (0.97) 0.22 (0.93) - - 
Number of young children  0.00 (0.04) 0.05 (0.03)* 0.09 (0.02)*** 0.01 (0.04) 0.09 (0.02)*** 0.09 (0.02)*** 0.09 (0.02)*** 
Interaction (interview period * number of young children)  
(non-fasting omitted) 
 
0.32 (0.07)** 0.15 (0.05)*** - 0.28 (0.07)*** - - - 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period * number 
of young children) (Orthodox Christian omitted) 
      (Orthodox Christian omitted) 
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Protestant * non-fasting 0.11 (0.07) - - 0.11 (0.07) - - - 
Protestant * fasting -0.18 (0.11)* - - -0.14 (0.10) - - - 
Muslim * non-fasting 0.06 (0.06) - - 0.06 (0.06) - - - 
Muslim * fasting -0.24 (0.09)*** - - -0.20 (0.09)** - - - 
Other * non-fasting -0.09 (0.14) - - -0.09 (0.14) - - - 
Other * fasting 0.09 (0.30) - - 0.12 (0.26) - - - 
Dairy cow herd size 1.69 (0.27)*** 1.81 (0.26)*** 1.66 (0.27)*** 1.83 (0.26)*** 1.80 (0.26)*** 1.79 (0.26)*** 1.82 (0.26)*** 
Interaction (interview period * dairy cow herd size)  
(non-fasting omitted) 
 
-0.22 (0.08)*** -0.12 (0.06)** -0.15 (0.08)** - - - - 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period * dairy 
cow herd size) (Orthodox Christian omitted) 
       
Protestant * non-fasting * dairy cow herd size 0.00 (0.08) - 0.02 (0.08) - - - - 
Protestant * fasting * dairy cow herd size 0.14 (0.16) - 0.12 (0.15) - - - - 
Muslim * non-fasting * dairy cow herd size 0.13 (0.10) - 0.14 (0.10) - - - - 
Muslim * fasting * dairy cow herd size 0.29 (0.12)** - 0.24 (0.12)** - - - - 
Other * non-fasting * dairy cow herd size -0.04 (0.20) - -0.03 (0.20) - - - - 
Other * fasting * dairy cow herd size 1.62 (0.72)** - 1.63 (0.72)** - - - - 
        
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
n 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 
Log likelihood -2,353.46 -2,366.21 -2,364.88 -2,363.55 -2,372.85 -2,373.05 -2,384.68 
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 
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Additionally, we ran more extended models for Probit regression modelling the likelihood of a 
household to consume milk. First of all, we ran additional models using church density instead of 
Orthodox density, to approximate the dominance of Christian congregations in each EA. Other 
important additions were the inclusion of extra control variables for household characteristics (e.g. 
age squared of the household head, the interaction term of age and gender of the household head, 
a more detailed categorization of household composition where we split out young children in infants 
below the age of 1 and children between 1 and 6 years old, and whether or not a household took 
credit in the past year) and location characteristics (e.g. the interaction term of region and milking 
cow herd size, the distance of a household’s residence to the nearest market, the interaction term of 
distance to the market and milking cow herd size, and the three way interaction between location, 
milk price and milking cow herd size). The regression results can be found in the tables below. 
Generally, we observe that the inclusion of church concentration (Tables S3-4) yields more 
significant effects than when accounting for the density of Orthodox Christians in an EA (Tables S3-
3). The church density variable represents all possible Christian congregations rather than only the 
Orthodox community. We thus observe that in dominantly Christian settings, the impact of religion 
on milk intake decisions is bigger. Furthermore, we see that our results remain fairly robust when 
incorporating extra control variables, although the effects become smaller. Firstly, Muslim 
households are more likely to consume milk compared to Orthodox households. Secondly, Orthodox 
fasting reduces the likelihood to consume milk, irrespective of the religious group (in Table S3-3 the 
p value is 0.131). This effect is especially strong for Orthodox households suggested by the negative 
interaction between Orthodox affiliation, fasting, and milking cow herd size. The impact of Orthodox 
fasting is also bigger for the Muslim community as compared to the Protestant households. 
Furthermore, we observe that an increasing density of Orthodox Christians and churches negatively 
impacts milk intake decisions, ceteris paribus. This effect, however, is dependent on the interview 
period and the religious affiliation of the household. Whereas an increasing density of Orthodox 
Christians reduces milk intake for all religious groups both during fasting and non-fasting periods 
(Table S3-3), the impact of church concentration is mixed (Table S3-4). As such, we observe that 
an increasing church concentration barely affects milk intake decisions of Orthodox households 
during fasting. Protestant households are increasingly likely to consume milk during non-Orthodox 
fasting periods with rising church concentration but an opposite trend is observed during fasting. 
Muslim households consume significantly less milk during with increasing church density irrespective 
whether it is an Orthodox fasting or non-fasting period. 
  
Table S3-3: Results from the extended Probit models modelling the likelihood of a household to consume milk accounting for the density of Orthodox 
Christians in an enumeration area 
 Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 3 Probit 4 Probit 5 Probit 6 Probit 7 
Religious affiliation (Orthodox Christian omitted)         
Protestant 0.24 (0.07)*** 0.07 (0.08) 0.07 (0.13) 0.07 (0.08) -0.08 (0.14) -0.04 (0.15) -0.08 (0.16) 
Muslim 0.54 (0.06)*** 0.50 (0.07)*** 0.36 (0.13)*** 0.34 (0.08)*** 0.31 (0.14)** 0.34 (0.15)** 0.34 (0.16)** 
Other 0.45 (0.13)*** 0.26 (0.16) 0.54 (0.20)*** 0.30 (0.14)** 0.34 (0.21) 0.38 (0.23) 0.36 (0.25) 
Interview period (non-fasting omitted)        
Fasting - -0.35 (0.07)*** - -0.21 (0.05)*** -0.45 (0.16)*** -0.36 (0.23) -0.34 (0.23) 
EA Orthodox concentration - - -0.37 (0.14)*** -0.39 (0.10)*** -0.37 (0.15)** -0.33 (0.17)** -0.35 (0.17)** 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period)  
(Orthodox Christian * non-fasting omitted) 
       
Protestant * fasting - 0.45 (0.12)*** - - 0.53 (0.16)*** 0.41 (0.27) 0.46 (0.28) 
Muslim * fasting - 0.11 (0.11) - - 0.23 (0.16) 0.12 (0.25) 0.13 (0.25) 
Other * fasting - 0.56 (0.28)** - - 0.79 (0.30)*** 0.67 (0.43) -0.00 (0.56) 
Interaction (religious affiliation * EA Orthodox concentration) 
(Orthodox Christian omitted) 
       
Protestant * EA Orthodox concentration - - 0.14 (0.24) - 0.01 (0.24) -0.06 (0.30) -0.00 (0.30) 
Muslim * EA Orthodox concentration - - -0.09 (0.23) - -0.12 (0.23) -0.20 (0.29) -0.17 (0.29) 
Other * EA Orthodox concentration - - -0.93 (0.45)** - -1.14 (0.46)** -1.23 (0.60)** -1.18 (0.60)* 
Interaction (interview period * EA Orthodox concentration)  
(non-fasting omitted) 
       
Fasting * EA Orthodox concentration  - - - - 0.10 (0.18) -0.01 (0.27) 0.06 (0.27) 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period * EA Orthodox 
concentration) (Orthodox Christian * non-fasting omitted) 
       
Protestant * fasting * EA Orthodox concentration - - - - - 0.20 (0.48) 0.09 (0.49) 
Muslim * fasting * EA Orthodox concentration - - - - - 0.20 (0.43) 0.13 (0.43) 
Other * fasting * EA Orthodox concentration - - - - - 0.22 (0.93) 1.05 (1.04) 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period * milking cow herd 
size) (Orthodox Christian * non-fasting omitted) 
       
Orthodox Christian * fasting * milking cow herd size - - - - - - -0.18 (0.08)** 
Protestant * non-fasting * milking cow herd size - - - - - - 0.04 (0.11) 
Protestant * fasting * milking cow herd size - - - - - - -0.07 (0.16) 
Muslim * non-fasting * milking cow herd size - - - - - - -0.04 (0.11) 
Muslim * fasting * milking cow herd size - - - - - - -0.09 (0.13) 
Other * non-fasting * milking cow herd size - - - - - - -0.02 (0.21) 
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Other * fasting * milking cow herd size - - - - - - 1.43 (0.71)** 
        
Household controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -4.74 (0.69)*** -4.59 (0.70)*** -4.37 (0.71)*** -4.29 (0.70)*** -4.22 (0.72)*** -4.26 (0.72)*** -4.16 (0.73)*** 
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Standard errors are given between parentheses.    
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Table S3-4: Results from the extended Probit models modelling the likelihood of a household to consume milk accounting for the density of churches 
in an enumeration area 
 Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 3 Probit 4 Probit 5 Probit 6 Probit 7 
Religious affiliation (Orthodox Christian omitted)        
Protestant 0.24 (0.07)*** 0.07 (0.08) 0.08 (0.23) 0.28 (0.07)*** -0.18 (0.24) -0.68 (0.32)** -0.70 (0.32)** 
Muslim 0.54 (0.06)*** 0.50 (0.07)*** 0.71 (0.11)*** 0.45 (0.07)*** 0.58 (0.13)*** 0.53 (0.14)*** 0.54 (0.14)*** 
Other 0.45 (0.13)*** 0.26 (0.16) 0.95 (0.52)* 0.56 (0.15)*** 0.64 (0.52) 0.97 (0.58)* 0.92 (0.60) 
Interview period (non-fasting omitted)        
Fasting  - -0.35 (0.07)*** - -0.26 (0.05)*** -0.55 (0.14)*** -0.67 (0.17)*** -0.64 (0.17)*** 
EA church concentration - - -0.02 (0.11) -0.21 (0.09)** -0.15 (0.13) -0.21 (0.14) -0.24 (0.14)* 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period)  
(Orthodox Christian * non-fasting omitted) 
       
Protestant * fasting - 0.45 (0.12)*** - - 0.42 (0.13)*** 1.53 (0.47)*** 1.56 (0.47)*** 
Muslim * fasting - 0.11 (0.11) - - 0.27 (0.14)* 0.38 (0.20)* 0.36 (0.21)* 
Other * fasting - 0.56 (0.28)** - - 0.68 (0.31)** -1.28 (1.39) -0.45 (1.43) 
Interaction (religious affiliation * EA church concentration) 
(Orthodox Christian omitted) 
       
Protestant * EA church concentration - - 0.24 (0.27) - 0.36 (0.27) 0.93 (0.36)** 0.93 (0.36)** 
Muslim * EA church concentration - - -0.69 (0.21)*** - -0.67 (0.21)*** -0.60 (0.25)** -0.58 (0.26)** 
Other * EA church concentration - - -0.45 (0.60) - -0.36 (0.60) -0.76 (0.68) -0.72 (0.69) 
Interaction (interview period * EA church concentration)  
(non-fasting omitted) 
       
Fasting * EA church concentration - - - - 0.18 (0.17) 0.35 (0.22) 0.43 (0.22)** 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period * EA church 
concentration) (Orthodox Christian * non-fasting omitted) 
       
Protestant * fasting * EA church concentration - - - - - -1.32 (0.54)** -1.42 (0.56)** 
Muslim * fasting * EA church concentration - - - - - -0.16 (0.38) -0.23 (0.39) 
Other * fasting * EA church concentration - - - - - 2.23 (1.56) 0.76 (1.67) 
Interaction (religious affiliation * interview period * milking cow herd 
size) (Orthodox Christian * non-fasting omitted) 
       
Orthodox Christian * fasting * milking cow herd size - - - - - - -0.22 (0.09)** 
Protestant * non-fasting * milking cow herd size - - - - - - 0.08 (0.11) 
Protestant * fasting * milking cow herd size - - - - - - 0.02 (0.17) 
Muslim * non-fasting * milking cow herd size - - - - - - -0.09 (0.12) 
Muslim * fasting * milking cow herd size - - - - - - -0.07 (0.13) 
Other * non-fasting * milking cow herd size - - - - - - 0.05 (0.25) 
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Other * fasting * milking cow herd size - - - - - - 0.00 (0.00) 
        
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -4.74 (0.69)*** -4.59 (0.70)*** -4.88 (0.72)*** -4.56 (0.71)*** -4.58 (0.73)*** -4.53 (0.74)*** -4.42 (0.75)*** 
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Standard errors are given between parentheses.    
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B. Supplementary material - Chapter 4 
B.1. Sampling strategy 
Dairy farming households are sampled from three subpopulations in and around Ethiopia’s capital 
city, Addis Ababa: rural, sub-urban and urban populations. For rural producers, a three-step 
sampling process is followed. First, all woredas (an Ethiopian administrative unit comprising several 
kebeles or villages) of the rural regions are ranked and divided into quartiles based on remoteness 
(travel time) to Addis Ababa. 10 woredas are randomly selected, proportional to the number of cows 
(four in Q1, and two each in Q2, Q3 and Q4). In a second step, three kebeles are selected from 
within each withheld woreda. For Q1 and Q2, a distinction is made between major road access 
kebeles and non-major road access kebeles. Two kebeles are randomly selected from the former 
category and one from the latter. Within Q3 and Q4, no such distinction is made and three kebeles 
are selected randomly. Finally, within each kebele, a census is drawn up of all households with cows 
in milk. Of that list, twenty households are selected, ten from those who have three cows or more 
and ten from those with one or two cows54. The sampling procedure for the sub-urban farmers is 
similar, save for the fact that four kebeles (three on-road, one off-road) are randomly selected within 
each of the three sub-urban woredas. Finally, for the urban dairy farmers, a household survey was 
implemented with 30 randomly selected producers with one or two cows. The sampling strategy is 
summarized in Table Q4-1 while the farmers’ geographic locations are shown in Figure S4-1. 
Table S4-1: Sampling strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
54 In case there are not enough households with 3 cows or more, more households are selected from those 
with one or two cows, until the number of twenty households per kebele is reached. 
 Urban Sub-urban Rural Total 
   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  
Woreda  3 4 2 2 2 13 
On-road 
kebeles 
 9 8 4   21 
Off-road 
kebeles 
 3 4 2 6 6 21 
Farms 30 240 240 120 120 120 870 
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Figure S4-1: Farm locations (the star indicates Addis Ababa) 
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B.2. Comparison of our sample data with the Living Standard Measurement Survey data 
We compare our data with the data we retrieved from LSMS for those households living in the same 
sample area around Addis Ababa (i.e. Addis LSMS subsample) (Table S4-2). We deliberately select 
this dataset, since it covers a wide range of household related variables that match the variables in 
our dataset. Moreover, and more importantly, the period during which consumption data were 
gathered for the LSMS questionnaire (i.e. February-April 2016) overlaps well with the timing of our 
own survey. The most important differences are observed in dairy cow ownership and dairy 
consumption levels, which we anticipated since the LSMS subsample also comprises non-dairy 
producing households. Moreover, household heads in our sample are more likely to be male, are 
slightly older, have fewer years of schooling and are predominantly Orthodox. The proportion of 
Muslims in our sample (1.72%) is considerably lower than that in the area (21%). Household sizes 
for our dairy producers are slightly bigger than those of more representative households, mostly 
driven by a higher number of (older) children. Judging by the type and number of assets owned, 
households in our sample do not appear to be considerably richer or poorer than their LSMS 
counterparts.  
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Table S4-2: Descriptive statistics for households in the national Living Standard Measurement 
Survey, the Addis Ababa sub-sample of the previous dataset and our survey sample along with t-
test of difference 
 Unit 
(1) 
National 
LSMS 
sample 
(n=4,954) 
(2) 
Addis LSMS 
subsample 
(n=842)a 
(3) 
Survey 
sample 
(n=870) 
(4) 
Difference 
and p value  
(3)-(2)b 
Household head characteristics      
Sex % male 69.35 65.40 91.6 26.2*** 
Age years 
46.36 
(15.30) 
46.60 
(15.25) 
48.95 
(13.71) 
2.35*** 
Schooling years 3.65 (4.93) 5.03 (5.43) 3.76 (4.27) -1.27*** 
Religious affiliation  %     
Orthodox Christian  49.92 70.43 85.00 14.57*** 
Protestant  17.95 7.24 11.72 4.48*** 
Muslim  29.29 21.02 1.72 -19.30*** 
Other  2.62 1.19 1.38 0.19 
Marital status  % married 69.34 66.35 90.92 24.57*** 
      
Household characteristics      
Household size # 4.72 (2.38) 4.45 (2.18) 6.02 (2.09) 1.57*** 
Infants (<1)  0.10 (0.31) 0.07 (0.27) 0.08 (0.28) 0.01 
Young children (1-6)  0.78 (0.94) 0.62 (0.86) 0.62 (0.79) 0.01 
Children (7-9)  0.41 (0.60) 0.29 (0.51) 0.52 (0.66) 0.23*** 
Adolescents (10-19)  1.30 (1.31) 1.18 (1.23) 2.11 (1.52) 0.94*** 
Adults (20-64)  2.25 (1.08) 2.37 (1.19) 2.43 (1.12) 0.07 
Elderly (65 and above)  0.20 (0.45) 0.20 (0.44) 0.24 (0.51) 0.04 
Asset ownership #     
Kerosene stove  0.07 (0.28) 0.14 (0.37) 0.10 (0.33) -0.04** 
Modern bed  1.43 (1.40) 1.67 (1.37) 0.60 (0.85) -1.07*** 
Sofa/couch  0.17 (0.65) 0.27 (0.57) 0.38 (1.14) 0.11** 
Radio  0.35 (0.54) 0.43 (0.54) 0.56 (0.64) 0.12*** 
Television  0.25 (0.46) 0.43 (0.53) 0.24 (0.49) -0.19*** 
Mobile phone  0.96 (1.17) 1.39 (1.45) 0.87 (0.72) -0.51*** 
Bicycle  0.03 (0.23) 0.03 (0.19) 0.01 (0.14) -0.02** 
Motorbike  0.02 (0.16) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.09) -0.00 
Car or truck  0.06 (0.82) 0.10 (0.78) 0.02 (0.17) -0.07*** 
      
Consumption      
Liquid milk intake L /ad. eq./week 0.34 (1.13) 0.25 (0.57) 0.64 (0.84) 0.39*** 
Own production  0.20 (1.05) 0.08 (0.29) 0.63 (0.84) 0.55*** 
Purchased  0.11 (0.42) 0.15 (0.51) 0.00 (0.03) -0.15*** 
Gifts and other sources  0.02 (0.21) 0.01 (0.10) 0.00 (0.03) -0.01** 
Cheese intake 
L eq./ad. eq. 
/week 
0.05 (0.86) 0.03 (0.14) 0.31 (0.58) 0.28*** 
Own production  0.04 (0.86) 0.03 (0.12) 0.31 (0.58) 0.28*** 
Purchased  0.01 (0.07) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00** 
Gifts and other sources  0.00 (0.05) 0.01 (0.07) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01** 
Butter intake 
L eq./ad. 
eq./week 
0.04 (0.67) 0.05 (0.94) 0.36 (0.48) 0.30*** 
Own production  0.02 (0.33) 0.01 (0.00) 0.34 (0.47) 0.34*** 
Purchased  0.03 (0.59) 0.05 (0.94) 0.00 (0.00) -0.05 
Gifts and other sources  0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00** 
      
Consumer liquid milk price ETB/L 
19.39 
(17.29) 
23.37 
(23.44) 
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Producer liquid milk price    12.87 (3.27)  
Consumer cheese price ETB/kg 
50.21 
(50.58) 
53.08 
(25.78) 
  
Producer cheese price    
39.31 
(19.37) 
 
Consumer butter price ETB/kg 
168.84 
(135.9) 
171.28 
(105.5) 
  
Producer butter price    
171.17 
(43.29) 
 
      
Cattle ownership      
Total cattle # 2.80 (13.37) 2.24 (3.95) 9.46 (6.13) 7.22*** 
Total cross/exotic cattle # 0.08 (0.70) 0.12 (0.73) 3.05 (4.78) 2.93*** 
Total milking cows # 0.53 (1.14) 0.45 (1.54) 2.82 (2.17) 2.37*** 
      
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Means are 
shown with standard deviations in parentheses. For comparison purposes, kilogram (kg) amounts of processed products 
are transformed into litre (L) of milk equivalents. The conversion rates used are 20 L/kg for butter and 1.33 L/kg for cheese. 
1 USD = 27 ETB at the time of the survey 
a The Addis subsample of the LSMS dataset represents the part of the LSMS in a comparable geographical area as where 
the survey data of this chapter was collected, i.e., it includes all LSMS households within a concentric circle of 170 
kilometres 
surrounding Addis Ababa (with 170 km being roughly the furthest distance from Addis in the survey sample). 
b A t-test (proportions test in the case of proportions) was conducted to compare the LSMS Addis subsample with the 
survey sample.  
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B.3. Fasting participation and beliefs among Orthodox producing households  
No study so far has attempted to map individual adherence to the different officially prescribed fasting 
periods at an intra-household level in Ethiopia. Several estimates on the number of fasting days 
annually can be found in the literature, with ranges of from 166-180 days [8, 17] and from 180-250 
days [16] being cited. Furthermore, we also detail Orthodox caregivers’ beliefs about fasting 
observance of children. An earlier study by Kim et al. [306] found that in households where ASFs 
are available, maternal beliefs about children’s participation in fasting rituals greatly affect children’s 
ASF consumption in the Lent fast period.   
In the survey, respondents (usually the household head) in Orthodox households were asked to 
indicate for each household member above the age of five years whether or not this member 
observes any Orthodox fasting event. Since most meals are consumed together within a household, 
member’s observance of fasting should be known to the household head. Moreover, consumption 
of dairy-based drinks away from home is not widespread in the country55. If a member was said to 
engage in fasting, member’s observance was detailed for each of the seven major fasts, as outlined 
in Table 2-1 in Chapter 2, with a dummy variable (yes/no). If a member participates in a particular 
fasting event, we assume that this member fasts during the entire prescribed fasting period. As such, 
we were able to calculate the effective number of fasting days adhered to for 3,945 individual 
Orthodox household members. Additionally, we asked Orthodox caregivers’ opinions about fasting 
observance by young children using the following four statements: (1) During fasting, a young child 
less than 2 years old should not observe fasting; (2) During fasting, children 6-23 months of age 
should continue eating eggs, milk, and meat to grow healthy; (3) During fasting, children 6-23 months 
of age should continue to eat as often as usual to grow healthy; and (4) During fasting, infants and 
children under 2 years of age should be breastfed as often as usual to grow healthy. Caregivers 
were asked to indicate to which degree they agree/disagree with the statements using a 5-point 
Likert scale (strongly disagree – disagree – somewhat agree – agree – strongly agree). Finally, 
caregivers were asked to indicate at what age they believe children should begin observing fasting. 
Both household member fasting adherence and caregivers’ beliefs about children fasting 
participation are descriptively described in the results sections, but we did not include these data as 
explanatory variables in our regression analyses since we are not able single out to what extent 
social desirability bias impacts the answers that were given by the respondents. 
Table S4-3 summarizes the extent of participation in fasting periods throughout the year for Orthodox 
Christian households. We observe that adherence varies both by age and by type of fasting period. 
First, fasting adherence increases with age. Average participation among older children, who are 
                                               
55 Looking descriptively in the LSMS data we used in the previous chapter (Chapter 3), we find that only 7% 
of the households indicated that members consumed dairy-based beverages outside the home. 
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requested to participate in fasting periods, is rather low with one-in-five participating. Adolescents 
do adhere more, 65% on average, while observance reaches 90% among adults and elderly. 
Surprisingly, we observe that a small proportion (5%) of young children participates in fasting rituals, 
although they are officially exempt from fasting. Second, participation rates differ greatly across the 
different obligatory fasting events. We observe that Lent, Felseta fast and weekly fasting periods are 
the most adhered to, followed, at some distance, by the Nineveh and the Advent fast. The Sene fast, 
finally, is only adhered to by about half of the adults in our sample. There is no age-specificity in the 
adherence to certain fasting periods. Finally, no sizeable differences are observed between female 
and male participation rates and, if anything, women tend to participate slightly more compared to 
their male counterparts, expect within the elderly category.  
Overall, we see that the number of fasting days on a yearly basis varies between 4-7 days for young 
children to about 138-145 days for elderly people. The fasting adherence of adults is around 140 
days and thus 20-110 days below the estimates of 166-250 fasting days per year cited ) [8, 16, 17]. 
It should also to be noted that 11-12% of the Orthodox Christian adults do not participate in any fast, 
possibly because of pregnancy or illness but also out of choice. Moreover, we also observe 
descriptively in our data that remote households report to adhere more to official fasting periods as 
compared to non-remote households. 
Table S4-3: Participation rates for different fasting periods and total number of fasting days per 
age-gender combination for members of the Orthodox faith 
Fasting period 
Length 
(days) 
Young 
children 
(5-6) 
Older 
children 
(7-9) 
Adolescents 
(10-19) 
Adults 
(20-64) 
Elderly 
(65+) 
M F M F M F M F M F 
Any (%) / 4.7 5.2 22.1 23.3 63.4 66.0 88.0 89.1 91.5 85.5 
Nineveh (%) 3 2.4 3.9 14.7 19.2 46.7 50.6 68.0 69.9 76.7 78.2 
Lent (%) 55 1.2 3.9 19.0 22.3 60.2 63.4 85.1 86.7 91.5 83.6 
Sene (%) 25 1.2 3.9 9.8 14.0 33.3 34.8 51.0 53.9 55.0 52.7 
Felseta (%) 15 2.4 3.9 19.0 22.8 60.9 62.7 85.0 85.7 88.4 85.5 
Advent (%) 40 2.4 3.9 12.9 17.1 43.1 44.3 65.2 67.6 63.6 65.5 
Weekly (%) 44 2.4 3.9 21.5 23.3 62.2 65.1 87.5 88.0 90.7 85.5 
Total (# days) 182 4 7 31 37 97 101 139 142 145 138 
n  84 76 163 193 852 644 885 859 132 57 
Note: We use an average of 25 days for the Sene fast and approximate the number of weekly fasting at 44 days a year, 
considering other fasting events that overlap with weekly fasting and the exemption of weekly fasting between Easter and 
Pentecost. M = Male, F = Female. 
Additionally, we asked Orthodox households’ opinions about fasting observance by young children 
(Table S4-4). Only 11% of households disagrees or strongly disagrees that children less than 2 years 
old should not observe fasting. 4% believes that children 6-23 months of age should stop eating 
ASFs during fasting, 6% argues that these children should eat less frequently during fasting, and 5% 
 252 
thinks these children should be breastfed less during fasting. In general, Orthodox households in our 
sample propose that children should start observing fasting at the age of 9.2 years (with a 95% 
confidence interval of 8.6-9.7 years old). In a study by Kim et al. [306], only half of the caregivers 
had positive attitudes towards the exemption of children from fasting practices56. We find that 96% 
of the respondents in our sample agrees that children should continue eating ASFs during fasting. 
Still it is worrisome to find in our data that a number of young children are actively participating or 
expected to participate in fasting. 
Table S4-4: Orthodox respondents beliefs about children’s fasting participation 
 Strongly 
disagree (%) 
Disagree 
(%) 
Somewhat 
agree (%) 
Agree (%) Strongly 
agree (%) 
During fasting, a young child less than 
2 years old should not observe fasting  
7.84 3.44 0.55 14.44 73.73 
During fasting, children 6-23 months 
of age should continue eating eggs, 
milk, and meat to grow healthy 
2.34 1.93 6.19 29.16 60.39 
During fasting, children 6-23 months 
of age should continue to eat as often 
as usual to grow healthy 
3.16 2.75 6.74 29.71 57.63 
During fasting, infants and children 
under 2 years of age should be 
breastfed as often as usual to grow 
healthy 
1.79 3.30 7.70 26.27 60.94 
It is possible that social desirability bias (SDB) is introduced when asking respondents to detail 
fasting participation of household members and fasting beliefs. Yet, one would expect to observe full 
participation in all official fasting periods by members who are prescribed to observe fasting if SDB 
                                               
56 The objective of the study by Kim et al. [306] was to investigate the factors influencing ASF consumption 
among young children (6-23 months old) during the Lent fasting period in western Amhara, Ethiopia. The data 
used in the study of Kim et al. [306] were gathered during the Lent fasting period in 2015 in three western 
zones of the Amhara region; while our data were gathered in the Addis region and Oromia region both during 
and outside Lent. The paper had 2,536 observations, while we only have 870 observations. Maternal beliefs 
about ASF feeding during fasting were measured in the paper of Kim et al. [306] by two: i.e. ‘During the Lent 
fasting period, children 6-23 months of age should continue eating eggs, milk and meat to grow healthy’ and 
‘Outside of Lent and fasting days, children 6-23 months of age should continue eating eggs, milk and meat to 
grow healthy’. Both items were measured using a 5‐point Likert scale. Answers to both questions were 
compiled to create an overall score of 10 (range 2–10). The sample was divided into two groups, those with 
low scores (below 6/10) and high scores (above 6/10). We measured beliefs using four different statements 
(see Table S4-4; also measured using a 5‐point Likert scale). One of our statements (the second one in Table 
S4-4) was identical to the one in the paper of Kim et al. [306]. 
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would be an issue in the sample. SDB could on the other hand also have led respondents to indicate 
more often that their children are not participating in fasting periods. But, when we look descriptively 
in the sample, we find that Orthodox households who have children below the age of five, still feed 
milk to these children during the Lent fasting period. Still we are not able to fully cancel out the impact 
of SDB. Therefore, we did not use such data as explanatory variables in our regression analyses, 
but rather report them descriptively here in this Supplementary material. 
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B.4. The impact of fasting on dietary diversity 
This supplementary material section focuses on a more detailed analysis how consumption changes 
on individual fasting days. In particular, we assess the impact of a fasting day (self-reported 
participation as opposed to the calendar approach used in the rest of the chapter) on diet quality. 
We use data on whether or not certain food groups were consumed (yes/no) using a 24-hour recall 
period for the household head, the spouse (if present) and the youngest child below the age of five 
(if present). This allows us to calculate Individual Dietary Diversity Scores (IDDS, see Swindale and 
Bilinsky [477]), but also to look at the likelihood of consuming different food groups separately. We 
do this to see whether individuals substitute the forgone consumption of ASFs by increasing their 
likelihood of consuming other food items.  
In our sample, the IDDS during non-fasting days for adults (both the household head and spouse) is 
around 4, while the one of the youngest child is 3.1 (Table S4-5). Similar values for the IDDS of 
children below the age of five are reported by Hirvonen et al. [314]. We could not compare the IDDS 
for spouse and head, since these are not calculated on a regular basis in Ethiopia. We observe a 
large impact of a fasting day on adults’ dietary diversity. Household head and spouse consume, 
respectively, 0.87 and 0.34 food groups less during a fasting day, which are non-negligible 
decreases given the average IDDS of 4 during non-fasting days. Crucially, no reduced dietary 
diversity is observed for the youngest child in the household during a fasting day.  
Table S4-5: Impact of a fasting day on daily Individual Dietary Diversity Score 
 Daily Individual Dietary Diversity Score 
 Household head Spouse Youngest child (<5) 
   
Fasting yesterday (0/1) -0.87*** -0.34*** 0.10 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.18) 
 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes 
 
Non-fasting mean 4.30 4.08 3.12 
n 833 833 698 
R² 0.23 0.24 0.16 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The type of 
fasting period is a categorical variable whereby no fasting is the reference category. For a complete list of controls, see 
Table 4-4, Chapter 4. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
A more detailed analysis of the likelihood to consume different food groups during fasting and non-
fasting days is shown in Figure S4-2. A detailed description of the food groups included in an average 
diet goes beyond the scope of our analysis, so we will focus on the intake of animal protein. During 
non-fasting days, the probability that a household head consumes ASFs is already low, one-in-three 
heads eats meat or drink milk, one-in-five consumes butter or cheese and one-in-ten eats eggs and 
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yoghurt. Fish intake is extremely low (1%). During fasting days, the likelihood that a household head 
consumes any ASF reduces to almost zero. Spouses on the other hand have a higher probability to 
consume any ASF during non-fasting days (30-40%) and on fasting days only the likelihood to 
consume fish, milk, yoghurt and buttermilk goes down but does not fall to zero. The differential impact 
of fasting days on heads and spouses might suggest that women are prioritized over men in the 
consumption of livestock products. Strikingly, no substitution occurs from ASFs towards other, 
equally nutritious food groups on fasting days. It is, however, possible that higher amounts of the 
same food groups are being consumed, but at least there is no introduction of other food groups into 
a fasting day diet.  
Although we cannot trace back the quantities of ASFs being consumed on non-fasting days, the 
above analysis reveals that adult household members are more likely to consume livestock products 
on non-fasting days which could partially compensate for their forgone consumption of ASFs during 
fasting days. Yet, milk intake levels in our sample are low, which could also explain why we observe 
a rather small effect of four fasting days a week. Milk consumption per adult equivalent in our sample 
amounts to 0.64 L in the week before the interview (Table S4-2). If we extrapolate this to a yearly 
level (for which some caveats certainly apply), this comes down to roughly 33 L. Average yearly milk 
intake levels in Ethiopia have been estimated at 20 L per capita, which is far below the average in 
East Africa (40 L per capita per year) [42]. Ethiopia has no published recommended intake for milk, 
but assessing the average recommended milk intake for those countries that have published 
standards, we conclude that an average daily consumption of 250 mL of milk is proposed which 
equals about 90 L per capita per year [23]. Milk intake in our sample is thus nearly double the national 
estimated average of 20 L/capita/year, but still only one third of the recommended intake of 90 
L/capita/year. Yet, according to the EAT-lancet commission, a wide range of intake of milk and 
derivatives, i.e. between 0-500 g per day, are compatible with a healthy diet.  
Finally, for children aged five and below, fasting days do not impact the overall intake of dairy 
products, although we observe that they consume less beef, pork and lamb on fasting days, probably 
because these food items are less likely to be consumed and prepared at the household level. Most 
of the children consume fresh milk (72%) while the consumption of pasteurized milk and powder milk 
is limited (2%). This is not surprising given the availability of freshly produced milk. Half of the children 
also consume eggs. Children do consume cheese and butter, although the likelihood is much lower 
as compared to fresh milk (20-25%). The probability to consume other ASFs (i.e., meat, fish and/or 
yoghurt) is low (below 10%).  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure S4-2: Impact of a fasting day on the likelihood of daily consumption of different food groups 
Note: *µ denotes the non-fasting mean of the dependent variable. Coefficients of the fasting day indicator are shown along with cluster robust confidence intervals. 
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B.5. Impact of fasting adherence strictness on consumption of liquid and processed milk 
Since we observe a large heterogeneity in fasting adherence, an interesting side-analysis consists 
in examining whether a varying strictness of fasting participation affects milk consumption patterns 
differently. To do so, we construct a household fasting days index. We calculate this index using the 
following steps. First, we internally standardize the number of fasting days by age (in years) following 
the non-parametric regression procedure of Rubio-Codina et al. [478]. Then, to obtain a household 
index of the yearly number of fasting days, we take the average of those individual deviations within 
each household (which explains why the measure is not perfectly centred around zero). Within the 
context of Ethiopia, this constructed index could be considered as a measure of a household’s extent 
of adherence to Orthodox fasting.  
We examine whether this strictness in adherence affects milk consumption patterns. Table S4-6 
shows that stricter adherence to Orthodox fasting is not associated with lower household milk intake 
during non-fasting periods, nor does it impact the youngest child’s milk consumption (for both non-
fasting and fasting periods). However, the more a household adheres to official Orthodox fasting 
periods, the less liquid and processed milk is consumed during fasting events. In particular, a one 
standard deviation increase in the household fasting index is linked with a 33% and 70% reduction 
in the consumption of liquid milk and processed milk, respectively. This result demonstrates that 
households that adhere to a higher number of prescribed Orthodox fasting events, also follow the 
fasting prescriptions during those periods more rigorously, even if milk is available at the household 
level.  
Table S4-6: Linear regression analysis of the impact of the household fasting days index on milk 
consumption volumes during fasting and non-fasting periods 
 Milk consumption 
 
Household liquid milk 
(L/week/ad.eq.) 
 
Household processed 
milk 
 (L eq./week/ad.eq.) 
Child liquid milk 
(L/week) 
 
 
Not 
fasting 
Fasting 
Not 
fasting 
Fasting 
Not 
fasting 
Fasting 
        
Household fasting days index 0.05 -0.19*** 0.03 -0.47*** 0.48 0.39 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.31) (0.28) 
    
Individual controls No No No No Yes Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    
Mean 0.95 0.57 1.48 0.65 2.92 2.95 
n 845 845 842 845 256 256 
R² 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.28 0.29 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at a probability of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Household 
amounts are expressed per adult equivalent to account for household size and composition. Household processed milk 
covers both cheese and butter intake. For a complete list of controls, see Table 4-4, Chapter 4. Cluster robust standard 
errors are in parentheses.  
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B.6. The impact of different long fasting season on milk intake 
In addition to the analysis in Section 4.2.1, respondents were also asked to recall and report 
the household’s intake of milk, cheese, and butter (all sourced from own production) in the 
middle of the latest long fasting period during which they had (at least) one cow in milk, with 
consumption two weeks after this fasting period. The same assessment was asked for the 
youngest child’s milk intake. For the vast majority of the sample, this fasting period was Advent 
(74%), followed by Lent (17%) and Felseta fast (9%). Respondents indicated that the 
household’s intake of milk, butter and cheese roughly halves during these long fasting periods. 
Milk intake of the youngest child within a milk producing household is virtually unaffected during 
long fasting periods (Table S4-7). 
Table S4-7: Descriptive statistics of self-reported milk consumption within and outside long 
fasting episodes 
Variable Unit Household Youngest child 
Liquid milk consumption    
Non-fasting week  L 4.47 (5.69) 2.91 (3.41) 
Fasting week  L 2.69 (3.78) 2.96 (3.39) 
Butter consumption     
Non-fasting week L eq. 4.81 (5.24)  
Fasting week L eq. 2.16 (3.46)  
Cheese consumption     
Non-fasting week L eq. 1.75 (3.01)  
Fasting week L eq. 0.85 (2.12)  
    
n  870 317 
Note: Means are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. 
‘Fasting week’ refers to a week in the last long fasting period when the household had at least one cow in milk. 
‘Non-fasting week’ refers to a week at least 2 weeks after that long fasting period 
Additionally, we conduct a Random Effects analysis. Given that there are two time periods for 
each household, one during one of the fasting periods and one two weeks after, we are able 
to account for all observed and unobserved heterogeneity between households57. Figure A.3 
shows the results of this RE analysis for liquid and processed milk, whereby consumption in 
the middle of the fasting period is always compared to consumption two weeks after its end. 
We detect that the impact of Lent on household’s intake of milk (particularly for liquid milk and 
butter) seems to be moderate when compared to that of Advent and Felseta fast, which is 
striking since Lent covers the longest fasting period (55 days as compared to 40 days of Advent 
fasting and 15 days of Felseta fasting). This might be explained by the fact that milk is more 
abundant during August (Felseta fast) and December (Advent) compared to February-March 
                                               
57 A Hausman test revealed it was permitted to use the more efficient RE estimator (compared to the 
consistent fixed effects estimator). This also allows us to assess the importance of other variables. 
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(Lent) making the difference between fasting and non-fasting weeks potentially larger. Advent 
fasting cuts household intake levels on average in half, while the effects of Lent and Felseta 
fast in particular, impact households differently (with reductions ranging between 10-100%), 
as can be seen from the large confidence intervals (except for cheese consumption). Also, for 
young children we observe large confidence intervals, but their milk intake seems to be barely 
affected or goes up slightly (especially during Lent).  
 
Figure S4-2: Differences in fasting impact on milk consumption depending on type of long 
fasting period 
Note: Coefficients of random effects analysis of latest long fasting period indicator are shown, along with cluster 
robust confidence intervals. µ denotes the average in a non-fasting week.
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C. Supplementary material - Chapter 5 
Table S5-1: Hay market arrangement among the identified farm clusters 
 Cluster 1  
(n = 20) 
Cluster 2  
(n = 40) 
Cluster 3  
(n = 7) 
Cluster 4 
 (n = 63) 
Cluster 5 
 (n = 33) 
Purchased from (%)      
rural farmer 20.0a 22.5a 57.1a 31.8a 27.3a 
trader 80.0a 77.5a 42.9a 69.8a 72.7a 
Arrangement (%)      
written 0a 2.5a 0a 0a 0a 
about volume bought 5.0b 70.0a 0bc 55.6a 0c 
about price  0d 72.5a 28.6bc 65.1ab 9.1cd 
about quality 90.0ab 62.5c 85.7bc 38.1d 100a 
Purchasing place (%)      
market 95.0ab 75.0b 85.7b 81.0b 100a 
Purchased volume (%)      
small volumes of hay 
 (kg or bag or donkey) 
85.0ab 60.0bc 100a 49.2c 97.0a 
large volumes of hay  
(car or heap or truck) 
15.0bc 40.0ab 0c 50.8a 3.0c 
Purchasing frequency (%)      
weekly 50.0a 17.5c 57.1ab 25.4bc 51.5a 
every 2-4 weeks 40.0a 47.5a 28.6a 25.4a 48.5a 
occasionally 10.0bc 32.5ab 14.3ab 47.6a 0c 
Payment frequency (%)      
upfront 85.0a 25.0b 85.7a 30.2b 69.7a 
at transaction time 10.0b 72.5a 0b 69.8a 30.3b 
Minimum price (ETB/donkey)2  93.4bc ± 8.9 132.3a ± 
12.9 
91.4abc ± 9.9 118.9ab ± 
10.6 
80.9c ± 4.1 
Maximum price (ETB/donkey)2  111.6bc ± 
10.6 
216.1a ± 
20.1 
133.6b ± 
21.4 
149.23 ± 
12.8 
100.7c ± 4.7 
Price fluctuation (ETB/donkey)2  18.1c ± 2.7 83.9a ± 12.0 42.1abc ± 
14.7 
36.54 ± 7.3 19.8c ± 2.3 
Note: Data in this table are only for those farmers that report to buy hay. Prices are only reported for those farmers  
that indicated donkeys as purchasing unit (the main purchase volume) as we could not easily convert other units. 
Mean ± standard error for the continuous variables and frequencies for the categorical variables. 
a-d Means and frequencies within a row with different superscripts differ (p < 0.05). 
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Table S5-2: Crop residue market arrangement among the identified farm clusters 
 Cluster 1  
(n = 53) 
Cluster 2  
(n = 61) 
Cluster 3  
(n = 35) 
Cluster 4 
 (n = 75) 
Cluster 5 
 (n = 14) 
Purchased from (%)      
rural farmer 76.9b 15.3d 100a 38.4c 0d 
trader 23.1c 84.8a 2.9d 61.6b 100a 
Arrangement (%)      
written 4.3a 1.8a 0a 0a 0a 
about volume bought 14.9b 71.9a 2.9b 74.7a 11.1b 
about price  10.6bc 82.5a 2.9c 91.6a 33.3b 
about quality 85.1a 79.0a 94.1a 12.7b 77.8a 
Purchasing place (%)      
Market 83.0bc 93.0ab 97.1a 70.4c 100abc 
Purchased volume (%)      
small volumes of hay  
(kg or bag or donkey) 
100a 100a 100a 63.4b 100a 
large volumes of hay  
(car or heap or truck) 
0b 0b 0b 36.6a 0b 
Purchasing frequency (%)      
weekly 57.5a 19.6b 61.8a 28.2b 44.4ab 
every 2-4 weeks 40.4b 76.8a 32.4bc 22.5c 44.4bc 
occasionally 2.1b 1.8b 5.9b 47.9a 11.1b 
Payment frequency (%)      
upfront 70.2a 14.0b 88.2a 8.5b 66.7a 
at transaction time 10.6bc 82.5a 0c 91.6a 33.3b 
Minimum price (ETB/donkey)  110.7bc ± 3.4 111.3c ± 6.8 115.6b ± 4.1 206.2a ± 
10.0 
225.0a ± 
25.0 
Maximum price (ETB/donkey)  203.6bc ± 6.8 223.0b ± 5.6 201.2c ± 4.3 273.6a ± 8.0 260.0abc ± 
40.0 
Price fluctuation (ETB/donkey) 93.0b ± 5.8 111.7a ± 5.0 85.6b ± 4.8 63.3c ± 4.3 35.0c ± 15.0 
Note: Data in this table are only for those farmers that report to buy crop residues. Prices are only reported for those 
farmers that indicated donkeys as purchasing unit (the main purchase volume) as we could not easily convert other 
units. 
Mean ± standard error for the continuous variables and frequencies for the categorical variables. 
a-d Means and frequencies within a row with different superscripts differ (p < 0.05). 
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Table S5-3: Wheat bran market arrangement among the identified farm clusters 
 Cluster 1 
(n = 60) 
Cluster 2 
(n = 71) 
Cluster 3 
(n = 38) 
Cluster 4 
(n = 91) 
Cluster 5 
(n = 34) 
Purchased from (%)      
rural farmer 58.3b 8.5c 86.8a 4.4c 0c 
trader 40.0b 87.3a 7.9c 51.1b 73.5a 
flour mill 1.7b 4.2b 2.6b 45.6a 26.5a 
Arrangement (%)      
written 3.3b 2.8b 0b 28.9a 0b 
about volume bought 11.7c 74.7a 2.6c 58.9b 5.9c 
about price  15.0b 81.7a 2.6c 73.3a 11.8bc 
about quality 86.7ab 76.1b 94.7a 27.8c 91.2ab 
Purchasing place (%)      
market 81.7ab 90.1a 92.1a 54.4c 73.5bc 
Purchased volume (kg)  
 
325.3a ± 39.7 452.5a ± 47.9 323.7a ± 55.8 352.6a ± 32.2 217.7b ± 58.2 
Purchasing frequency (%)      
weekly 23.3bc 14.1c 21.1bc 36.7ab 44.1a 
every 2-4 weeks 76.7a 84.5a 73.7ab 61.1b 55.9b 
occasionally 0a 0a 5.3a 2.2a 0a 
Payment frequency (%)      
upfront 73.3ab 16.9c 89.5a 18.9c 70.6b 
at transaction time 11.7c 81.7a 0d 81.1a 29.4b 
Minimum price (ETB/kg)  
 
4.0b ± 0.1 3.8c ± 0.1 4.1b ± 0.1 4.2a ± 0.1 2.7d ± 0.1 
Maximum price (ETB/kg)  
 
5.0a ± 0.2 5.5a ± 0.1 5.3a ± 0.2 5.0b ± 0.1 3.3c ± 0.1 
Price fluctuation (ETB/kg) 1.1b ± 0.1 1.7a ± 0.1 1.2b ± 0.1 0.8c ± 0.0 0.6d ± 0.1 
Note: Data in this table are only for those farmers that report to buy wheat bran. 
Mean ± standard error for the continuous variables and frequencies for the categorical variables.  
a-d Means and frequencies within a row with different superscripts differ (p < 0.05). 
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Table S5-4: Atella market arrangement among the identified farm clusters 
 Cluster 1  
(n = 45) 
Cluster 2  
(n = 70) 
Cluster 3  
(n = 28) 
Cluster 4 
 (n = 87) 
Cluster 5 
 (n = 30) 
Purchased from (%)      
trader 64.4b 98.6a 32.1c 94.2a 100a 
local brewery 24.4b 1.4c 57.1a 3.5c 0c 
Arrangement (%)      
written 2.2a 0a 0a 1.2a 0a 
about volume bought 22.2cd 74.3a 7.1d 60.9ab 43.3bc 
about price  24.4c 85.7a 14.3c 77.0ab 63.3b 
about quality 82.2a 28.6b 92.9a 24.1b 86.7a 
Purchasing place (%)      
market 40.0b 37.1b 21.4b 90.8a 100a 
Purchased volume (L)  
 
127.6b ± 
27.0 
205.7a ± 
23.9 
125.4b ± 
32.4 
115.6b ± 
18.9 
77.9b ± 6.5 
Purchasing frequency (%)      
daily 8.9bc 15.7b 0c 66.7a 6.9bc 
weekly 68.9ab 81.4a 75.0ab 25.3c 58.6b 
every 2-4 weeks 22.2a 2.9b 25.0a 6.9b 34.5a 
Payment frequency (%)      
upfront 40.0b 11.4d 28.6bc 17.2cd 70.0a 
at transaction time 4.4c 10.0c 0c 73.6a 26.7b 
weekly to monthly 55.6b 78.6a 71.4ab 9.2c 3.3c 
Minimum price (ETB/L)  
 
0.6a ± 0.2 0.3c ± 0.0 0.5b ± 0.1 0.3c ± 0.0 0.3d ± 0.0 
Maximum price (ETB/L)  
 
0.7abc ± 0.2 0.4c ± 0.0 0.5b± 0.1 0.4d ± 0.0 0.3e ± 0.0 
Price fluctuation (ETB/L)  
 
0.0b ± 0.0 0.1a ± 0.0 0.0c ± 0.0 0.1a ± 0.0 0.1a ± 0.0 
Note: Data in this table are only for those farmers that report to buy atella. 
Mean ± standard error for the continuous variables and frequencies for the categorical variables.  
a-d Means and frequencies within a row with different superscripts differ (p < 0.05).  
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Table S5-5: Butter marketing strategies among the identified farm clusters 
 
Cluster 1  
(n = 48) 
Cluster 2  
(n = 51) 
Cluster 3  
(n = 1) 
Cluster 4 
 (n = 8) 
Cluster 5 
 (n = 4) 
Butter buyer (%)      
neighbours 89.6a 88.2a 100 87.5a 100a 
Farmers who have more than 1 
type of butter buyer (%) 
0a 2.0a 0 12.5a 0a 
Arrangement for butter (%)      
written 0a 0a 0 0a 0a 
about butter volume 8.3b 56.0a 100 75.0a 0b 
about butter price  10.4b 88.0a 0 25.0b 25.0b 
about butter quality 89.6a 56.0b 0 37.5b 50.0b 
Payment frequency for butter (%)      
upfront  62.5a 11.8c 100 12.5bc 25.0abc 
at end of transaction 18.8b 84.3a 0 37.5b 50.0ab 
weekly or less  18.8b 3.9c 0 50.0ab 25.0abc 
Minimum butter price (ETB/kg) 181.0a ± 3.8 143.3c ± 3.9 200.00 192.9ab ± 
13.0 
150.0bc ± 
12.3 
Maximum butter price (ETB/kg)  213.3a ± 4.3 209.4a ± 4.7 250.00 218.6a ± 14.2 187.5a ± 12.5 
Butter price fluctuation (ETB/kg)  32.3b ± 2.8 66.1a ± 4.0 50.00 25.7b ± 9.5 37.5ab ± 7.5 
Selling frequency of butter (%)      
weekly  2.1b 13.7a 100 0ab 0ab 
less than weekly 97.9a 86.3b 0 100ab 100ab 
Note: Data in this table are only for those farmers that report to sell butter.  
Mean ± standard error for the continuous variables and frequencies for the categorical variables.  
a-c Means and frequencies within a row with different superscripts differ (p < 0.05).  
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D. Supplementary material - Chapter 6  
D.1. Names and religious symbols used in the discrete choice experiments 
Table S6-1: Christian and Muslim names adopted in the choice experiment 
Names referring to Christian background Names referring to Muslim background 
Male Female Male Female 
Abraham Eleni Ali Semira 
Yisak Sara Mohammed Jemilla 
Michael Weletemariam Ahmed Fatuma 
Yared Letegebriel Seid Kedija 
Yohanis Arisema Ibrahim Hayat 
Kidus Mariamawit Jemal Kerya 
Gebregzabher Eyerusalem Yusin Saada 
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Table S6-2: Christian and Muslim cartoons adopted in the choice experiment 
  Cartoons referring to Christian background Cartoons referring to Muslim background 
Male Female Male Female 
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D.2. Latent Class Attribute Non-Attendance model 
Formally, in latent class models the probability that a respondent i chooses milk seller j in 
choice situation t is generated by the multinomial logit model expression:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 [𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗 |𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑐] =  
exp(𝛽′𝑐∗ 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡)
∑ exp(𝛽′𝑐∗ 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1 )
                                                                          eq. 1 
The probability that an individual belongs to a specific segment can be expressed as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 [𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑐] =  
exp(𝛼′𝑐∗ 𝑍𝑖)
∑ exp(𝛼′𝑐∗ 𝑍𝑖
𝐶
𝑐=1 )
                                                                                       eq. 2 
 
Where Zi is a vector for specific variables of the individual informative about the likelihood of a 
farmer’s membership to a particular segment, and α is a segment specific parameter that 
denotes the contribution of the farmers’ characteristics to the probability of a class 
membership.  
The unconditional probability that any randomly selected respondent chooses a specific 
alternative, is obtained by combining the conditional probability in (1) with the segment 
membership probability in (2), resulting in the following equation: 
Prob[𝑦 𝑖𝑡=j] =∑ (
exp (𝛽′𝑐∗ 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡)
∑ exp (𝛽′𝑐∗ 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 )
𝐽𝑗
𝑗=1
)𝐶𝑐=1 ∏ (
exp (𝛼′𝑐∗ 𝑍𝑖)
∑ exp (𝛼′𝑐∗ 𝑍𝑖 )
𝐶
𝑐=1
)𝑇𝑡=1                                                eq. 3 
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D.3. Detail of latent class specification and average class membership share of the 
stepwise latent class attribute non-attendance approach 
In the first ANA model specification six non-attendance patterns are estimated, i.e. full 
attendance and non-attendance of one of the five attributes. Only those non-attendance 
patterns found significant (i.e. full attendance, class 3 and 4 of one attribute non-attendance) 
were retained for the second ANA specification. These three classes were estimated in ANA 
model 2 together with the ten classes representing non-attendance of 2 attributes. The classes 
1,8,10,11 and 16 were retained in the third ANA model and estimated together with the 
specifications for non-attendance for 3 attributes. This procedure was repeated for models 4 
and 5. 
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Table S6-3: Detail of latent class specification and average class membership share of the 
stepwise LC ANA model 
Class 
number 
Coefficients estimated 
Model 
ANA-1 
Model 
ANA-2 
Model 
ANA-3 
Model 
ANA-4 
Final ANA 
model 
1 βreligion βgender βsupplier βdistance βprice 31.93% 37.25% 37.57% 34.95% 28.03% 
2 βreligion βgender βsupplier βdistance 0 0.00% -- -- -- -- 
3 βreligion βgender βsupplier 0 βprice 30.95% -- -- -- -- 
4 βreligion βgender 0 βdistance βprice 37.12% -- -- -- -- 
5 βreligion 0 βsupplier βdistance βprice 0.00% -- -- -- -- 
6 0 βgender βsupplier βdistance βprice 0.00% -- -- -- -- 
7 0 0 βsupplier βdistance βprice -- -- -- -- -- 
8 0 βgender βsupplier βdistance 0 -- 29.23% 17.58% 15.62% 14.90% 
9 βreligion 0 βsupplier βdistance 0 -- -- -- -- -- 
10 βreligion βgender 0 βdistance 0 -- 25.56% -- -- -- 
11 βreligion βgender βsupplier 0 0 -- 0.90% -- -- -- 
12 βreligion βgender 0 0 βprice -- -- -- -- -- 
13 βreligion 0 βsupplier 0 βprice -- -- -- -- -- 
14 0 βgender βsupplier 0 βprice -- -- -- -- -- 
15 βreligion 0 0 βdistance βprice -- -- -- -- -- 
16 0 βgender 0 βdistance βprice -- 7.06% -- -- -- 
17 βreligion βgender 0 0 0 -- -- 9.03% 0.92% 2.89% 
18 βreligion 0 βsupplier 0 0 -- -- 16.12% -- -- 
19 βreligion 0 0 βdistance 0 -- -- 15.25% 13.08% 11.41% 
20 βreligion 0 0 0 βprice -- -- -- -- -- 
21 0 βgender βsupplier 0 0 -- -- -- -- -- 
22 0 βgender 0 βdistance 0 -- -- -- -- -- 
23 0 βgender 0 0 βprice -- -- 0.71% 0.62% 0.38% 
24 0 0 βsupplier βdistance 0 -- -- -- -- -- 
25 0 0 βsupplier 0 βprice -- -- -- -- -- 
26 0 0 0 βdistance βprice -- -- 3.74% 3.23% 3.99% 
27 βreligion 0 0 0 0 -- -- -- 10.54% -- 
28 0 βgender 0 0 0 -- -- -- -- -- 
29 0 0 βsupplier 0 0 -- -- -- 21.06% 27.42% 
30 0 0 0 βdistance 0 -- -- -- -- -- 
31 0 0 0 0 βprice -- -- -- -- -- 
32 0 0 0 0 0 
    
10.98% 
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D.4. Measuring religiosity  
Additionally, we tried to measure the intensity of belief (i.e. religiosity) amongst our 
respondents. We wondered whether adherence to fasting practices varies with intensity of 
belief. Moreover, we were curious if religiosity could explain why certain consumers self-select 
to co-religious milk suppliers as Allport and Ross [479] argued that individuals who are 
extrinsically motivated are more prejudiced than those who are intrinsically motivated. 
Very often religion has been instrumentalized as a combination of religious affiliation (i.e. what 
you believe) and religiosity (i.e. how strong you believe). Worthington et al. [480] has defined 
religiosity as “the degree to which a person adheres to his or her religious values, beliefs, and 
practices and uses them in daily life”. In economic studies, religiosity has predominantly been 
operationalized using behavioural measures such as attendance to religious services or other 
religious activities (notably religious spending), e.g. see Barro and McCleary [62], Mangeloja 
[481], Gruber [482], Gruber and Hungerman [483], and Mohanty [484]. Yet, more complex 
scales have been developed whereby respondents self-assess the strength of their belief. A 
downside of such self-assessments is their sensitivity to social desirability bias. One of the 
oldest and most commonly employed scales is the Religious Orientation Scale developed by 
Allport and Ross [479]. This scale measures motivation for religious behaviour rather than 
behaviour itself. The scale divides individuals broadly in two categories: intrinsically religious 
people and extrinsically religious people. The former live their religion, while the latter use their 
religion for their own ends [479]. The latter are engaged in religion for the sake of other 
objectives, which can be e.g. security, status, distraction, or being part of a religious 
community. The ROS has been tested and validated with several groups and within various 
context. The scale, which comprises several items, has been regularly updated, and we used 
the most recent one, i.e. the New Indices of Religious Orientation Revised scale, which has a 
simplified language [485].  
The New Indices of Religious Orientation Revised scale comprises 18 statements of which 
nine measure extrinsic motivation, and the other nine intrinsic motivation. Respondents need 
to report the extent to which they agree or disagree with each statement using a 5-item Likert 
scale (strongly agree, agree, not certain, disagree, strongly disagree) (Table S6-4). Both the 
extrinsic and intrinsic sub-scales consist of three conceptual components, the first reflecting 
separation (Q1-Q3) or integration (Q10-Q12) of religion from/with the rest of life, a public 
component (Q4-Q6 and Q13-Q15) and a personal component (Q7-Q9 and Q16-Q18). The 
ROS and NIROR scales have been almost exclusively tested in Western contexts, and 
therefore not yet validated in developing contexts. We are the first to verify whether these 
scales can be used as such within an African context 
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Table S6-4: Extrinsic and intrinsic orientation statements included in the NIROR scale and 
adapted to the Ethiopian context 
Extrinsic orientation 
 
Intrinsic orientation 
Q1: While I believe in the Orthodox / Muslim / 
Protestant / Catholic faith, I feel there are more 
important things in my life 
Q10: My Orthodox / Muslim / Protestant / 
Catholic faith shapes how I live my daily life 
Q2: While I am an Orthodox / Muslim / 
Protestant / Catholic, I do not let my faith 
influence my daily life 
Q11: I try hard to carry my Orthodox / Muslim / 
Protestant / Catholic belief over into all other 
areas of my life 
Q3: Occasionally I have compromised my 
Orthodox / Muslim / Protestant / Catholic beliefs 
to fit in better with other people 
Q12: My Orthodox / Muslim / Protestant / 
Catholic faith really shapes the way I treat 
people 
Q4: One reason for me going to Church / 
Mosque is to connect with others 
Q13: I allow almost nothing to prevent me from 
going to Church / Mosque on Sundays 
Q5: A key reason to go to Church / Mosque is 
that it is socially enjoyable 
Q4: I go to Church/ Mosque because it helps 
me feel close to God / Allah 
Q6: I go to Church / Mosque because it helps me 
to feel part of a community 
Q15: The Church/ Mosque is most important to 
me as a place to be part of God / Allah's family 
Q7: One reason for me praying is that it helps 
me to gain relief and protection 
Q16: I pray at home because it helps me be 
aware of God / Allah's presence 
Q8: What prayer offers me most is comfort when 
bad things happen to me 
Q17: I often read books about my religion 
Q9: I pray mainly because it makes me feel 
better 
Q18: I pray mainly because it deepens my 
relationship with God / Allah 
 
First of all, we descriptively display the respondents’ answers to each of the statements in 
Figure S8-1. We found that the answers of our respondents were highly skewed to either the 
left or right side. As such, 90% or more of the respondents (strongly) agreed to 10 of the 18 
statements. For five statement, more than three quarter (strongly) agreed (Q1, Q3, Q4, Q13, 
and Q17). Only three statement (all in the extrinsic orientation dimension) showed some 
variation: mostly Q6 where 50% (strongly) agreed and 45% (strongly) disagreed, for the other 
Q2 and Q5, we found that 34% and 32% (strongly) disagreed while 55% and 64% (strongly) 
agreed, respectively. 
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Figure S6-1: Frequency distribution of the answers to several religious orientation statements 
Note: The labels on the x-axis represent the following: 1= strongly agree; 2= agree; 3= not certain; 4= disagree; 5= strongly disagree. The several statements (Q1-Q18) are 
summarized in Table 4.
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
p
e
rc
e
n
t
1 2 3 4 5
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
1
0
3
0
5
0
7
0
p
e
rc
e
n
t
1 2 3 4 5
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
1
0
3
0
5
0
7
0
p
e
rc
e
n
t
1 2 3 4 5
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
p
e
rc
e
n
t
1 2 3 4 5
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
p
e
rc
e
n
t
1 2 3 4 5
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
3
0
5
0
7
0
p
e
rc
e
n
t
1 2 3 4 5
Q13 Q14 Q15 
Q16 Q17 Q18 
2
7
6
 
 277 
Next, we tested the validity of the scale using an exploratory factor analysis, which consisted of a 
principal axis factor extraction with orthogonal rotation in order to determine the dimensions of the 
religious orientation in our sample. We did not retrieve the same dimensions/factors as those 
established in literature. Instead, we found significant overlap in several components of the scale 
and six items were not included in the factors we retrieved, i.e. Q1, Q2, Q3, Q8, Q14, Q17 (Table 
S6-5). Moreover, factor 1 and 2 we retrieved were still significantly correlated, after we used an 
orthogonal rotation. 
Table S6-5: Retrieved factors and included items after applying exploratory factor analysis 
 Included items 
Factor 1 Q7 Q9 Q15 Q16 
Factor 2 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q18 
Factor 3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
 
Q1, Q2, and Q3 were often defined as a paradox by our respondents because there are clearly “no 
more important things in life” than faith (Q1). Consequently, religion influences people’s daily life 
(Q2) and no compromises are made (Q3). All three items loaded very poorly on the identified factors, 
and were thus dropped. The items Q8 and Q14 loaded on two factors (factor 1 and 2) and therefore 
had to be removed as well. Finally, item Q17 was considered irrelevant for the factor analysis. A 
large number of our respondents was not able to read, yet many respondents claimed to go to church 
and listen to somebody else reading religious books. Because of the ambiguous understanding of 
this question, we decided to remove also Q17 from the analysis. 
The factors/dimensions we retrieved are very different from the original NIROR scale. We observe 
overlap of the extrinsic personal, intrinsic public, and intrinsic personal components in factor 1. 
Moreover, in factor 2, items of all three components of the intrinsic orientation were present. Only 
the third factor combined the three items that are supposed to measure the extrinsic public 
component. During the data collection, we noted that respondents frequently confirmed to enjoy the 
atmosphere and social life around church, however they indicated that this was not the major reason 
for going to church. 
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The NIROR scale can thus not be used as such in the context of Ethiopian, and there is a need to 
develop better scales that can capture various degrees of religiosity in this context. Although we 
could not validate the scale, we still tested for those items we explored some response heterogeneity 
(i.e. Q2, Q5, and Q6) whether we could link this heterogeneity to differential probabilities of attending 
to the attribute religion in the choice experiment. Yet, we could not find any tendency that people 
scoring high or low on these extrinsic item questions were also more likely to attend to the attribute 
religion.
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1. Questionnaire milk shop owner(s) in Mekelle city (Chapter 2) 
General information for the respondent  
Good day, we are researchers from the department of Agricultural Economics of Mekelle University and Ghent University 
in Belgium. We are currently questioning dairy households to obtain detailed information about the dairy value chain in 
Mekelle. 
Your participation is voluntary. You may choose not to answer any question and you may choose to stop the discussion 
at any time. Refusing to participate will not affect you or your family in any way. We would like you to answer as honestly 
as possible. We want to emphasize that your responses will be kept strict confidential. Are you willing to participate in this 
study?  
 
0. No 1. Yes 
 
By filling in this questionnaire, we are able to identify major issues and strengths of the urban and peri-urban dairy sector. 
This information will be used to identify possible intervention areas and solution strategies to solve critical problems. We 
will keep you informed of the research findings and recommendations will be shared with you once the study is completed. 
 
Survey identification  
Date (according to the European calendar) 
 
...../……/2016 
Survey carried out by  
 
1.  Enumerator 1 
2.  Enumerator 2 
3.  Enumerator 3 
4.  Enumerator 4 
5.  Atakilt 
Survey number  
Name of respondent   
Telephone number of respondent  
Location of the shop Woreda/district  
Kebele  
GPS coordinates  
 
Note for the enumerator 
The answer options displayed should NOT be read out loud, unless it is indicated otherwise. These options only serve 
as a guide for the interviewer to indicate the respondent’s answer. Extra information for the enumerator is indicated in ital ic 
fond style. This information should NOT be read out loud. 
To be filled in by the enumerator after completing the questionnaire 
 
Write down important observations/remarks/thoughts on the interview (eg interviewee was reluctant to answer the 
questions, you doubt whether (some) answers given by the interviewee are reliable etc) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
SECTION A: HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERTISTICS  
 
 
Ask the respondent following questions for each person (including children, relatives, hired laborers…) living in the household’s house. Include members that are living outside the household’s 
house but send their income earned to the household. 
 A.1. Name  A.2. Sex 
Male=0 
Female=1 
A.3. Age 
(in years) 
A.4. Marital status 
(Code 1) 
A.5. Is currently 
going to school? 
No=0 
Yes=1 
 
A.6. Highest 
education or 
qualification level 
attained 
(Code 2) 
 
 
A.7. Status in the 
household 
(Code 3) 
A.8. Is currently 
working for cash or 
in-kind income? 
No=0 
Yes=1 
A.9. Main 
occupation 
(Code 4)  
1          
2          
3          
4          
5          
6          
7          
8          
9          
10          
 
Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4 
1. 1= Single 1= No schooling 1= Household head 1= Working in the milk shop 
2. 2= Married 2= Junior primary/basis education (Grade 1-
4) 
2= Partner of household head 2= Livestock activities  
3. 3= Divorced/separated 3= Senior primary/ general education (Grade 
5-8) 
3= Child 3= Crop production 
4. 4= Widowed 4= General secondary (Grade 9-10) 4= Grandparent 4= (Agro-) industry 
5.  5= Preparatory secondary (Grade 11-12) 5= Aunt or uncle 5= Trade 
6.  6= Higher education/university 6= Niece or nephew 6= Retail 
7.  7= Courses or certificates for formal training; 
technical or vocational training 
7= Cousin 7= Government employee 
 8= Great-grandparent 8= Retired 
 8= Church/mosque education 9= Other family 9= Unemployed 
  10= Other non-family 10= Carrying out household tasks 
   11= Shop 
   12= Brewing beer 
   13= Petty trade 
   14= Other, specify 
 
A.10. Religion of the household 
 
1. Ethiopian 
orthodoxy 
2. Protestantism  3. Catholicism 4. Islam 5. Traditional faith 6. Other, specify 
2
8
2
 
  
SECTION C : GENERAL SHOP ACTIVITIES 
 
 Read out following list of activities and ask the respondent whether the activity is performed in the shop. Indicate 0 if the activity is NOT performed and 1 if the activity is performed. Then ask 
who is/are the responsible(s) for that activity. Indicate responsible(s) in the column “Responsible(s)” by using the accompanying code 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
C.1. Since how long do you have the shop (in 
years)? 
                                  years 
C.2. Why did you start keeping the shop?  
(Multiple answers are possible. If multiple 
answers are given, ask the respondent the 
level of importance and indicate this; 1= most 
important, 2= second most important, 3=….) 
 1. Family 
tradition 
2. Earn cash 
income from 
selling milk 
3. Saving/ 
insurance 
4. Investment 
opportunity 
5. Generate 
employment 
6. Other, 
specify 
Level of importance       
C.3. Who is the owner of the shop? 1. Household head 2. Partner of the household 
head 
3. Household head & partner 4. Other, specify 
C.4. Did you use hired labour for your shop in the 
last 12 months? 
0.   No 1.    Yes 
C.5. If the answer is YES to C.4., how many female 
laborers and/or male laborers did you hired 
permanently (ie from 5 days per week up to 
every day per week)? 
1. Number of female laborers hired permanently  
2. Number of male laborers hired permanently  
 If the answer is YES to C.4., how many  female 
laborers and/or male laborers  did you hire 
between 2 days per week and 4 day; 1 day per 
week and 1 day per month; and/or less than 1 
day per month? 
 C.6. 2 days/week – 4 days/week C.7.  1 day/week – 1 
day/month 
C.8. Less than 1 day/month 
1. Number of female 
laborers hired  
   
2. Number of male 
laborers hired  
   
Type of activity C.9. Is it performed? 
No=0 Yes=1 
C.10. Responsible(s) 
(Code 5) 
1 Buying dairy products   
6 Processing milk   
7 Selling of dairy products   
Code 5  
1= Household head 7= Uncle  
2= Partner of household head 8= Niece or nephew 
3= Child (boy) 9= Cousin 
4= Child (girl) 10= Other family 
5= Grandparent 11= Permanent hired labour 
6= Aunt  12= Seasonal/temporal hired labour 
 13= Other, specify 
2
8
3
 
  
SECTION D: PROCESSING ACTIVITIES 
 
 
If it was indicated that milk was processed in the previous table, ask questions D.1. to D.3. If no milk is processed continue to question D.4. 
D.1. How much of the milk that you purchase each 
week do you process on average? Is this the same 
during the fastening and non-fastening 
days/periods? If not, specify for both the proportion 
of produced milk that is processed each week 
(answer can be written down as  eg 2/3, 1/2, 1/3, 
1/5). 
1. Fastening period   2. Non-fastening                         
D.2. What is/are your reason(s) for processing this 
milk? (Multiple answers are possible. If multiple 
answers are given, ask the respondent the level of 
importance and indicate this; 1= most important, 
2= second most important, 3=….) 
 1. Own 
preferenc
e 
2. Consumer 
preference  
3. Longer shelf 
life 
4. Higher market 
price 
5. 
Fastening 
6. Other, specify 
Level of 
importance 
      
D.3. What products are made in the shop? (Multiple 
answers are possible. If multiple answers are 
given, ask the respondent the level of importance 
and indicate this; 1= most important, 2= second 
most important, 3=….) 
 1. 
Cooking 
butter 
2. Cosmetic 
butter 
3. Cheese 4. Yoghurt 5. Fermented 
milk 
6. 
Butter 
milk 
7. Whey 8. Other, 
specify 
Level of 
importance 
        
D.4. Why are you not processing milk? (Multiple 
answers are possible. If multiple answers are 
given, ask the respondent the level of importance 
and indicate this; 1= most important, 2= second 
most important, 3=….) 
 1. Lack of 
capital 
2. No 
processing 
equipment 
3. No 
processing 
knowledge 
4. Limited 
demand for 
processed 
products 
5. Not 
interested 
6. All milk is 
sold 
7. Other, 
specify 
Level of 
importance 
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SECTION E : BUYING ACTIVTIES DAIRY PRODUCTS 
 
 
Ask the respondent from which seller(s) they bought milk and/or milk products during the last 12 months.  
 
Ask for each seller  
1. the type of milk product(s) they bought from this seller. If more than 1 type was bought from that seller, fill in 1 row for each type of milk product bought. 
2. the terms of agreement (whether they agreed orally or via a written contract to buy the milk product) 
3. whether they agreed on certain details such as the quantity being bought, the price, the quality etc (combination of answer codes are possible, if multiple contract details are agreed on, 
please indicate all details agreed on and write down the corresponding codes) 
4. where the milk product was bought (i.e. buying place) (ask if milk was bought in Mekelle, if this is not the case, indicate in this column the village were the product was bought) 
5. which mode(s) of communication was/were used to communicate with the seller (whether it was face-to-face, via telephone, internet,…) (combination of answer codes are possible, if 
multiple modes are used, please indicate all modes and write down the corresponding codes) 
6. how frequent you paid the seller for the milk product (up front, per transaction, daily, weekly,…) 
7. which volume was bought per transaction during fastening and non-fastening days (in L or kg) on average. Indicate the unit! 
8. how frequent you bought the type of milk product from that seller (occasionally, daily, weekly,…) 
9. the minimum and maximum price you paid for that type of milk product from that seller (in Birr/L or Birr/kg) if that milk product was bought more than once from that seller during the last 
12 months. If the milk product was only bought once, indicate the price paid in the column “Min. price” and scratch out the column “Max. price”. Indicate the unit! 
 E.1. Seller 
(Code 6) 
 
E.2. Type of 
milk product 
bought 
(Code 7) 
E.3. Terms 
of 
agreement 
written=1 
unwritten=2 
E.4. 
Contractual 
specification
s 
(Code 8) 
E.5. Main 
buying place 
(Code 9) 
E.6. Mode(s) 
of 
communicati
on 
(Code 10) 
E.7. 
Frequency 
of payment 
(Code 11) 
E.8. Volume 
bought per 
transaction  
during 
fastening 
(in L or kg)  
Indicate unit! 
E.9. Volume 
bought per 
transaction  
during NON-
fastening 
(in L or kg)  
Indicate unit! 
E.10. 
Frequency 
of buying 
(Code 12) 
E.11. Min 
price 
(Birr/L or 
Birr/kg) 
Indicate unit! 
E.12. Max 
price 
(Birr/L or 
Birr/kg) 
Indicate unit! 
1             
2             
3             
4             
5             
6             
7             
8             
9             
10             
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1= Dairy farmer 1= Fresh milk 1= Quantity supplied 1= Farm gate 1= Cell phone 1= Up front 1= Occasionally (i.e. 
less than once per 
month) 
2= Cooperative/union 2= Butter 2= Mode of payment 2= Shop 2= Internet 2= At the end of each 
transaction 
2= Daily 
3= Processor 3= Cheese 3= Date of payment 3= Market 3= Letter 3= Daily 3= Weekly 
4= Trader 4= Yoghurt 4= Time/ date of supply 4= Collection point 4= Face-to-face 4= Weekly 4= Every 2 weeks 
5= Retailer (eg 
supermarket, shop, 
kiosk) 
5= Fermented milk 5= Guaranteed 
purchase 
5= Processing plant 5= Other, specify 5= Every 2 weeks 5= Every 3 weeks 
6= Café, restaurant, 
hotel 
  6= Retailer’s shop  6= Every 3 weeks 6= Monthly 
7= Neighbours 6= Butter milk 6= Price 7= Café, restaurant, 
hotel 
 7= Monthly 7= Other, specify 
8= Strangers 7= Whey 7= Quality 8= Other, specify  8= Other, specify  
9= Family 8= Other, specify 8= Other, specify     
10= Friends       
11= Hospital, school       
12= Other, specify       
2
8
6
 
  
SECTION F: GENERAL BUYING ACTIVITIES  
 
 
 Can you indicate from which milk seller(s) you prefer to buy your milk and/or milk 
products from? (Multiple answers are possible. If multiple answers are given, ask 
the respondent the level of preference and indicate this; 1= most preferred, 2= 
second most preferred, 3=…) 
 
Can you also mention the reason(s) for indicating this/these preferred seller(s)? 
(Multiple answers are possible. If multiple answers are given, ask the respondent 
the level of importance and write the reasons down in order of importance i.e. first 
number that is written down is the most important reason, second number written 
down the second most important reason etc.) 
 
Code 13 
1= Fair price 
2= Regular supply 
3= High volume supplied 
4= Sellers located nearby the shop 
5= Trust 
6= Familiarity (i.e. sellers are family, friends) 
7= Payment frequency 
8= Other, specify 
 F.1. Level of preference  F.2. Reason (Code 13) 
 
1. Dairy farmer   
2. Cooperative/union   
3. Processor   
4. Trader   
5. Retailer   
6. Café, resto, hotel   
7. Neighbors   
8. Strangers   
9. Family   
10. Friends   
11. Hospital, school   
12. Other, specify   
F.3. In general, how would you describe your relation with all your sellers of milk 
and/or milk products?  
(Show the emoticon card and read out loud the different codes and 
accompanying expressions. Indicate the most appropriate letter) 
A= very good 
B= good 
C= neutral 
D= Not so good 
E= Totally not good 
 
                                                                 A              B               C               D             E 
F.4. What is going good in these relations? 
 
 
F.5. What is going not so good in these relations? 
 
 
F.6. What could be improved in these relations? Or: how could these relations be 
improved?   
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SECTION G : SELLING ACTIVTIES DAIRY PRODUCTS 
 
 
G.1. How many dairy customers do you have?  
G.2. To who do you sell your dairy product(s)? (Multiple answers 
are possible. If multiple answers are given, ask the 
respondent the level of importance and indicate this; 1= 
most important, 2= second most important, 3=….) 
 Level of importance 
1. Strangers  
2. Family  
3. Friends  
4. Neighbours  
5. Other shops, retailers  
6.Café, restaurant, hotel  
7. Cooperative/union  
8. Processor  
9. Trader  
10. Hospital, school  
11. Other, specify  
G.3. Which type of milk product(s) are sold in the shop? 
(Multiple answers are possible. If multiple answers are 
given, ask the respondent the level of importance and 
indicate this; 1= most important milk product sold, 2= second 
most important, 3=….) 
1. Milk 2. Butter 3. Yoghurt 4. Cheese 5. Fermented 
milk 
6. Other, specify 
      
 What is the volume sold of different product(s) each day in 
the shop? Does this volume differ between fasting and non-
fasting days? If yes, indicated the volumes for fastening and 
non-fastening days. 
(Indicate the unit!) 
 1. Fasting 2. Non-fasting 
G.4. Milk                          L                          L 
G.5. Butter                          kg                          kg 
G.6. Yoghurt                          L                          L 
G.7. Cheese                          kg                          kg 
G.8. Fermented milk                          L                          L 
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G.9. Other, specify   
 What is the price of different product(s) sold in the shop? 
Does this price differ between fasting and non-fasting days? 
If yes, indicate the prices in fasting and non-fasting days. 
 1. Fasting 2. Non-fasting 
G.10. Milk                          L                          L 
G.11. Butter                          kg                          kg 
G.12. Yoghurt                          L                          L 
G.13. Cheese                          kg                          kg 
G.14. Fermented milk                          L                          L 
G.15. Other, specify   
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SECTION H: GENERAL SELLING ACTIVITIES  
 
 
 Can you indicate to which milk buyer(s) you prefer to sell your milk and/or milk products to? (Multiple 
answers are possible. If multiple answers are given, ask the respondent the level of preference and 
indicate this; 1= most preferred, 2= second most preferred, 3=…) 
 
Can you also mention the reason(s) for indicating this/these preferred seller(s)? (Multiple answers 
are possible. If multiple answers are given, ask the respondent the level of importance and write the 
reasons down in order of importance i.e. first number that is written down is the most important 
reason, second number written down the second most important reason etc.) 
 
Code 13 
1= Fair price 
2= Regular demand 
3= High volume demanded 
4= Buyer located nearby the shop 
5= Trust 
6= Familiarity (i.e. sellers are family, friends) 
7= Payment frequency 
8= Other, specify 
 F.1. Level of preference  F.2. Reason (Code 
13) 
 
1. Dairy farmer   
2. Cooperative/union   
3. Processor   
4. Trader   
5. Retailer   
6. Café, resto, hotel   
7. Neighbors   
8. Strangers   
9. Family   
10. Friends   
11. Hospital, school   
12. Other, specify   
F.3. In general, how would you describe your relation with all your buyers of milk and/or milk products?  
(Show the emoticon card and read out loud the different codes and accompanying expressions. 
Indicate the most appropriate letter) 
A= very good 
B= good 
C= neutral 
D= Not so good 
E= Totally not good 
 
                                                                 A               B              C               D              
E 
F.4. What is going good in these relations? 
 
 
F.5. What is going not so good in these relations? 
 
 
F.6. What could be improved in these relations? Or: how could these relations be improved?    
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SECTION I : COOPERATIVE MEMBERSHIP 
 
 
I.1. Is the shop part of a cooperative/association/group? 0.  No 1.  Yes 
I.2. If your answer is NO to I.1., has the shop ever been part of a 
cooperative/association/group in the past? 
0.  No 1.  Yes 
I.3. If  the answer is NO to I.2., did you ever think to become part of a 
cooperative/association/group?  
0.  No 1.  Yes 
I.4. Why are you no part anymore/ why did you not join a 
cooperative/association/group?  (Multiple answers are possible. If multiple 
answers are given, ask the respondent the level of importance and indicate this; 
1= most important, 2= second most important, 3=….) 
 
 
 Level of importance 
1. Lack of trust  
2. No cooperative nearby  
3. High government involvement in 
cooperative 
 
4. High membership fee  
5. Little advantage of joining cooperative  
6. Bad personal experience in past with 
cooperative 
 
7. Bas stories told by others  
8. Unawareness of existence of a 
cooperative 
 
9. Milk yield too low to sell milk to 
cooperative 
 
10. Other, specify  
I.5. If your answer is YES to I.1. or I.2., what is/was the name of the 
cooperative/association/group you are member of? 
 
I.6. What is/was going good in the cooperative/association/group? 
 
 
 
 
I.7. What could be/have been improved in the cooperative/association/group? Or: 
how could the cooperative be/have been improved? 
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SECTION J : LAND  
 
 
J.1. How much land do you own (ha)?                                      ha 
J.2. Who is the owner of this land? 1. Household head 2. Partner of household 
head 
3. Household head & 
partner 
4. Parent of 
household head 
5. Other, specify 
J.3. How much land do you rent (ha)?                                      ha 
J.4. How much land do you share with others (ha)?                                      ha 
 
 
SECTION K : CREDIT  
 
 
K.1. Did you ever borrow money for your shop? 0.    No 1.    Yes  
K.2. If the answer is YES to K.1., from whom did you borrow 
this money? (Multiple answers are possible. Indicate the 
different options if multiple answers are given) 
1. Micro-
finance  
2. NGO 3. 
Governm
ent 
4.Bank 5. 
Cooperati
ve/ union 
6. Family 7. 
Friends 
8. Iqub/ 
iddir 
9. Other, 
specify 
K.3. If the answer is YES to K.1., why did you borrow this 
money? (Multiple answers are possible. Indicate the 
different options if multiple answers are given) 
1. To purchase 
the shop  
2. To purchase 
shop 
equipment 
3. To rent a 
shop 
  6. To pay hired 
labor 
7. Other, 
specify 
K.4. Did you already repaid the money? 0.    No 1.    Yes  
K.5. In general, if you need money, to who do you turn to? 
(Multiple answers are possible. Indicate the different 
options if multiple answers are given) 
1. Bank 2. Family 3. Friends 4. Iqub/ iddir 5. Other, 
specify 
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SECTION L: ASSET AND SERVICE OWNERSHIP  
 
 
Read out following list (“Does the household has …) and indicate whether household owns (encircle 1) or owns NOT (encircle 0) a specific asset . 
 No Yes 
L.1. Electricity 0 1 
L.2. Radio 0 1 
L.3. Television 0 1 
L.4. Refrigerator 0 1 
L.5. Mobile telephone 0 1 
L.6. Non-mobile telephone 0 1 
L.7. Bicycle 0 1 
L.8. Motorcycle/scooter 0 1 
L.9. Car/truck  0 1 
L.10. Ox  0 1 
L.11. Horse  0 1 
L.12. Donkey 0 1 
L.13. Bank account 0 1 
 
L.14. What source of drinking water does the household uses? (If more than 1 source is used, only indicate the main drinking water source) 
1.  Drinking water is piped into dwelling 8.  Drinking water from public protected spring 
2.  Drinking water is piped to yard/plot 9.  Drinking water from public unprotected spring 
3.  Drinking water is piped in public tap 10.  Drinking water is from surface water (river, lake, pond, stream dam) 
4.  Drinking water from borehole 11.  Drinking water is rainwater 
5.  Drinking water from well in residence 12.  Drinking water from bottled water 
6.  Drinking water from public protected well 13.  Other, specify 
7.  Drinking water from public unprotected well   
 
 
L.15. What type of toilet/latrine facilities does the household uses? (NOTE: A facility is shared once it is used by two or more households) 
1.  Uses own flush toilet 7.  Uses own ventilated pit latrine 
2.  Uses shared flush toilet 8.  Uses shared ventilated pit latrine 
3.  Uses own pit latrine without slab 9.  Uses own composting toilet 
4.  Uses own pit latrine wit slab 10.  Uses shared composting toilet 
5.  Uses shared pit latrine without slab 11.  Uses bush as latrine 
6.  Uses shared pit latrine wit slab 12.  Uses other type of latrine, specify 
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L.16. What type of flooring material is present in the household’s house? (If more than 1 type of material present, only indicate the main flooring material type) 
1.  Earth/sand 6.  Vinyl or asphalt strips 
2.  Dung 7.  Ceramic tiles 
3.  Wood/planks 8.  Cement 
4.  Palm/bamboo 9.  Carpet 
5.  Parquet or polished wood 10.  Other, specify 
 
L.17. What type of roofing material is used for the household’s house? (If more than 1 type of material used, only indicate the main roofing material type) 
1.  Natural material roofing 
2.  Corrugate iron roofing 
3.  Roofing tiles 
4.  Other, specify 
 
L.18. How many rooms are used for sleeping? 
1  One 
2.  Two 
3.  Three or more 
 
L.19. What type of cooking fuel is used by the household? (If more than 1 type of fuel used, only indicate the main cooking fuel type) 
1.  Electricity 6.  Straw/shrubs/grass 
2.  LPG/natural gas/biogas 7.  Agricultural crop 
3.  Kerosene 8.  Animal dung 
4. Charcoal 9.  Other, specify 
5.  Wood  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2
9
4
 
  
SECTION M : SOCIAL TIES  
 
 
M.1. How many relatives (i.e. family) of the household (which 
are living outside the household’s house) are also 
engaged in having a milk shop? 
 
M.2. How many fellow milk shop owners do know personally?  
M.3. How many dairy product sellers do you know 
personally? 
 
M.4. How many dairy buyers do you know personally?  
M.5. How many people are really willing to assist the 
household if the household is having difficult times (eg 
death of household, losing job…) 
1. No one 2. One or two people 3. Three or four people 4. Five or more people 
 Do you or any member of your household belong to one 
or more of the following groups? If yes, tell me which 
household member is most active in the group. (Read 
out & indicate 1  if someone of the household is member 
and 0 if no one is member. If you indicated 1, please 
write down who of the household is most active in the 
group using the accompanying code 25) 
 
Code 25 
1= Household head 
2= Partner household head 
3= Child 
4= Grandparent 
5= Aunt or uncle 
 M.6. Membership? (0= No, 1= Yes) M.7. Most active member 
(Code 25) 
1. Neighbourhood/village committee (eg 
agricultural bureau, woreda office) 
 
  
2. Religious or spiritual group (eg 
church, mosque) 
  
3. Finance, credit or savings group (eg 
iqub/iddir) 
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SECTION N : HOUSEHOLD’S INCOME AND INCOME SOURCES 
 Can you indicate how much income was generated by 
each activity carried out by one of the household 
members(*) during the last month (in Birr)? 
 
Do these activities provide a regular or an occasional 
income? Regular= income every week 
Occasional= income in some months (1-4 months) 
(Place an “R” in the column “Frequency” if the income is 
regular and if the income is occasional place an “O”) 
 
(*) i.e. every person part of the household (either living 
in the households’ house or living outside the house but 
still sending part of the income earned to the household) 
that is participating either as consumer or producer (of 
income) for more than 6 months. Thus this also includes 
children, disabled people and old people. 
 N.1. Amount 
(Birr/month) 
N.2. Frequency 
1. Milk shop   
2. Livestock activities    
3. Crop production   
4. (Agro-)industry   
5. Trade   
6. Retail   
7. Government employee   
8. Shop   
9. Brewing beer   
10. Petty trade   
11. Pension/social insurance   
12. Other, specify   
N.3. What was the total income of your household in one 
month on average during the last 12 months (including 
income of all household members) (in Birr)? 
                               Birr/month 
N.4. Is total income of the household enough to meet the 
basic needs of the household (i.e. enough for your 
household to feed, clothe and house themselves)? 
0.   No 1.   Yes 
N.5. How satisfied are you with the overall financial situation 
of your household? 
(Show the emoticon card and read out loud the different 
codes and accompanying expressions. Indicate the 
most appropriate letter) 
A= very satisfied 
B=  satisfied 
C= neutral 
D= not so  satisfied 
E= totally not  satisfied 
 
                                                               A               B               C               D             E 
N.6. Is this money earned from shop activities spend on 
different sources than money earned from other 
activities?  
0.   No 1.   Yes 
N.7. If the answer is YES to N.6., for what is the money 
earned from the shop activities only, used for? (Multiple 
 Level of importance 
1. Pay school fees & material  
2. Buy basic needs (food, cloths)  
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answers are possible. If multiple answers are given, ask 
the respondent the level of importance and indicate this; 
1= most important, 2= second most important, 3=…) 
3. Buy non-basic goods  
4. Health expenditure  
5. Savings  
6. Loan repayment  
7. House construction  
8. Invest in shop  
9. Buy shop material/equipment  
10. Other, specify  
N.8. Who decides on what resources the income from selling 
milk and/or milk products is used? 
1. Household head 2. Partner of household 
head 
3. Partner & household 
head 
4. Other, specify 
2
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SECTION P : GENERAL QUESTIONS  
 
 
P.1. Are you planning to continue your shop? Can you explain why yes or why not?  
0.    No 1.    Yes 
 
 
 
P.2. If you’re planning to continue, will you increase your shop activities? Can you explain why yes or why not? 
0.    No 1.    Yes 
 
 
 
P.3. Would you recommend having a milk shop to other people (such as family or friends)? Can you explain why yes or why not? 
0.    No 1.    Yes 
 
 
End individual interview. Thank the respondent. 
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2. Questionnaire dairy holder(s) in Mekelle city (Chapter 5) 
General information for the respondent  
Good day, we are researchers from the department of Agricultural Economics of Mekelle University and Ghent University in 
Belgium. We are currently questioning dairy households to obtain detailed information about the dairy value chain in Mekelle. 
Your participation is voluntary. You may choose not to answer any question and you may choose to stop the discussion at any 
time. Refusing to participate will not affect you or your family in any way. We would like you to answer as honestly as possible. 
We want to emphasize that your responses will be kept strict confidential. Are you willing to participate in this study?  
 
0. No 1. Yes 
 
By filling in this questionnaire, we are able to identify major issues and strengths of the urban and peri-urban dairy sector. This 
information will be used to identify possible intervention areas and solution strategies to solve critical problems. We will keep you 
informed of the research findings and recommendations will be shared with you once the study is completed. 
 
Survey identification  
Date (according to the European calendar) 
 
...../……/2016 
Survey carried out by  
 
6.  Enumerator 1 
7.  Enumerator 2 
8.  Enumerator 3 
9.  Enumerator 4 
10.  Atakilt 
Survey number  
Name of respondent   
Telephone number of respondent  
Location of the dairy farm Woreda/district  
Kebele  
GPS coordinates  
 
Note for the enumerator 
The answer options displayed should NOT be read out loud, unless it is indicated otherwise. These options only serve as a 
guide for the interviewer to indicate the respondent’s answer. Extra information for the enumerator is indicated in italic fond style. 
This information should NOT be read out loud. 
To be filled in by the enumerator after completing the questionnaire 
The farmer operates:  
Entirely informal  
Mainly informal  
Entirely formal  
Mainly formal  
(*) Entirely informal means that all the milk being produced (ie 100 %) is  sold to buyers without making any written 
contract/agreement with the different buyers.  
Mainly informal means that between 50 % and 99 % of the milk being produced is sold to buyers  without making any written 
contract/agreement with the different buyers. 
Entirely formal means that all the milk being produced (ie 100 %) is  sold with making a written contract/agreement with the 
different buyers.  
Mainly formal means that between 50 % and 99 % of the milk being produced is sold with making a written contract/agreement 
with the different buyers. 
 
Write down important observations/remarks/thoughts on the interview (eg farmer was reluctant to answer the questions, you 
doubt whether (some) answers given by the farmers are reliable etc) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
SECTION A: HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERTISTICS  
Ask the respondent following questions for each person (including children, relatives, hired laborers…) living in the household’s house. Include members that are living outside the 
household’s house but send their income earned to the household. 
 A.1. Name  A.2. Sex 
Male=0 
Female=1 
A.3. Age 
(in years) 
A.4. Marital 
status 
(Code 1) 
A.5. Is currently 
going to school? 
No=0 
Yes=1 
 
A.6. Highest 
education or 
qualification 
level attained 
(Code 2) 
 
 
A.7. Status in 
the household 
(Code 3) 
A.8. Is currently 
working for cash 
or in-kind 
income? 
No=0 
Yes=1 
A.9. Main occupation 
(Code 4)  
1          
2          
3          
4          
5          
6          
7          
8          
9          
10          
 
Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4 
8. 1= Single 1= No schooling 1= Household head 1= Working on the dairy farm 
9. 2= Married 2= Junior primary/basis education (Grade 
1-4) 
2= Partner of household head 2= Other livestock activities (other than dairy cow) 
10. 3= Divorced/separated 3= Senior primary/ general education 
(Grade 5-8) 
3= Child 3= Crop production 
11. 4= Widowed 4= General secondary (Grade 9-10) 4= Grandparent 4= (Agro-) industry 
12.  5= Preparatory secondary (Grade 11-12) 5= Aunt or uncle 5= Trade 
13.  6= Higher education/university 6= Niece or nephew 6= Retail 
14.  7= Courses or certificates for formal 
training; technical or vocational training 
7= Cousin 7= Government employee 
 8= Great-grandparent 8= Retired 
 8= Church/mosque education 9= Other family 9= Unemployed 
  10= Other non-family 10= Carrying out household tasks 
   11= Shop 
   12= Brewing beer 
   13= Petty trade 
   14= Other, specify 
 
A.10. Religion of the household 1. Ethiopian 
orthodoxy 
2. Protestantism  3. Catholicism 4. Islam 5. Traditional faith 6. Other, specify 
        
3
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SECTION B: DAIRY COW OWNERSHIP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
B.1. How many dairy cows do you own of each breed? 
(Read out loud and indicate the number of animals 
which are kept for each specific breed) 
B.1. Begait/Barka B.2. Other local 
breed(s) 
B.3. Crossbreed  B.4. Pure breed B.5. Other, specify 
     
B.2. How long do you own crossbreeds/exotic dairy breeds? 
(Write down in years) 
                              years 
B.3. What is/are your reason(s) for having cross-
breeds/exotic animals? (Multiple answers are possible. 
If multiple answers are given, ask the respondent the 
level of importance and indicate this; 1= most important, 
2= second most important, 3=….) 
 1. Good 
quality milk 
2. High milk 
production 
3. Family 
tradition 
4. Received 
from 
relatives/ 
friends 
5. Received 
from NGO/ 
government 
6. Milk 
buyers 
prefer milk 
from these 
breeds 
7. Other, 
specify 
Level of 
importance 
       
B.4. If you have local breeds, what is/are your reason(s) for 
having local breeds? 
(Multiple answers are possible. If multiple answers are 
given, ask the respondent the level of importance and 
indicate this; 1= most important, 2= second most 
important, 3=….) 
 Level of importance 
1. Good quality milk  
2. Good disease resistance  
3. Good resistance heat stress  
4. Low feed need  
5. Little care needed  
6. Cultural/ family tradition  
7. Good for drought purpose  
8. No other breed available  
9. Other breeds too expensive  
10. Received from relatives/ friends  
11. Received from NGO/ government  
12. Milk buyers prefer milk from these breeds  
13. Other, specify  
3
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SECTION C : DAIRY ACTIVITIES GENERAL 
C.1. Since how long are you engaged in dairy farming (in 
years)? 
                                  years 
C.2. Why did you start keeping dairy cows?  
(Multiple answers are possible. If multiple answers are 
given, ask the respondent the level of importance and 
indicate this; 1= most important, 2= second most 
important, 3=….) 
 1. Family 
tradition 
2. Earn 
cash 
income 
from selling 
milk 
3. Saving/ 
insurance 
4. 
Investment 
opportunity 
5. To 
produce 
dairy 
products for 
household  
6. Status 
symbol 
7. 
Other, 
specify 
Level of 
importance 
       
C.3. Who is the owner of the dairy farm? 1. Household 
head 
2. Partner of the household head 3. Household head & partner 4. Other, specify 
C.4. Did the dairy owner ever receive any training in dairy 
production? 
0.     No 1.     Yes 
C.5. Did the partner of the dairy owner ever receive any 
training in dairy production? 
0.     No  1.     Yes 
C.6. Does the dairy farm have access to livestock extension 
services? 
0.     No 1.     Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
If your answer is YES to C.6., mention the extension 
source and how often you were visited during the last 12 
months. 
C.7. Livestock extension agent C.8. Number of visit(s) last year 
1. Government  
2. NGO  
3. Cooperative  
4. Private organisation  
5. Other, specify  
C.9. Did you use hired labour for your dairy activities in the 
last 12 months? 
0.   No 1.    Yes 
C.10. If the answer is YES to C.9., how many female laborers 
and/or male laborers did you hired permanently (ie from 
5 days per week up to every day per week)? 
1. Number of female laborers hired permanently  
2. Number of male laborers hired permanently  
 If the answer is YES to C.9., how many  female laborers 
and/or male laborers  did you hire between 2 days per 
week and 4 day; 1 day per week and 1 day per month; 
and/or less than 1 day per month? 
 C.11. 2 days/week – 4 
days/week 
C.12.  1 day/week – 1 
day/month 
C.13. Less than 1 
day/month 
1. Number of 
female laborers 
hired  
   
2. Number of 
male laborers 
hired  
   
C.14. What is done with the manure produced?   Level of importance 
1. Used as manure by the dairy household  
3
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 Read out following list of activities and ask the respondent whether the activity is performed on their dairy farm. Indicate 0 if the activity is NOT performed and 1 if the activity is 
performed. Then ask who is/are the responsible(s) for that activity. Indicate responsible(s) in the column “Responsible(s)” by using the accompanying code 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(Multiple answers are possible. If multiple answers are 
given, ask the respondent the level of importance and 
indicate this; 1= most important, 2= second most 
important, 3=….) 
2. Used as fuel by the dairy household  
3. Used as plastering material for barn/house by the 
dairy household 
 
4. Sold to farming neighbours as manure  
5. Sold to farming neighbours as fuel  
6. Sold to traders as manure  
7. Sold to traders as fuel  
8. Sold to rural farmers as manure  
9.  Sold to rural farmers as fuel  
10. Sold to family/friends as manure  
11. Sold to family/friends as fuel  
12. Discarded  
13. Other, specify  
Type of activity C.15. Is it performed? 
No=0 Yes=1 
C.16. Responsible(s) 
(Code 5) 
1 Cutting and carrying green roughage   
2 Feeding   
3 Watering   
4 Milking   
5 Cleaning pens/barns   
6 Processing milk   
7 Selling of dairy products   
8 Selling of dairy animals   
9 Artificial insemination   
10 Bull services   
11 Purchase of feed   
12 Purchase of animals   
Code 5 
1= Household head 
2= Partner of household head 
3= Child (boy) 
4= Child (girl) 
5= Grandparent 
6= Aunt  
7= Uncle  
8= Niece or nephew 
9= Cousin 
10= Other family 
11= Permanent hired labour 
12= Seasonal/temporal hired labour 
13= Other, specify 
3
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SECTION D : PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MILK 
 
 
D.1. How much milk do you produce on average per day during the 
dry season (from July to November) (in L)? 
And how much during the rainy/harvest season (from 
December to June) (in L)? 
1. Rainy/harvest season                       L/day 2. Dry season                       L/day 
D.2. How much of this milk that is produced each day is sold on 
average? Is this the same during the fastening and non-
fastening days/periods? If not, specify for both the quantity sold 
in L. If the quantity in L is not known by the respondent, ask the 
proportion of produced milk that is sold each day and write 
down this proportion eg 2/3, 1/2, 1/3, 1/5) 
1. Fastening period                        L/day 2. Non-fastening                       L/day 
D.3. How much of this milk that is produced each day is consumed 
by the household on average? Is this the same during the 
fastening and non-fastening days/periods? If not, specify for 
both the proportion of produced milk that is consumed each day 
(answer can be written down as  eg 2/3, 1/2, 1/3, 1/5). 
1. Fastening period  2. Non-fastening  
D.4. How do you feed the calves milk? (Read out and encircle 
response) 
1. Bucket feeding 2. Suckling 3. Both 
D.5. Do you give milk for free to family or friends? 0.   No 1.   Yes 
D.6. If the answer is YES to D.5., do you frequently give milk for free 
to family or friends (i.e. more than once a week)? If the answer 
is YES ask the respondent following question: how much of the 
milk produced each week is given for free (in proportion)? 
(answer can be written down eg 2/3, 1/2, 1/3, 1/5) 
0.   No 1.   Yes 
 
If it was indicated that milk was processed in the previous table, ask questions to D.7. to D.9. If no milk is processed continue to question D.10. 
D.7. How much of the milk produced each day is processed on 
average? Is this the same during the fastening and non-
fastening days/periods? If not, specify for both the proportion 
of produced milk that is processed each day (answer can be 
written down as  eg 2/3, 1/2, 1/3, 1/5). 
1. Fastening period   2. Non-fastening                         
D.8. What is/are your reason(s) for processing this milk? (Multiple 
answers are possible. If multiple answers are given, ask the 
respondent the level of importance and indicate this; 1= most 
important, 2= second most important, 3=….) 
 1. Own 
preference 
2. Consumer 
preference  
3. Longer 
shelf life 
4. Higher 
market price 
5. 
Fastening 
6. Other, 
specify 
Level of 
importance 
      
D.9. What products are made on the dairy farm? (Multiple answers 
are possible. If multiple answers are given, ask the respondent 
 1. 
Cooking 
butter 
2. 
Cosmeti
c butter 
3. 
Cheese 
4. 
Yoghurt 
5. 
Ferment
ed milk 
6. Butter 
milk 
7. Whey 8. Other, 
specify 
3
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the level of importance and indicate this; 1= most important, 2= 
second most important, 3=….) 
Level of 
importan
ce 
        
D.10 Why are you not processing milk? (Multiple answers are 
possible. If multiple answers are given, ask the respondent the 
level of importance and indicate this; 1= most important, 2= 
second most important, 3=….) 
 1. Lack of 
capital 
2. No 
processing 
equipment 
3. No 
processing 
knowledge 
4. Limited 
demand for 
processed 
products 
5. Not 
interested 
6. All milk 
is 
consumed 
and/or sold 
7. Other, 
specify 
Level of 
importance 
       
 
Quick check for reliability of milk distribution:  D.2. + D.3. + D.7. may not be greater than 1! 
  
3
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SECTION E : SELLING ACTIVTIES DAIRY PRODUCTS 
 
 
Ask the respondent to which buyer(s) they sold milk and/or milk products during the last 12 months. If they sold to cooperative/union and/or processor, ask the name of the 
cooperative/union and/or processor and write down this name in column E.1. together with the code. 
 
Ask for each buyer  
the type of milk product(s) they sold to this buyer. If more than 1 type was being sold to that buyer, fill in 1 row for each type of milk product sold. 
the terms of agreement (whether they agreed orally or via a written contract to sell the milk product) 
whether they agreed on certain details such as the quantity being sold, the price, the quality etc (combination of answer codes are possible, if multiple contract details are agreed on, 
please indicate all details agreed on and write down the corresponding codes) 
where the milk product was sold (i.e. selling place) (ask if milk was sold in Mekelle, if this is not the case, indicate in this column the village were the product was sold) 
which mode(s) of communication was/were used to communicate with the buyer (whether it was face-to-face, via telephone, internet,…) (combination of answer codes are possible, if 
multiple modes are used, please indicate all modes and write down the corresponding codes) 
how frequent the buyer paid for the milk product (up front, per transaction, daily, weekly,…) 
which volume was sold per transaction (in L or kg) on average. Indicate the unit! 
how frequent they sold the type of milk product to that buyer (occasionally, daily, weekly,…) 
the minimum and maximum price they received for that type of milk product from that buyer (in ETB/L or ETB/kg) if that milk product was sold more than once to that buyer during the last 
12 months. If the milk product was only sold once, indicate the price received in the column “Min. price” and scratch out the column “Max. price”. Indicate the unit! 
 
 E.1. Buyer 
(Code 6) 
 
E.2. Type of 
milk product 
sold 
(Code 7) 
E.3. Terms 
of 
agreement 
written=1 
unwritten=2 
E.4. 
Contractual 
specificatio
ns 
(Code 8) 
E.5. Main 
selling place 
(Code 9) 
E.6. Mode(s) 
of 
communicat
ion 
(Code 10) 
E.7. 
Frequency 
of payment 
(Code 11) 
E.8. Volume 
sold per 
transaction  
(in L or kg)  
Indicate unit! 
E.9. 
Frequency 
of selling 
(Code 12) 
E.10. Min 
price 
(ETB/L or 
ETB/kg) 
Indicate unit! 
E.11. Max 
price 
(ETB/L or 
ETB/kg) 
Indicate unit! 
1            
2            
3            
4            
5            
6            
7            
8            
9            
10            
  
3
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Code 6 Code 7 Code 8 Code 9 Code 10 Code 11 Code 12 
1= Trader 1= Fresh milk 1= Quantity supplied 1= Farm gate 1= Cell phone 1= Up front 1= Occasionally (i.e. 
less than once per 
month) 
2= Cooperative/union 2= Butter 2= Mode of payment 2= Market 2= Internet 2= At the end of each 
transaction 
2= Daily 
3= Processor 3= Cheese 3= Date of payment 3= Collection point 3= Letter 3= Daily 3= Weekly 
4= Retailer (eg 
supermarket, shop, 
kiosk) 
4= Yoghurt 4= Time/ date of 
supply 
4= Processing plant 4= Face-to-face 4= Weekly 4= Every 2 weeks 
5= Café, restaurant, 
hotel 
5= Fermented milk 5= Guaranteed 
purchase 
5= Retailer’s shop 5= Other, specify 5= Every 2 weeks 5= Every 3 weeks 
6= Neighbours 6= Butter milk 6= Price 6= Café, restaurant, 
hotel 
 6= Every 3 weeks 6= Monthly 
7= Strangers 7= Whey 7= Quality 7= Delivery to the 
buyer’s house 
 7= Monthly 7= Other, specify 
8= Family 8= Other, specify 8= Other, specify 8= Other, specify  8= Other, specify  
9= Friends       
10= Hospital, school       
11= Other, specify       
  
3
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SECTION F: GENERAL SELLING ACTIVITIES  
 
 
 Can you indicate to which milk buyer(s) you prefer to sell your milk and/or milk products to? (Multiple 
answers are possible. If multiple answers are given, ask the respondent the level of preference and 
indicate this; 1= most preferred, 2= second most preferred, 3=…) 
 
Can you also mention the reason(s) for indicating this/these preferred buyer(s)? (Multiple answers 
are possible. If multiple answers are given, ask the respondent the level of importance and write the 
reasons down in order of importance i.e. first number that is written down is the most important 
reason, second number written down the second most important reason etc.) 
 
Code 13 
1= Pay good price 
2= Regular demand 
3= High volume demanded 
4= Buyers located nearby farm 
5= Trust 
6= Familiarity (i.e. buyers are family, friends) 
7= Payment frequency 
8= Not strict on milk quality  
9= Other, specify 
 F.1. Level of 
preference  
F.2. Reason (Code 13) 
 
1. Trader   
2. Cooperative/union   
3. Processor   
4. Retailer   
5. Café, resto, hotel   
6. Neighbors   
7. Strangers   
8. Family   
9. Friends   
10. Hospital, school   
11. Other, specify   
F.3. In general, how would you describe your relation with all your buyers of milk and/or milk products?  
(Show the emoticon card and read out loud the different codes and accompanying expressions. 
Indicate the most appropriate letter) 
A= very good 
B= good 
C= neutral 
D= Not so good 
E= Totally not good 
 
                       A              B               C               D              E 
F.4. What is going good in these relations? 
 
 
F.5. What is going not so good in these relations? 
 
 
F.6. What could be improved in these relations? Or: how could these relations be improved?   
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SECTION G : FEED USE AND PURCHASE 
 
 
 What type(s) of feed do you give to your animals? 
 
Can you indicate why you use a feed type? (Multiple 
answers are possible. If multiple answers are given, ask the 
respondent the level of importance and write the reasons 
down in order of importance i.e. first number that is written 
down is the most important reason, second number written 
down the second most important reason etc.) 
 
What proportion of a feed type was purchased on average 
during last dry season (from December to June) and last 
rainy/harvest season (from July to November)? (Give the 
respondent 10 marbles and ask the respondent how much 
marbles represent the proportion purchased for that feed 
type; do this for the last dry season and rainy/harvest 
season respectively)  
 G.1.  Feed type (Code 
14) 
G.2. Reason of use  
(Code 15) 
 
G.3. Proportion 
purchased - DRY 
(Code 16) 
G.4. Proportion 
purchased – 
RAINY/HARVEST 
(Code 16) 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6     
7     
8     
9     
 
 
Code 14 Code 15 Code 16 
1= Green grass 12= Brewery spent grain 1= Leftovers from own production 1= One marble 
2= Hay 13= Cactus 2= Leftovers from HH food 2= Two marbles 
3= Cereal crop residues  14= Oil seed cakes 3= Easy available 3= Three marbles 
4= Pulses crop residues 15= Fresh cultivated forages 4= Other feed types are less or unavailable 4= Four marbles 
5= Oil seed crop residues 16= Dried cultivated forages 5= Healthy for the animals 5= Five marbles 
6= Wheat bran 17= Molasses 6= Animals like to eat it 6= Six marbles 
7= Wheat middling 18= Prepared feed mixtures 7= Increases milk production 7= Seven marbles  
8= Cereal grain screenings 19= Salt 8= Cheap 8= Eight marbles 
9= Oil seed screenings 20= Limestone 9= Other feed types are too expensive 9= Nine marbles 
10= Pulses hulls 21= Food leftovers HH 10= Received for free from family/friends 10= Ten marbles 
11= Atella 22= Other, specify 11= Exchanged with others farmers  
  12= Other, specify  
 
G.5. Do you exercise urea treatment? 0.   No 1.   Yes 
G.6. Do you prepare multi-nutrient blocks to provide to your dairy cows? 0.   No 1.   Yes 
 
 
 30
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Ask the respondent from which seller(s) they bought feed during the last 12 months. If they bought from cooperative/union and/or factory, ask the name of the cooperative/union and/or 
factory and write down this name in column G.7. together with the code. 
Ask for each seller 
1. the type of feed product(s) they bought from this seller. If more than 1 type was being bought from that seller, fill in 1 row for each type of feed product bought. 
2. the terms of agreement (whether they agreed orally or via a written contract to buy the feed product) 
3. whether they agreed on certain details such as the quantity being bought, the price, the quality etc. (combination of answer codes are possible, if multiple contract details are 
agreed on, please indicate all details agreed on and write down the corresponding codes) 
4. where the feed product was bought (i.e. buying place) 
5. from which village the feed product was sold (write down the name of that village eg Mekelle, Agula, Alamata, Maichew) 
6. which mode(s) of communication was/were used to communicate with the seller (whether it was face-to-face, via telephone, internet,…) (combination of answer codes are 
possible, if multiple modes are used, please indicate all modes and write down the corresponding codes) 
7. how frequent you paid the seller for the feed product (up front, per transaction, daily, weekly,…) 
8. which volume was bought per transaction on average. Specify and indicate the unit! 
9. how frequent you bought the type of feed product from that seller (occasionally, daily, weekly,…) 
10. the minimum and maximum price paid for that feed product type to that seller (in ETB) if that feed product was bought more than once from that seller during the last 12 months. 
If the feed product was bought only once from that seller, indicate the price paid in the column “Min. price” and scratch out  the column “Max. price”.  Specify and indicate the 
unit! 
 G.7. Seller 
(Code 17) 
G.8. Feed 
type 
purchased 
(Code 18) 
G.9. Terms 
of 
agreement 
Written=1 
Unwritten=2 
 
G.10. 
Contractual 
specificatio
ns 
(Code 19) 
G.11. Main 
buying 
place 
(Code 20) 
G.12. 
Village of 
purchase 
G.13. 
Mode(s) of 
communicat
ion 
(Code 21) 
G.14. 
Frequency 
of payment 
(Code 22) 
G.15. 
Volume 
bought per 
transaction  
(specify 
purchasing 
unit) 
G.16. 
Frequency 
of 
purchasing 
(Code 23) 
G.17. Min. 
price  
(ETB/purch
asing unit) 
G.18. Max. 
price 
(ETB/purch
asing unit) 
1             
2             
3             
4             
5             
6             
7             
8             
9             
10             
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Code 17 Code 18 Code 19 Code 20 Code 21 Code 22 Code 23 
1= Rural farmers 1= Green grass 12= Brewery spent 
grain 
1= Quantity supplied 1= Market 1= Cell phone 1= Up front 1= Occasionally 
(i.e. less than 
once per month) 
2= Neighbouring 
farmers 
2= Hay 13= Cactus 2= Mode of payment 2= At the selling farmer 
gate 
2= Internet 2= At the end of 
each transaction 
2= Daily 
3= Friends 3= Cereal crop 
residues  
14= Oil seed cakes 3= Date of payment 3= At the own farm-
gate 
3= Letter 3= Weekly 3= Weekly 
4= Family 4= Pulses crop 
residues 
15= Fresh 
cultivated forages 
4= Time/ date of 
supply 
4= Cooperative/ union 
plant 
4= Face-to-face 4= Every 2 weeks 4= Every 2 
weeks 
5= Traders 5= Oil seed crop 
residues 
16= Dried 
cultivated forages 
5= Guaranteed supply 
of feed purchased 
5= Compound feed mill 
plant 
5= Other, specify 5= Every 3 weeks 5= Every 3 
weeks 
6= Cooperative/ 
union 
6= Wheat bran 17= Molasses 6= Price 6= Flour mill plant  6= Monthly 6= Monthly 
7= Compound feed 
mills 
7= Wheat middling 18= Prepared feed 
mixtures 
7= Quality 7= Oil seed processing 
plant 
 7= Other, specify 7= Few times a 
year 
8= Flour mills 8= Cereal grain 
screenings 
19= Salt 8= Other, specify 8= Brewery plant    8= Other, specify 
9= Oil seed 
processing plants 
9= Oil seed 
screenings 
20= Limestone  9= Sugarcane 
processing plant 
   
10= Brewery 10= Pulses hulls 21= Other, specify  10= Shop    
11= Sugarcane 
processing plant 
11= Atella   11= Other, specify    
12= Retailer        
13= Other, specify        
 
G.19. What type of water source do you use as 
drinking water for your dairy cows? (Only 
indicate one source; however if two sources 
were equally used, then indicate the two) 
1. River 2. Dam/pond 3. 
Borehole/well 
4. Spring 5. Pipe water 6. Rain water 7. Other, 
specify 
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SECTION H : GENERAL FEED PURCHASE ACTIVITIES  
 
 
 Can you indicate from which feed sellers you prefer to purchase feed from? (Multiple answers 
are possible. If multiple answers are given, ask the respondent the level of preference and 
indicate this; 1= most preferred, 2= second most preferred, 3=…) 
 
Can you also mention the reason(s) for indicating these preferred sellers? (Multiple answers 
are possible. If multiple answers are given, ask the respondent the level of importance and 
write the reasons down in order of importance i.e. first number that is written down is the 
most important reason, second number written down the second most important reason etc.) 
 
Code 24 
1= Fair price 
2= Regular supply 
3= High volume supplied 
4= Good quailty 
5= Sellers located/active in an area nearby farm  
6= Trust 
7= Familiarity (i.e. sellers are family, friends) 
8= Purchase on credit 
9= Other, specify 
 H.1. Level of 
preference 
H.2. Reason (Code 24) 
 
1. Rural farmers   
2. Neighboring farmers   
3. Friends    
4. Family   
5. Traders   
6. Cooperative/union   
7. Compound feed mills   
8. Flour mills   
9. Oil seed processing plants   
10. Brewery   
11. Sugercane processing plant   
12. Retailer   
13. Other, specify   
H.3. In general, how would you describe your relation with all your feed providers?  
(Show the emoticon card and read out loud the different codes and accompanying 
expressions. Indicate the most appropriate letter) 
A= very good 
B= good 
C= neutral 
D= Not so good 
E= Totally not good 
 
                                                                  A              B              C                D             
E 
H.4. What is going good in these relations?  
 
H.5. What is going not so good in these relations?  
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H.6. What could improve in these relations? Or: how could these relations be improved?  
 
 
 
SECTION I : COOPERATIVE MEMBERSHIP 
 
 
I.1. Is the dairy farm owner currently member of a 
cooperative? 
0.  No 1.  Yes 
I.2. If your answer is NO to I.1., has the dairy farm owner ever 
been member of a cooperative in the past? 
0.  No 1.  Yes 
I.3. If  the answer is NO to I.2., did you ever think to become 
a member of a cooperative? (If the answer is NO, please 
proceed to Section J; if the answer is YES, complete the 
following questions). 
0.  No 1.  Yes 
I.4. If your answer is YES to I.2. or I.3., why are you no 
member anymore/ why did you not join a cooperative?  
(Multiple answers are possible. If multiple answers are 
given, ask the respondent the level of importance and 
indicate this; 1= most important, 2= second most 
important, 3=….) 
 
 
 Level of importance 
1. Lack of trust  
2. No cooperative nearby  
3. High government involvement in cooperative  
4. High membership fee  
5. Little advantage of joining cooperative  
6. Bad personal experience in past with cooperative  
7. Bas stories told by others  
8. Unawareness of existence of a cooperative  
9. Milk yield too low to sell milk to cooperative  
10. Other, specify  
I.5. If your answer is YES to I.1. or I.2., what is/was the name 
of the cooperative you are member of? 
 
I.6. When did you join the cooperative? (write down year 
according to the European calendar) 
 
I.7. Do/did you pay a membership fee? 0.   No 1.   Yes 
I.8. If the answer is YES to I.7., how much do/did you pay each 
month in ETB on average? 
                      ETB/month 
I.9. 
 
Do/did you have a share in the cooperative? 0.   No 1.   Yes 
I.10. 
 
If the answer is YES to I.9., do you know how much money 
your share is/was worth in ETB? 
 
                      ETB 3
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I.11. Why did you join the cooperative? (Multiple answers are 
possible. If multiple answers are given, ask the 
respondent the level of importance and indicate this; 1= 
most important, 2= second most important, 3=…) 
 
 Level of importance 
1. Good milk price   
2. More market access  
3. Provide guaranteed outlet (market)  
4. (Better) access to inputs/ services  
5. Provide technical assistance  
6. Provide market information  
7. Timely payment  
8. Collect and sell the milk  
9. Other, specify  
I.12. 
 
Which of the following services/inputs does/did the 
cooperative provide to its members? (Read out & indicate 
0 if service/input is NOT provided and 1 if it is provided) 
 Provided? (0= No, 1= Yes) 
1. Feed  
2. Veterinary services  
3. AI services  
4. Credit  
5. Extension/ training  
6. Milk quality control  
7. Milk processing  
8. Marketing dairy products  
9. Other, specify  
I.13. Are/were you part of the management board? 0.   No 1.   Yes 
I.14. Are/were you involved in the decision making process of 
the cooperative? 
0.   No 1.   Yes 
I.15. How do/did you feel about your membership within the 
cooperative? (Show the emoticon card and read out loud 
the different codes and accompanying expressions. 
Indicate the most appropriate letter) 
A= very good 
B= good 
C= neutral 
D= Not so good 
E= Totally not good 
 
                                                                   A              B                C              D              E 
I.16. 
 
NOTE: ask following question only if the answer to the 
previous question was C, D or E. 
 
It seems that you are/were not that satisfied with your 
membership, what is/are, was/were the reason(s) for this? 
(Multiple answers are possible. If multiple answers are 
given, ask the respondent the level of importance and 
indicate this; 1= most important, 2= second most 
important, 3=…) 
 
 Level of importance 
1. Lack of trust  
2. Limited influence in decision-making  
3. Low price for milk/milk products  
4. Limited intake capacity  
5. Delayed payments  
6. Government involvement in cooperative  
7. Inadequate/ineffective offered services/inputs  
8. Corruption  
9. Other, specify  
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I.17. What is/was going good in the cooperative? 
 
 
 
 
I.18. What could be/have been improved in the cooperative? 
Or: how could the cooperative be/have been improved? 
 
 
 
 
SECTION J : LAND  
 
 
J.1. How much land do you own for crop cultivation (ha)?                                      ha 
J.2. Who is the owner of this land for crop cultivation? 1. Household head 2. Partner of 
household head 
3. Household head & 
partner 
4. Parent of household 
head 
5. Other, 
specify 
J.3. How much land do you rent for crop cultivation (ha)?                                      ha 
J.4. How much land do you share for crop cultivation with 
others (ha)? 
                                     ha 
J.5. How much pasture land do you own (ha)?                                      ha 
J.6. Who is the owner of this pasture land? 1. Household head 2. Partner of 
household head 
3. Household head & 
partner 
4. Parent of household 
head 
5. Other, 
specify 
J.7. How much pasture land do you rent (ha)?                                      ha 
J.8. How much pasture land do you share with others (ha)?                                      ha 
J.9. Is the pasture land you own/rent/share, used for grazing 
your dairy cows or to cut and carry the vegetation? 
1. Grazing 2. Cut and carry 
J.10. How much land do you own for keeping your dairy cows 
(including the housing) (ha)? 
                                     ha 
J.11. Who is the owner of this land you use for keeping your 
dairy cows? 
1. Household head 2. Partner of 
household head 
3. Household head & 
partner 
4. Parent of household 
head 
5. Other, 
specify 
J.12. How much land do you rent for keeping your dairy cows 
(including the housing) (ha)? 
                                     ha 
J.13. How much land do you share for keeping your dairy cows 
(including the housing) (ha)? 
                                     ha 
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SECTION K : CREDIT  
 
 
K.1. Did you ever borrow money for your dairy activities? 0.    No 1.    Yes  
K.2. If the answer is YES to K.1., from whom did you borrow 
this money? (Multiple answers are possible. Indicate the 
different options if multiple answers are given) 
1. Micro-
finance  
2. NGO 3. 
Govern
ment 
4.Bank 5. 
Cooperati
ve/ union 
6. 
Family 
7. Friends 8. Iqub/ 
iddir 
9. Other, 
specify 
K.3. If the answer is YES to K.1., why did you borrow this 
money? (Multiple answers are possible. Indicate the 
different options if multiple answers are given) 
1. To 
purchase 
animal 
2. To purchase 
farm equipment 
3. To purchase 
land 
4. To purchase 
forage seeds 
5. To 
purchase 
feed 
6. To pay 
hired labor 
7. Other, 
specify 
K.4. Did you already repaid the money? 0.    No 1.    Yes  
K.5. In general, if you need money, to who do you turn to? 
(Multiple answers are possible. Indicate the different 
options if multiple answers are given) 
1. Bank 2. Family 3. Friends 4. Iqub/ iddir 5. Other, 
specify 
 
 
 
SECTION L: ASSET AND SERVICE OWNERSHIP  
 
 
Read out following list (“Does the household has …) and indicate whether household owns (encircle 1) or owns NOT (encircle 0) a specific asset . 
 No Yes 
L.1. Electricity 0 1 
L.2. Radio 0 1 
L.3. Television 0 1 
L.4. Refrigerator 0 1 
L.5. Mobile telephone 0 1 
L.6. Non-mobile telephone 0 1 
L.7. Bicycle 0 1 
L.8. Motorcycle/scooter 0 1 
L.9. Car/truck  0 1 
L.10. Ox  0 1 
L.11. Horse  0 1 
L.12. Donkey 0 1 
L.13. Bank account 0 1 
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L.14. What source of drinking water does the household uses? (If more than 1 source is used, only indicate the main drinking water source) 
1.  Drinking water is piped into dwelling 8.  Drinking water from public protected spring 
2.  Drinking water is piped to yard/plot 9.  Drinking water from public unprotected spring 
3.  Drinking water is piped in public tap 10.  Drinking water is from surface water (river, lake, pond, stream dam) 
4.  Drinking water from borehole 11.  Drinking water is rainwater 
5.  Drinking water from well in residence 12.  Drinking water from bottled water 
6.  Drinking water from public protected well 13.  Other, specify 
7.  Drinking water from public unprotected well   
 
 
L.15. What type of toilet/latrine facilities does the household uses? (NOTE: A facility is shared once it is used by two or more households) 
1.  Uses own flush toilet 7.  Uses own ventilated pit latrine 
2.  Uses shared flush toilet 8.  Uses shared ventilated pit latrine 
3.  Uses own pit latrine without slab 9.  Uses own composting toilet 
4.  Uses own pit latrine wit slab 10.  Uses shared composting toilet 
5.  Uses shared pit latrine without slab 11.  Uses bush as latrine 
6.  Uses shared pit latrine wit slab 12.  Uses other type of latrine, specify 
 
 
L.16. What type of flooring material is present in the household’s house? (If more than 1 type of material present, only indicate the main flooring material type) 
1.  Earth/sand 6.  Vinyl or asphalt strips 
2.  Dung 7.  Ceramic tiles 
3.  Wood/planks 8.  Cement 
4.  Palm/bamboo 9.  Carpet 
5.  Parquet or polished wood 10.  Other, specify 
 
L.17. What type of roofing material is used for the household’s house? (If more than 1 type of material used, only indicate the main roofing material type) 
1.  Natural material roofing 
2.  Corrugate iron roofing 
3.  Roofing tiles 
4.  Other, specify 
 
L.18. How many rooms are used for sleeping? 
1  One 
2.  Two 
3.  Three or more 
 
L.19. What type of cooking fuel is used by the household? (If more than 1 type of fuel used, only indicate the main cooking fuel type) 
1.  Electricity 6.  Straw/shrubs/grass 
2.  LPG/natural gas/biogas 7.  Agricultural crop 
3.  Kerosene 8.  Animal dung 
4. Charcoal 9.  Other, specify 
5.  Wood  
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SECTION M : SOCIAL TIES  
 
 
M.1. How many relatives (i.e. family) of the household (which are 
living outside the household’s house) are also engaged in 
dairy farming? 
 
M.2. How many fellow dairy farmers do know personally?  
M.3. How many feed sellers do you know personally?  
M.4. How many dairy buyers do you know personally?  
M.5. How many people are really willing to assist the household 
if the household is having difficult times (eg death of 
household, losing job…) 
1. No one 2. One or two people 3. Three or four people 4. Five or more 
people 
 Do you or any member of your household belong to one or 
more of the following groups? If yes, tell me which 
household member is most active in the group. (Read out & 
indicate 1  if someone of the household is member and 0 if 
no one is member. If you indicated 1, please write down who 
of the household is most active in the group using the 
accompanying code 25) 
 
Code 25 
1= Household head 
2= Partner household head 
3= Child 
4= Grandparent 
5= Aunt or uncle 
 M.6. Membership? (0= No, 1= 
Yes) 
M.7. Most active member (Code 25) 
1. Neighbourhood/village 
committee (eg agricultural bureau, 
woreda office) 
 
  
2. Religious or spiritual group (eg 
church, mosque) 
  
3. Finance, credit or savings group 
(eg iqub/iddir) 
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SECTION N : HOUSEHOLD’S INCOME AND INCOME SOURCES 
 Can you indicate how much income was generated by each 
activity carried out by one of the household members(*) during 
the last month (in ETB)? 
 
Do these activities provide a regular or an occasional income? 
Regular= income every week 
Occasional= income in some months (1-4 months) 
(Place an “R” in the column “Frequency” if the income is regular 
and if the income is occasional place an “O”) 
 
(*) i.e. every person part of the household (either living in the 
households’ house or living outside the house but still sending 
part of the income earned to the household) that is participating 
either as consumer or producer (of income) for more than 6 
months. Thus this also includes children, disabled people and 
old people. 
 N.1. Amount 
(ETB/month) 
N.2. Frequency 
1. Dairy cow production   
2. Other livestock activities (other than dairy 
cows) 
  
3. Crop production   
4. (Agro-)industry   
5. Trade   
6. Retail   
7. Government employee   
8. Shop   
9. Brewing beer   
10. Petty trade   
11. Pension/social insurance   
12. Other, specify   
N.3. What was the total income of your household in one month on 
average during the last 12 months (including income of all 
household members) (in ETB)? 
                               ETB/month 
N.4. Is total income of the household enough to meet the basic needs 
of the household (i.e. enough for your household to feed, clothe 
and house themselves)? 
0.   No 1.   Yes 
N.5. How satisfied are you with the overall financial situation of your 
household? 
(Show the emoticon card and read out loud the different codes 
and accompanying expressions. Indicate the most appropriate 
letter) 
A= very satisfied 
B=  satisfied 
C= neutral 
D= not so  satisfied 
E= totally not  satisfied 
 
                                                               A              B               C               D              E 
N.6. Is this money earned from dairy activities spend on different 
sources than money earned from other activities?  
0.   No 1.   Yes 
N.7. If the answer is YES to N.6., for what is the money earned from 
the dairy activities only, used for? (Multiple answers are 
possible. If multiple answers are given, ask the respondent the 
 Level of importance 
1. Pay school fees & material  
2. Buy basic needs (food, cloths)  
3. Buy non-basic goods  
3
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SECTION O: MONTHTLY EXPENDITURES ON DAIRY FARM INPUTS 
 
 
level of importance and indicate this; 1= most important, 2= 
second most important, 3=…) 
4. Health expenditure  
5. Savings  
6. Loan repayment  
7. House construction  
8. Invest in dairy farm  
9. Buy dairy farm inputs  
10. Other, specify  
N.8. Who decides on what resources the income from selling milk 
and/or milk products is used? 
1. Household head 2. Partner of household 
head 
3. Partner & household 
head 
4. Other, 
specify 
O.1. How much money did you spend on purchasing drugs 
and medication for your dairy cows during the last 12 
months on average? 
                                  ETB 
O.2. How much money did you spend on paying a 
veterinarian/artificial inseminator for your dairy cows 
during the last 12 months on average? 
                                  ETB 
O.3. How much money did you spend monthly on renting land 
for keeping your dairy cows during the last 12 months on 
average? 
                                  ETB/month 
O.4. How much money did you spend monthly on purchasing 
feed on average (in ETB) during the last dry season 
(from December to June) and the last rainy/harvest 
season (from July to November)? 
1. Dry season                             ETB/month 
2. Rainy/harvest season                             ETB/month 
O.5. How much money did you spend monthly on paying 
hired labor for your dairy cows during the last 12 months 
on average? 
                                  ETB/month 
3
2
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SECTION P : GENERAL QUESTIONS  
 
 
P.1. Suppose you would not have dairy cows and you were not practicing any dairy production activities. Would the 
consumption of dairy products within your household stay the same, increase or decrease? (Place an “X” in the corresponding 
row) 
1. Stay the same  
2. Increase  
3. Decrease  
P.2. Is there a feed shortage problem? 
0.    No 1.    Yes 
 
P.3. If the answer is YES to P.2. how do you try to bridge periods of feed insecurity? (Multiple answers are possible. If multiple 
answers are given, ask the respondent the level of importance and indicate this; 1= most preferred, 2= second most preferred, 
3=…) 
 Level of importance 
1. Destocking  
2. Renting grass land  
3. Storing feed  
4. Transferring stock to other people  
5. Planting forage  
6. Asking relatives feed for free  
7. Exchanging goods/services with others for feed  
8. Doing nothing  
9. Other, specify  
 
P.4. Is the answer is YES to P.2., which interventions are needed, according to you, to overcome these shortage problems? 
And who should be responsible for these interventions? 
 
 
 
 
P.5. Are you planning to continue your dairy activities? Can you explain why yes or why not?  
0.    No 1.    Yes 
 
 
 
P.6. If you’re planning to continue, will you increase your dairy activities? Can you explain why yes or why not?  
0.    No 1.    Yes 
 
 
 
P.7. Would you recommend dairy farming to other people (such as family or friends)? Can you explain why yes or why not? 
0.    No 1.    Yes 
 
 
End individual interview. Thank the respondent. 
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3. Questionnaire milk producers and consumers in Mekelle city (Chapter 6 and 7) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Q1.1 Enumerator 
 Desu  
 Mulu  
 
Q1.2 Student 
 Anna  
 Svenja  
 
Q1.3 Date 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q1.4 Respondent number of the day 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q1.5 Inform Consent   
    
Dear participant,   
    
WELCOME to our survey! We are researchers from the department of Agricultural Economics of Ghent University in 
Belgium. In this questionnaire, we would like to ask you questions on your household's  milk consumption, 
production and purchase. Your participation to this study will give us more insight in how the dairy market functions in 
Ethiopia.   
    
The survey will take about 20 minutes to complete. 
  
 Your participation is entirely voluntary and you are under no obligation to participate. Refusing to participate will not 
affect you or your family in any way. We would like you to answer as honestly as possible. There are no right or wrong 
answers. We want to emphasize that your responses will be kept strict confidential and processed anonymously. 
  
 If you would have further questions or comments about this study, please contact: 
  
 Eline D'Haene 
 eline.dhaene@ugent.be    
    
Are you willing to participate in this study? 
  Yes   
  No  
Skip To: End of Survey If Q1.5   =  No 
 
Q1.6 How did you hear about the survey? 
 Friends  
 Family  
 Random bystanders/individuals  
 I didn't hear about it  
 Other  
 
Q1.7 In which sub-city do you live? 
 Ayder  
 Adi Haqi  
 Hawelti  
 Hadnet  
 Quiha  
 Semien  
 Kedamay Weyane  
 I live outside Mekelle  
 
Q1.8 How old are you? 
Skip To: End of Survey If Condition: Q1.8 Is Less Than 18. Skip To: End of Survey. 
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Q1.9 Male/female? 
 Male  
 Female  
 
Q1.10 Are you the main responsible for purchasing food within your household meaning that you do the shopping?   
  Yes   
  No  
 
Display This Question: 
If  Q1.10=  No 
Q1.11 How often do you purchase food for your household compared to the main responsible that is doing the shopping. 
 As often as the main responsible  
 Less often as the main responsible  
 Never  
 
Q1.12 Does the household buy any milk or other dairy products (e.g. butter, ayib) from others?  
 Yes  
 No never, milk and dairy products are all produced within the household or received from others  
Skip To: Q1.14 If Q1.12  = No never, milk and dairy products are all produced within the household or received from 
others 
 
Q1.13 Does the household produce its own milk?  
  Yes   
  No  
Skip To: Q1.18 If Q1.13  =  No 
 
Q1.14 Is (part of) this produced milk sold to others? 
  Yes   
  No  
 
Display This Question: 
If Q1.12 = No never, milk and dairy products are all produced within the household or received from others 
Or Q.13 =  Yes 
Q1.15 On average, how much of the milk that is consumed within the household comes from own production? 
0= No milk is produced within the household 
50= half of the milk that is consumed within the household comes from own production  
100= all the milk that is consumed within the household comes from own production 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
 
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q.14=  Yes 
Q1.16 How often does the household sell milk to others? 
 Daily  
 4-5 times a week  
 2-3 times a week  
 Once a week  
 1-2 times a month   
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Display This Question: 
If Q.14 =  Yes 
Q1.17 To who do you sell your milk to?    
Rank the buyer types below according to the frequency you sell your milk to them.   
This means that the buyer you indicate with number 1 should be the buyer to whom you sell your milk most often to, 2 
means that this buyer is the second most important buyer et cetera.   
 
If you have 2 types of buyers to whom you sell your milk equally frequently to, you can give both the same number.  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Neighbours  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Family  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Friends  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Trader  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Milk shop  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Café/restaurant  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Processing plant  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Cooperative  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Strangers  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
 
Display This Question: 
If Q1.12  = Yes 
Q1.18 How often does the household purchase milk? 
 Daily  
 4-5 times a week  
 2-3 times a week  
 Once a week  
 1-2 times a month  
 
Display This Question: 
If Q1.12  = Yes 
Q1.19 On average, how much of the milk that is consumed within the household comes from purchase? 
0= No milk is purchased at all 
50= half of the milk that is consumed within the household comes from purchase 
100= all the milk that is consumed within the household comes from purchase 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
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Display This Question: 
If Q1.12  = Yes 
Q1.20 From which type of buyer do you purchase your milk?    
Rank the seller types below according to the frequency you buy your milk from them.   
This means that the seller you indicate with number 1 should be the seller from whom you buy your milk most often from, 
2 means that this seller is the second most important seller et cetera.   
    
If you have 2 types of sellers from whom you buy your milk equally frequently from, you can give both the same number.  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Neighbours  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Family  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Friends  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Trader  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Milk shop  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Café/restaurant  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Cooperative  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Strangers  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
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2. MILK CONSUMPTION, PRODUCTION AND SOURCING STRATEGIES 
 
Q2.1  
Over the past one week (7 days), did you or others in your household consume any liquid milk (excluding milk 
creamer/powder)? Include milk both consumed communally in the household and that consumed separately by individual 
household members. 
  Yes   
  No  
Skip To: End of Block If Q2.1 =  No 
 
Q2.2 How much of this milk consumed in the past week came from purchase (in litre), own production (in litre),  and/or 
gifts and other sources (in litre)?     
    
If no milk came from a particular source, you may just indicate 0 e.g. if all the milk that was consumed in the past week 
was coming from purchase, you may put 0 in the box of own production and gifts and other sources.   
    
The total you get in the end should match the total quantity of milk which was consumed by the household in the past 
week.    
 
 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 
Litre(s) coming 
from purchase  
       
Litre(s) coming 
from own 
production  
       
Litre(s) coming 
from gifts and 
other sources  
       
 
Display This Question: 
If Q2.2 of purchase is >0 
Q2.3 How much did the household spend for this milk that you bought in the past week (in Birr)? 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q1.13 =  Yes 
Or Q1.12  = No never, milk and dairy products are all produced within the household or received from others 
Q2.4 How many cattle for milk are owned by the household? 
 
Cows (has had at least 1 calf) : _______  
Calves : _______  
Total : ________  
 
Display This Question: 
If Q1.13  =  Yes 
Or Q1.12  = No never, milk and dairy products are all produced within the household or received from others 
Q2.5 What is the average quantity of milk produced per day per cow in litres? 
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3. DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
Q3.1  
In the following part, we would like some information about you and the people who live in your house. Exclude family 
that is NOT living in the house.   
How many servants live in your house? 
If you have no servants, write down 0. 
 
Q3.2 How many family members live in your house? 
If you alone live in the house, write down 1. 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q3.2 Is Greater Than  1 
Q3.3 How many children does the household have?  
If the household does not have any children, please fill in 0. 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q3.2 Is Greater Than  1 
Q3.4 How many children go to school/college/university? 
 
Q3.5 Fill in the following grid for the household head. 
 
Is the household head male or 
female? 
What is the age of the household 
head in years since his/her last 
birthday? 
  Age in years 
Household head  ▼ Female ... Male  
 
 
Q3.6 Click to write the question text 
 
What is the highest 
education or qualification 
the household head 
completed? 
What is the marital status 
of the household head? 
Is the household head 
working for  income? 
    
Household head  
▼ No schooling ... Above 
Bachelor's degree (e.g. 
Master, PhD) 
▼ Single ... Widowed ▼ Yes ... No 
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Display This Question: 
If Q3.2 Is Equal to  1 
Q3.7 What is your profession? 
  
Display This Question: 
If Q3.2 Is Equal to  1 
Q3.8 How much cash income do you earn in 1 month on average in Birr?  1 month = 30 days  
 
Display This Question: 
If Q3.2 Is Equal to  1 
Q3.9 Do you also earn in-kind income?    
In-kind income are NON-cash payments for services you render to others.    
These non-cash payments can be food, right to use the land of someone else to farm etc. 
  Yes   
  No  
 
Display This Question: 
If Q3.2 Is Greater Than  1 
Q3.10 What is the profession of the household member that brings in most of the money in the household? 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q3.2 Is Greater Than  1 
Q3.11 How many of the family members in the household work for income?  
Include yourself in the number if you are also working for income. 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q3.2 Is Greater Than  1 
Q3.12 How much cash income does your household earn in 1 month on average in Birr?   
 1 month = 30 days; include the income of all family members who are working in the household's house  
 
Display This Question: 
If Q3.2 Is Greater Than  1 
Q3.13 Does the household also earn in-kind income?    
In-kind income are NON-cash payments for services the household renders to others.    
These non-cash payments can be food, right to use the land of someone else to farm etc. 
  Yes   
  No  
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4. CHOICE EXPERIMENT - CONSUMER SIDE INTRODUCTION 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q1.12  = Yes 
And Q1.13  =  No 
Q4.1       Image that you move to another area than the one you are living now (for example another sub-city within 
Mekelle). In this new area, you would like to buy 1 litre of fresh, liquid milk. We will present you different alternative and 
unknown sellers of milk from whom you can buy your 1 litre of milk. Select the seller that you prefer most using the 
described characteristics for each seller. There are no right or wrong answers. You may opt to choose none of the sellers 
described.       
       
 
Display This Question: 
If Q1.12  = Yes 
And Q1.13  =  No 
Q4.2 The sellers we present you can be an individual urban milk producer or a milk shop who got the milk from a 
farmer. 
These sellers will ask you different prices for 1 litre of milk and the distance you have to walk by foot (one-way) from 
your house to the sellers will differ.    
  
 
 
5. Choice experiment - producer side Introduction 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q1.13  =  Yes 
Or Q1.12  = No never, milk and dairy products are all produced within the household or received from others 
Q5.1       Image that you move to another area than the one you are living now (for example another sub-city within 
Mekelle). In this new area, you would like to sell 1 litre of fresh, liquid milk. In the following you will see alternative and 
unknown buyers available to you for selling your fresh milk to. Select the buyer that you prefer most using the described 
characteristics for each buyer. There are no right or wrong answers. You may opt to choose none of the buyers 
described.       
           
Display This Question: 
If Q1.13  =  Yes 
Or Q1.12  = No never, milk and dairy products are all produced within the household or received from others 
Q5.2 These buyers we present you can be either a direct consumer who picks up the milk at your farm, a trader who 
picks up the milk at your farm and who will sell it to somebody else, or a milk shop where you should deliver the milk to 
the shop itself. These buyers will pay different prices for your 1 litre of milk and this payment can be either direct (you 
get your money the moment you give them the milk) which will be represented by this symbol  
 
or delayed (you get your money later, not at the moment you give them the milk) which will be represented by this 
symbol  
  
 
            
6. CHOICE EXPERIMENT  
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7. DIRECT DEBRIEFING -  CONSUMER SIDE 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q1.12  = Yes 
And Q1.13  =  No 
Q7.1 Could you formulate in your own words what this study is about?  
Why do we ask you these questions? 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q1.12  = Yes 
And Q1.13  =  No 
Q15.2 Do you know the name(s) of your milk supplier(s) in the real world? 
 Yes  
 No  
 
Display This Question: 
If Q15.2 = Yes 
Q15.3 What is/are the name(s) of your milk supplier(s)? 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q1.12  = Yes 
And Q1.13  =  No 
Q15.7  
Please rank the following characteristics according to their importance when choosing a fresh milk supplier;   
 1 represents the most important characteristic 
 2= 2nd most important characteristic 
 3= 3th most important characteristic 
 4= 4th important characteristic 
5= least most important characteristic 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Type of supplier 
(farmer, milk 
shop)  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Gender of 
supplier (male, 
female)  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Religious 
background of 
supplier  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Distance to 
supplier  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Milk price  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
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8. DIRECT DEBRIEFING -  PRODUCER SIDE 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q1.13  =  Yes 
Or Q1.12  = No never, milk and dairy products are all produced within the household or received from others 
Q8.1 Could you formulate in your own words what this study is about?  
Why do we ask you these questions? 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q1.13  =  Yes 
Or Q1.12  = No never, milk and dairy products are all produced within the household or received from others 
Q8.2 Do you know the name(s) of your milk buyer(s) in the real world? 
 Yes  
 No  
 
Display This Question: 
If Q16.2 = Yes 
Q8.3 What is/are the name(s) of your milk buyer(s)? 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q1.13  =  Yes 
Or Q1.12  = No never, milk and dairy products are all produced within the household or received from others 
Q16.4 
Please rank the following characteristics according to their importance when choosing a fresh milk buyer;   
 1 represents the most important characteristic 
 2= 2nd most important characteristic 
 3= 3th most important characteristic 
 4= 4th most important characteristic 
5= least most important characteristic 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Type of client 
(direct 
consumer, 
trader, milk 
shop)  
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Gender of client 
(male, female)  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Religious 
background of 
client  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Type of payment 
(immediate or 
delayed)  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Milk price  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
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9. TRUST 
 
Q9.1 Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing 
with people? 
 Most people can be trusted  
 You need to be very careful  
 I don't know  
 
Q9.2 I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each of the following 
groups of people whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? 
 
 
 
 Trust 
completely   
 
 
 Trust 
somewhat  
 
 Do not trust 
very much 
 
 Do not trust 
at all 
 
 I don't know 
It depends  
Your family  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
Your 
neighborhood  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
People you 
know 
personally  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
People you 
meet for the 
first time  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
People of 
another 
religion  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
People of 
another 
nationality  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  ▢  
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10. RELIGION QUESTIONS 
 
Q10.1 To which religious group do consider yourself to belong too? 
▼ Orthodox ... Other 
 
Display This Question: 
If To which religious group do consider yourself to belong too? = Orthodox 
Q10.2 Do you participate in the Assumption fast? 
  Yes   
  No  
 
11. RELIGIOSITY QUESTIONS 
 
Q11.1 While I am a Muslim/Protestant/Catholic/Orthodox, I do not let my faith influence my daily life. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
Q11.2 Occasionally I have compromised my Muslim/Protestant/Catholic/Orthodox beliefs to fit in better with other people. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
Q11.3 One reason for me going to mosque/church is to connect with others. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
 
Q11.4 A key reason to go to mosque/church is that it is socially enjoyable. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
Q11.5 I go to mosque/church because it helps me to feel part of a community. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
Q11.6 One reason for me praying is that it helps me to gain relief and protection. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
Q11.7 What prayer offers me most is comfort when bad things happen to me. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
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Q11.8 I pray mainly because it makes me feel better. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
Q11.9 While I believe in the Muslim/Protestant/Catholic/Orthodox faith, I feel there are more important things in my life. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
Q11.10 My Muslim/Protestant/Catholic/Orthodox faith shapes how I live my daily life. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
Q11.11 I try hard to carry my Muslim/Protestant/Catholic/Orthodox belief over into all other areas of my life. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
Q11.12 My Muslim/Protestant/Catholic/Orthodox faith really shapes the way I treat people. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
Q11.13 I allow almost nothing to prevent me from going to mosque/church on Fridays. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
Q11.14 I go to mosque/church because it helps me feel close to Allah/God. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
Q11.15 The mosque/church is most important to me as a place to be part of Allah's/God’s family. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
Q11.16 I pray at home because it helps me be aware of Allah's/God’s presence. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
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Q11.17 I often read books about my religion. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
Q11.18 I pray mainly because it deepens my relationship with Allah/God. 
 Strongly agree    
 Agree  
 Not certain    
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
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